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NEO-FASCISM AND THE STATE:
THE NEGOTIATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN MODERN RUSSIA
by
HANNA BARANCHUK
Under the Direction of M. Lane Bruner, PhD

ABSTRACT
The present dissertation is a study of the process of national identity renegotiation in
modern Russia. More specifically, I analyze the use of the word fascism in contemporary
Russian discourse. Developing a blend of Kenneth Burke’s theory of human motives and Jacques
Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory of the subject, I compare the psycho-rhetorical narratives of the
four distinct parties - Vladimir Putin, state-sponsored “anti-fascists” (Nashi), independent antifascists (Antifa), and neo-fascists - which fight over the usage of the word fascism in their
attempts to renegotiate the meaning of Russianness. While explicating the mechanism of national
identity construction, Lacan’s theory, as I argue, does not help distinguish among various visions
of the nation. Therefore, I build upon Burke’s classification of symbolic frames (comedy,
tragedy, epic, elegy, satire, the burlesque, and the grotesque) to differentiate among alternative
fantasy-frames (Lacanian fantasy and Burkean frame) as more or less politically dangerous and
ethically sophisticated. As the reading of the four psycho-rhetorical narratives shows, the vision
of Russia proposed by Russian neo-fascists dangerously approximates the Russian idea promoted
by the state and pro-Putin “anti-fascists.”
INDEX WORDS: Neo-fascism, National identity, Nationalism, Neo-fascists, Nashi, Antifa,
Putin, Russia, Burke, Lacan, Psycho-rhetorical criticism
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1

INTRODUCTION

On November 4, 2005, for the first time in the history of the country, Russians observed
National Unity Day.1 The holiday was supposed to celebrate “the best features and qualities of
the Russian national character,” “traditions of mutual help,” and “sensitivity to the pain and
misfortunes of others.”2 Yet, the spirit of the holiday was far from a display of compassion,
goodness or unity. Instead, National Unity Day was marked by fear and anger triggered by socalled Russian Marches (or Right Marches) – demonstrations organized by neo-fascist, ultranationalist and anti-immigrant activists in major cities in Russia. Major targets of the discontent
voiced by organizers and participants of the Russian Marches have been the churki (literally
translated as “wooden stubs”), or knuckleheads, as extreme nationalists derogatorily refer to
non-Slavic Muslim labor immigrants from former Soviet republics in Central Asia, the South
Caucasus, and Russian republics in the North Caucasus.3
In Moscow more than 2,000 members of ultra-right organizations “marched” from the
statue of Griboedov in Chistye Prudy to the Slavic Square, chanting “Russia is against
occupants,” “The Russians are coming,” “Russia belongs to us,” “Glory to the Empire,” “Russia
is everything, others are nothing,” “Russia is for Russians, Moscow is for Muscovites,” and
“Sieg Heil!”4 In 2013 the Russian March attracted around 6,000 participants, who openly urged
for violent actions against non-Slavic population of Russia.5

1

National Unity Day is “Den’ narodnogo edinstva” in Russian, also known as People’s Unity Day in

English.
2

In the Russian language the English word “Russian” has two variants: “Russky” means “ethnic Russian;”
“Rossiysky” means “something/somebody belonging to, somebody living in the Russian Federation,” not
necessarily “ethnic Russian.” In this instance, “Russian” is “Rossiysky.” For more about this holiday, see “Federal
Law,” n. pag. In the dissertation all titles of and citations from articles in Russian have been translated by me.
3
Churki is translated by Zarakhovich, “Inside Russia’s Racism Problem,” n. pag.
4
In the following years the slogans of the Russian March were similar: in 2007 - “Russians, stand up,”
“Russian order or war,” and “Tolerance is AIDS”; in 2008 - “Glory to Russia!” and “Glory to the Russian people!”
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At the end of the demonstrations members of the Slavic Union (abbreviated as SS) raised
their flag with a stylized swastika.6 Despite the numerous protests of Russian and foreign
journalists, political analysts, human rights activists and experts, the Russian Marches are
sanctioned by local authorities in Russian cities year after year. The Russian Marches show that
extreme nationalism and neo-fascism as its species are not marginal political phenomena or
poorly organized social movements in Russia.7
The reaction of the Kremlin to the Russian Marches and other neo-fascist mass rallies is
also disturbing. For instance, addressing the violent ethnic clashes in Moscow’s Manezh Square
in winter 2010-2011, Vladimir Putin promised to “suppress” any “manifestations of extremism”
and offered “seemingly reasonable” solutions to the problem: he suggested “perfecting”
excessively liberal registration rules in big cities and also warned that those who migrate “from
the North Caucasus must respect local customs, local culture, local traditions and local laws.”8
Putin, however, did not blame Russian neo-fascists, who had severely beaten non-Slavic
passersby, but rebuked non-Slavic immigrants, as well as Russian liberal politicians and other
forces opposing the government. Talking about political rallies organized by anyone other than
the Kremlin and state-sponsored organizations, Putin noted that those rallies are just pretexts to
fight with authorities.
Following Putin, the main Kremlin ideologist, former First Deputy of the Chief of the
Russian Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov, insisted that it was Russian liberal
See Berman n. pag.; “Far-Right Russians Clash” n. pag.; “Nationalists Marching in Moscow” n. pag.; “The RightLegged March” n. pag.; “4th of November Fascist Demonstrations” n. pag.
5
“Radical Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russia.”
6
Dmitrij Demushkin, the leader of the Slavic Union (SS), is a former member of Russian National Unity
(RNE), the biggest and the most powerful ultra-right organization in the early 1990s. The SS, as well as the RNE, as
openly fascist organizations have been banned. See the official website of the SS at <http://www.demushkin.com> .
7
Makarkin n. pag. For more information visit the SOVA Center for Information Analysis website at
http://xeno.sova-center.ru (many of SOVA’s articles are available in English).
8
Yudina and Alperovich n. pag.; “Vladimir Putin: ‘A Thief Should Sit in Jail’” n. pag.; “Prime Minister V.
V. Putin Met With Representatives of Soccer Fan Associations” n. pag.
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politicians who were purportedly guilty of the Manezh Square chaos: liberal politicians “have
been persistently setting the fashion for unsanctioned public actions, Nazis and cheapskates
follow them.”9 A slightly different version was presented by Interior Minister Rashid
Nurgaliyev, who accused “the radical left youth” of provoking ethnic disturbances on Manezh
Square (he apparently referred to Antifa, Russia’s independent anti-fascist youth movement,
critical of the Kremlin).10 Apparently, for Putin and other state officials, the real threat emanates
not from Russian neo-fascists but from other “fascists” - Russian liberal politicians and anybody
who opposes the political regime in the country.
Growing ethnic violence, the Kremlin’s reluctance to curb fascist-like tendencies in
Russia, coupled with the regime’s suspicion of liberal political opposition, suggest that Putin
feels more comfortable in the company of extreme nationalists and neo-fascists than supporters
of liberal freedoms. While some see the nationalistic inclination of the state as an
inconsequential pragmatic, populist step, others, including myself, point out the dangers of such
pragmatism.11 It is true that right-wing extremist movements and parties exist in European
countries, as well as in America and virtually everywhere else. The situation in Russia, however,
differs significantly from the extreme right in established democracies.12 Democratic traditions
are not deeply rooted in Russia, and the country is not well integrated into major international
political alliances. Russia, however, is a key player in the international arena, and to disregard
the process of Russian national identity renegotiation under the circumstances - when the

9

“Surkov Found ‘Liberal’ Traces” n. pag.
“Manezh Square, Nurgaliev Comments” n. pag.
11
See Sperling n. pag.; Kagarlitsky n. pag.; Kozhevnikova, “Political Games With Ethnic Implications” n.
10

pag.
12

For more information about right-wing populist parties and movements in democratically-based
countries, see Betz and Immerfall.
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government does little to prevent, but, on the contrary, as I will show, systematically promotes
ethnic nationalistic ideals - would be unreasonable and dangerous.
Guided by these considerations, I embark on the study of national identity construction in
modern Russia by analyzing the use of the word fascism in contemporary Russian discourse.
Blending Jacques Lacan’s theory of the subject and Kenneth Burke’s theory of human motives, I
perform a “psycho-rhetorical” comparative reading of four distinct narratives: national visions
held by Russian neo-fascists, state-sponsored “anti-fascists” (Nashi), independent anti-fascists
(Antifa) and Putin, who all fight over the usage of the word fascism in their attempts to
renegotiate the meaning of Russianness.13
I am drawn to this study that takes on neo-fascism as a form of the extreme right for
several reasons. First, it is arguably important to understand manifestations of extreme
nationalism in modern Russia. Just like, for instance, in prefascist Italy, a popular sentiment in
modern Russia is that of reactive, aggrieved or injured nationalism, defined as “a form of generic
ingroup sentiment exacerbated by a real or fancied sense of protracted humiliation on the part of
a political and/or ethnic community that is, or imagines itself to be, the object of abuse at the
hands of others.”14 While the situation in contemporary Russia may remind us of social and
economic tensions in prefascist Germany and Italy, social and economic calamities do not
necessarily lead to the rise of fascism in a country.15 Although Russians may favor a strong
government, the memories of personality cults, Stalinist repressions, as well as the Nazi invasion
of the USSR are still strong. Indeed, there are only a few explicitly neo-fascist organizations in

13

What I refer to as a psycho-rhetorical reading is a close textual analysis performed through the prism of
Lacan’s and Burke’s theories. Each of the two theories can be considered as psycho-rhetorical since they both
engage the unconscious, which is structured like language, and conscious manifestations of inner psychic processes
in speech.
14
Gregor 31-32.
15
See Parland; Laqueur.
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Russia, and just like the Black Hundred in tsarist Russia (officially known as the Union of the
Russian People), they are not fascist in a classic sense. They are mostly xenophobic,
chauvinistic, racist, anti-Semitic, and supportive of the Russian Orthodox Church and a strong
government. As I show in Chapter Three, to fully understand why these sentiments are
characteristic of Russian neo-fascism, one needs to consider how major historical events - from
the summoning of the Varangian princes to help build the first Russian state, Kievan Rus, to the
break-up of the Soviet Union - shaped the way the Russians think about themselves and others.
Second, while neo-fascism in the country has acquired a specific, not a “classic” fascist,
form, the terms “fascist” and “anti-fascist” are widely, if not always coherently, used in modern
Russian public and political discourse.16 Historical memory about fascism complicates the
situation in the country, where May 9 is celebrated as Victory Day to mark the capitulation of
Nazi Germany, and yet on November 4 neo-fascists march in the heart of Moscow chanting profascists slogans. The term “fascism,” at first sight, elicits a univocal response: as early as in
elementary school Russian children are taught about the dangers and consequences of fascism.17
Yet, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, “fighting with fascism” acquired a meaning other
than “resisting the Nazi invasion.” It has been used in Russian public discourse both as an
accusation against those who discriminate against ethnic Russians (for example, the Estonian
government, which decided to relocate a Soviet World War II memorial - the Bronze Soldier from the center of Tallinn to a military cemetery), as well as a form of self-defensive behavior

16

See Andreas Umland, “Concepts of Fascism in Contemporary Russian and the West.”
In elementary school (grades 1-4) children are told about major events in Russian history, including the
Great Patriotic War only in a nutshell (WWII is often discussed as the “Great Patriotic War” in the Russian context).
More in-depth information is provided in secondary (grades 5-9) and high (grades 10-11) school (a detailed study of
WWII is conducted in the ninth grade). Russian history lesson plans and other information about history lessons in
Russian schools can be found at <http://school10.rc-buzuluk.ru/mo_ped/istoria.htm> (in Russian);
<http://prosv.ru/ebooks/Bogolubov_Obshestvoznanie_6kl/0.html> (in Russian).
17
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(for example, neo-fascists claim that their actions are required to save ethnic Russians from their
enemies).18
Understanding the significance and uniqueness of Russian ethnic nationalism, I explore
national narratives of Putin, pro-Putin “anti-fascists” (Nashi), independent anti-fascists (Antifa)
and neo-fascists to see what they reveal about the process of national identity construction in
contemporary Russia from an ethical perspective. As a result of the ethical critique of
nationalisms in Russia, I explain why, on the one hand, most Russians are proud of their
country’s anti-fascist, multicultural past, but, on the other hand, why incidents of national/ethnic
intolerance and extreme ethnic nationalism are on the rise.19 More specifically, building upon
Burke’s classification of frames and Lacan’s four Discourses, which I explicate in detail in
Chapter Two, I differentiate among alternative national fantasies as less or more politically
dangerous and ethically sophisticated.
Joining the discussion on national identity renegotiation and extreme expressions of
hatred, I explore areas of significant overlap between Burke’s and Lacan’s theories in Chapter
Two and argue that, by bringing them together, they create a potent framework for the study of
national identity construction. The proposed psycho-rhetorical analysis of national identity
construction in Russia aims to contribute to the body of literature at the junction of contemporary
rhetorical theory, the Lacanian theory of subjectivity and collective identity, as well as to a larger
pool of works on national identity construction.
The problem of national identity building has been more often examined in psychological
rather than psychoanalytic literature. As proponents of social psychological views on nationalism
18

For foundational documents of major neo-fascist organizations, see “DPNI Organization Chapter,” n.
pag.; Demushkin, “Russian Nationalism” n. pag.
19
When reading Putin’s psycho-rhetorical narratives of the Russian nation I focus on both President Putin’s
and former President Medvedev’s rhetoric, since the latter during his presidential career did not express ideas
different from Putin’s views.
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argue, emotions constitute a key psychological dimension of social relations, while relationships
are seen as social aspects of emotions.20 To understand the power of nationalism (including neofascism), they maintain, is to understand how national identity is formed on the basis of emotions
and the irrational. However, links between individual and collective (e.g., national) identities in
social psychology are not firmly established. Psychoanalysis, conversely, helps to connect the
individual and the social.21 As Herbet Marcuse argues, psychoanalysis is already social: the
foundation of the self is in “fundamental relatedness to reality, [a] libidinal cathexis of the
objective world.”22
Resisting the major limitations of psychological and some psychoanalytic accounts of the
collective subject, Lacan’s theory of intersubjectivity has been more often applied to the study of
national identity negotiation. Unlike Freud’s psychoanalytic approach, which has been charged
with reducing the social to the individual, the Lacanian theory of subjectivity, although greatly
indebted to Freud’s scholarship, resists such charges. Lacan’s theory is founded on the concept
of intersubjectivity. Simply put, subjectivity is understood as an outcome of affectively driven
and unconsciously structured interactions between the self and the other. Lacan’s
intersubjectivity is especially prominent in attempts to explicate national identity construction:
the national subject never equals the ideal national self and therefore is constitutively dependent
on an image of the national other.
Despite Burke’s objection to “an essentializing mode of [Freudian] interpretation,” or the
tendency of Freudian psychoanalysis to reduce complex behavior to its libidinal components, as
well as Burke’s warning against the inclination of psychoanalysis to consider any non-libidinal
20

On various social psychological views on nationalism, see Searle-White; Scheff; Langman; Dekker, et
al.; Houghton; Ross.
21
On psychoanalysis and nationalism, see Salecl, “Nationalism”; Brunner, “Pride and Memory”; Falk;
Stavrakakis; Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras.
22
Marcuse as cited in Eli Zaretsky 206.
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interpretation of human motives as deceptive rationalization (after all, “any set of motives is but
part of a larger implicit or explicit rationalization regarding human purpose as a whole”), Burke
does not consider himself anti-Freudian.23 Instead, he sees a great potential in psychoanalysis,
calling to revise Freud’s theory and to create “an over-all theory of drama itself.”24
Drawing important parallels between Burke’s and Lacan’s theories, I zoom in on the
utility of Burke’s attitude toward history understood as “[one’s] notion of the universe or
history” by which “a thinking man gauges the historical situation and adopts a role with relation
to it.”25 To give the concept of attitude a Lacanian twist, it is possible to say that I focus on
fantasy/attitude as the symbolic history of the subject’s desire for unity. Similar to Burkean
attitude, Lacanian fantasy is a fundamental structure of desire by means of which the subject
explains what it is. The Lacanian desire to fill in identity lack or the constitutive void, to put it in
Burke’s terms, is “the ultimate motive behind our acts.”26
Just as Benedict Anderson’s concept of the nation as an imagined community must be
distinguished from fictitious mental creations, Lacan’s fantasy and Burke’s attitude as reality
structure must be differentiated from fantasies as conceived in Ernest Bormann’s symbolic
convergence theory. Bormann is interested in how the process of fantasy-making “[serves] to
sustain the members’ sense of community, to impel them strongly to action…, and to provide
them with a social reality filled with heroes, villains, emotions and attitudes.”27 Although,
defined as such, Bormann’s fantasy may seem to coincide with Lacan’s concept, Bormann’s

23

Burke, Philosophy of Literary Form 261, 291; Burke, Permanence and Change 26.
Burke, Philosophy of Literary Form 291.
25
Burke, Attitudes Toward History 3, 5.
26
Burke, Permanence and Change 222.
27
Bormann, “Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision” 398. Bormann’s fantasy is “the creative and imaginative
interpretation of events that fulfills a psychological or rhetorical need....Rhetorical fantasies may include fanciful
and fictitious scripts of imaginary characters, but they often deal with things that have actually happened to
members of the community or that are reported in authenticated works of history, in the news media, or in the oral
history and folklore of the group.” Bormann, The Force of Fantasy 5.
24
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interest lies in a strictly conscious process of mythmaking. Through the prism of Lacan’s theory
of the subject, Bormann “[approaches] the function of speech in analysis from its least rewarding
angle, that of ‘empty’ speech in which the subject seems to speak in vain about someone
who…will never join him in the assumption of his desire.”28 By limiting himself to a reading of
conscious or egocentric fantasies, Bormann focuses on an image of someone who the collective
subject wants to be. Such analysis of imaginary longing does not “[aim] at, [and does not form],
the truth such as it becomes established in the [unconscious] recognition of one person of
another.”29 In other words, Bormann’s symbolic convergence theory is merely descriptive of the
social subject and its social reality. Alternatively, having armed oneself with a blended LacanianBurkean theory of the subject, one can explain the mechanism of national identity construction
as a never ending process of covering “an originary and insurmountable lack of identity” and,
more importantly, to evaluate distinct national ideas qua desire for unity.30
Desire, however, is not readily available for exploration, for it is pushed far into the
unconscious. That said, in order to approach the repressed desire for unity qua fantasy/attitude,
one has to start a psycho-rhetorical reading of a national narrative on the conscious level of
speech: “The only object that is within the analyst’s reach is the imaginary relation that links him
to the subject ego; and although he cannot eliminate it, he can use it to adjust the receptivity of
his ears” to the unconscious.31 Desire silts in the conscious and congeals in symptoms. The latter
takes forms of both an image of the ideal national self and an image of the national other
required to sustain the former.

28

Lacan, Écrits 211.
Lacan, Seminar, Book I 107.
30
Laclau and Zac 3.
31
Lacan, Écrits 211.
29
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Lacan’s theory, however, does not provide the analyst with a framework for symptomatic
reading, perhaps owing to Lacan’s injunction to not interpret the metaphor of symptom. After all
it is nothing but the subject’s lack. At this point I propose to borrow Burke’s tragic, comic,
satiric, epic, elegiac, burlesque, and grotesque frames as specific iterations of fantasy/attitude
which lend themselves for symptomatic readings of national narratives. Burke’s frames,
however, are not totally imaginary concepts. Although being symptomatic and thus conscious
iterations of fantasy or attitude, frames reveal the truth, or the ethics, of the national subject; they
allow differentiating between two modes of the subject’s constitutive intersubjectivity –
mourning and melancholy. Developing a blend of Burke’s theory of human motives and Lacan’s
psychoanalytic theory of the subject, I therefore supplement it in Chapter Two with Sigmund
Freud’s concepts of mourning and melancholy. When discussing tragic and comic frames as
competing psycho-rhetorical visions of the nation, I note the theoretical proximity between
mourning as the attitude of loss and tragedy, on the one hand, and melancholy as the attitude of
lack and comedy, on the other.
The tragic frame as always sacrificial requires to get rid of, to kill, the enemy. When a
comic frame is adopted, one does not view the other as the enemy who needs to be symbolically
or physically sacrificed, but as an uneasy reminder that the nation is always imperfect or lacking.
As we shall see, Slavoj Žižek’s concept of the tragic complements the Burkean tragic frame. As
Žižek explains, a collective fantasy acquires a tragic dimension when it “takes itself literally,”
without acknowledging the insurmountable gap between “the people” and how they collectively
fantasize about themselves.32
An observation that tragic mourning is paranoiac through and through brings attention to
Lacan’s extensive work on paranoia. The national other always seems to be enjoying itself better,
32

Žižek, “Enjoy Your Nation as Yourself” 203; Žižek, “All’s Well That Ends Well?” 187-188.
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because it has taken away what should rightfully belong to the national self. For example, the
Russians like to think about themselves as a powerful, intellectually and spiritually superior
nation. However, there are always those - immigrants from the North Caucasus or the U.S.
government - who, in the eyes of the Russians, have managed to steal what the Russians want, be
that economic well-being (one of the common sentiments among the Russians is that illegal labor
immigrants earn more than local Russians) or world great power status. Thus, Lacan’s
conceptualization of paranoia as “the dialectic of jealousy” and suspicion of the other’s
enjoyment enriches my theorizing about the attitude of tragic mourning and lends a
psychoanalytic insight in a more general discussion of the paranoid style.
The ultimate attitude of “humane enlightenment,” or comedy, translates transgressions
from the category of mourning loss, or “the positivization of a void or lack,” into the category of
melancholic lack.33 To move from tragic mourning to melancholic lack, one must not seek for a
perfect object or state that would grant oneself the pleasure of a complete, or ideal, sense of the
self, but maintain an attitude of lack. This comic melancholy is what Lacan presents as the
ethical maxim ne pas céder sur son désir (“do not give way on your desire”), or, to borrow
Alenka Zupančič’s term, “heroism of the lack.”34 Put otherwise, subsumed by the insatiable urge
to enjoy national identity fullness, people must not compromise their desire by entertaining a
surrogate fantasy of the national self, since by humiliating or expelling the national enemy from
their otherwise perfect national fantasy, they still cannot recover what is not lost in the first
place. The attitude of comic melancholy, on the contrary, allows the national self to traverse

33

Burke, Attitudes Toward History 41.
Zupančič 170. It is important to distinguish between comic and tragic frames, on the one hand, and comic
melancholy and tragic mourning, on the other hand. Frames, among which are also epic, elegy, satire, the burlesque
and the grotesque, are conscious or symptomatic manifestations of intersubjectivity. Comic melancholy and tragic
mourning are the two normative poles that organize both Lacan’s and Burke’s theories of ethics.
34
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national fantasy, to confront the lack of the national subject.35 Pushing the limits of national
fantasy is not to remind oneself that the national self is just a fantasy. Instead, to push the limits
of national fantasy is to establish a healthy balance between oneself and the external world.
This is precisely the mechanism of patriotic identification with the nation as love for
one’s people and land, “without putting them above others or implicitly devaluing other people
and nation.”36 Such “constitutional patriotism,” or, to rehash Jürgen Habermas’ term from a
Lacanian perspective, patriotic fantasy/attitude constitutive of the ethically responsible national
subject, “sharpens an awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life
which coexist in a multicultural society.”37 Unlike ethically driven patriotism, jingoistic and
xenophobic fantasies are sacrificial, aggressive, and ruthless in their attempts to defend the
nation’s superiority, or lack of lack. Therefore, the fantasy of tragic mourning as a typical feature
of extreme nationalist rhetoric is the most hazardous, and the fantasy of comic melancholy as a
characteristic of patriotic discourse is the most progressive.
With the comic and tragic national fantasies as the most discernible expressions of
ethically animated and ethically exhausted national rhetoric respectively, the remaining frames of
epic, elegy, satire, burlesque and grotesque can be said to move along an ethnic-civic nationalist
continuum. An epic frame that “enables the humble man to share the worth of the hero” may
easily transform into an extreme nationalistic attitude: when the “balance between humility and
self-glorification” is lost, the heroic national self can no longer see flaws in itself, since it can no
longer differentiate between itself and an ideal of the god-like hero.38 The elegiac frame of
“ironic humility” or ironic awareness of one’s own lack is another comic device. Yet elegy

35
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becomes tragic - a property of extreme nationalist rhetoric - when the emphasis on the nation’s
redemptive suffering is replaced with the focus on the divinity of the weak national self and the
evil of the mighty national other.39
When neither an unequivocally tragic nor comic resolution is possible or desirable, the
national fantasy can be structured within the frames of satire, the burlesque and the grotesque.
While Burke regards satire as exclusively comic and the burlesque as tragic, by saying that
“satire is universal, but burlesque is factional,” I suggest that the satiric and burlesque frames
contain both comic or tragic impulses, just as Horatian satire is traditionally differentiated from
the Juvenalian type.40 In addition, on occasion exhibiting an uneasy confluence of a tragic attack
on mistakes of the national other and a comic inventory of limitations of the national self, satire
becomes a space of “strategic ambiguity,” where the national subject shares the evils attributed
to the national other.41 In a similar fashion, the burlesque can be said to function as an amusing
absurdity or a heartless caricature. When the national other is welcomed in its candid incongruity
or rejected completely or in part as unsympathetically bizarre, it becomes an object of the comic
or tragic grotesque respectively.
The concept of frame as a conscious narrative and its underlying unconscious truth
attunes the rhetorical critic to an indirect “transaudition of the unconscious.”42 As a psychorhetorical reading of national fantasies continues on the level of the Symbolic as a vicarious
inquiry into the unconscious, I solicit help from Lacan’s theory of the four Discourses. Lacan’s
discourses of the Master, the University, the Hysteric and the Analyst are permutations of the
fundamental structure of desire, which animates fantasy/attitude.
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Attention to the four Discourses helps to explain how frames adopted by Putin, Nashi,
Antifa, and neo-fascists fit in a larger socio-political context. A symptomatic reading of the
national frames of Putin, Nashi, and neo-fascists reveals that they are, ethically speaking, at odds
with the dominant socio-political order of liberal democracy (and with Russia’s anti-fascist
history). Conversely, Antifa’s national vision challenges ideas of the capitalist free market
economy associated with the dominant democratic order. An analysis of the four discursive
structures illuminates a structure of opportunities for the national subject to maneuver in the
dominant symbolic order that denounces its symptomatic expressions.
From this theoretical angle, the Four Discourses are to be understood as strategic
positions from which the national subject performs its symptoms.43 In light of the widening
ideological gap between Russia and the West (i.e., the U.S. and countries of Western Europe) a
consideration of the four Discourses permits us to see how Russian neo-fascists, Putin, Nashi,
Antifa and sustain those national visions (as deceptively stable images of the national self and the
national other) that turn out to be in stark opposition to the dominant symbolic order of liberal
democracy and neoliberal rationality that underlies, or, as some point out, erodes the former.44
From the position of the true believer of the Master’s Discourse the national subject that
conceives of the ideal self by suppressing the very truth of its desire does not seek absolution for
its tragic sacrifice. Considering the modern globalized context, there is virtually no national
subject who performs the Master’s discourse unconditionally: even the radically tragic North
Korea prefers an official name of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; similarly, the
extremist Islamic State group arguably justly fights the dominant Western ideology for its
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purportedly natural or God-given right to be.45 Stated otherwise, even radically tragic national
visions are enunciated hypocritically under the aegis of supposedly comic mourning.
Whereas the national subject of the Master’s Discourse seeks no justification for enjoying
the perfect national self, the national subject as the agent of the University’s Discourse relies on
supposedly disengaged knowledge or “facts” that affirm its national image.46 In Chapter Two I
discuss two forms of the Discourse of the University – the discourse of democracy and the
discourse of bureaucracy. While these two discourses have forms that gravitate toward both
poles of the Lacanian-Burkean ethical continuum – comic melancholy and tragic mourning
respectively, they draw their authority from supposedly objective and universal knowledge.
Claims to the objective and the universal do not necessarily prohibit the national subject in its
democratic or bureaucratic functions from participating in politically vocal and ideologically
inspired narratives. When, however, the national bureaucrat adopts a cynical attitude, he/she
exchanges the discourse of the University for the Discourse of the Hysteric in its obsessive form.
The latter is a radically tragic attempt of the national subject at securing its identity fullness by
ritually engaging in practices that the national subject does not believe in.
The national revolutionary, or the national subject of the Hysteric’s Discourse proper, is
in a constant fight with the national other whose values are deemed incompatible with the ideal
national self. Considering the symbolic, or performative, positions of North Korea and the
Islamic State, one can discuss them either within the discourse of the obsessive or the discourse
of the hysteric depending on what is in focus: cynicism or incompatibility of the national subject
with the ethical vision promoted by the dominant symbolic order.
45
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Unlike the revolutionary subject, the national subject of the Analyst’s Discourse does not
invest recklessly in any image of the national self conceived as final and necessary. Maintaining
the melancholic mode of desire, the psychoanalytic national subject positions itself in a visible,
or critical, proximity to the national other. This is a position taken by, for example, Antifa, who
confront the national tragic mourning upheld in neo-fascist and capitalist circles.
As I will explain more rigorously in Chapter Two, methodologically the dissertation is an
instance of ideological psycho-rhetorical criticism, in which the unit of analysis (traces of
ideology in the case studies) is a national fantasy of each of the parties: Putin, Nashi, Antifa, and
neo-fascists. Generally speaking, the goal of ideological rhetorical criticism is not to dismantle
the very structure that supports the subject’s identity and holds society together; instead, it is just
as in psychoanalysis: the end of analysis is neither to help one to adapt to society better, to
become a happier person, nor to remove neurotic symptoms, because removed symptoms will be
replaced by new symptoms, but to bestow responsibility on the subject for the way he/she enjoys
his/her desire. Ideological criticism aims to show how national fantasy is being structured, why it
is structured in a particular way (in Sonja Foss’s words, to identify the interests the ideology
serves and to uncover strategies used to promote an ideology) and how to push the limits of
national fantasy.47
In subsequent chapters I engage in a psycho-rhetorical reading of the narratives of the
four parties by looking at the Imaginary and the Symbolic dimensions of their national fantasies.
Stated briefly, I analyze how Russian neo-fascists (Chapter Four), Nashi, Antifa, and Putin
(Chapter Five) view Russia and Russia’s enemies by strategically placing the images about the
past, present and future national self and the national other in certain symbolic positions that
presumably confirm those appeals to perfect national selves.
47
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Having provided in Chapter Three a “disengaged” account of, to borrow Friedrich
Nietzsche’s concepts, antiquarian and monumental histories of the Russian national idea, or, said
otherwise, having explored the material and symbolic historical context of the upcoming case
studies, in Chapter Four I discuss the national vision of neo-fascist groups such as the banned
Slavic Union (SS), the extreme nationalist Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) and
the extreme nationalist, Orthodox and monarchist Russian Imperial Movement (RIM),
specifically how they negotiated their relationship with state officials during their Russian
Marches between 2005-2011 and the racial riots on Manezh Square in December 2010.
Chapter Five is dedicated to the discussion of the pro-Putin youth “democratic antifascist” movement Nashi, their campaigns against “fascist states” and “fascists” - Estonia,
Georgia, Ukraine, Great Britain, the U.S., Russian liberal politicians, human rights advocates and
journalists - as well as Nashi’s alternative Russian Marches. Self-described “anti-fascists,” Nashi
activists struggle with any expressions of “fascism” in Russia and abroad, which actually boils
down to a “fight against the unnatural unity of oligarchs and liberals, who aspire to strip Russia
of its independence, similar to the ‘Orange Revolution’ scenario in Georgia and Ukraine.”48 The
“democratic” and “anti-fascist” Nashi movement often engages in hostile, intolerant and
aggressive behavior in its fight against “fascists” - anybody or any country whose political
actions supposedly anger the Kremlin.
Next In Chapter Five I focus on Antifa and a series of Antifa’s rallies organized to protest
the state’s hostile attitude toward their organization. Unlike Nashi, Antifa “does not cooperate
with any state bodies, political parties or repressive units” and supports democracy, liberalism,
anarchism, anarcho-communism, anarcho-syndicalism, green anarchism, and Trotskyism.49
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Chapter Five ends with a reading of Putin’s psycho-rhetorical narrative in relation to neofascists, Nashi, Antifa and the events discussed in Chapters Four and Five.
As the findings of my psycho-rhetorical reading of the four national narratives, as well as
the implications of the symbolic history of the Russian idea, will show, the multiethnic make-up
of the Russian Federation, the large ethnic Russian diaspora in the former Soviet republics, and
the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought about political, social, economic instability and
uncertainty, aggravated the sense of Russian national inferiority and became defining factors in
the development of extreme nationalistic sentiments since the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Extreme ethnic nationalism in its neo-fascist form promises to fill in the spiritual and political
void, to save and restore the country. And this situation in Russia, where the national imaginary
is being structured in a predominantly tragic way under the false labels of “anti-fascism” and
“democracy,” as will be evident from the reading of Putin’s and Nashi’s rhetoric, or the idea of
fascism as necessary defensive label to be used against anti-Russian forces, as it transpires in the
rhetoric of Russian neo-fascists, is profoundly disturbing when considering the types of political
action such tragic perspectives promote.
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2

THE TRAGICOMEDY OF THE NATION

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Having earlier introduced my work as an ethical
critique of the deployment of nationalisms in Russia, I first seek to establish the theoretical and
analytical value of the present study as an instance of Lacanian-Burkean ideological criticism.
By bringing Lacan’s and Burke’s accounts of subjectivity production in proximity to one
another, I navigate between the claims that underrate the utility of Lacan’s psychoanalysis as a
poststructural theory for ideologically motivated rhetorical criticism and the arguments that cast
doubt on the potency of Burke’s theory of motives necessary for a rigorous poststructural
research agenda.
Next, I lay out a methodological foundation for the upcoming ideological reading of four
distinct psycho-rhetorical narratives of Russianness, each bound by its idiosyncratic employment
of the word “fascism.” More precisely, I focus on Lacan’s fantasy and Burke’s attitude, which
are both instrumental in understanding the national subjects’ modes of enjoyment. National
fantasy/attitude is a dialectic of national savoir and national connaissance (or rather
méconnaissance), in other words, of the Symbolic as unconscious knowledge, or differential
articulations constitutive of the national subject, and the Imaginary as conscious knowledge, or a
constitutive effect of the Symbolic.1 Since the truth about desire for unity is rejected from the
conscious, imaginary knowledge (connaissance) that the national subject has of the national
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Both French words savoir and connaissance are translated into English as “knowledge.” For Lacan savoir
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other and the national self, connaissance is rather méconnaissance - an unredeemable
misunderstanding of the national self.
Although the notion of national fantasy/attitude permits us to distinguish between tragic
mourning and comic melancholy as two ethical positions toward the national other and thereby
the national self, I push even further in pursuit of a blended Lacanian-Burkean theory of
nationhood. More specifically, I join Burke’s explication of alternative frames (content-specific
narratives of the national subject’s attitude toward the national other and the self) with Lacan’s
elaboration of the four Discourses (positions from which the national subject performs its
frames) to propose a compound framework for an ethically robust and politically animated
discussion of national identity renegotiation.

2.1

Ideological Criticism as a Psycho-Rhetorical Enterprise

While offering to combine psychoanalysis and rhetoric for the purposes of an
ideologically driven reading of national narratives, I must acknowledge that some question the
value of Lacan’s psychoanalysis for rhetorical criticism. As Cloud asserts in her article “The
Materiality of Discourse as Oxymoron,” poststructural theories (with Lacan’s psychoanalysis
being one of them) emerged as “an antidote to traditional rhetoric’s...search for certitude” and
thus are incompatible with a politically charged rhetorical criticism.2 A poststructural
preoccupation with the world of words, rather than the world of things, is often taken to mean
that the discursive alone is what matters. Such commitment to the discursive causes some to
denounce poststructural theories as unredeemably idealist. A related proposition that reality is
constructed discursively without any relation to the non-discursive, and therefore lacks a
2

McKerrow 76.
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transcendental reference point, is regarded as an affirmation of radical contingency.
Unconditional reliance on the contingent in its turn supposedly challenges the normative strength
needed for vigorous criticism of ideology, leaving it relativist.
The implications of the poststructural influence for rhetorical criticism are arguably
crippling. “Textual obsession” in contemporary rhetorical studies, in Thomas B. Farrell’s words,
aestheticizes rhetoric.3 Postmodern rhetorical criticism is supposedly apolitical since, as Cloud
affirms, it is idealist.4 Focusing solely on the discursive without considering its material context supposedly extra-discursive economic or physical forces - the idealist critical project loses its
demystifying power. Instead of uncovering material motives obscured by specific ideologies,
Cloud insists, postmodern critics do no more than simply describe “competing reality definitions
that are unfixed, free-floating and malleable regardless of the material circumstances in which
one finds oneself.”5 Stated differently, textually-driven ideological criticism is supposedly a
pointless exercise.
Poststructural rhetorical criticism is also arguably apolitical because it is anti-realist.
When theoretical detachment from material context is taken to the extreme - to mean either that
there is nothing but and beyond the discursive reality, or, stated less radically, that nothing but
contingent discursively produced reality matters, poststructuralist theories also come to lack
normative vigor. In response to Raymie E. McKerrow’s nominalist and radically contingent
conceptualization of rhetorical theory and practice, critical rhetoric, Robert Hariman justly points
out that the position of the writer of critical rhetoric is a position of “a disembodied thinker
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having no identifiable social location, writing in an impersonal style.”6 As a result of this
position, rhetorical critics are unable to make political choices - to favor this or that competing
ideological narrative.
Being supposedly useless (descriptive) and inadequate (disinterested), such critical
practice, Hariman asserts, is also outright dangerous:
[I]magine someone standing before an El Salvadorean interrogator appealing to
the universality of human rights, only to be told, by someone well schooled in
critical rhetoric, that “human rights” were but another set of power relations, that
universal standards were but names for matters of opinion, and that there was no
contradiction between commitments to truth and practices of torture as all were
polysemic performances.7
Responding to this critique, McKerrow emphasizes Michel Foucault’s principle of “nonprivilege” at the root of critical rhetoric - the principle that does not preclude the critic from
taking a politically meaningful stance.8
Finally, the poststructural critical project is purportedly apolitical also because it lacks
the mobilizing force required of rhetorical criticism to be a potentially transformative act.
Maurice Charland proposes to equip critical rhetoric with an opportunity to “[engage] in an
ongoing struggle against the oppressive formations of power specific to [the critics’] own
context.”9 In other words, rhetorical criticism must also propel political activism. However,
depleted by idealist and relativist propositions, the poststructural rhetorical criticism, in Cloud’s
and Farrell’s views, is deceptively liberating. As long as writers of rhetorical criticism focus on
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the material effects of discourse instead of focusing on non-discursive materiality, they
supposedly engage in “‘mere talk’” rather than in true transformative, emancipatory action:
“textuality has had the effect of blinding many of us to...the places where real material
grievances are stored and sometimes lost.”10
While Cloud, on the one hand, does not see much use in poststructural theories (and by
extension, in Lacan’s psychoanalysis) for the purposes of politically viable rhetorical criticism,
Christian Lundberg, on the other, points out the inability of traditional rhetorical theories
(including Burke’s theory of human motives) to engage in rigorous rhetorical criticism.
Lundberg prefers Lacan’s psychoanalysis to Burke’s theory as he opposes Lacan’s preoccupation
with formal logic constitutive of discourse (savoir) to Burke’s supposed commitment to the
study of particular manifestations of this logic (mé/connaissance). More specifically, as
Lundberg contends, Burke’s theory is a theory of tropes as epistemological tools rather than
tropes as a productive principle of discourse.11 Although, to resist such an understanding of
Burke’s theory, we might confine ourselves to Burke’s explicit acknowledgement that he
engages in both ontological and epistemological conversations, it would be more convincing to
illustrate Burke’s attention to the role of language and metaphor in the process of subjectivity
production as it is compared to Lacan’s psychoanalytic account of the subject.12
Speaking “Lacanian,” Burke’s rhetorical criticism arguably centers on the Imaginary as a
level of appearances (mé/connaissance) while neglecting the Symbolic as a level of substance
(savoir).13 If we were to accept Lundberg’s argument about Burke’s theory as preoccupation
10
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with the Imaginary, we would have to admit that Burkean rhetorical criticism is superficial and
somewhat limited in its political and ethical impulse. For example, to research a national
narrative only in its imaginary particularity is to read what a particular national subject says
about the national self and the national other without accounting for what makes the national
subject speak.14 From the point of view of Lacan’s theory, an exclusive analysis of the Imaginary
is simply a descriptive exercise. To explore a national narrative also by engaging its symbolic
logic, however, is to evaluate whether and how the national subject adjusts its specific vision of
the national self and the national other to an understanding of the self as eternally lacking or
imperfect.15 The distinction between the Imaginary (mé/connaissance) and the Symbolic (savoir)
is not only central to the upcoming discussion of the analytic potential of Burke’s theory, but the
terms are also key methodological categories of my ethical critique of psycho-rhetorical national
narratives in modern Russia. Before I address this further, however, I must return for a moment
to another issue that might arguably diminish the theoretical and analytical rigor of a Lacanian
rhetorical criticism.
It is peculiar that while Lundberg disapproves of Burke’s purported captivation with
appearances, Peter Dews regrets Lacan’s supposed shortage of interest in exactly the same: the
particular, the variable. Lundberg and Dews then conclude that both Burke’s and Lacan’s
theories respectively are inapt for social and cultural critique.16 As Dews believes, the way Lacan
conceptualizes the subject leaves the critic with no opportunity to analyze and evaluate social
Burke’s action and motion. Like Lacan who distinguishes between the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real as the
three registers of psychic experience (“a ternary conception of the human condition - nature, society and culture”),
Burke too recognizes the three “order[s] of [human] motivation”: bodily sensations, pre-linguistic behavioristic
imagery and symbolic ideas. Burke, Attitudes toward History 373.
14
The national other refers to all particular national others of the national subject.
15
The lack of the subject’s substance, or the radical inability of the speaking being to be what the subject
says or thinks of him/herself, is paradoxically the only stable, substantial feature of the subject, therefore “[t]he
tension between the symbolic and the real is…substantial….It’s an upokeimenon.” Upokeimenon (written as
ὑποκείμενον in Greek) stands for substance. Lacan, Seminar, Book II 323.
16
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orders that exist and are galvanized by specific material relations. This arguably “returns
psychoanalysis to a historical and political vacuum.”17 In other words, Dews is critical of
Lacan’s psychoanalysis for it is supposedly a theory of formal, general subjectivity production
(the Symbolic) that is severed from a possibility to account for existence of particular social
realities (the Imaginary) because:
[t]here is in Lacan’s work…nothing of [the] conflict between nature and culture –
a conflict which frequently takes on a tragic dimension….The unconscious is not
understood as the locus of a more primitive or rudimentary type of mental
activity, or of a demand for sensuous fulfillment which is incompatible with
civilization, and which disrupts the coherence of conscious discourse in order to
make its message known….18
Dews suggests treating the conscious (the sphere of appearances, or the Imaginary, or
mé/connaissance) and the unconscious (the sphere of substance, or the Symbolic, or savoir) as
two different languages, with the former being false consciousness and the latter being the locus
of true motives. Thus placing the Imaginary in a stark opposition to the Symbolic, Dews retheorizes the latter as merged with the Real (the realm of true material reasons guiding
ideology).19 As a result the critic, as Dews believes, will be able to observe certain
correspondences between specific extra-discursive events and specific statements of the subject.
Thus, just as Cloud does, Dews invites back the certitude (in the form of physical, as well as,
oddly, economic and political forces) that is supposedly vehemently withheld by
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poststructuralism. As I argue, the only certitude a Lacanian-Burkean study is based on is the
certitude of productive lack.
Against the background of Cloud’s critique of postmodernism, Lundberg’s dismissal of
Burke’s theory of human motives and Dews’s disappointment with Lacan’s psychoanalysis, my
attempts to combine Lacan’s and Burke’s accounts of subjectivity production consonant with a
larger poststructural project to execute an ideological reading of national narratives may seem
like a risky enterprise. In this chapter I venture to prove the opposite: to offer a LacanianBurkean theory of national identity renegotiation that is politically charged, ethically motivated
and propitious for activism.
The question of whether Burke’s and Lacan’s (or any other poststructural theories) can
engage in a fruitful conversation with each other is not so much connected with the issue of the
compatibility (or incompatibility) of Burke’s work and poststructural ideas, but with the
perceived ambiguity of Burke’s philosophy. As William H. Rueckert points out, “[there] are as
many Burkes as there are books and essays by him, and probably more Burkes than there are
books because there are often many Burkes in one book.”20 The many faces of Burke can be
explained by the many roles he performs: the dialectician, the dramatist, the logologist, the
tropist, the comedian and others, as well as by various interpretations of Burke’s works.21
Samuel Southwell and David Damrosch, for instance, characterize Burke’s scholarship as
hermeneutics; Frank Lentricchia and Giles Gunn see Burke as a critical theorist; Barbara
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Biesecker, Timothy Crusius, Cary Nelson, Robert Wess, David Cratis Williams and others link
Burke’s philosophy with the postmodern/ poststructural project.22
Most often such variations in reading stem from the constant unfolding of Burke’s
thought throughout the years. The “indecisiveness” of Burke’s scholarship has prompted critics
to consider how to characterize Burke’s philosophy, as ontology or epistemology, which later
shifted into a discussion about which study, of being or knowledge, comes first both in a logical
and temporal sense.23 Placing an emphasis on its epistemological contribution, Burke’s account
of human motives (just as any traditional rhetorical theory), as I already mentioned, is arguably
in stark contrast to Lacan’s psychoanalysis.
The question of a radical shift from ontology to epistemology or vice versa in Burke’s
writings at one point became a primary issue among Burkean scholars. While, on the one hand,
such detailed consideration of Burke’s theory has certainly been beneficial to Burkean studies,
the emphasis on the seemingly unintelligible break in Burke’s career, on the other hand, “harbors
the capacity to radically compromise the unity...of the entire Burke corpus.”24 As Biesecker
astutely contends, all those seemingly irreconcilable differences and irreparable breaks in
Burke’s scholarship, so rigorously debated by Burkean scholars, should not preclude critics from
viewing Burke’s theory in all its complexity:
Burke’s thought is constantly on the move, perpetually on the make, chronically
undoing itself....Burke’s works resemble more a crypt than a maze; more the
working out of a desire than the accomplishment of a project. All of this is not
meant to suggest that I do not see Burke affirming, or negating, as the case may
22
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be, distinct positions. It is meant to suggest, however, that the series of decisive
engagements we call Burke’s thought may not be best understood by assuming
that a logic of progression obtains between them.25
Burke’s “false starts, delays, fissures, and detours,” as Biesecker stresses, generate opportunities
for a more careful and fruitful engagement with Burke.26
The passage above presents Biesecker’s “deconstructive...reading” of Burke, which can
also be employed with respect to Lacan, especially for the purposes of Burke and Lacan’s
combined reading.27 Just as with Burke, Lacan’s work constantly evolved. This prompted some
commentators, according to Dylan Evans, to approach Lacan’s scholarship as a collection of
separate theoretical phases or, on the contrary, as a fixed narrative bereft of significant changes
in scholarly trajectories. Evans questions both extremes and stresses that Lacan’s “theoretical
vocabulary advances by means of accretion rather than mutation.”28 Similar to “Burke’s playful,
often fragmented, nonlinear style,” Lacan’s writings are too (intentionally or not) enigmatic.29
What is more important, however, is that neither Burke nor Lacan yearn for neatness. Coherence,
which is expressed in “harmonious naming” or as “untroubled happiness,” is precisely the
opposite of the goals of Lacan’s psychoanalytic practice and antithetical to Burke’s philosophy. 30
Despite their opaque styles and theoretical fluctuations, neither Burke’s nor Lacan’s
writings are disjointed. Both theorists put forward comprehensive theories that encompass the
questions of being and knowledge (and also truth). For Burke, the study of being - “what we
humans are (the symbol-using animal)” - is necessarily connected with the study of knowledge:
25
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“the range and quality of knowledge that we acquire when our bodies...come to profit by their
peculiar aptitude for...’natural’ languages.”31 Such reciprocity of Burke’s ontology and
epistemology, when a consideration of the former necessarily leads to a discussion of the latter
and vice versa, is akin to the treatment of being and knowledge in Lacan’s theory, which
“radically imbricates epistemology and ontology.”32 Burke and Lacan are certainly far from
advocating for universal essence and certain truth, and yet their theories contain moral
judgments, and thus are thoroughly ethical.33
Both in Burke’s and Lacan’s views, human animals or moving bodies become truly
human or desiring and thus capable of action only through language (or rather in fantasy/attitude
oscillating between two aspects of language: the unconscious and the conscious) and only under
the condition that language fails to grasp the whole complexity of the non-discursive (that is,
under the condition that the split, as I discuss below, is an effect of the subject’s lacking nature).
This point serves as an ontological foundation of Burke’s and Lacan’s theories. The accent on
the incomparability of the non-discursive (Burke’s “sheer motion” and Lacan’s Real) and the
discursive (Burke’s action and Lacan’s reality) as productive of human subjectivity places both
theories between the extremes of idealism and materialism (thus shielding them from an
unjustified accusation of idealism). 34 In addition, it also brings attention to Burke’s
preoccupation with the question of subjectivity production, which allows countering Lundberg’s
dismissal of Burke’s theory as merely descriptive of particular instances of subjectivity.
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Taking the tension thesis further, one may see that in language the subject, in attempts to
match the discursive with the non-discursive, in other words, to follow desire for unity, makes
this process intelligible in a particular cultural and sociopolitical context.35 Such a view on the
subject who is ridden by the asymmetry between what he/she aspires to be and what he/she is,
and who therefore maneuvers in language to secure a relatively stable, albeit equivocal, idea or
knowledge of the self, stresses an epistemological element in Burke’s and Lacan’s scholarship.
This epistemological emphasis in Lacan’s and Burke’s theories helps to cast off Dews’ doubt
about “the incompatibility between desire and speech [that] cannot be given any social
content.”36 Equally important, it also aids in highlighting the discursive nature of power relations
which shape specific narratives of the subject.
As Burke points out, since language keeps people at a distance from the non-symbolic
realm, or, in Lacanian terms, bars them from the Real, it endows them with an ability to act, or to
choose among possible ways in attempts to mitigate the said incomparability of the discursive
and the non-discursive. While each and every attempt to achieve seamless representation of the
non-verbal by the verbal fails, how exactly various subjects try to bridge the unbridgeable, or try
to enjoy their aspired unity, is of ethical significance. Both Lacan’s and Burke’s theories do not
commit either to an epistemic realist claim that there is one transcendental truth as a guide for
action, or an epistemic materialist assumption that true motives of human action are not
universal, but relative to specific contexts. The incompatibility of the non-discursive and the
discursive results in a multitude of human choices qua truths; and this proliferation of choices is
at the same time the only transcendental truth against which those choices can be judged. Such
peculiar juxtaposition of uncertainty and certitude allows characterizing Lacan’s and Burke’s
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accounts of subjectivity negotiation as mitigated relativism. To sum up, both Burke’s and
Lacan’s theories can be characterized as ontologically grounded and ethically driven
epistemologies or epistemological ontologies with a strong ethical emphasis.
While the foregoing survey of Lacan’s and Burke’s ontologies, epistemologies and ethics
might be (if only barely) enough to respond to Cloud’s, Dews’ and Lundberg’s reluctance to
grant Lacan’s and Burke’s theories their political and analytical vigor, a more thorough review
and comparison of Lacan’s and Burke’s accounts of subjectivity is required to offer an adequate
(both theoretically and methodologically) foundation for a psycho-rhetorical study of national
identity renegotiation. What I present as a Lacanian-Burkean theory of national identity
negotiation is not a collection of various analytic tools lifted from Lacan’s psychoanalysis and
Burke’s theory of human motives, but a juxtaposition of Lacan’s and Burke’s accounts of
subjectivity as they complement and counterbalance each other. I point out that together Lacan’s
and Burke’s ontologies, epistemologies and ethics shape an understanding of how the national
subject is produced (savoir), what the national subject knows (and says) about the national self
and national other (mé/connaissance), and finally, how what the national subject knows/says can
be evaluated against the way subjectivity is produced (i.e., the dialectic of savoir and
mé/connaissance).
More specifically, I begin by accentuating an effect of the process of individuation at
birth, or what Lacan calls the real lack, followed by an explication of the second lack, or an
effect of the tension between the Real as the non-discursive and the discursive, or the human
world of linguistically mediated reality. Both lacks are constitutive of the subject, yet in a
slightly different sense. The earlier lack is a condition of possibility for the second lack, or, in
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other words, attention to the real lack explains how the subject becomes possessed by the
unquenchable desire for completeness, desire to become someone that the subject is really not.37
National identity construction is then set in motion and sustained by precisely this
impulse to cover lack or attend to desire by discursive means, that is, in fantasy/attitude. An
image that the national subject holds of the self has to be constantly renegotiated since this
covering-up is unsuccessful every time. This failure translates into a permanent split within the
subject, between the Imaginary, mé/connaissance as what the subject consciously knows of
himself, and the Symbolic, savoir as an unconscious movement of signifiers productive of that
the subject knows of him/herself. Submerged into the unconscious, desire periodically resurfaces
in the Imaginary (or on the level of consciousness) in the form of symptom – a constitutive
relationship between the national other and the national self. The national subject never equals
the self; it exists only in relation to his/her lack and therefore only in relation to the national
other. Considering the notion of the split, it is possible to reformulate the above definition of
national identity construction as negotiation of an attitude toward or fantasy of what the national
subject wants to be into a more specific idea of national identity negotiation as the dialectic of
savoir and mé/connaissance. National identity negotiation then can be designed as a process that
discursively masks the constitutive dependence of the national self on nobody (no national other)
but his/her lack.38
By emphasizing Lacan’s concept of lack (a related notion of the objet a explicates how
lack is incessantly posed as a missing object or the suffering self and then “recovered” in a
symptom) and Burke’s notions of imperfection (and the subsequent purification that results in
redemption required to restore a state of perfection), I draw attention to a Lacanian-Burkean
37
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ethical system. It is organized between the opposite poles of fantasy/attitudes: categorical
rejection of human incompleteness and full acceptance of constitutive lack. In addition to
evaluating national narratives between the ethical coordinates of tragic mourning and comic
melancholy, I further offer a more nuanced method to evaluate specific instances of
fantasy/attitude, or modes of masking the split within the national subject. For this reason I
propose to complement national fantasies/attitudes of comic melancholy and tragic mourning
with Burke’s frames and Lacan’s four discourses. Tragic, comic, epic, elegiac, satiric, burlesque
and grotesque frames are content-specific variations of national fantasy/attitude, while the
Master’s, the University’s, the Hysteric’s and the Analyst’s Discourses are structural
permutations of national fantasy/attitude.
A reading of national fantasy/attitude through the prism of the concepts of lack (or
imperfection), the objet a (or purification as the compensatory mechanism), symptom
(redemption as the end result of purification), does not only permit us to gauge an ethical
position of each of the four analyzed national subjects on a scale from comic melancholy (which
is characteristic of civic nationalist discourse as the most progressive mode) to tragic mourning
(which corresponds with extreme ethnic/cultural nationalist rhetoric as the most hazardous
mode), but also to discuss national narratives with regard to tactical opportunities that specific
frames present the subject within a larger context of liberal democracy and neo-liberal rationality
and against the background of Russia’s anti-fascist history.
Аs I explain more thoroughly further in this chapter, Lacan’s theory of the four
Discourses accounts for variations in the unconscious structure that underpins the process of
national identity negotiation. As Lacan stresses, a psychoanalytic inquiry into desire necessarily
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“requires the assistance of structural elements.”39 Burke’s frames in turn emphasize, crudely
speaking, conscious knowledge that the national subject possesses of itself and its national other.
To explore a psycho-rhetorical national narrative exclusively in its Imaginary dimension, on the
one hand, is to confine an analysis to its “rhetorical” part, to read what the particular national
subject knows and says about itself and its particular national others without making allowance
for “the psychical” – the deep structural logic responsible for this conscious knowledge.40 To pay
attention solely to the Symbolic, on the other hand, is to consider the structure that guides the
national subject’s conscious knowledge, while offsetting the value of rhetorical analysis.
However, to analyze a national narrative through the prism of both the Symbolic and the
Imaginary, that is, psycho-rhetorically, is to judge if and how a specific vision of the national self
squares with the truth of the national self as an imagined community without a corresponding
necessary essence, or the real national upokeimenon.
As noted, the concepts of the Imaginary and the Symbolic are decisive in my theoretical
and methodological considerations. They are multidimensional concepts. Viewed synchronically,
the Symbolic and the Imaginary are two linguistically mediated orders of psychic experience.
The Symbolic is the unconscious formation of the psyche, which is structured like language, and
the Imaginary is conscious speech of the human subject as it is guided by the unconscious. From
the diachronic angle, the Imaginary and the Symbolic are often discussed as phases of the child’s
psychical development. Strictly speaking, however, the mirror stage is a primitive model of
subjectivity construction that is already enmeshed in the social, “already bounded by the register
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of the symbolic.”41 Lacan emphasizes that “[the] domain of the symbolic does not have a simple
relation of succession to the imaginary domain….We do not pass from one to the other in one
jump from the anterior to the posterior, once the pact and the symbol are established.”42 As I turn
to the theoretical foundation and methodology of the upcoming psycho-rhetorical analysis of
nationalisms in modern Russia, I discuss the ontological, epistemological and ethical
underpinnings of Lacan’s and Burke’s theories diachronically - from the angle of psychic
development, followed by a consideration of the Imaginary and the Symbolic at a synchronic
level.

2.2

The Two Lacks as the Birthplace of Subjectivity

Although siding with the thesis of the constitutive capability of language, Lacan and
Burke do not grant it full inaugurating power. As I have mentioned above, neither the discursive,
ideal, nor the non-discursive, material, alone is the only sufficient generative force: “It is
precisely this relation between action and motion, itself structured in and by an irreducible
distance, that constitutes the economy of the subject.”43 The unsurpassable asymmetry of the
non-discursive and the discursive, or in other words, the inability of the subject as a symbolusing animal to apprehend the Real directly, without failure, is what Lacan calls lack.44 Lacan’s
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lack, or Burke’s imperfection, is the “lack of being whereby the [speaking] being exists.”45 Since
the notion of lack/imperfection is the foundation of both Lacan’s and Burke’s theories, including
their ethical considerations, as well as an integral element of national identity construction, I
must stay on the topic slightly longer.
Lacan tirelessly reminds us that lack begets the subject. Strictly speaking, the subject is
the seat of two lacks:
The first emerges from the central defect around which the dialectic of the advent
of the subject to his own being in the relation to the Other turns—by the fact that
the subject depends on the signifier and that the signifier is first of all in the field
of the Other. This lack takes up the other lack, which is the real, earlier lack, to be
situated at the advent of the living being, that is to say, at sexed reproduction. The
real lack is what the living being loses, that part of himself qua living being, in
reproducing himself through the way of sex. This lack is real because it relates to
ultimate jouissance, before or beyond their meditation by imaginary and symbolic means. A distant echo of the Real
as it reaches the human being, is the pure sensations of pleasure (the most of it can be said to coincide with the
experience of fetal metabolic homeostasis) and pain. The Real that I refer to as non-discursive is the real Real. The
idea of the symbolic Real, or the Real as the impossible, brings attention to the gap between the Real and the
Symbolic, that is, the second lack, from where desire springs towards jouissance. The imaginary Real, or the Real as
the sensible, is the space between the Real and the Imaginary, the space of the real lack and libido, which is
engendered in/by the former. The real Imaginary is a dimension of Gestalt, or a united body image that the subject
sees in his/her own reflection in the mirror or in other people. The image of the completed and coherent human form
becomes foundational for the production of the ego, which occupies the space of the imaginary Imaginary, while the
symbolic Imaginary is the locus of meaning qua product of signification. Meaning, according to Lacan, “is not the
things in their raw state.” The symbolic Imaginary then can be said to be an image without a corresponding material
form. Such (symbolic) image radically differs from Gestalt, in the sense that the former portrays what cannot be
portrayed insofar as it is hidden, insofar that it always eludes us. From this angle the symbolic Imaginary can be
explained in relation to the issue of representation of God in various religions. As unknown and immaterial, God is
considered to be the one who has no image and appears only in an “‘epiphanic form’” – as a catachresis. The latter,
in the words of Paul de Man, “gives face to the faceless.” The remaining categories of the Symbolic highlight
distinct properties of the signifier. The symbolic Symbolic emphasizes the concept of the negative and the
differential logic of language, while the real Symbolic is the dimension of the materiality, or singularity and
indivisibility, of the signifier, since “it can…be said that something is not in its place only…[when it] can change
places – that is, of the symbolic. [But] the real, whatever upheaval we subject it to, is always and in every case in its
place….” Finally, the imaginary Symbolic is the plane of the gaze, or the ego-ideal, which can be said to function as
the privileged signifier. The latter anchors not just a singular meaning, but meanings within a particular
sociopolitical system. Lacan, Seminar, Book III, 119. See Žižek, “Schlagend, aber nicht Treffend!”; Paul de Man,
The Resistance to Theory 44; Lacan, Écrits 719.
45
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something real, namely, that the living being, by being subject to sex, has fallen
under the blow of individual death.46
The real lack, or what Burke’s describes as the “‘fall’ from a prior state of [Edenic or divine]
unity” and what can be interpreted in a Lacanian manner as “the fall of non-being into being,” is
immediate at birth.47 Upon his/her birth, as Lacan puts it, “[the subject] is no longer immortal.”48
Such immortality defines only the mythical “‘pure’ or ‘absolute’ person,” or the divine,
“Absolute Being,” which is the same as non-being, since no human being has ever lived to
experience it, or rather lived and thus never experienced it.49
To explicate how the human being comes to “lose” immortality and how this primordial,
radical “loss” shapes the human psyche, Lacan draws attention to a biological fact that organisms
that reproduce asexually by, for example, fragmentation, can essentially live forever by passing
virtually invariable genetic material to their offspring. Meanwhile human beings are born with
the genetic material of both their parents, reproduce by passing only half of their genetic material
to their offspring (thus losing the other half of their chromosomes) and then die. Lacan
emphasizes that meiosis, or the biological mechanism of creating a new life by joining two
organisms that lose a part of themselves in the process, is very much like the combinatory logic
of signification that always results into a certain loss or surplus (which are the same in Lacanian
psychoanalysis): “what emerges from this genetics if not the dominant function, in the
determination of certain elements of the living organism, of a combinatory that operates at
certain of its stages by the expulsion of remainders?”50
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While it is not immediately transparent how for Lacan subjectivity gets constructed as an
answer to the primordial “loss,” as a response invited by “a desperate affirmation of life…[in its]
purest form,” it is important to point out that Lacan does not claim a direct, causal relationship
between the failed immortality of the human organism as a matter of biology and a relentless
attempt to overcome this failure to live eternally as a psychic experience. On the contrary, as
Stella Sandford insists, by “pointing out an affinity between the enigmas of sexuality and the
play of the signifier,” Lacan draws attention to the fact that biological aspects of human life can
function only in the sphere of the human psyche indirectly, or as a myth.51 That is why Lacan
tells a story of the lamella - a mythical shapeless and sexless creature that can “[survive] any
division, and scissiparous intervention,” “[the] organ, whose characteristic is not to exist, but
which is nevertheless an organ.”52 Unlike the human organism, which cannot escape the destiny
of birth and death, the lamella, or “the libido, qua pure life instinct,” lives an “immortal life, [an]
irrepressible life,…[an] indestructible life.”53 What follows from the story of the odd organ that
“vanishes” at birth is that “human life is never ‘just life’: humans are not simply alive, they are
possessed by the strange drive to enjoy life in excess, passionately attached to a surplus which
sticks out and derails the ordinary run of things.”54 This extraordinary life force is what Lacan
ironically dubs the death drive.
Since Lacan often does not make it easy on his readers by indulging in tortuous prose, a
reading of Freud, whose work the former puts at the foundation of his psychoanalytic theory,
clarifies how exactly the human being comes to be radically lacking. Here I refer to the emphasis
51
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that Freud places on oceanic sensibility at the very beginning of Civilization and its Discontents,
by the way of commenting on the notion of oceanic feeling originally introduced by Romain
Rolland. According to Freud, at birth the infant cannot differentiate between him/herself and the
external world, experiencing a feeling of limitlessness. But as the child matures psychically and
learns to view him/herself as an autonomous human being, he/she is longer “eternal, [no
longer]…without perceptible limits, and in that way oceanic.”55 Stated otherwise, Lacan speaks
of the “lost” immortality in not only temporal but also spatial terms – as a pre-linguistic,
mythical experience of bodily limitlessness.56
Before I move into a discussion of the real lack in relation to the mirror stage as a
transition from an oceanic state of unity with the external world to a more exclusive idea of the
self, and explain why the attention to the development of subjectivity through the mirror stage
and the subsequent Oedipal phase is important in the context of the study of national identity
construction, I want to briefly spell out the relationship of the real, or radical, lack and the
second, or symbolic, lack. The real lack as a perceived loss of a mythical, or pre-linguistic,
sensation of limitlessness is the tension created in the space between the Real and the
Imaginary.57 This traumatic experience stems from the human being’s dependence on the other,
or another human being, the image of which plays a critical part at the very early stage of the
subject’s psychical development. The second lack as the impossibility of the Symbolic to reflect
the Real in its fullness occupies the space between the Real and the Symbolic and can be
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attributed to the subject’s dependence on the Other qua language. As it transpires from Lacan’s
discussion of the two lacks, the real lack eventually gives way to the second lack. Said otherwise,
as the subject matures psychically, he/she attempts to deal with the real lack, or the impossibility
for the subject to revert to the pre-linguistic infinitude, that is, the gratifying sense of oneness
with the mother as the first, privileged other in the subject’s life and, by extension, the external
world, by attempting to recover the second lack, that is, by pursuing the fantasmatic certainty of
the subject’s autonomy. In his/her newly found aspirations for psychical finitude, the subject (or,
rather, the speaking subject, since one has to speak to obtain subjectivity) relies on the signifier
and therefore he/she is destined for defeat: “our finitude is always already a failed finitude—one
could say a finitude with a leak in it.”58
Although Lacan poses the real lack to be chronologically prior to the second lack, Žižek
warns against reducing the role of the Symbolic. The death drive as the movement toward the
ultimate enjoyment of identity fullness, he emphasizes, does not stem from the sole
incompatibility of the Real and the Imaginary. Žižek fairly notes that what makes the human
being the subject he/she is cannot be viewed as something pre-linguistic: “it is the very
mediation of the symbolic order that transforms the organic ‘instinct’ into an unquenchable
longing which can find solace only in death.”59 Attention to the fact that the Imaginary is always
intertwined with the Symbolic, as explained below, allows us to see that the death drive springs
from the space between the Real of human organism and the (Imaginary and Symbolic) reality of
human life.
As the infant’s basic needs are attended by the other, whose image the infant relies on to
construct a relatively stable image of the self (for the self can only be constructed as an
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opposition to the other), this process does not occur in isolation from language. It is in a demand,
which emerges in a form of a cry, or a vocalized, quasi-linguistic articulation of need, that the
infant comes to manifest his/her longing for a pleasurable, libidinized sense of wholeness, which
is at first perceived as supposedly original oceanic limitlessness and later as a well-delineated
and certain being.60 Put differently, the Real of the human organism is apprehended through the
Other, more precisely, by the mediation of language, which is always an appeal to somebody
other than oneself – the spectral other or the desired object, both of which exercises the function
of otherness:
An infant at the breast…must be very strongly impressed by the fact that some
sources of excitation, which he will later recognize as his own bodily organs, can
provide him with sensations at any moment, whereas other sources evade him
from time to time—among them what he desires most of all, his mother’s
breast—and only reappear as a result of his screaming for help. In this way there
is for the first time set over against the ego an “object,” in the form of something
which exists “outside” and which is only forced to appear by a special action.61
Thus, as soon as the child is born, and due to the human physical immaturity at birth, the
newborn starts to express his/her need in a cry, or, in Lacan’s terms, demand, but there appears
to be always something left that no one will ever be able to gratify. This unsatisfied leftover of a
demand is desire. Therefore, from the very start the subject is guided by, speaking in Burke’s
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terms, the “principle of perfection,” the “entelechial principle, which is the same as Lacan’s
desire, or the “will to jouissance.”62

2.3

The Mirror Stage and the Study of National Identity Construction

The longing for completeness, as I already noted, partially owes to the fact that “the
human being is born with foetalised traits, that is to say deriving from premature birth.”63 Lacan
builds on Louis Bolk’s fetalization theory, according to which the infant is essentially a fetus for
the first nine to seventeenth months of his/her life.64 Prematurity expresses itself in the initial
inadequacy of the infant’s sensorimotor (as well as psychic) development. The infant at first
perceives his/her body not as coordinated and delineated, but as a “fragmented body, or
“infantile formlessness (where all things are patchy combinations wholly alien to the realm of
Order as we know it).”65 As the infant enters the mirror stage, the he/she rises above the primal
sensation of physiological insufficiency, or the traumatic experience of the Real, of his/her
(disjointed, or fragmented) body, by wrestling “an original noetic positivity” for him/herself.66
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Said otherwise, prior to the moment when the infant fully masters his/her own body and thus
his/her needs, he/she manages to compensate for his/her corporeal fragmentation in an imaginary
manner.67
The fact that the primary caregiver attends to the infant’s needs is a condition of
possibility for an idea of the self. The infant, as Lacan argues, longingly catches his/her own
reflection in the mirror and identifies with it. This mirror image, however, is not only a reflection
of the infant’s form in the mirror, but rather the infant’s affectively caught visual perception of
the mother as a coordinated and autonomous body. The infant then imagines that he/she sees
his/her own fragmented body as an organized whole. The imaginary role of the mother therefore
exceeds its biological significance and provides the subject with mental support in his/her
attempts to revert to a state of impossible oceanic limitlessness. What is described above is the
“mirror stage,” or “mirror phase” as both an initial phase of human psyche maturation and a
primitive model of subjectivation. And this is precisely when and how the ego, or a conscious
idea of selfhood, begins to emerge.68

death. Although Lacan does not deny its materiality (e.g., painful death), he argues that “death is never experienced
as such,...it is never real. Man is only ever afraid of an imaginary fear.” Similarly, Burke argues that most “[s]timuli
do not possess an absolute meaning. Even a set of signs indicating the likelihood of death by torture has another
meaning in the orientation of a comfort-loving skeptic than it would for the ascetic whose world-view promised
eternal reward for martyrdom.” Lacan, Seminar, Book VII 32; Burke, Attitudes toward History 370-371; Lacan,
Seminar, Book I 223; Lacan, Seminar, Book II 210, 164; Burke, On Symbols and Society 130. Also see Salecl, Spoils
of Freedom; Scarry, especially 3-6,12,31,34,35,52-54,162; Salecl and Žižek; Burke, “Nonsymbolic,” especially 816;
Salecl, “Ideology.”
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Consideration of the mirror stage is rather relevant for a study of national identity
construction. While, in isolation from the symbolic dynamics of the Oedipal phase, the mirror
stage does not suffice to explain the phenomenon of national identity, it nevertheless builds the
very foundation of the national subject. First, the narcissistic character of the mirror stage
elucidates how the “primitive paranoid dialectic of identification with the counterpart” gives an
impetus to a tragic relationship between the national self and the national other.69
Lacan theorizes the subject’s primary relation to the other; that is, the relationship
between the developing ego and its specular image as narcissistic: “[i]t’s one’s own ego that one
loves in love, one’s own ego made real on the imaginary level of the self.”70 Since the mirror
image, by means of which the ego is formed, is ultimately an external image, the ego is both an
anticipation of an ideal unity and “frustration in its very essence.”71 Following the subject’s
failed narcissistic attempts to coincide with the reflected other, the imaginary relationship is
staged as inescapably aggressive and paranoid. The reflected other, which is in fact the ego’s
virtual ideal image, is therefore apprehended as a rival who supposedly threatens the unity of the
subject:
In every relationship with the other…there is some echo of this relation of
exclusion, it’s either him or me, because, on the imaginary plane, the human
subject is so constituted that the other is always on the point of re-adopting the
place of mastery in relation to him, because there is an ego in [the subject] that is
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always in part foreign to him, a master implanted in him over and above his set of
tendencies, conduct, instincts, and drives.72
Overwhelmed by the primitive (or imaginary) alienating impulses, the subject, as he/she passes
into the Oedipal phase, learns how to mitigate the ambiguously aggressive relationship with the
specular other.
Although Lacan refers to the “‘pacifying’ function” of the Symbolic that permits the
subject to overcome the disturbing ambivalence of the Imaginary, he does not argue that in the
Symbolic the subject escapes the inherently paranoid and aggressive relation to the other. On the
contrary, the Symbolic only further masks the subject’s constitutive lack. Emerging from the
imaginary oscillation between narcissism and aggression into the Symbolic, the national other is
often raised to a definitive status of enemy, or criminal, who supposedly harbors or attempts to
rob the subject of his/her happiness: “Aggressive tension thus becomes part of the drive,
whenever the drive is frustrated because the ‘other’s’ noncorrespondence [to one’s wishes]
aborts the resolving identification, and this produces a type of object that becomes criminogenic
by interrupting the dialectical formation of one’s ego.”73
The subject that is fully realized in the Symbolic thus is susceptible to an imaginary
tendency to grow paranoid about the other. Although in the Symbolic, which functions in a way
other than the dialectic of (dis)similarity with the specular other, the subject can mitigate his/her
desire for unity with more confidence than in the Imaginary, the outcome is often quite the same.
Similar to the psychotic, the national subject fights to death for its death, most clearly observable
in instances of war or violent conflicts. The national subject often resorts to violent exclusion of
72
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its national other for the sake of its own certainty (and thus can be qualified as tragic). The
difference between the psychotic and the neurotic (exemplified by the national subject),
however, is that the death drive does not leave the ego shattered; the ego, on the contrary,
emerges as ever more solidified by an operation of exclusion of the other. While both psychosis
and the Imaginary are characterized by aggressive and paranoid tendencies, in psychosis
paranoia and aggression are structural consequences of the repudiation of the Symbolic; in
neurosis though paranoiac and aggressive phenomena are inherited from the primitive narcissism
as an inalienable feature of the subject.
Since “the dialectic of jealousy…is [a] primordial manifestation of communication,” it
makes it that much harder to expropriate the national other of its “criminogenic” status for the
sake of a more ethically responsible, comic way of being the national self.74 In addition, political
agents often purposefully tap into the constitutively “conflictual” relationship between the
national subject and the national other to shape an appealing image of the national self. Besides,
since “[d]efense…[is] at the origin of paranoia,” the lure of the tragic economy of the national
subject intensifies at traumatic moments in history which threaten to disintegrate the supposed
unity of the national self.75 To resist such primitive tension, the national subject must find a way
to identify with the fictitious enemy, since this rival is not the national other; the competitor is
lodged within the national self. By identifying with its supposed enemy, the national other
assumes an attitude of “humane enlightenment,” comedy as the most progressive mode of
national identity construction.76 In order to structure oneself comically, or to maintain an attitude
of lack, a far greater restraint is required to resist both the Imaginary and the Symbolic - the
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egocentric, narcissistic lure of imaginary unity supported by the effacing effect of the symbolic
structure of metonymy and metaphor.
Before I turn to the Oedipal phase, which will clarify the statements already made with
regard to the Symbolic, I must consider another point of relevance of the mirror stage to a study
of national identity construction. The tortuous relationship between images of the self and the
reflected other reveals the social nature of the subject. As I already showed, in the mirror stage
the nascent subject as “the set of imaginary elements of the so-called fragmented body” attempts
to coincide with an image of the other qua the ideal self.77 Although unable to succeed, “it is by
means of [this] gap... opened up by his prematurity…that the human animal is capable of
imagining himself mortal [which implies self-consciousness],” that is, becoming the truly
intersubjective subject.78
In addition to forming a precondition for the development of subjectivity qua
intersubjectivity, the sociality of the mirror stage also allows grounding the concept of the
national subject in the Real. If Lacan’s theory relied solely on the differential mechanism of
subjectivity production, the national subject would be no more than a history of always shifting
constellations of master signifiers without any, however ambiguous, connection to real events
(commonly understood as historical events).79 To emphasize that psychoanalysis does not
disregard the Real(ity) of facts (as, for example, the Real(ity) of a violent riot), I must refer first
to the non-mathematical (as opposed to differential), relational logic of the Imaginary.80
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The mechanism of the mirror stage calls attention to the fact that what engenders the
subject is his very first traumatic encounter with the external world experienced as “a painful
organic sensation” of “a primordial Discord.”81 Said otherwise, the human subject is sensitive
towards an object – “some element…[that is] experienced as more or less external to [the
subject]” and thought to be capable of fulfilling the subject’s desire.82 Similarly Burke sees a
primal, or biological, impulse in sensory images, or what he calls “the imagery” (an equivalent of
Lacan’s Imaginary).83 Lacan and Burke, however, are far from endorsing a “naïve” empiricist
position that what we know about the world (and ourselves) comes directly from our senses
(after all, “[a]s guides to the real, feelings are deceptive”).84 Burke’s and Lacan’s concept of the
Imaginary make us draw attention to “the register of sensory reactions,” but neither in terms of
the instinctual response to a Gestalt, nor in a purely biological mimetic value of those images.85
Burke’s and Lacan’s concepts of the Imaginary stress the relational, or “the social animus
contained in sensations.”86
An idea of the national self is produced in response to a perceived image of a specific
group of real people endowed with symbolic value (as I explain below, in Lacan’s modified
formula of the subject
of

the sign

stands for the subject’s substantial void; the place

is the location of a sensory image of a specific group of real people that takes on a

symbolic role of the national other). From this point of view, the national subject is a history of
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defensive reactions to the certitude of the national other perceived as a community of “real others”
- real people who live in a real geographical location and engage in real acts.87 The fact that the
process of subjectivity production stems from the traumatic relationship between the subject and
the world external to him emphasizes the role of the Real of sensations. The Real as the sensible
is that which vicariously creates a condition of possibility for the subject.88
In the mirror stage the social resides in the mechanism of similarity with somebody. Such
similarity is not real, but rather perceived likeness of the subject with its ideal image. The care
the mother directs at the infant is accepted as a proof of the mother’s love or pre-symbolic
recognition of the infant as “structured by a certain conception of…autonomy” (as Lacan points
out, this conception of autonomy is “fundamentally biased and incomplete [partiel et partial],
inexpressible, fragmentary,…and profoundly delusional”).89 In pursuit of his/her identity
wholeness, the child attempts to be one with the mother by imitating her (hence the mother
functions as the mirror image) and simultaneously becoming what she presumably wants him to
be (hence having the mother to recognize him as worthy of her approval).90 The notion of
imaginary recognition then explains the imaginary literality as an attempt at love.
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Whereas it is possible to give a superficial explanation of family dynamics in such terms,
on the level of collective identity one would run into serious problems. Assuming an idea that
people seek literal approval, or seek to conform to social standards, shuts down any opportunity
to resist. Moreover, identification by imitation exhausts itself fairly quickly, as soon as the
subject fails to prop up his/her likeness with the other, and therefore precludes the subject from
making complex and durable social connections. The Symbolic as culture or a dimension of the
pleasure principle, however, presupposes the subject’s affective investment in a limitless range
of heterogeneous objects (as I explain, those are part-objects of the objet a), rather than into a
limited/limiting mechanism of perceived resemblances.

2.4

The Neurotic Structure of National Subjectivity

The social, or relational, aspect of the mirror stage and its effects in the Imaginary,
however, is unable to explain the phenomena of collective identity fully.91 Only by conceiving
the subject as a successful confluence of the Imaginary and the Symbolic is Lacan’s theory
capable of explaining national subjectivity as a type of ideological animated collective identity.
Unlike the ambiguous and chaotic imaginary relation toward the other which shapes the subject’s
sociality, the Symbolic is governed by the law of castration and as such can be discussed in terms
of culture.92 This culture is not a culture of the subject’s enlightened attitude to others (such as
comic melancholy), but a culture of mutual recognition, or reciprocal determination of each other
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– both differentially and affectively, discussed below as intersubjectivity: “[The Symbolic] is
always a pact, an agreement, people get on with one another, they agree - this is yours, this is
mine, this is this, that is that.”93 And as the ego finds its support in the structure of the Symbolic,
the subject transforms from “the dummy” into “the true subject.”94
The structure of the neurotic qua true subject as the one who, unlike the psychotic and the
pervert, completes a proper transition to the Symbolic via the stages of alienation and separation,
is the structure of the ideologically inspirited subject. Since in Chapter Four I argue that fascist
narratives are the neurotic’s fantasy, rather than something pathological, a brief look into the
mechanism of the neurotic’s subjectivity construction is a must. Unable to achieve the mythical
pre-natal wholeness in the mirror stage, the neurotic subject eventually attempts to support the
idea of the (complete) self by symbolic means: he/she gets named, or represented by a signifier
in relation to the Name-of-the-Father – the primordial signifier that anchors all signifiers within
the symbolic field. The price of such representation is castration – the subject’s abdication of the
sought-after fullness, or unrestrained jouissance: “Castration means that jouissance has to be
refused in order to be attained on the inverse scale of the Law of desire.”95 Governed by the
castrating “No!” of the Father, the subject of desire is allowed to enjoy as little and safely as
possible, although keeping the (however illusory) promise of ultimate jouissance alive. The
neurotic subject thus operates along “the law of feeling good,” or the pleasure principle, which
precludes otherwise deadly jouissance from reaching its goal: “pleasure’s law [is] such as to
make [desire] always fall short of its aim: the homeostasis of the living being, always too quickly
reestablished at the lowest threshold of tension….”96
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The price of the Symbolic does not only entail the renunciation of the ultimate, raw
jouissance, but also a further alienation of the subject.97 In addition to primary alienation in the
imaginary other, the neurotic subject moves further away from him/herself, being a product of
the Other of language: “Alienation consists in this vel, which…condemns the subject to
appearing only in that division [when]…if [the subject] appears on one side as meaning,
produced by the signifier, it appears on the other as aphanisis.”98 Simultaneously, this vel, this
puncture in the Symbolic, that is, to the ultimate impossibility for the subject to fully match
his/her name, to be pure, absolute being, is what the neurotic owns his/her subjectivity to:
“we…must bring everything back to the cut qua function in discourse, the most significant being
the cut that constitutes a bar between the signifier and the signified….This cut in the signifying
chain alone verifies the structure of the subject as discontinuity in the real.”99
The subject, however, is not totally determined by the differential structure of the
Symbolic. In the process of separation, the neurotic recognizes, albeit unconsciously, that the
Other which, “[marks the subject’s] place in the field of the group’s relations, between each
individual and all the others,” is actually lacking.100 Since the signifier as it represents the subject
to all other signifiers (and thereby other subjects) fails to determine the subject’s meaning
unequivocally, the subject is left to speculate what it is in him/her that brings him/her to a certain
relation to other subjects. At this point, rather than the differential mechanism of the Symbolic,
the work of which is manifested in the process of alienation, the affective function of the
Symbolic, more specifically, the subject’s desire comes to the fore of the present discussion.
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The most fundamental element of the neurotic’s affective economy is the mysterious and
fleeting objet a. It is the sought-after impossible truth or essence; the radical identity wholeness;
as well as the locus of lack. The objet a is situated at the very center of the process of
subjectivity production in general, and national identity construction in particular. It is around
the objet a that the national subject structures its desire for the perfect national self, or crafts its
national fantasy/attitude. Considering the focal position of the concept of the objet a for the
purposes of offering a Lacanian-Burkean account of national identity construction, I will linger
on the topic of the objet a, its place in the formula of the subject, as well as the related concepts
of symptom, fantasy, and frame, which are all instrumental in the analysis of the psychorhetorical narratives of Russian neo-fascists, Nashi, Antifa and Putin.

2.4.1 The Formula of the Subject

Marked in Lacan’s theoreticization by the symbol $ as the self disquieted by the real lack
arising from the original discord between the Innenwelt and the Umwelt, the subject enters in a
relation with the unary signifier S1. The first signifier is what Lacan calls a “single stroke.” To
elucidate the concept, Lacan tells a story about a notch made by a prehistoric hunter presumably
on the wall of his/her cave to mark his/her first kill. It is:
by means of [this notch representing the first kill he did] will not become
confused in his memory when he has killed ten others. He will not have to
remember which is which, and it is by means of this single stroke that he will
count them....When this signifier, this one, is established—the reckoning is one
one. It is at the level, not of the one, but of the one one, at the level of the
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reckoning, that the subject has to situate himself as such. In this respect, the two
ones are already distinguished.101
A proper name is another example of the function of the unary signifier. There is no necessary
link between the subject and the unary signifier that the former is named by, since “in its
dimension as a pure signifier,” or in isolation from other signifiers, the unary signifier bears no
meaning on its own, it “signifies nothing.”102 This relationship is not of imaginary resemblances
either, although it is perceived by the tragic subject as such. Whatever sensibly literal connection
exists in the imaginary link between the infant and his/her mirror image qua mother, in the
Symbolic it is exceeded by the figurative – metonymical and metaphorical – relation between the
subject, the unary signifier and the binary signifier.103
Marked by the originary meaninglessness of the unary signifier (the fact that produces the
second lack or radical dissonance between the Symbolic and the Real), the subject acquires
his/her subjectivity, or meaning, only in connection to another signifier, or the “binary signifier”
S2.104 This is why Lacan defines a signifier as that “which represents a subject...for another
signifier” that represents another subject.105 The link between the unary signifier S1 and the
binary signifier S2 is metonymic, while the subject that is represented by the juxtaposition of S1
101
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and S2 is metaphoric. The Symbolic thus is engendered in an incessant metonymic movement of
signifiers, which transiently halts at some point (point de capiton) to congeal into a metaphor,
thereupon producing a relatively stable formation of the subject’s meaning.106
Despite the fact that Burke’s metonymy as reduction differs in nuance from Lacan’s
metonymy as juxtaposition, for both scholars “metonymy is an impoverished metaphor…[or
that] metonymy exists from the beginning and makes metaphor possible.”107 Lacan and Burke
conclude that language and thus the subject are metaphoric, since metaphor permits us to speak
about things in terms of what they are not (and consequently, to use the unary signifier as a mark
of the subject):
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whatever correspondence there is between a word and the thing it names, the
word is not the thing….And just as effects that can be got with the word can’t be
got with the thing, so effects that can be got with the word can’t be got with the
thing. But because two realms coincide so usefully at certain points, we tend to
overlook the areas where they radically diverge. We gravitate spontaneously
towards naïve verbal realism.108
In anticipation of my discussion of modes of enjoyment of national unity, I point out that, by
taking the national self literally, the national subject adopts a tragic attitude toward itself.109
Tragic literality, however, differs from a sensibly literal connection that exists between the
subject and his/her mirror image, which I discussed several pages ago, just as there is a disparity
between how the neurotic and the psychotic respond to will for jouissance. In psychosis the
subject’s quest for literality is unsupported symbolically and thus ends in disintegration of the
self, while tragic literality secures the neurotic in his/her purported awareness of the united self.
The sensible literality of the Imaginary must be distinguished from tragic literality of the
Symbolic also in a sense that in the Imaginary the subject mistakenly takes an image of the other
for its own, while in the Symbolic the subject identifies with the unary signifier as it set against
the binary signifier of the other. Although in both cases the subject depends on the other, in the
second case the reliance on the other is affectively productive.
Here I must draw attention to Lacan’s formula of the subject

(which is also

instrumental to the upcoming discussion of the objet a and the four Discourses) and its
modification
108
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exterior that is simultaneously internal to the subject, or points to the subject’s essential
intersubjectivity (or “the intimate exteriority or ‘extimacy’” of the subject).110 S2 is a signifier of
the space that can be occupied by anybody (or rather a sensory image of any real body) who is
not the subject

: “The human being poses the day as such, and the day thereby becomes

presence of the day - against a background that is not a background of concrete nighttime, but of
possible absence of daytime.” 111 Similarly, the national subject can only be conceived
symbolically, or negatively: “it is through the exchange of symbols that we locate our different
selves in relation to one another.”112

is the space where the national subject does not equal

itself, it is the location of the subject’s absence.
An account of the primary narcissism ravaging the ego and the pacifying intersubjectivity
of the Symbolic expressed in the dynamics of the subject’s absence/presence allows seeing the
national other as nothing but a means to sustain an appeasing image of the national self (which
could be referred to as the “ego” of the nation). The concept of intersubjectivity then is
somewhat different from Burke’s concept of consubstantiality. As Burke explains, “[i]n being
identified with B, A is ‘substantially one’ with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time
he/she remains unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus he/she is both joined and separate, at
once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another.”113
Speaking in terms of the present discussion of nationhood, Burke’s concept of
identification as “an acting-together (to produce new “common sensations, concepts, images,
ideas, attitudes that make [people] consubstantial”) emphasizes cooperation among people who
imagine they belong to one nation. The concept of intersubjectivity as a symbolic connection
110
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between the national self and the national other explicates that the process of national identity
construction occurs, more broadly speaking, in the presence and often at the expense of the
national other. In other words, Burke’s concept of consubstantiality underscores partnership
among those who supposedly belong to one nation, while Lacan’s theory of the subject stresses
that the search for autonomy and certainty of the national self involves a fellow human being,
who is usually treated with suspicion and resentment. The difference between Burke’s
consubstantiality and Lacan’s intersubjectivity can be also viewed in terms of comic and tragic
identity construction: consubstantiality spotlights the potential for comedy in the process of
national identity negotiation and intersubjectivity points to the possibility of tragic enjoyment of
the national self. While the comic national subject builds its identity around the objet a as certain
national values, which interpellate some national subjects, rather than others, the tragic national
subject sustains itself only negatively – by rejecting the national other for being, as Russian neofascists have it, “incompatib[le] [in character] and blood.”114 This tragic negativity of assuming a
pleasing vision of the self by renouncing the national other for the latter is supposedly
implicated in the loss of the objet a, however, has to be differentiated from the structural
negativity of the subject, who, in absence of its truth, or essence, that is, due to its innate lack,
gets to know what it is, what it desires only by accounting for the desire of the national other.
As such Lacan’s concept of intersubjectivity and Burke’s notion of consubstantiality
complement each other allowing to discuss the process of Russian national identity construction
as negotiation. The type of negotiation in question, however, is not a conscious act of mutual
cooperation, but an unconscious, formal dependency of the national subject on its symbolic
position among other national fantasies. Any instance of social cooperation then can be viewed
as an extension of speech as the locus of subjectivity constitution. Speech, generally speaking, is
114
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moved by an unconscious appeal to the other– summoning of the other for the sake of
constituting the self.115 In this respect, the historic legend of summoning of the Scandinavian
princes by the Russian people to build the first Russian state, which I briefly recount in Chapter
Three, can be read as a myth of structural intersubjectivity constitutive of national identity.
Heralded into language by the unary signifier, the subject cannot perceive the Real and
him/herself qua body in the Real directly, or literally (hence the bar between $ and S1 in Lacan’s
formula of the subject

). As an effect of the second lack and consequently desire, the

subject is split between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, or what the subject knows he/she is (a
narcissistically fueled idea of the self) and what he/she is (an intersubjective tropological
construct): the subject is “a perspective …from which the subject will see himself…as others see
him – which will enable him to support himself in a dual situation that is satisfactory for him
from the point of view of love.”116 To mask the split between the Imaginary and the Symbolic
the subject resorts to fantasy. Fantasy equips the subject with “a certain construction of his
autonomy” as a product of “the symbolic chain that binds and orients [the subject’s selfawareness].”117 Just as Lacan’s fantasy “yields us the entire world system,” so Burke’s attitude
shapes the subject’s “notion of the universe or history.”118
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2.5

Fantasy as an Attitude of the National Subject

Fantasy, or, in Burke’s terms, an attitude, is ultimately a misrepresentation
(méconnaissance) of the complete self: “In the pursuit of this beyond, which is nothing, [the
subject] harks back to the feeling of a being with self-consciousness which is nothing but its own
reflection in the world of things.”119 But this misrepresentation is the only possible reality of the
speaking subject. Extending Lacan’s concept of fantasy and Burke’s corresponding notion of
attitude to the context of national identity construction, one can say that national identity is an
all-encompassing attitude toward or fantasmatic narrative about the national self and the national
other. Such a view on national identity problematizes Ernest Gellner’s and Eric Hobsbawm’s
theories of the nation as false consciousness and an ideological illusion respectively, but
confirms Benedict Anderson’s argument about the nation as an imaginary community. National
fantasy is neither Gellner’s and Hobsbawm’s repressed delusion masterfully crafted to hide the
supposed real essence of the nation, nor, as mentioned in Chapter One, Bormann’s conscious
“fanciful invention about events not in the here and now.”120 Instead, national fantasy is a
constitutive response to the traumatic negativity of the national subject encountered in the space
between the Real as sensible and the Real as the impossible: “The function of the tuché, of the
real as encounter—the encounter in so far as it may be missed, in so far as it is essentially the
missed encounter—first presented itself in the history of psycho-analysis in a form that was in
itself already enough to arouse our attention, that of the trauma.”121
Conceived as split within the double aspect of language – its unconscious symbolic
structure and conscious manifestations in the Imaginary – the subject, as noted above, is not a
119
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solely discursive product. The subject is what he/she fantasizes he/she is; that is, a comforting
idea of certainty as a defensive response to the Real: “The place of the real…stretches from the
trauma to the [f]antasy - in so far as the [f]antasy is never anything more than the screen that
conceals something quite primary.”122 While the mirror stage initiates the subject’s defense from
the sensible Real, the Symbolic provides the subject with means to defend him/herself from
traumatic lack: the Symbolic shields the subject from the Real as the sensible by setting him/her
in figurative, rather than sensibly literal relation to the desired unity. Although the Symbolic
manages to protect the subject from the primary traumatic encounter with the Real as the
sensible, it nevertheless cannot fully safeguard the subject from the effects of the Real as the
impossible. In other word, the subject hides from his/her constitutive lack in his/her
fantasy/attitude, which, however, is not an impenetrable wall that divides the subject from the
Real. Now and then the Real reminds us of itself “by the accident, the noise, the small element of
[the Real], which is evidence that we are not dreaming.”123
As the Imaginary emphasizes the role of the Real as the sensible (or the real lack, the
inability to match the demand of need), the concept of the Symbolic highlights the Real as
“recalcitrant,” as “this obstacle, this hitch” (or the second lack).124 It is in this sense the Real is
impossible: “the real is the impossible…[n]ot in the name of a simple obstacle we hit our heads
up against, but in the name of the logical obstacle of what, in the symbolic, declares itself to be
impossible.”125 The second lack, or the fact that the Real cannot be fully represented in language,
is traumatic too. Considering the notions of the Real as the sensible and the Real as the
122
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impossible, the national subject is a history of defensive accommodation (Imaginary in impulse
and Symbolic in execution) of traumatic tension brought about by the two lacks.

2.6

The Objet a and Symptoms

The ideas of lack and fantasy/attitude are closely connected with the concept of the objet
a. Lacan introduces the concept of the objet a by drawing his readers’ attention to the fort/da
game of the child as a “repetitive [exercise] in which subjectivity simultaneously masters its
dereliction [(or incompleteness)] and gives birth to the symbol.”126 By throwing a wooden reel
and pulling it back by the string it was attached to and exclaiming fort and da, the child reenacts
the presence and absence of the mother. The child “compensated himself [or herself] for [the
separation with the real mother],” as it were, by staging the disappearance and return of the
objects within his [or her] reach.” 127 As Lacan clarifies, the reel, however, does not stand for the
child’s mother as such, but is connected with an idea of the external, missing object that can
supposedly complete the subject. Just as the mother, or rather her mirror image, although
literally, served to provide the subject with a rudimentary sense of the self, the reel stands for the
objet a that promises to make the subject whole. The fort/da game demonstrates how the
Symbolic is much more than the differential mechanism of subjectivity production: it comes to
possess an affective dimension. In the differential play of signifiers there is always something
left undetermined, unsaid, something that moves the subject to keep looking for the answer.
Lacan expresses this process in the formula of the neurotic’s fundamental fantasy

,

which reads as “the subject longs for jouissance that is ‘[replaced] by an instrument’,” that is, the
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subject desires identity fullness, for which the objet a is a stand in.128 The formula of the
fundamental fantasy is, in its turn, a part of Lacan’s formula of the subject

, which

subsumes both the differential and affective aspect of the Symbolic. The place that the objet a
occupies in Lacan’s formula of the subject

(the bottom right position) is the place where

the subject’s life force, or desire qua will to jouissance, siphons through. And it is not an
accident that the objet a and the subject’s aphanisis, represented by
place – in the right bottom corner of Lacan’s formula of the subject

, are located in the same
.129 Both are marks

of the subjective void, or lack.
The objet a, or “the cause of desire,…[which] manifests itself as want-to-be,” is the
mechanism of subjective enjoyment.130 Constitutive articulation of the subject fueled by the objet
a is a compromise between the principles of perfection as the death drive and the pleasure
principle. As such it functions as a cause of an endless parade of “part-objects,” “signifying
objects”: “it is of this [enjoyment of the complete self] that all the forms of the object a...are the
representatives, the equivalents.”131 Strictly speaking, part-objects do not represent the objet a, as
it is nothing but a place of lack, masked as loss that gets provisionally recuperated by partobjects. Part-objects are rather an “exponent of a function [of the objet a], a function that
sublimates [the objet a] even before it exercises the function; this function is that of the index
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raised toward an absence….”132 The objet a is an index of desire or a place from which the
originary negativity of subjectivity is converted into positivity of the subject’s reality.
The subject confuses satisfaction provided by part-objects with pre-Symbolic jouissance.
In this sense the objet a can be understood as surplus jouissance or pleasure unaccounted for by
part-objects. To put it otherwise, the objet a extends an offer of jouissance that the subject is
always supposed to refuse by saying “that’s not it,” that the offered object always falls short.133
That is how the objet a is able to keep part-objects far enough to suggest the forthcoming
pleasure of identity wholeness and close enough to preserve the minimal degree of lack.
Operating along the pleasure principle, the objet a is able to sustain the subject’s desire: “At the
moment of climax [jouissance], [desire] would simply be out of the picture if fantasy did not
intervene to sustain it with the very discord to which it succumbs.”134
For the purposes of the discussion of national identity construction, it is especially
important to emphasize that the objet a is an extimate element – something that is both external
to the subject and intimate, or, in Lacan’s words, “something strange to me, although it is at the
heart of me.”135 As Lacan repeats it over and over again in his seminars, the objet a as the
Other’s desire is what the subject desires too:
[d]esire is first grasped in the other, and in the most confused form. The relativity
of human desire in relation to the desire of the other is what we recognise in every
reaction of rivalry, of competition, and even in the entire development of
132
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civilization….The subject originally locates and recognises desire through the
intermediary, not only of his own image, but of the body of his fellow being. It’s
exactly at that moment that the human being’s consciousness, in the form of
consciousness of self, distinguishes itself. It is in so far as he recognises his desire
in the body of the other that the exchange takes place. It is in so far as his desire
has gone over to the other side that he assimilates himself to the body of the other
and recognises himself as body.136
In other words, the subject learns to desire only in the presence of another speaking and thus
desiring subject.
In this respect the objet a functions as a liaison between the subject and the Other as a
another desiring, or speaking, being: “The dialectic of the objects of desire, in so far as it creates
the link between the desire of the subject and the desire of the Other—I have been telling you for
a long time now that it is one and the same—this dialectic now passes through the fact that the
desire is not replied to directly.”137 The subject is destined to be searching for the objet a as an
answer to the question of his/her own desire in “an echo that [it] sets off in the Other,” which is
paradoxically phased as “Che vuoi?” - “What do you, the Other, want from me?”138 Speaking in
Burke’s terms, in attributing certain motives to the desiring other, the subject reveals his/her own
specific motives. The objet a then coincides with the moment of interpellation when the neurotic
recognizes a certain connection, or what Lacan calls a social link (lien social), between
him/herself and the other, whose question the neurotic assumes to be directed at him/her.139 The
neurotic’s attitude to lack and the objet a thus allows him/her to become a part of “ideology as a
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social bond.”140 In contrast, the pathological subjects – the psychotic and the pervert – struggle to
come to terms with lack and thereby an idea of otherness, which is crucial in establishing
ideological commitment to certain national images. The psychotic does not even consider the
question of lack, while the pervert is aware of lack, but refuses to renounce the complete,
uncompromised jouissance of the self.
As soon as the place of lack is occupied by the objet a, the latter simultaneously becomes
the locus of symptoms as enigma of the subject’s substantial lack:
A symptom here is the signifier of a signified that has been repressed from the
subject’s consciousness. A symbol written in the sand of the flesh and on the veil
of Maia, it partakes of language by the semantic ambiguity that I have already
highlighted in its constitution. But it is fully functioning speech, for it includes the
other’s discourses in the secret of its cipher [chiffre].141
Symptom qua chiffre is what the subject always misrecognizes in his/her desire. Symptom as this
cryptic element “give[s] to this $ something which will alleviate the part of it which sustains the
presence of the [objet a],…something which the subject can hold onto,” since “the [objet a] is no
being” at all and the part-object is its trace.142 In other words, symptom is an element that makes
the vision of the subject in possession of certain part-objects enjoyable. As “the signification [or
product] of repression,” symptom is an element of the subject’s consciousness and radically
separated from the unconscious dimension of its articulation and the objet a: “As with all the
other unconscious processes, nothing…reaches the level of consciousness....”143 Being partisan
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products of affectively driven signification, part-objects can be said to be on the same side as
symptoms. While, as Lacan’s psychoanalysis evolved, the discussion of part-objects was limited
to the consideration of the four partial objects (the voice, the gaze, the breast and faeces), in this
work I hold to a more general understanding of part-objects as objects in which the subject
misrecognizes the cause of his/her desire – the objet a. In this sense both part-objects and
symptoms are elements that make up the subject’s méconnaissance, which gives me an
opportunity to treat the former as symptomatic. In other words, I understand symptom as a
compound concept, which does not only stand for that which prevents the national subject from
enjoying itself to the fullest (and this function is often attituted to the national other), but also
includes that which promises the national subject its wholeness.
Such dual nature of symptom is reminiscent of the imaginary mechanism of the subject’s
vaccilation between the ideal image of the self and the foreign image of the other. Just as the
subject (mis)recognizes him/herself in the image of another human being, so, speaking in terms
of the Symbolic and from the point of view of national identity construction, the national subject
gets to know what it wants to be or rather it is (which is the same) only in relation to the national
other: “[i]t is in the other, by [par] the other, that desire is named. It enters into the symbolic
relation of I and you, in a relation of mutual recognition and transcendence.”144 To invoke
Burke’s idea of the cycle of guilt/pollution (or the lacking self), purification (from one’s own
mistakes or, more frequently, the other) and redemption (of the perfect self), purification as a
mechanism of the subject’s enjoyment results in a symptomatic redemption of the ideal national
self often at the expense of the national other.145 The lacking nature of the national subject,
which can be understood both in terms of depravity and contamination, is emphasized in the
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Discourse of the Hysteric and the apocalyptic character of the tragic national vision (all of which
I will discuss later in this chapter).
The myth of the apocalyptic regeneration highlights the symptomatic character of the
tragic national fantasy. The apocalyptic national narrative owns its consistency and, more so, its
very existence to the national symptom – the national other. The latter, speaking in Burke’s
terms, pollutes the national subject constraining its “true” potential. Remarkably, having
conceived of the national enemy as a force from the outside, more precisely, the force that must
be held accountable for the national subject’s imperfections, the national subject is able to see
itself as always already ideal. And the symptomatic analysis of such dynamics constitutes the
first step of a psycho-rhetorical reading of national fantasy.
It is important to stress that the national subject thinks of itself (the ego) as the already
ideal self (the ideal ego) since there is somebody else to take all the blame for everything less
than ideal in him. As we shall see in the upcoming analysis, most national narratives in Russia
are permeated by longing for political, military, economic, moral and physical greatness. Yet, at
the same time there was almost no moment in the history of the Russian idea (which I discuss in
Chapter Three) when most national subjects thought of Russia as less than prominent.146 There
was always the national other (most recently the national other has been predominantly the West,
including the U.S. and countries of Western Europe) whose presence simultaneously amplified
and resolved Russia’s national desire.
To sum up briefly, the objet a is what sets the mechanism of affective signification in
motion, and symptom is a product of signification, presented in cryptic form. Although the objet
a and symptom are not the same concepts, they are all in one place – they occupy the place of the
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subject’s truth: “It is the truth of what his desire has been in his history that the subject cries out
through his symptom.”147 Lack (the signifier of which is the objet a) stems from the disparity
between the non-discursive and the discursive and incites the subject’s desire to close this gap.
The ultimate impossibility of such operation is traumatic and therefore removed from the
subject’s consciousness. The repressed, “censored” truth of the subject’s lack returns as
symptom.148
Lacan’s concepts of lack, desire, the objet a, and symptom, as well as Burke’s principle
of perfection and the cycle of guilt-purification-redemption, help theorize the subject
ontologically, epistemologically and ethically. Ontologically speaking, the subject maneuvers
defensively and thus constitutively between the Real as the sensible and the Real as the
impossible in pursuit of certainty. From an epistemological point of view, a conscious idea is an
idea that the subject has of others and therefore of himself: what the subject “[heard] and [said],
in her own way,… [is] her symptom.”149 However, what the subject knows of him/herself is not
the subject himself: who the subject knows “is something else – a particular object within the
experience of the subject.”150 This particular object qua ego is a stand-in for the objet a, a place
or a signifier of lack, which compulsively perpetuates the subject’s action or unwitting
movement toward certainty.
The corresponding notions of Burke’s action and Lacan’s psychoanalytic act are ethical
concepts, since action/act “involves character, which involves choice; and the form of choice
attains its perfection in the distinction between Yes and No.”151 As I explain below, when
discussing a symbolic strategy of the obsessive neurotic, this choice, however cynical it may be,
147

Lacan, Écrits 413.
Lacan, Écrits 215.
149
Lacan, Seminar, Book I 36.
150
Lacan, Seminar, Book II 44.
151
Burke, Rhetoric of Religion 41.
148

70

is not necessarily a conscious action, which makes it no less a matter of ethics. The action/act in
question is an act of speech, since only by speaking can the subject gain an idea of him/herself
and his/her relation to the other: “speech is the founding medium of the intersubjective relation,
and what retroactively modifies the two subjects. It is speech which, literally, creates what
installs them in that dimension of being I try to get you to glimpse.”152 This dimension of being
or meaning, as Lacan insists, is the space of truth: “[meaning] is not that it is affirmed as truth,
but rather that it introduces the dimension of truth into the real.”153 The above consideration of
concepts of action/act, choice, and truth lead me directly into a discussion of Lacan’s and
Burke’s ethics as they meld together to generate robust conversations about ideology, in general,
and a rewarding discussion of national identity construction, in particular.

2.7

Attitude and Fantasy-Frames: A Lacanian-Burkean Ethical Framework

As I hinted throughout the chapter, lacking certainty and thus chasing after it, the national
subject has no choice but to make a choice of an attitude, which endows him with some idea of
unity.154 Stated otherwise, the national subject acts, and this action, according to Lacan and
Burke, occurs in the space between tragedy and comedy. Despite the terminological mismatch
between Lacan’s and Burke’s tragedy and comedy (what Lacan calls tragedy is Burke’s comedy,
while Lacan’s comedy corresponds with Burke’s tragedy), both ethical accounts of the subject
152
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are surprisingly similar. Lacan’s comedy and Burke’s tragedy comprise what I call a tragic
ethical category of the national fantasy as a flight from the unredeemable uncertainty of the
human condition: “life slips away, runs off, escapes all those barriers that oppose it, including
precisely those that are the most essential, those that are constituted by the agency of the
signifier.”155
Tragic national narratives mitigate the traumatic effects of the Real as the sensible (the
tension between the subject’s Innenwelt and the Umwelt) and the Real as the impossible (the
incompatibility between the Real and the signifier) by consuming the least ethical energy to
sustain the national self as ideal. Tragic attitude is a question of “[the] fundamental failure of
[action] to catch up with [desire],” a failed attempt to recognize the nature of desire as always
hungry for something else.156 In this sense, tragic national fantasy is what Burke refers to as “the
attitude of ‘happy stupidity’ whereby the gravity of life fails to register.”157
A traumatic effect of lack brought about by the Real as the sensible and the Real as the
impossible is a source of paranoia: “[When] the subject makes himself an object by striking a
pose before the mirror, he/she could not possibly be satisfied with it, since even if he/she
achieved his/her most perfect likeness in that image, it would still be the jouissance of the other
that he/she would cause to be recognized in it.”158 Aggressive and ruthless instances of national
tragedy as remnants of the primal narcissism are directed toward masking the nation’s substantial
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void by telling compelling narratives about the national self and the national other. When the
national subject understands itself literally, that is, when it takes its conscious knowledge at face
value, the national subject tends to think of itself not simply in relation to but against the national
other. In tragic national fantasy/attitude the national other is perceived as the one who is guilty of
lack in the national subject and thus must be rid of, to be killed symbolically or physically. More
specifically, in tragic fantasy lack is always presented as loss.
Lacan points out that the mechanism of “mourning [explicates the process of]…the
constitution of the object in desire” in a sense that “only insofar as the object of [the subject’s]
desire has become an impossible object can it become once more the object of his desire.”159 I
further propose to use the concept of mourning as a persistent attachment to the lost object to
explain the distinctiveness of national tragedy: the national other is envisioned as a perpetrator
who steals something from the national subject, thereby rendering it incomplete. Having
conceived the tragic national fantasy as mourning, I reverse Freud’s understanding of mourning
as healthy and melancholy as pathological forms of affective attachment. The way Freud
conceives of melancholy is how I theorize tragic mourning: it is “the love for the object…[that]
takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation on this substitute
object….The self-tormenting [in mourning]…is without doubt enjoyable….”160 Similarly Žižek’s
version of melancholy accurately conveys my understanding of mourning as a tragic attitude of
loss: “insofar as the object-cause of desire is originally, in a constitutive way, lacking, [this
attitude] interprets…lack as a loss, as if the lacking object was once possessed and then lost.”161
The tragic national subject never thinks it lacks anything, while simultaneously
suspecting that its enjoyment is limited by the national other. When viewed from tragically, the
159
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national other is perceived as unequivocal evil, that is, inhumane, omnipotent, and ubiquitous:
“Unlike the rest of us, the enemy is not caught in the toils of the vast mechanism of history,
himself a victim of his past, his desires, his limitations. He is a free, active, demonic agent.”162
The national other always seems to be enjoying itself better, because it has purportedly taken
away what rightfully belongs to the national self.163 Paranoid tragedy as mourning allows the
national subject to supposedly return “to something you thought you [had] but couldn’t quite
account for.”164 It also is foundational of “the phantasmatic politics of the ‘[a]s if.’”165 While for
Barbara Biesecker the melancholic subject in a paranoid fashion anticipates the supposedly
imminent loss of a cherished object of desire, I think of such subject as the one who mourns
his/her pretend loss. In my view, tragic mourning is exactly “this determined, determining, and
dangerous rhetoric” that Biesecker warns about.166 By translating the trauma of lack as loss the
tragic national subject comes to (mis)recognize itself as a united, or certain subject: mourning as
an attitude of loss “obfuscates…that [it] is lacking from the very beginning, that its emergence
coincides with its lack....”167
As a product of “the dialectic of jealousy,” or the paranoid jealousy of the image of the
other, and the overwhelming suspicion of the Other’s desire, articulated in the ultimate question
to the Other – “Che vuoi?,” tragic mourning is thoroughly conspiratorial.168 As a comparatively
fixed narrative, conspiracy arranges separate and ambiguous events and their participants in a
162

Hofstadter 32.
For an application of the Lacanian dialectic of enjoyment, see McGowan.
164
Marcus17.
165
Biesecker, “No Time for Mourning” 156.
166
Ibid. Both Žižek and Biesecker rely on Freud’s opposition between pathological melancholy and healthy
mourning, as well as Giorgio Agamben’s discussion of melancholy. Agamben, Stanzas, especially chapters 3-5.
167
Here I reconsider Žižek’s views on melancholy as an “unconditional fixation on the lost object, in a way
possesses it in its very loss.” Unlike Žižek, I associate an attitude of lack with melancholy and an attitude of loss
with mourning. Žižek, “Melancholy and the Act” 660.
168
Lacan, Seminar, Book III 39. Lacan differentiates between the (small) other and the (big) Other. The
former is a spectral counterpart, or another human being whose image draws the subject’s attention; as such the
other belongs to the level of the Imaginary. The latter must be understood in the context of the affective dimension
of the Symbolic as a fellow speaking being, whose desire both intrigues and frustrates the subject.
163

74

single narrative – exaggerated, “overheated, oversuspicious, overaggressive, grandiose, and
apocalyptic in expression.”169 In such a narrative the national subject suffers cruel persecutions
for “[its] political passions [that] are unselfish and patriotic”; conspiratorial discourse “goes far
to intensify [its] feeling of righteousness and [its] moral indignation.”170
What Richard Hofstadter calls the paranoid style is truly pervasive: “it represents an old
and recurrent mode of expression in our life which has frequently been linked with movements
of suspicious discontent and whose content remains much the same even when it is adopted by
men of distinctly different purposes.”171 As scholars of conspiracy theories and conspiracy
rhetoric point out, the paranoid style has become a staple of mainstream sociopolitical discourse
notwithstanding its location.172 With regard to Russian political culture, George E. Marcus notes
that “[c]onspiracy discourse has long been a popular gambit in Russian politics, and between the
folklore for all things Decembrist, Masonic, Bolshevik, and Stalinist, it would seem at times that
Russia invented the genre.”173 Indeed, there have always been those (e.g., immigrants from the
North Caucasus or capitalists in the U.S.) who, in the eyes of the Russians, have attempted to
appropriate what the Russians have always had, be that economic well-being - one of the
common sentiments among the Russians is that illegal labor immigrants earn more than local
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Russians or great power status. Throughout years many Russians have preferred to think about
themselves as a powerful, intellectually and spiritually superior nation.
Although Hofstadter conceives of the paranoid style as “political pathology,” tragic
paranoia, however, is not a “pathologized ailment” akin to psychosis.174 As I mentioned briefly
above and promised to explicate further in Chapter Four, to be qualified as psychotic the subject
must experience a radical break between the three registers of the psychic experience: the
Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real. In psychosis the Symbolic halts its function, and the
Imaginary remains the psychotic’s only, albeit radically inadequate and unstable, means to
structure his/her reality.175 The national subject may exhibit paranoid behavior, but it does not
possess the structure of the psychotic. Tragic mourning as often paranoid national
fantasy/attitude must not be diagnosed as pathological abnormality: after all, as Lacan
emphasizes, paranoiac tendency as “the behavior of everyone” is the remnant of “the paranoiac
structure of the ego,” and also incited by the fact that the subject’s desire is the desire of the
Other.176 Instead, the paranoid style of national tragedy is ethically problematic: “[what]
underlies [hateful] remarks [is] not madness, but [an]...ideology.”177 In this case, the tragic
national subject should accept responsibility for its attempted literality, or its desire to equal its
mark, “[to be] a pure sign, that is to say, obscene.”178
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The obscene lure of tragic paranoia emerges from retroactively “stringing together the
anomalies of a troubling situation into a coherent narrative.”179 In fact, paranoid stories and
conspiratorial narratives as examples of tragic fantasy are excessively coherent, which, however,
should not be confused with their logical validity:
[the paranoid mentality] is nothing if not coherent – in fact, [it] is far more
coherent than the real world, since it leaves no room for mistakes, failures, or
ambiguities. It is, if not wholly rational, at least intensely rationalistic; it believes
that it is up against an enemy who is as infallibly rational as he is totally evil, and
it seeks to match his imputed total competence with its own leaving nothing
unexplained and comprehending all of reality in on overreaching, consistent
theory.180
By carefully collecting details, putting forward defensible assumptions, but then leaping to
staggering and baseless conclusions to compose a seemingly compelling narrative about the
national other as “a perfect model of malice, a kind of amoral superman[,] sinister, ubiquitous,
powerful, cruel, sensual, luxury-loving,” the national subject takes the easiest way out of “the
least stupidity,…sublime stupidity” of the human condition.181 The latter is what comic fantasy
aspires to, while tragic fantasy protects the national subject from the knowledge that “the
signifier [that] is stupid,” or the very negativity of subjectivity.182 By masking its originary
indeterminacy at the expense of the national other, the national subject unwittingly masks the
sublime stupidity of its savoir only to give in to the happy stupidity of its méconnaissance.
179
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As I demonstrate, for example, in the analysis of the national fantasy of Russian neofascists in Chapter Four, the issue to (ir)rationality is prominently featured in their tragic
narrative. The whole psycho-rhetorical narrative of Russian neo-fascists is permeated with the
theme of the grotesque contradiction. Besides, Russian neo-fascists also claim to defend both the
supposed rationality of the neo-fascist argument and the purported power of their ideological
views, which are meant to invoke the strongest emotional reaction, rather than invite thoughtful
consideration. Such claims apparently do not preclude Russian neo-fascists from believing in a
supposedly coherent national story.
“[N]ourished in the imaginative dimension,” the tragic attitude (just as any other national
fantasy for that matter) does not even need to be evaluated either in terms of narrative coherence
or factual fidelity.183 “[Forging] ahead into the storm-clouds...toward [the] mirage” of “this so
precious completeness,” the national subject narrates a story that, even if coherent and rational, is
not, contra Walter Fisher, any more ethical.184 Factual accuracy of tragic claims about crimes of
the national other does not render them just from a Lacanian-Burkean point of view: “even if
most of the Nazi claims about the Jews were true...their anti-Semitism would still be (and was)
[problematic] - because it represses the true reason the Nazis needed anti-Semitism in order to
sustain their ideological position.”185 This truth that the tragic national subject rejects is the truth
of its founding negativity.
Considering that the primal narcissism as an aggressive impulse to coincide with itself in
a literal, obscene way underpins the national subject, it is fair to conclude that, as noted above,
the national subject is susceptible to tragedy. A far greater restraint is required to resist “the
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egoism of happiness” and to build oneself comically instead.186 While the tropological
mechanism of subjectivation functions to translate lack into loss, it also leaves the subject with
an opportunity to lay bare the subject’s lack.187
Whereas tragedy (that subsumes Burke’s tragedy and Lacan’s comedy) is “the triumph of
life,” comedy (that comprises Burke’s comedy and Lacan’s tragedy) is the triumph of death,
more precisely “a triumph of being-for-death.”188 In contrast to tragedy, the ultimate attitude of
“humane enlightenment,” as Burke calls comedy, translates transgressions from the category of
mourning, or “the positivization of a void or lack,” into the category of the melancholic lack, the
ultimate negativity.189 To stir away from tragic mourning, one must view mistakes made by
oneself or others (e.g., problems with, or “mistakes” of, labor laws to which some would
attribute an influx of illegal immigrants in Russia) not as something that could be expelled from
the social order or ignored, but as an uneasy reminder that the national subject is always
imperfect or lacking. This is an attitude of comic melancholy. Following it, an influx of illegal
immigrants, for example, must be regarded as problematic not due to the presence of immigrants,
which runs against the law, disrupts the established order, inaugurating the feeling of loss, but
because they are an easy target, an obvious scapegoat in a society, or, in other words, a repressed
embodiment of the permanent identity lack.
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According to Burke, comedy is inherently humane and self-reflective, as it reinvents the
evil villain as the mistaken fool and reminds us that being mistaken is a necessary human
condition. Despite Burke’s disclaimer that the comic is not a passive or ambivalent attitude, for
quite a few scholars comedy is radically relative, uncertain and indifferent, and thus morally
suspect.190 When the nation constitutes the national other and the national self comically, treating
everybody as equals, in their humane blindness comedy supposedly leads to “the paralysis of
indecision or self-doubt,” “[disarms] the self when confronting genuine threat and wrongdoing,”
or, as Žižek puts it, results in a decaffeinated fantasy with “the Other deprived of its
Otherness.”191
To deal with the supposed blind spot of comic ethics, Celeste Condit, Herbert Simons,
Gregory Desilet and Edward Appel stress the need for Burke’s theory of the comic to become an
adequate tool for ideological rhetorical criticism, when one is able to express his/her warrantable
outrage. Condit introduces a tragicomic attitude, which “transcends Burke’s preference for the
comedic, by a adopting a realistic attitude, rather than a farcical or merely ironic one.”192 In her
attempts to solve the problem of the alleged passivity of the comic, Condit reads the comic as
humorous against the explicit distinction drawn by Burke between high comedy and humor: the
former takes “the gravity of life” seriously, while the latter is often childish and happy in its
stupidity.193
Similarly to Condit, Desilet and Appel suggest one should “adopt rhetorically tragic
structurings of conflict [with its protagonist and antagonist]...while nevertheless [maintaining] an
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underlying attitude broadly consistent with the comic frame.”194 Calling for a more ideologically
appropriate attitude, the scholars end up reducing their proposed tragicomic frame to an issue of
argumentative practice, by differentiating between “blustering and dehumanizing name-calling”
as a property of tragedy and “evidence and explanation” as a feature of the comic.195 Another
attempt to improve on Burke’s concept of comic self-reflection belongs to Simons, who advised
the rhetorical critic “to proceed intellectually from righteous indignation, through comedic selfexamination, to warrantable outrage.”196 In other words, the scholar proposes starting with
tragedy, moving through comedy until one finally reaches the level of ideology critique. This
solution is somewhat akin to Desilet and Appel’s call for unbridled yet mature judgment
tempered by a comic attitude, which implies an ability to both stand up for what is right and
preserve the human essence of the perceived foe.
While most scholars who read Burke advertise the need for some tragedy in Burke’s
comedy, Camille Lewis insists that Burke’s notion of the comic, complemented with Chantal
Mouffe’s idea of the essential agonism of the political, acknowledges the very necessity of the
constitutive outside and a healthy distance between the self and its adversarial other (this view is
reminiscent of Desilet and Appel’s warrantable outrage).197 This agonistic approach to reality
presents the rhetorical critic with, as Burke would say, a well-rounded apparatus: one does not
have to ignore or silence others, but maintain a productive tension with adversaries instead.
As Burke urges us to “to be observers of [one]selves, while acting…by noting [our] own
foibles,” Lacan’s ethical ideal seems to be more extreme.198 It culminates in the maxim ne pas
194

Desilet and Appel 356.
Desilet and Appel 357 (note 8).
196
Simons, n.p. (original emphasis).
197
For more on the role of the constitutive other/outside, in addition to Burke and Mouffe, see Butler;
Cloud, “Foiling the Intellectuals”; Davis; Henderson, “Postmodern Burke”; Laclau; Murray; Gunn and Treat; Žižek,
Enjoy Your Symptom!.
198
Burke, Attitudes toward History 171.
195

81

céder sur son désir (“do not give way on your desire”), or what Alenka Zupančič calls the
“heroism of the lack.”199 Subsumed by the insatiable urge to enjoy the presumed fullness of the
self, the national subject must not compromise its desire by entertaining any fantasy of the united
national self. As Simon Critchley fairly points out, formulated as such, Lacan’s ethical maxim is
“too Catharistic, too pure, too decanted, too clean, too heroic.”200
Indeed, Lacan’s ethics has one τέλος (“goal”): it aims at “the purgation of the τιαθηματα,
the emotions of fear [of one’s own misfortune] and pity” for the misery of a fellow human
being.201 “[T]he bourgeois dream” of happiness, as Lacan insists, is political and unethical:
the service of good or the shift of the demand for happiness onto the political
stage has its consequences. The movement that the world we live in is caught up
in, of wanting to establish the universal spread of the service of good as far as
conceivably possible, implies an amputation, sacrifices, indeed a kind of
puritanism in the relationship to desire….202
The tragic pursuit of desire runs against the good and happiness, but the end result is death (as
noted above, the death of the body and/or the death of being) when we “pay the [highest] price
for access to desire.”203 While Lacan does not spend much time elucidating it clearly, he
acknowledges that the radical fidelity to lack is an ideal to aspire for, but not to reach. Life must
run away from happy complicity in loss toward “the [grave] sense of life,” rather than drive the
subject to his/her grave.204 This is why Lacan calls tragicomedy the place “where the experience
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of human action resides”: a politically progressive way to enjoy national fantasy/attitude is to
maintain an attitude on the edge of death, falling short of it.205
For both Lacan and Burke a truly ethical stance in life is much more than mere
acceptance of the burden of earthly life, more than a belief in unspeakable desire. One must not
only reveal the truth about desire, or the ultimate lack of being, but rather, without taking a
cynical position, embrace an attitude of “a very old γνωθι σαυτον” (“know thyself”), or what
Burke refers to as “maximum consciousness,” thus affirming the very productivity of mourning
lack.206 In this particular sense Lacan’s knowledge and Burke’s consciousness are not conscious
méconnaissance or unconscious savoir, but the subject’s moral philosophy or posture of humility
and shame. Just like Burke, who contraposes humility to self-glorification, Lacan talks about
“true humility” as welcoming of the subject’s incompleteness, as “an act in which he cannot help
but become a being of flesh and…a slave to pleasure.”207 As a result of this act, Lacan adds, the
subject experiences “an outlandish shame of living”; he/she is “dying of shame” for
compromising his/her desire with fantasies.208 Speaking of the national subject, to accomplish
this “humility” it must, first, recognize occasions when the national subject constitutes itself at
the expense of the national other and, second, to assume responsibility for such an operation of
national fantasy/attitude. Since national narratives are always fantasmatic (due to “desire’s
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incompatibility with speech”), the task of the critic is to evaluate as to how fully they articulate
the truth about desire.209
To reiterate, the blended Lacanian-Burkean ethical system as described above leans on
two pillars: tragic mourning and comic melancholy. A fantasy/attitude of loss can be viewed as
a typical feature of extreme ethnic/cultural nationalist rhetoric, while a fantasy/attitude of lack
can be regarded as characteristic of civic nationalist discourse. Between these two modes of
enjoyment of national unity the former is the most hazardous, since it functions by (often violent)
expulsion of the national other.210 As two radically opposite attitudes toward the national other
and thereby the national self, tragic mourning and comic melancholy create the tragicomic
continuum along which exists a whole range of particular forms of national fantasies/attitudes. In
addition to tragedy and comedy, these forms include epic, elegiac, satiric, burlesque, and
grotesque frames.
The epic frame, as Burke puts it, “‘[a]dvertis[es]’ courage and individual sacrifice for
group advantage.”211 In its tragic variant, epic depicts the world in primitive terms – as a standoff
with the national enemy, and therefore promotes “the rigors of war ([as] the basis of the
[nation’s] success) by magnifying the role of warlike hero.”212 For example, such is the position
of Russian neo-fascists who consider war to be necessary and even desirable. It is in war that the
national subject can purportedly see itself as deific, or complete. Conversely, if “humility and
self-glorification work together,” the national subject is likely to be a hero of the comic epic.213
The comic national hero possesses “the sense of one’s limitations (in comparison with the
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mighty figure of the legend)…, while his vicarious kinship with the figure gives him the
distinction necessary for the needs of self-justification.”214 Just like Achilles, who has a
vulnerable spot, as Burke stresses, so does the humble, comic hero have foibles that he/she cares
to admit in a self-reflective, enlightened manner: “This sense of a flaw serves happily to promote
an openness to a realistic admonition – the invitation to seek the flaw in oneself promotes in the
end the attitude of resignation, which, when backed by a well-rounded symbolic structure, is
nothing other than the inventory of one’s personal limits.”215
Elegy is of particular importance in the Lacanian-Burkean study of national identity
negotiation, since, as either a mournful or melancholic lament, that is, in a tragic or comic form,
the elegiac frame demonstrates the very structure of the subject’s fantasy – the subject’s pursuit
for the part of itself that is perceived as temporarily lost or recognized as permanently lacking.
“[O]nce a man has perfected a technique of complaint, he is more at home with sorrow than he
would be without it,” because the life of the speaking subject is the very expression of grief or
sadness that the forced choice of castration imposed on the human being.216 When discussed in a
more specific context, that is, in terms of the Imaginary, the comic plaint is galvanized by the
spirit of “ironic humility” or the awareness of one’s own incomplete, or flawed, nature.217 In the
tragic elegy the subject’s misfortune is interpreted as necessarily unfair and misplaced.
The satiric frame highlights another aspect of the affective organization of the speaking
subject – desire for identity fullness, or, in Burke’s terms, the “entelechial” principle. Unlike the
tragedy, tragically inspired epic and elegy, all of which pursue maximum coherence, or unity, of
the national self by either expelling or conquering the foreign other, satire functions as a ridicule
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of the very perfectionist aspirations. Satire ironically leads to the least desired results within the
tragic worldview – the proliferation of mistakes and the amplification of flaws, thus further
exposing the lacking, deficient nature of the human being: “[t]he satirist can set up a situation
whereby his text can ironically advocate the very ills that are depressing us—nay more, he can
‘perfect’ his presentation by a fantastic rationale that calls for still more of the maladjustments
now besetting us.”218 While striving for perfection, or Utopia - an ideal, absolute, yet nonexistent
place, or, in Burke’s terms, No-Place - the human being can only arrive at Utopia-in-reverse: “It
is thus that satire can embody the entelechial principle. But it does so perversely, by tracking
down possibilities or implications to the point where the result is a kind of Utopia-in-reverse.”219
Depending on whether the Lacanian-Burkean ethical principle of not giving up on desire is taken
into account, one can speak either about the sympathetic mockery or the contemptuous attack on
others through irony and ridicule.
While tragedy banks on the perceived coherence of national narrative, satire relies on “an
excess of consistency” as an ironic attempt at perfection. In this vein, Burke further discusses the
burlesque and the grotesque in such terms as absurdity and incongruity. The burlesque functions
as a funny caricature and the grotesque is a “gargoyle-thinking,” “incongruity without the
laughter.”220 To make the distinction between the burlesque and the grotesque clearer, Burke
adds that “[t]he grotesque is not funny unless you are out of sympathy with it (whereby it serves
as unintentional burlesque).”221
As we shall see, against Burke’s admonition that one should not “select [the tragic
burlesque] as the pièce de résistance for a steady diet,” both Russian neo-fascists and Kremlin218
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backed “anti-fascists” consistently gratify themselves with a heartless caricature of Russia’s
supposed enemies.222 On the other hand, the comic burlesque as the ultimate perspective by
incongruity, can function, for example, to counter oppressive power.223 As the comically-moved
burlesque verges toward what Lacan calls la bêtise, or the stupidity of the signifier, attempts are
made to render privileged signifiers unintelligible or stupid, thus allowing chains of signifiers to
unpredictably unfold and mutate, which, in its turn, invites a wide range of unexpected
interpretations and reactions. 224 The burlesque, however, often risks being too obscure to
produce the desired effect. Among such burlesque performances are the mock demonstrations
that take place in Russia almost every year on May 1. Dressed in odd costumes and carrying
posters with apolitical and absurd slogans, participants in these monstrations playfully challenge
the absence of space for civic action in the country.
The grotesque too has a comic potential to “[suspend] the subject’s certainties” nourished
in coherent tragic narratives.225 This potential, however, is not realized in the tragic grotesque of
Russian neo-fascists, Putin and pro-Putin “anti-fascists,” who, only having rejected the
legitimacy of nationalist aspirations in former Soviet republics, view them with “brotherly”
affection. In the comic grotesque one accepts contradictions, rather than trying to resolve them.
For example, in efforts to build sincerely intimate ties with neighboring countries, Russian
national subjects have to aknowledge the desire of former Soviet republics for independence
from Russia.
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2.8

The Imaginary and the Symbolic Levels of a Psycho-Rhetorical Analysis of the
Nation

As Lacan’s and Burke’s ontological, epistemological and ethical considerations
complement and counterbalance each other, both theories provide the rhetorical critic with tools
conducive for a psycho-rhetorical reading of national fantasy/attitude. A concept of the ultimate
motive people live by, or desire they follow, is a focal point of the present Lacanian-Burkean
ideological criticism. Desire, or motive, is not something tangible or positive. Born in the tension
between the non-discursive and the discursive, desire is neither a property of the Real nor is it
purely Symbolic; it can be said to reside in the dimension of the symbolic Real.226 Desire rises
from the real of the body, but only in the Symbolic, “only once it is formulated, named in the
presence of the other, that desire, whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term”; only
then desire is “authentically integrated on the symbolic plane.”227 Formulated as such, desire
presents the subject with the opportunity to live, which is the same thing as to live
fantasmatically and ideologically.228 As the locus of desire, the subject lives in the split between
unconscious and conscious knowledge and thus is constituted in a multitude of partisan social,
political and cultural ways.
Since the poetic or tropological function of language provides the subject’s desire with its
mechanism or structure (discussed above as the objet a), desire as an effect of the tension
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between the non-discursive and the discursive cannot be manifested in language fully. Desire is
always misrecognized or repressed from the conscious, from speech. Nevertheless, speech is
where criticism begins: analytic experience, says Lacan, “has but one medium - the [subject’s]
speech.”229 Conceived as such, the proposed Lacanian-Burkean analysis of nationalisms is
ultimately a close textural reading of competing national narratives. As Lacan warns, however, a
reading of the Imaginary, “far from representing the core of analytic experience, give us nothing
of any consistency unless [images] are related to the symbolic chain that binds and orients
them.”230 In short, ideological criticism must proceed from an analysis of imaginary appearances
of the ultimate motive to an exploration of symbolic structures of desire.
Although an extensive theoretical base that Lacan builds in his seminars presents the
critic with a multitude of methodological options for an ideological reading of the subject as split
between conscious knowledge and the unconscious, they are not equal in analytic strength
relative to certain research agendas. Considering the question of nationhood, close attention to
Burke’s theory of motives allows recognizing a couple of Lacan’s concepts essential for a
rigorous ideological critic of national identity negotiation: symptom and the objet a. James
Jasinski, following Gerard Hauser, notes that Burke conceptualizes motive in an inconsistent
manner: as a psychological concept and a linguistic notion.231 In the first case, motives are
“synonymous with the structural way in which [the subject] puts events and values together,”
which he/she is not conscious of doing.232 In the second instance, the linguistic concept of
motive (which derivates from the psychological one) stands for people’s vocabularies as cultural
229
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principles and values which orient people in particular situations. Motive as “a vocabulary
concept can be observed,” while motive as “a psychological concept...must be inferred” from the
former.233
There is, however, nothing “elusive” in Burke’s theory of motives.234 Psychological and
linguistic motives are the two dimensions of the ultimate motive qua desire: the Symbolic and
the Imaginary. Psychological motive stands for the structure of the unconscious dynamics of
desire, while linguistic motive is a context-specific manifestation of the workings of the structure
of the ultimate motive in speech. Psychological motive and linguistic motive are made of the
same cloth: the former cannot be located anywhere else but in language, while the latter is an
effect of the former. Understood as such, Burke’s linguistic motive functions as Lacan’s
symptom, while Burke’s psychological motive draws attention to the objet a.
To put the above considerations of fantasy, motives, symptom, and the objet a in
methodological terms, the object of the present ideological criticism is national ideology,
presented by national fantasies of Putin, Nashi, Antifa, and neo-fascists, which I approach first
symptomatically and then by focusing on the position of the national subject in relation to the
objet a. Since in my reading of competing national fantasies I attend to rhetorical and
psychological motives, I refer to the proposed method of analysis as psycho-rhetorical.
Just as psychoanalysis starts by listening to the analysand’s empty speech, or the “here and now”
of the subject’s desire to coincide with an ideal image of the self, and aims to eventually inspire
the analysand to speak truthfully about his/her lack, so does the proposed Lacanian-Burkean
ethical critique of nationalisms begin with a symptomatic reading and searches for a moment
when full speech of the national subject emerges:
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full speech…realises the truth of the subject, empty speech [is]…what he has to
do hic et nunc with his analyst, in which the subject loses himself in the
machinations of the system of language, in the labyrinth of referential systems
made available to him by the state of cultural affairs to which he is a more or less
interested party. Between these two extremes, a whole gamut of modes of
realisation of speech is deployed.235
To reach this moment the critic engages in a symptomatic reading of Burke’s frames, which
momentarily “fix attitudes” of lack and loss, thus making the ultimate motive vicariously
readable within a cultural and sociopolitical context.236 One may say that, being at the joint of the
Imaginary and the Symbolic, frame permits the critic to make preliminary judgments about
national attitude as it takes various forms on a scale from most ethically animated to most
ethically exhausted.237

2.8.1 The Imaginary: A Symptom as a Linguistic Motive

By zooming in on Burke’s frames I read national symptoms as “the [product] of
repression itself,” that is, manifestations of the repressed and thus unconscious desire to cover
lack.238 An interpretation of symptoms as “imaginary impregnations (Prägung) in the
partializations of the symbolic alternative” shows how exactly each national subject visualizes its
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national other and the national self: as a comic hero, a tragic villain, an object of the tragic
burlesque and so on.239 As such, symptoms are nothing but oblique traces of the truth of lack.
The psychoanalytic symptom differs from medical symptoms in a sense that the latter
appear intermittently and can be rid of upon recovery. The psychoanalytic symptom is not a
pathology, but “language from which speech must be delivered.”240 What the subject consciously
knows and says about him/herself (the ego) and others (the specular other/ideal ego) is
symptomatic of the ultimate truth of his/her being. In this sense, symptom, understood as “the
constitutive condition” of the subject’s reality, cannot disappear completely: after all, “if this
void [in the place of the objet a] becomes visible as such, reality [of the subject]
disintegrates.”241
Nevertheless, psychoanalysis involves “interpretation of meaning” of symptoms - an
enterprise rather distinct in its operation and goal from “interpretation of resistances” in egopsychology and ego-psychoanalysis: “If, then, the analyst gave the subject the solution [mot] to
his symptom, but the symptom persisted, it was because the subject resisted recognizing its
meaning: analysis thus concluded that it was this resistance that must, above all, be analyzed.”242
According to Lacan, by focusing on the ego’s resistance or the question of why the subject
resists resolving his/her symptom, ego-psychology and ego-psychoanalysis aims at
“psychological normalization [that] implies what might be called rationalizing moralization,”
and thus endorses “the bourgeois dream” of happiness.243 Burke too believes that an analysis of
resistances of the ego provides the subject with just another misconception or méconnaissance of
the self: an emphasis on the ego “would tend to accuse a man of self-deceptive rationalization...,
239
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whereas any set of [symptoms] is but part of a larger implicit or explicit rationalization regarding
human purpose as a whole.”244
As the upcoming analysis of the four competing national narratives reveals, national
fantasies of Putin, Nashi, and neo-fascists tend toward the pole of tragic mourning, while Antifa
predominantly maintains an attitude of comic melancholy. What is more peculiar, however, that
notwithstanding what kind of frames – any from tragic to comic frames – each national subject
adopts, it embraces Russia’s anti-fascist past as foundational of its present national self (and antifascism as radical opposition to exclusivity fits a comic frame).245
The interplay of the narratives about the past and the present is in the heart of Homi
Bhabha’s theory of the nation as the double time. Influenced by Lacan’s theory of the split
subject between the Imaginary and the Symbolic (among many other theories), Bhabha models
his nation as divided between the pedagogical and the performative: he talks about “the people”
as the “double-writing or dissemi-nation.”246 On the one hand, he claims, there is the pedagogical
- “the historical ‘objects’ of a nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is
based on the pre-given or constituted historical origin in the past.”247 On the other hand, the
performative includes “the prodigious, living principles of the people as contemporaneity: as that
sign of the present through which national life is redeemed and iterated as a reproductive
process.”248 As Bhabha explains, the pedagogical is a “discourse of irrationality,” whereas the
performative is a language of “progress and modernity.”249 Conceived as such, the pedagogical
and the performative are two distinct – roughly speaking, rational and irrational – narratives that
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provide the national subject with a complete idea of the national self: “the subject of cultural
discourse - the agency of a people - is split in the discursive ambivalence that emerges in the
contest of narrative authority between the pedagogical and the performative.”250
Guided by Bhabha’s theory of the nation understood as a competition between the
purportedly irrational, or mythical, past of the nation and the supposedly rational justification of
the nation’s present actions, it is, however, hard to explain how, for example, Nashi uses a comic
memory of Russia’s past to justify its tragic image of modern Russia. This is the case, in part,
due to the theoretical latitude of Bhabha’s interpretation of the Imaginary and the Symbolic.
Bhabha’s pedagogical, which, for instance, points to memories of Russia’s past, Bhabha’s
performative, which can be viewed as images of Russia’s present, as well as, more generally
speaking, Bhabha’s agency of a people, exemplified in the idea of Russianness, all comprise the
Imaginary.
Contra Bhabha, the pedagogical is unable to challenge the performative in its narrative
authority since the former is always a product of the latter. As the pedagogical, national images
of the past and the present (as well as the future) can and do only conceal their constitutive
dependence on the Symbolic mechanism of affective signification. Since Bhabha’s idiosyncratic
application of Lacan’s concepts of the Imaginary and the Symbolic does not prove helpful in
resolving the aforementioned contradictions apparent in the national fantasies in question, I take
another close look at Lacan’s Symbolic and his theory of the Four Discourses. Lacan’s
discourses of the Master, the University, the Hysteric and the Analyst, I argue, allow us to see
how the simultaneous appeal to the comic history and the tragic presence of the nation can be
rhetorically rewarding and affectively satisfying for a national subject.
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2.8.2 The Symbolic: The Objet a as the Ultimate Motive and the Four Discourses

As Lacan warns, an analysis must necessarily descend to the symbolic level to reveal the
truth of the subject qua lack: “A signifier has meaning only through its relation to another
signifier. The truth of symptoms resides in this articulation” fueled by the objet a qua lack.251 A
further push toward full speech by distinguishing among four discursive positions, from which
the national subject performs its frames, is a must:
Look at the paradox of the analyst’s position from that moment on. It’s just at the
moment when the speech of the subject is at its fullest that I, the analyst, can
intervene. But I would be intervening in what? - in his discourse. Now, the more
intimate the discourse is for the subject, the more I focus on this discourse. But
the inverse is equally true. The emptier his discourse is, the more I too am led to
catch hold of the other, that is to say, led into doing what one does all the time, in
this famous analysis of the resistances, led into seeking out the beyond of his
discourse - a beyond, you’ll be careful to note, which is nowhere, the beyond that
the subject has to realise, but which he hasn’t, and that’s the point, realised, and
which is in consequence made up of my own projection, on the level on which the
subject is realising it at that moment.252
An inquiry into affective economies of Putin, Nashi, Antifa, and neo-fascists helps to see how
each national subject performs the meaning of Russianness juggling various and often logically
or ethically contradictory frames, one of which is necessarily a comic background of Russia’s
anti-fascist past. With this task in mind, I discuss the nation not simply as a product of a
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differential movement of signifiers, but also a question of strategic performance of national
enjoyment, or discourse, in relation to the national other as another enjoying subject.
Consideration of the notion of discourse draws attention to the function of separation.
Lacan claims that the subject truly becomes the subject only as he/she passes the symbolic stages
of alienation from the self and separation from his/her jouissance.253 First and foremost, the
subject is constituted differentially – vis-à-vis the unary signifier that marks another: “The
subject is nothing other than what slides in a chain of signifiers, whether he/she knows which
signifier he/she is the effect of or not. That effect – the subject - is the intermediary effect
between what characterizes a signifier and another signifier, namely, the fact that each of them,
each of them is an element.”254 For Lacan, however, the subject is not simply “dialectized” or
alienated from himself; it is also separated from himself. 255 In other words, the subject renounces
his/her unruly and unlimited jouissance (which always chases him down into the abyss of
madness or death) for the sake of a safer alternative granted by the unconscious mechanism of
the objet a.
While the concept of alienation underscores the tropological, figurative nature of
subjectivity, the notion of separation emphasizes an affective element of the process of
subjectivity production. As separated from his/her jouissance, the subject is a “dialectized
[product of signification] in the relation of the desire of the Other….” 256 Understood as such, the
subject is not just marked by the unary signifier in opposition to another unary signifier, but
presented (by the unary signifier) as a subject within a network of signifiers that mark many
other desiring subjects, each meaning being another limit to what and how the subject desires: “it
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is untrue to say that the signifier in the unconscious is open to all meanings. It constitutes the
subject in his freedom in relation to all meanings, but this does not mean that it is not determined
in it….”257
Precision with regard to the compound structure of the Symbolic allows focusing on
separation as the locus of the properly performative strength of the Symbolic. Leaning on J. L.
Austin’s concept of performative utterance, Lacan accentuates that, unlike the Imaginary, the
Symbolic performs; and to perform is “to act as” authority, “to give proof.”258 From this point of
view, the Symbolic acts on the Imaginary, while the Imaginary refers to the authority of the
Symbolic. To explore how the Symbolic structures the Imaginary I start by locating
psychological motive, or the objet a, in discourse, since motive is “a…reduced action, an
inhibited action, an incipient action, a little model of action.”259 Although in Chapter Four and
Chapter Five, where I analyze the linguistic and psychological motives of competing national
narratives of Russian neo-fascists, Nashi, Antifa, and Putin, I will be able to offer a more
substantive explication of the performative function of discourse as it manifests itself in the
strategic employment of the four discourses, here I must provide a brief theoretical review of
Lacan’s discourses of the Master, the University, the Hysteric, and the Analyst.
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The Four Discourses are four alternative strategies for “man’s life in political
communities.”260 Each discourse places the national subject in a specific position toward its objet
a, or the place of lack from which desire for certainty emerges. Said differently, the national
subject negotiates its meaning (e.g., Russianness) not only by calling the national other an enemy
or by identifying with the national other (or both, as it is explicated by the satiric frame), but also
by appealing to the national other as the Other that desires:
when [the fomenting ego is] reflected in the mirror, it not only gives us a’, the
standard of exchange, the currency with which the other’s desire enters the circuit
of the ideal ego’s transitivisms. It is also restored to the field of the Other, serving
the function of desire’s exponent in the Other….In order for the subject to accede
to this point beyond the reduction of the ideals of the person, it is as desire’s
object a, as what he was to the Other in his erection as a living being, as wanted
or unwanted when he came into the world, that he is called to be reborn in order
to know if he wants what he desires.261
As a glyph of arcane language, Lacan’s prose is in need of additional translating. The national
subject cannot merely imagine the national other and thereby the national self as it pleases (e.g.,
“evil,” “fascist,” “terrorist,” “oppressor,” “hero,” “anti-fascist,” “savior”) since “the question of
identification is never…a self-fulfilling prophecy.”262 Instead, the national subject speaks from a
position of the Other’s desire: both in the context of the Other and as an object of the Other’s
desire: “Enjoying (jouir) has the fundamental property that it is, ultimately, one person’s body
260
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that enjoys a part of the Other’s body. But that part also enjoys - the Other likes it more or less,
but it is a fact that the Other cannot remain indifferent to it.”263
For instance, Nashi negotiates the meaning of Russianness in terms of Western
democracy and in relation to primarily the U.S., or the Other that sets those terms and that enjoys
the fantasy of Western democracy, as it seems, to the fullest. By visualizing the U.S. as
sympathizing with fascism (among other things), Nashi places supposedly anti-fascist Russia in
the center of the Other’s desire as that which the West supposedly needs in order to sustain itself
as democratic. Although Nashi, Russian neo-fascists and Putin fight for what it means to be
Russian in the terms of political liberalism, Antifa speaks to the West in the language of
economic liberalism or, more specifically, neo-liberalism. Having conceived of the U.S. as an
oppressive and dividing force, Antifa calls for a principally new mode of enjoyment of the
national self in relation to, rather than at expense of, the national other. These are extremely
general and brief explications of various discursive positions that the national subject
strategically occupies in relation to the national Other: Nashi acts as the Hysteric and Antifa
performs the role of the Analyst. What follows is a fairly brief and simplified account of Lacan’s
theory of the four discourses, which I will be able to illustrate by historic examples in Chapter
Three and flesh out in the analysis in Chapter Four and Chapter Five.
The Four Discourses are based on Lacan’s formula of the subject

. Although the

formula and its terms have been discussed above, the elements of the “quadripodes” obtain
additional, although related, meanings.264 S1 is the unary or master signifier. As a part of
quadripode the master signifier stands for “the signifier function, that the essence of the master
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relics upon.”265 This function is of the mark that names the subject, makes the subject
meaningful, provided that S2 as the other signifier is in vicinity. And the other signifier is always
there.266 The other signifier S2 stands for “the battery of signifiers,” the unconscious knowledge
(savoir), the Other: “This other signifier is not alone. The stomach of the Other, the big Other, is
full of them. This stomach is like some monstrous Trojan horse that provides the foundations for
the fantasy of a totality-knowledge” (connaissance).267 In sociopolitical terms, S2 represents a
social order, or a network of signifiers particular to a specific community, local or global.
As the master signifier intervenes in the network of other signifiers as a force that “comes
and strikes [the Trojan horse of the Other] from without,” as Lacan poetically relates, Troy gets
taken and the subject $ gets produced.268 The subject, however, comes out as divided, or lacking
autonomy and certainty. As split between the self and the other, the subject can only
momentarily experience itself as whole: sooner rather than later the subject experiences
harrowing disappointment. At this moment the subject is closest to his/her lack, to the objet a as
a place from which desire for unity seeks to break loose:
It was not for nothing that last year I called “surplus jouissance” this same object
that I had moreover described as the one, that the entire dialectic of frustration in
analysis is organized around. This means that the loss of the object is also the gap,
a hole opened up to something, and we don’t know whether or not this something
is the representation of the lack in jouissance, which is situated by means of the
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knowledge process, insofar as it appears in a completely different light as a result
of being, from that point on, knowledge [tamed] by the signifier.269
This unaccounted jouissance, this gap, this hole, this place of lack is, ironically, the most
essential part of the subject as a social and political being.270 Before the subject finds him/herself
an agent of either of the four discourses, he/she is first and foremost a subject of, or rather
subject to, “the discourse of jouissance.”271 The four Discourses are four distinct modes of
subjective enjoyment, of which the objet a is a primary element.
Notwithstanding the fact of which the quadrupedal schema (Master’s
University’s

, Hysteric’s

or Analyst’s

,

) is in question, the left top corner is

occupied by the agent, the left bottom corner is a place of truth, the right top corner is taken by
the other and, finally, the right bottom part is where an effect is produced. Following Lacan’s
notion of extimacy, the left half of the schema can be said to be the province of the subject,
whereas the right half is the domain of the Other as a relic of another desiring subject that
governs the subject. Depending on the position of the objet a in schemas, in other words, the
subject’s relationship with the place of lack from which will to jouissance bursts forth forcefully,
“jouissance is questioned (s’interpelle), evoked, tracked, and elaborated.”272
The discourse of the Master is a discourse of the subject $ who truly believes that he/she
is his/her mark S1, he/she is the master who arouses his/her own and everyone’s desire to be.
The Master violently imposes its will on others, which is the same to say that the first signifier
269
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imposes itself on the Other: “a pact [between S1 and S2] always precedes violence before
perpetuating it, and what I call the symbolic dominates the imaginary, allowing us to wonder
whether or not murder really is the absolute Master.”273 The Master aspires to be the perfect,
“‘pure’ or ‘absolute’ person,” “Absolute Being,” something like a “‘purified’ body in heaven.”274
The Master’s discourse is also a discourse of tragically literal, obscene power. There is nothing
but the signifier that would authorize the command of the Master, since the authority of the
Master is purely tautological: he/she is a master because he/she is the master. Following Žižek, it
may be possible, at a pinch, to discuss the Master’s discourse in terms of absolute monarchy:
“the ‘Sun King’ Louis XIV with his L’etat, c’est moi...is the master par excellence.”275
In her treatment of the discourse of the Master, Zupančič fairly notes that this discourse
involves a leap of faith, a blind belief that a Master is the Master. As she continues:
We know that in the context of new (democratic) masters, it is precisely this leap
that is under the imperative of disintegrating into something linear and, above all,
accountable (counting the votes, knowledge, skill, wealth), as well as being filled
in with the question of merit, substituted for the chain of reasons. The modern
form of the social bond is largely determined by the imperative (call it
unattainable ideal) of commensurability between the (master) signifier and the
subject.276
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Stated otherwise, in democracies the question of equivalence of S1 with $ is accounted for and
thus justified. Such rationalization – a seemingly objective and universal warrant – of the
Master’s authority, I contend, is a feature of the University’s discourse.
As monarchies started to crumble in late eighteenth-century Europe, “the classical
master’s discourse” made way to “[the discourses] of the modern master,” that is, the Discourse
of the University operative in republics and democracies.277 In the age of globalization, elected
leaders more than ever vouch to represent the interests of their entire constituencies fairly.
Regardless whether such claims are more or less genuine, the Discourse of the University is
always “a discourse of the perverted master.”278 Said otherwise, the agent of the University
appeals to “the [supposed] neutrality of…human knowledge,” to universal knowledge, while
exercising the symbolic violence of the Master.279
Any presumption of objectivity, rationality and universality, as Lacan argues, is an effect
of primal, or primary, repression: “This lack of truth about truth – necessitating as it does all the
traps that metalanguage, as sham and logic, falls into – is the rightful place of Urverdrängung,
that is, of primal repression which draws toward itself all the other repressions – not to mention
other rhetorical effects.”280 In other words, claims to objectivity and universality cannot be
ultimately sustained since meaning is a product of the differential play of signifiers, where each
signifier refers back to another signifier and ultimately the movement gets interrupted by the
non-reciprocity of the unary signifier. The knowledge of such an operation, or rather the
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knowledge of lack exhibited by the unary signifier as the very first, isolated and therefore nonsensical signifier, is registered in the psyche, thus shaping what comes to be the unconscious.281
Similar to the primary role of the unary signifier S1, which sets the whole linguistic
operation in motion, on the level of secondary psychic processes certain privileged, or master,
signifiers (also marked as S1) function as nodal points by pinning down, albeit only temporarily,
the meaning of symbolic networks that they float across. As floating, or, rather, as Ernesto
Laclau has it, empty signifiers, they also acquire distinct value depending on a specific discourse
they get to structure. For example, as the close textual reading of dominant Russian national
narratives reveals, master signifiers that today animate most contemporary Russian fantasies, the
proponents of which insist on the just and objective nature of those narratives, are the nodal
points of democracy and fascism. The latter, in their turn, get to have specific meanings
depending on signification networks they organize.
The empty signifier, however, is neither equivocal nor ambiguous. Instead, similar to
Lacan’s unary signifier, Laclau’s empty signifier is the signifier that “points…to the discursive
presence of its own limits,” to lack.282 As Laclau notes, “there can be empty signifiers within the
field of signification because any system of signification is structured around an empty place
resulting from the impossibility of producing an object which, none the less, is required by the
systematicity of the system.”283 Laclau’s notion of the empty signifier then further helps to
unpack the logic of the University’s Discourse. Although in Chapter Five I discuss the
mechanism of the “unstable compromise between equivalence and difference” operational in
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hegemonic constructs, such as, for instance, national identity, now it is enough to point out
where the master signifier can empty itself from its signified to the point when this master
signifier as a particularity can assume the role of “an incommensurable universal
signification.”284 Put otherwise, a certain privileged signifier (S1) that functions as empty can
represent the whole hegemonic field of knowledge (S2), which is often argued to be universal
and objective.285
From the prism of the ethics of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the fact that purportedly
disinterested knowledge is the “truth” spoken by the Master is certainly problematic.286 In a way,
on the most general level, one can say that the agent of the University’s Discourse is a hypocrite,
who feigns to possess to a neutral, universal knowledge, while in reality this knowledge is
nothing other than a product of a particular subjective interest. At the same time, it would be
incorrect to argue that narratives structured like the Discourse of the University (or, for that
matter, like any other Discourse) do not differ from each other in terms of their fidelity to the
Lacanian-Burkean ethical ideal. The Discourse of the University, for instance, has at least four
distinct ethically-driven variants: the comic discourse of liberal democracy as a narrative of
universal rights and freedoms; the tragic discourse of democratic tyranny, which highlights
tensions between popular sovereignty and individual liberties; the comic discourse of
bureaucracy as a narrative of law that operates in and sustains an open society; and the tragic
discourse of bureaucracy as a narrative of administrative law divorced from ethical
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considerations and the idea of the equal protection of rights and freedoms of various social,
religious and political groups.
Contrary to the argument laid out by Russian neo-fascists and Nashi that the West favors
the politics of the double standard by promoting their motives under the guise of appeals to
universal freedom and equality, in a liberal democratic society the knowledge that partisan
interests stand behind appeals to the universal is not concealed, but welcomed in order to counter
the uneven concentration of power among various political interests. In this respect one cannot
justifiably claim that Western liberal democracy is an inherently deceitful and immoral project.
Instead, in the discourse of bureaucracy political interests and moral considerations are often
considered to be irrelevant for administrative purposes, which is hypocritical, since bureaucracy
largely helps the existing political regime function more efficiently and as such benefits the
Master.287
In its most obscene form the discourse of bureaucracy is the rhetoric of an oppressive,
often totalitarian society, a society of Michel Foucault’s “well-disciplined body,” Theodor
Adorno’s “administrative reason,” Hannah Arendt’s “faceless bureaucrat of death,” as well as the
Soviet “configuration of workers-peasants” mentioned by Lacan.288 These tragic discourses
presuppose that the dummy as a malleable body is disciplined into and observed on its path to
being: “you have only one thing to do, which is to weave yourselves into it along with those who
work, that is with those who teach you, under the banner of the means of production and,
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consequently, of surplus value.”289 Generally speaking, the discourse of bureaucracy in its tragic
form embraces obedience to authority, observance of rules, and the pursuit of efficiency, while
simultaneously refusing critical judgments and ethical consideration.
This deliberate or spontaneous refusal, or this inability to see an issue from unexpected or
incongruous angle, is what Burke describes as “[the] state of affairs whereby one’s very abilities
can function as blindness,” and, following Thorstein Veblen, calls “trained incapacity.”290
Similarly, Burke draws on John Dewey’s concept of “occupational psychosis” and pushes both
Dewey’s and Veblen’s terms, employed interchangeably, even further to apply them to the
condition of the speaking subject, who, by seeing the world from a particular perspective,
through “some particular nomenclature, some one terministic screen,” is bound to miss
something: “A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing – a focus upon object A involves a
neglect of object B.”291
The fantasy of the ordinary Nazi bureaucrat, described as a fairly average person, in the
sense of being “no exception within the Nazi regime,” who was “neither feeble-minded nor
indoctrinated nor cynical,” in the works of Hannah Arendt and Zygmunt Bauman, which I
discuss briefly in Chapter Four, has been so far the most well-known historic example of the
tragic discourse of bureaucracy.292 As Arendt stresses, what characterizes “the modern
bureaucratic mode of rationalization” is “a quite extraordinary confusion over elementary
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questions of morality.”293 Among the most recent examples of such bureaucratic discourse is also
the inclination of Russian neo-fascists to treat any issue that involves non-ethnic Russian
minorities as an administrative rather than political matter, which again I briefly discuss in
Chapter Four. Less obviously tragic national narratives in contemporary Russia are too often
structured as the discourse of bureaucracy. As I demonstrate in Chapter Five, Nashi and Putin
emphasize the role of law and the majority’s opinion at the expense of a critical and moral
judgment. More specifically, both Putin and pro-Putin “anti-fascists” advocate for a “true” kind
of democracy and civil society – a regime that is arguably supported by all Russians and
reflected in a set of laws that take into considerations Russia’s aspirations toward efficiency,
economic and technological progress, rather than progressive political attitudes such as an
unconditional respect for human rights and civil liberties.
Unlike the agent of the tragic discourse of bureaucracy, which is a voiceless and inert
apparatus irreconcilable with the tenets of liberal democracy, the comic bureaucrat is one who
carries out their administrative duties in order to serve as a guardian of the principle of universal
equality and the one who, if a situation demands, engages in the practice of active bureaucratic
resistance to the tragic encroachment of, for example, the power of a president.294 Russian neofascists, however, not only refuse to acknowledge the existence of comic forms of socio-political
discourses, they are also comfortable defining the national democracy they aspire to as a regime
that prioritizes the rights of the ethnic Russian majority, or “the tyranny of the [Russian]
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majority,” and point out that liberal democracy is nothing other, than “the worldview of [tragic]
bureaucracy,” or a discourse that is divorced from any political or ethical considerations.295
Having been depicted as bureaucratic, Western liberal democracy is also arguably formal.
Speaking of the ideological and ethical emptiness that Russian neo-fascists and Nashi wrongly
attribute to the discourse of liberal democracy, one can indeed notice that the University’s
Discourse, compared with the other three Discourses, displays best what Ernesto Laclau
theorized as populism: the logic of the political manifested in the relationship between the
particular and the universal. Taking into consideration the idea that empty master signifiers stand
behind (or, rather, lie beneath, as it is demonstrated in the formula of the Discourse of the
University

) any supposedly objective or universal system of knowledge (S2) and as such

are foundational of this knowledge, it is then important to raise an objection to the claim of
Russian neo-fascists and Nashi that Western liberal democracy is an abstract framework depleted
of any particular ideological content and as such is adaptable to any system of values. While the
discourse of liberal democracy, just like any political discourse, indeed possesses the structure of
universality, which is set in motion by the empty signifier, it is not merely a placeholder. Despite
Nashi’s conviction that it is possible to successfully “connect universal principles of…[liberal]
democracy with Russia’s reality,” liberal democracy is an embrace of a wide variety of particular
comic interests, and is incommensurable with Russia’s political scene, which is dominated by
tragic demands.296 Neither have Russian neo-fascists and pro-Kremlin “anti-fascists” been fair to
insist that the discourse of liberal democracy is also a discourse of cynical bureaucracy. Instead, I
argue that it is tragic Russian national actors who do not move past bureaucratic blindness and
cynical pragmatism, which structurally are not the same discourses. The discourses of liberal
295
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democracy and bureaucracy are structured along the lines of the University’s Discourse, but the
cynic’s fantasy is tragically inspired and organized as the discourse of the obsessive, which I
discuss below.
While the subjects of the Discourse of the Master and the Discourse of the University are
relatively satisfied with the status quo, the hysteric and the obsessive subjects of the Discourse of
the Hysteric revel in division as “symptomatic tearing apart.”297 The Discourse of the Hysteric,
which subsumes the position of the hysteric and its dialect, the obsessive position, is a discourse
of resistance toward, protest against, and complaint of the master signifier that lacks its power to
be the true Master. Whereas the hysteric wants to be the sole object of the Other’s desire, he/she,
just like the neurotic in general, does not want the Other to experience wholeness at the
hysteric’s expense;s that is, the hysteric does not want to serve as the source of the Other’s
enjoyment.298 Therefore a peculiar dynamic between the hysteric and the Other is established:
“She wants the other to be a master,…but at the same time she doesn’t want him to know so
much that he does not believe she is the supreme price of all his knowledge. In other words, she
wants a master she can reign over. She reigns, and he does not govern.”299 Divided between the
self and the Other, or “split…between jouissance and the henceforth mortified body,” the
hysteric then enjoys his/her power as a promise of certainty that he/she installs in the Other.300
The Other’s desire, however, remains forever unsatisfied, just as the hysteric’s, because “there is
something else that [the hysteric] prefers to her desire; she prefers that her desire should be
unsatisfied so that the Other should hold the key to her mystery. It is the only thing that is
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important to her and this is the reason why…she strives to reanimate this Other, to reassure him,
to complete him, to restore him.”301
Whereas the hysteric desires for an unsatisfied desire by seizing an opportunity to present
him/herself as an enigma, or something that the Other desires but never gets, the obsessive
makes an effort to protect him/herself from ravaging jouissance by setting up the Other’s and
thus his/her own desire as impossible: “It is in a way in the measure that the object of his desire
has become an impossible object that it becomes for [the obsessive] once again the object of his
desire.”302 Although the impossibility of jouissance is at the foundation of subjectivity, Lacan
underscores that “[w]hat characterizes the [obsessional] neurotic in particular is that he
emphasizes the confrontation with this impossibility.”303
Undergoing castration, which is read by the obsessive as the forced surrender of
jouissance to the Other, the obsessive readily accepts his/her position as the Slave and plunges
into work for the sake of the Master. Similar to any other neurotic, the obsessive then becomes
alienated from the product of his/her labor. What emerges as the obsessive’s idiosyncratic
feature, however, is that “the subject’s recognition of his own essence in his creation, in which
this labor finds its justification, eludes him no less, for he himself ‘is not in it’.”304 Put
differently, the obsessive does not procure enjoyment for him/herself from work - from tirelessly
wondering what the Master’s desire is, but rather from pretending to be loyal to the Master, from
keeping up the ritualized charade of power, or authenticity, of the Other, to whom the obsessive
“[demonstrates] his good intentions through hard work”: “‘Everything for the other’ says the
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obsessional and this indeed is what he does.”305 While the hysteric searches for the impotent
Master to govern, the obsessive “need[s] to be the Other’s guarantor,” to assume the role of a
witness of the Other’s supposed Mastery.306
The answer as to why “[the obsessive] devalues himself, in so far as he puts outside
himself the whole game of the erotic dialectic [of the Master and the Slave], that he pretends, as
someone has said, to be its organizer,” is that the obsessive neurotic is better off professing that
the Other is the true Master, rather than risking to impinge on his/her own lack.307 While the
obsessive refuses to openly acknowledge the Master’s lacking nature and in effect denies the
ultimate impossibility of his/her own wholeness, “being in the perpetual vertigo of the
destruction of the Other, [the obsessive] can never do enough to allow the other to maintain
himself in existence.”308
Although the obsessive enjoys the status of the Slave - being separated from his/her
jouissance by what he/she thinks to be the will of the Master, “whose death he awaits,” the
obsessive, however, is terrified by the revelation of the ultimate impossibility of being: “the
obsessional when all is said and done dreads nothing more than that to which he imagines he
aspires, the liberty of his acts and his deeds,” obtained with the death of the Master.309 As Lacan
teaches us, the subject is never free from language, which gives the subject its name, or from the
intriguing question of his/her fellow human being’s desire, which keeps the subject wanting and
enjoying only as much as the speaking being possibly can. It is either freedom from the question
of the Other, from language, or meaningful life as the speaking, desiring subject; but it is never
both. The obsessive then is rightfully terrified, since “[b]eyond the death of the master, [the
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obsesive] really will be obliged to confront death, as every fully realised being has to, and to
assume, in the Heideggerian sense, his being-for-death.”310 To approach the ultimate
impossibility of being requires the grit and ethical conviction of the subject that eagerly sees the
self and the world in light of comic melancholy. Yet “the obsessional does not assume his beingfor-death, he has been reprieved.”311 That is why the obsessive goes for tragic mourning rather
than comic melancholy: he/she finds pleasure in wallowing in sorrow for a part of the self that
has dissipated into nothingness, or vanished in “the hole in the real…[which] sets the signifier in
motion.”312
The obsessive’s fantasy is not only tragic, but also cynical. As Žižek has it, “[c]ynical
distance is just one way – one of many ways – to blind ourselves to the structuring power of
ideological fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance,
we are still doing them.”313 Lacan notes, this action can be viewed as a quasi-religious ritual that
the obsessive neurotic performs in order to secure the certainty of his/her identity. This, I argue,
does not make the cynic any less of a believer, or an ideological product. The obsessive trusts
that one day he/she will liberate him/herself from the master that he/she does not believe in and
he/she will be able to become his/her own master, to find what he/she was supposedly deprived
of. But before such day comes, he/she continues to operate in an already customary manner,
because the Master, even as a fraud, remains to be the sole source of the promise of identity
fullness by, ironically, taking on the function, as the obsessive fantasizes, of the usurper of the
obsessive’s jouissance.
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With regard to the process of Russian identity negotiation, Russians function as the
obsessive in, for example, Nashi’s national fantasy. Traumatized by the “loss” of the authentic
sense of the national self, brought about by the dissolution of the USSR and the failure of
democratic reforms of the 1990s, Russians persistently aspire for what they see as their forfeited
greatness, the hope of which return they discern in the figure of a strong leader. They do not
really believe this Master, who, as they acknowledge routinely, is corrupted just like all
politicians, but whom nevertheless they slavishly support to keep the promise of their wholeness
alive. In this sense, the Russian subject is not exactly a captive of its authoritarian Master; rather,
as the obsessive structure of the Russian subject’s fantasy reveals, the one who chooses, in a
manipulative manner, “to injure themselves, defeat themselves, humiliate themselves, or
sacrifice themselves.”314
Despite masochistic and subservient impulses that animate the fantasy of the obsessive,
Lacan sees a revolutionary potential in the Discourse of the Hysteric – a capacity of the
Discourse to situate the subject in propitious proximity to his/her lack: “The subject’s division is
without doubt nothing other than the radical ambiguity that attaches itself to the very term,
‘truth.’”315 Yet, it is not subversive or hystericized enough: in the end the hysteric gets engulfed
by the Master’s discourse and structured knowledge of his/her own making: “the hysteric’s
discourse reveals the master’s discourse’s jouissance, in the sense that in it knowledge occupies
the place of jouissance.”316
Whereas the hysteric places confidence in him/herself as the objet a - a secret and
promise of fullness, the analyst identifies with the place of lack that the objet a stands for.
Unlike the hysteric who enjoys his/her divided nature, the analyst does not obsess over his/her
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lack. Instead, the analyst attempts to explicate his/her acts in accordance with the recognized lack
so to “emerge [as] another style of master signifier” - produce less exclusive and oppressive.317
Although symptomatic reading permits to read beyond appearances, or what the subject says
about the other and the self, an analysis of frames may leave the critic wondering in cases when
the subject employs ethically contradictory frames. An attention to the subject’s symbolic
positions, or discourses, then would attune the critic to “the unsaid that dwells in the holes in
discourse,” thereby enabling the critic to attend to the full speech of the subject’s lack.318

2.9

The Critical Vigor of a Lacanian-Burkean Theory of National Identity Construction

In concluding this chapter and transitioning to the next chapter, which addresses the
larger historical context of Russian identity negotiation, I would like to emphasize the role of the
material in the blended Lacanian-Burkean theory and how such account of the material
encourages a robust ideological critique of nationalisms within specific socio-political and
historical contexts. The material in its relation to the rhetorical can be understood twofold. First,
both Burke and Lacan support the thesis of the materiality of discourse. To speak of rhetoric as
material is the same as to argue for linguistic or rhetorical realism, which Robert Lawrence
Heath and Robert Wess respectively employ in their conversations about Burke’s theory of
motives. Following Frederic Jameson, Wess points out the paradox of Burke’s notion of the
symbolic act, which “insists on the real while subscribing to the constructionist thesis” – an idea
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that the symbolic act produces the subject and his/her reality, rather than stemming from
something external to it, that is, something objective or transcendental.319
Such an understanding of the symbolic act disregards the material role of the Real as the
non-discursive. In addition to acknowledging that human reality is discursively mediated and
effectual, both Lacan and Burke stress the momentous role of the Real in human life.
Responding to the irresistible lure of certainty (an epitome of which the Real is, since the Real
“is always and every case in its place”) with insecurity, the subject thereby carves out a space for
himself.320 In this space, or in the discourse of jouissance, the subject as true/intersubjective,
knowing/speaking and (un)ethical begins.321 An account of the originating tension between the
non-discursive and the discursive thus permits a psychoanalytically inflected rhetorical theory
and criticism of ideology to avoid the traps of idealism and moral relativism.
An emphasis on both the non-discursive and the discursive, however, does not suffice,
according to Dews, to recover Lacan’s psychoanalysis from “a historical and political
vacuum.”322 Similarly M. Lane Bruner questions the utility of Lacan’s theory (at least in its
highly abstract form) for ideological criticism as an analysis of distance between the nondiscursive and the discursive.323 Indeed, it is not readily obvious how Lacan’s theory that refuses
the subject’s access to the Real as immutable and objective is capable of accounting for social
and historical conditions. I believe, however, that a focused attention on the ethical category of
lack as a product of the incompatibility between the Real and language redeems Lacan’s
psychoanalysis for the purposes of ideological criticism.
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The conflict between nature and human reality (which, contra Dews, is foundational of
Lacan’s psychoanalysis) allows the subject to act or to perform him/herself (ethically),
simultaneously making this process knowable and contestable by other subjects. A consideration
of the Real as the sensible and the impossible provides the critic with an opportunity to read the
performed reality of a particular social subject, or a particular socio-political fantasy/attitude,
through the prism of its distance to the truth of irrecoverable lack, rather than a supposed truth of
each reality. Both Burke and Lacan refuse that a metalanguage or “a genuinely neutral
vocabulary” can be spoken, or that we can speak of situations in a way that is truly objective. 324
An analysis of society or history from this point of view is an analysis of competing reality
definitions, or, in Wess’ words, “an agonistic process in which cultural orthodoxies displace one
another,” with regard to the fixed material (and impenetrable) wall of the Real.325 Neither Burke
nor Lacan deny material facts of, for instance, a violent revolt or death, but they underscore that
those facts exist in human reality burdened with subjective meaning.326 In human reality facts are
always acted upon:
in mediating between the social realm [or the Imaginary] and the realm of nonverbal nature [or the Real], words communicate to things the spirit that the society
imposes on the words which have come to be the ‘names’ for them. The things are
in effect the visible tangible material embodiments of the spirit that infuses them
through the medium of words. The things of nature…become a vast pageantry of
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social-verbal masques and costumes and guild-like mysteries, not just a world of
sheer natural objects, but a parade of spirits.327
In this respect, a study of a supposedly factual context without addressing its actual value is a
reading of a conscious, imaginary dimension of fantasy/attitude under the pretense of having an
access to metalanguage. Such study is ineffectual and possibly dangerous since it passes an
(ethical) act off as a fact.
Rather than lulling the subject into a dream of happiness qua certainty by the “mere talk”
of the Imaginary, a blended Lacanian-Burkean theory incites in the subject an uncompromising
human capacity to act ethically, that is, with regard to lack and with no regard for one’s own
good or the good of the Other: “the access to desire necessitates crossing not only all fear but all
pity, because the voice of the hero trembles before nothing, and especially not before the good of
the other.”328 An awareness of lack perpetuated by the ethical stance of comic melancholy is,
perhaps, the only possible meta-knowledge (as knowledge about the impossibility of knowledge
or certainty in the uncertain). Without being dogmatic or, on the contrary, too permissive, a
Lacanian-Burkean ethics leaves it to the national subject to decide how exactly one performs
itself tragicomically – located between the polar opposites of tragic mourning and comic
melancholy.
Ideological rhetorical criticism conducted within the Burkean-Lacanian theoretical
framework attempts to explicate how the subject attempts to overcome the limit of the
unspeakable in pursuit of certainty.329 In this respect the present study could be said to be an
extension of Bruner’s limit work. While Bruner’s limit work is an analysis of particular
discursive limits, that is, what cannot be said in a specific socio-political and cultural context,
327
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limit work that is driven by the blended Burkean-Lacanian theory attends to the limit imposed on
the discursive by the Real, or what cannot be said as such. Although pointing out specific
discursive limits and the general limit to the discursive respectively, Bruner’s limit work and a
psychoanalytically inflected rhetorical criticism of ideology similarly focus attention on how
particular visions of reality sustain and/or “undermine the fragile coherence [and thus certainty]
of preferred [imaginary] characterizations.”330
Understood against the background of the truth of the Real, national identity is a process
of testing the limit imposed by the Real by acting in response to specific events and real people.
Said otherwise, the national subject finds itself in a fantasmatically negotiated space between the
traumas of the Real as the impossible and the Real as the sensible. Mindful of continuous and
extensive analytic accretions, which molded Lacan’s psychoanalysis and Burke’s theory of
human motives into labyrinthine networks of ontological, epistemological and ethical concepts
and principles, a Lacanian-Burkean theory of national ideology, I argue, presents the critic with
the means to carry out a politically responsive, ethically viable, and suggestively liberating
analysis of national identity negotiation.
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3

THE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL SUBJECT: THE RUSSIANS AND THE
RUSSIAN IDEA

3.1

The Rewriting of History as an Ethical Enterprise

To think of the national subject as a product of discursive negotiation within the limits of
the Real as the sensible and the Real as the impossible may help resist the charge that a
Lacanian-Burkean theory is out of touch with the material, but still may not be enough to counter
claims that Lacan’s psychoanalysis is socially indifferent and completely ahistorical. Luce
Irigaray, for example, is adamant in her argument that Lacan’s theory has nothing to contribute
to cultural studies, as “[i]ts theory and practice rest upon historical nothingness.”1 More
specifically, she argues that Lacan’s psychoanalysis presents a complete, rigid system of
knowledge, that is, “psychoanalytic ‘science’,” where each particular case is merely an
illustration of a universal law, rather than a means to uncover something new about the analyzed
phenomenon.2 Indeed, if a critic interested in national identity negotiation asks a question of why
a specific national subject invests affectively in a specific mode of identification, the most
general answer to that question is that the national subject attempts to maximize its enjoyment.
Similarly critical of psychoanalysis, Judith Butler doubts the ability of Lacanian psychoanalysis
to “respond to the pressure to theorize the historical specificity of trauma, to provide texture for
the specific exclusions, annihilations, and unthinkable losses that structure the social
phenomena” like Nazism, Stalinism etcetera.3 According to Butler, the problem of an “overrapid universalization” characteristic of Lacanian theory consists in the fact that psychoanalysis
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does not differentiate among various traumas which arguably prompt distinct, historically
embedded social formations.4
In return, quite a few of Lacanian scholars responded vocally to the accusations made
against Lacan’s psychoanalysis. In History after Lacan, Teresa Brennan proposes to look at the
human psyche as changing over time. She tells “the story of a social psychosis” by examining
“an ego’s era.”5 The age of the Imaginary that arguably begins in the seventeenth century,
according to Brennan, obliterates historical consciousness, or a critical understanding of society.
Although Dylan Evans disassociates himself from Brennan’s historical account of the psyche, he
too discusses the ego as a modern phenomenon, which, according to Evans, dates back to the end
of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth century.6 He defends the historical
sensitivity of Lacan’s psychoanalysis by discussing the Oedipus complex as a psychic structure
relative to a certain social and historical context. Although laudable, these solutions to the
alleged lacuna in Lacan’s theory may not suffice in properly defending the place of the historical
in psychoanalysis.7
In the book Read My Desire, Copjec approaches the debate on the presumed (a)historicity
of Lacan’s work from a more successful angle. She does not search for traces of historical value
in separate psychoanalytic concepts, but maintains that the concept of the “objectively
indeterminate” subject paradoxically keeps Lacan’s theory open for textually palpable social and
4
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historical specificity.8 I argue that an emphasis on Lacan’s ethics allows distancing Lacan’s
psychoanalysis from the ahistorical prejudice even further. An ethically inflected LacanianBurkean ideological criticism of national identity negotiation invites the critic to ask how, more
specifically, judging on a scale from comic melancholy to tragic mourning, national subjects
enjoy their identities, and why some modes of enjoyment are more appealing than others in light
of their socio-political consequences.
To answer these questions, the critic does not turn, as Butler suggests, to an analysis of
the determinate - the realm of the Real (and traumas are reminders of the encounter with the
Real) - but to an indeterminate dimension opened up by the traumatic tension between the nondiscursive and the discursive, which allows conceiving of a Lacanian-Burkean criticism as
mindful of social and historical particularities.9 Although it is fair to say that the national subject
is produced in its defensive and thus fantasmatic reaction to traumas inflicted in the process of
the subject’s encounter with the Real (the reminder of which is the real lack and the second lack),
the emphasis in Lacan’s psychoanalysis is not placed on trauma: “For to say of psychoanalysis
and of history that, qua sciences, they are both sciences of the particular, does not mean that the
facts they deal with are purely accidental or even factitious, or that their ultimate value comes
down to the brute aspect of trauma.”10 Instead, the key is to pay special attention to the ethically
driven choices of a fantasmatic response to the traumatic effect of the Real. To study the national
subject then is to learn the history of its faltering between the poles of tragic mourning and comic
melancholy.
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As I briefly mentioned above, the history of the national subject is an ethically significant
symbolic action, rather than an unfolding of the supposedly objective account of past events.
While Lacan does not deny the Realness of historic events, the history of the national subject “is
less a matter of remembering than of rewriting history.”11 First, a real fact of something that
occurred becomes a historical event when the former gets marked by a signifier. Further, for a
real fact to become meaningful for the subject the primary function of historicization must be
necessarily complemented by the secondary historicization: “The signifier is…primitively given,
but it remains nothing as long as the subject doesn’t cause it to enter into his history.”12 Thus
national history is not a factual account of a remembered past, but a partisan account of factual
events - both as they have been directly experienced and rewritten by the national subject - that
are perceptible and significant enough to become a part of the national fantasy/attitude: “the
history presents itself as something memorable and memorized in the Freudian sense, namely,
something that is registered in the signifying chain and dependent on its existence.”13 To study
national history is then to study how national fantasies shift, rather than evolve over time.
Clearly, Lacan’s psychoanalysis is at odds with a study of “the general march of
history.”14 The subject’s history is the “futural past.”15 Lacan insists that “what is realized in [the
subject’s] history is neither the past definite as what was...nor even the perfect as what has been
in what I am, but the future anterior as what I will have been, given what I am in the process of
becoming.”16 An emphasis on the future dimension of the subject’s history stems from the idea
that subjectivization never results in a permanent, fixed idea of the self (thus the self does not
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correspond to the grammatical past or perfect tense or, much less, to the noun). The subject is
then an anticipation of becoming the whole, ideal self and his/her history is the history of the
affective economy behind this anticipation. In other words, meaning is being constantly rewritten
in the affectively driven movement of signifiers. Every time the national subject reflects on its
past, it historicizes its present in relation to the future, it enacts a certain vision of the past as an
attempt to secure a sought-after ideal, or, complete idea of the national self. Knowledge about the
past is not recollected, but reconstituted: signifiers that mark the past experience of the nation are
rearranged in light of its present attempts at certainty. For example, as I demonstrate in Chapter
Four and Chapter Five, the signifiers of “war,” “victory,” “freedom,” “fascism,” and so on are
endowed with various meanings by contemporary national subjects, which make up for distinct
and at times ethically conflicting national historical narratives and, more broadly speaking,
national fantasies.
To reiterate, the history of the national subject is not a dominant narrative about past
events, which presents history as a coherent and often epic story of the nation, and as such is
comparable to what Nietzsche called monumental history: “Monumental history is the cloak
under which [citizens’] hatred of present power and greatness masquerades as an extreme
admiration of the past.”17 A monumental story of the national past is nothing more than a
petrified national image or misrecognition (méconnaissance) of the national self as complete.
The national history is neither to be found in the supposedly objective account of the national
subject’s traumatic experience of the Real, which could be said to roughly parallel Nietzsche’s
antiquarian history: the latter “assigns to the things of the past no difference in value and
17
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proportion which would distinguish things from each other fairly.”18 To chart an antiquarian
account of the national subject’s history is a misguided or cynical enterprise, since “[to]
articulate what is past does not mean to recognize ‘how it really was.’ It means to take control of
a memory.”19
Both monumental and antiquarian histories are told by appealing to certainty, which
illustrates a possible uncritical, tragic impulse in the mechanism of national identity construction,
or, to say otherwise, national history making. While monumental history as a hegemonic
narrative of the victor can be said to correspond to the discourse of the Master, while an
antiquarian, or purportedly objective, account of historical events is the discourse of the
University, Nietzsche’s third method for history – critical history – has the form of Lacan’s
discourse of the Analyst. Just like the Analyst’s discourse, a critical study of the nation’s history
starts by acknowledging lack in the center of national identity and continues by “tracing the
master signifiers of [the subject’s] life.”20 By revealing how the national subject symbolically
performs its desire, an ideological, critical reading of national identity negotiation allows us to
explicate the “truth” of the national subject - national savoir, rather than exposing a dominant or
supposedly objective meaning of historical events: “in psychoanalytic anamnesis, what is at
stake is not reality, but truth, because the effect of full speech is to reorder past contingencies by
conferring on them the sense of necessities to come, such as they are constituted by the scant
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freedom through which the subject makes them present.”21 This statement once again
emphasizes that psycho-rhetorical criticism must treat traumas not merely as accidental elements
of the Real, but also as “historical ‘turning points’” which necessitate ethical choices.22 The latter
express themselves in social and cultural particularity of national identity negotiation.
In contemporary Russia, just as in any other nation that finds certainty by seeing itself as
a part of the globalized world, the process of national identity negotiation occurs within the
particular symbolic limits of Western liberal democracy. The privileged, master signifier of
Western democracy, which functions as a “word that concentrates around it the greatest number
of threads in the mycelium that you know it is the hidden centre of gravity of the desire in
question,” organizes a multitude of signifier-to-signifier connections into a hegemonic network
of meanings.23 Thus, as Putin claims, Russia “subscribes to universal democratic principles” and
can boast of a purportedly “healthy and civilized” legal system.24
Even before Russia had to accede, at least in appearance, to a relatively comic attitude
promoted by the Other of Western democracy, that is, at the time when the language of
international affairs was a language of brutal military force, the West already was Russia’s
privileged national other, absolute Other, in conversations with which the Russians were able to
feel themselves most Russian: “Absolute, that is to say that [it] is recognized but that [it] isn’t
known.… It’s essentially this unknown in the otherness of the Other that characterizes the
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[national subject’s] relation…to the other.”25 Put differently, the West has been perceived as
enjoying itself as ideal or certain, but the secret of the Other’s enjoyment has always been
inaccessible and thus alluring to Russia. Hence, Russian national narratives have been saturated
with both fascination with and suspicion of (and even hatred for) the West’s enjoyment
purportedly possible only at the expense of Russia’s aspired greatness.26
As the reading of most Russian national narratives in this project reveals, Russian
“democracy” presumes Russia’s right to live the life it chooses, and this choice is almost always
tragic (an exception is Antifa, which sees the national self in a largely comic way). The question
then is how predominantly tragic national subjects (Putin, pro-Putin Nashi and Russian neofascists), as well as the only comically driven national subject (Antifa), speak to the Western
Other in their attempts to renegotiate Russianness. As I show in the following chapters, it is
accomplished by appealing to Russia’s past, more specifically the USSR’s fight with fascism:
Nashi, neo-fascists and Putin validate Russia’s unreflective, tragic aspirations for certainty
(disguised under the veil of Russian “democracy”) with a purportedly democratic tradition of
nationhood, the epitome of which is ascribed to the country’s anti-fascist resistance. The memory
of the Soviet victory over fascism also invigorates Antifa’s negotiation of Russianness, which
according to independent anti-fascists must be discussed not in terms of ethnic nationalism but
class struggle.
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Considering the fact that for the competing national subjects, as it is largely the case in
any attempts to negotiate national identity, the past is perceived as a reservoir of memories which
have been monumental in the national subject’s attempts at certainty, attention to articulatory
histories of Russianness is decisive. In other words, since Nashi, neo-fascists, Putin and Antifa
make claims to Russia’s purportedly democratic tradition, it is paramount to take into
consideration how the idea of Russianness in its monumental form developed over time. With
this in mind I provide a brief review of major national ideas that have been shaping a sense of
Russian distinctiveness for centuries. Among them are preference for autocracy, Russian
Orthodoxy, military chauvinism, xenophobia and racism. I must note that this chapter does not
necessarily engage in a critical history of the national subjects in question (this task is
accomplished in Chapter Four and Chapter Five); rather, it considers how the dominant Russian
national narrative has been repunctuated in response to significant events in Russia’s national
experience.27 Thus I provide a discounted account of antiquarian and monumental histories of
the Russian idea in order to situate contextually the upcoming critical reading of the history of
the four contemporary national subjects: Nashi, neo-fascists, Putin and Antifa.28
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3.2

The Russian Idea

Academic conversations about Russian national identity usually focus on the concept of
the Russia idea (russkaia ideia), which is more than just a set of beliefs about Russia and the
Russians, but “an interweaving of social practices, ideological interpretations of these social
practices, and transformative activity with respect to these practices based partly on the ideas that
they helped generate.”29 The very notion of the Russian idea is most commonly attributed to the
famous Russian writer Fyodor Dostoyevsky and the Russian philosopher and literary critic
Vladimir Solovyov, while some scholars suggest that the Russian idea, which appeared in
Dostoyevsky’s and Solovyov’s works in 1856 and in 1889 respectively, stems from the notion of
the Russian view developed by the Slavophile thinker and writer Konstantin Aksakov in 1856.30
Aksakov defines the Russian idea as “a national point of view held by the people independently,
as the only condition to reach the universal human truth.”31 As the analysis of the competing
national narratives shows, it is precisely from the position of the universal human truth that each
of the four competing national subjects conceive of the national self.
During the Soviet era, ideas of a specific Russian path of development were given up in
favor of world revolution and word socialism, which changed in the mid 1920s with the
introduction of the theory of socialism in one country by Stalin.32 While the term “Russian idea”
was eliminated from the Soviet discourse, it returned with more power than ever after the breakup of the USSR. It is peculiar that post-Soviet Communists - those who in the Soviet times were
dedicated to the idea of stripping Russia of its national identity - now call “[to restore] the
29
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Russian idea in all its historical greatness and spiritual power...[in order to] reunite our
dismembered historical Fatherland, cure its illnesses, mend its fractures, and heal the ulcers of
national self-awareness.”33 Nearly as profound as the primal trauma, a post-Soviet crisis of
national identity is vividly enacted in this image of the defragmented national body.
Preoccupation with the Russian idea has been overwhelming in the post-Soviet official
discourse: after the victorious Presidential elections in 1996 Boris Yeltsin instructed his
administration to swiftly develop a national idea.34 In contrast to Yeltsin, former President
Dmitry Medvedev, however, expressed his skepticism about the national idea being “born on
request from politicians...cultivated in a tube and offered to society.”35 Instead, for Medvedev the
national idea is comprised of “the principles that are...in the air” and “consistent with the epoch
we live in.”36 At the beginning of his presidential career, Putin too felt it necessary to stress that
he “[opposed] the reinstatement of any state, official ideology in Russia,” expecting the public’s
suspicion that the Kremlin would attempt to impose another state ideology (Yeltsin’s search for
the national idea fueled such rumors in 1996). 37 Yet more than a decade later, during his third
term as President, Putin conceded that “[it] was an illusion that a new national ideology…would
simply appear by itself.”38 Putin clarified that “[p]ractice has shown that a new national idea does
not simply appear, nor does it develop according to market rules. The withdrawal of the state and
society does not work, and neither does the automatic copying of other countries’ experiences.”39
By that moment the Kremlin had already been aggressively promoting the country’s national
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ideology both at home and abroad. While the specifics of the Russian idea favored by the
Kremlin, as well as Russian neo-fascists, Nashi and Antifa, are discussed in Chapter Four and
Five, here I am concerned with Russian history as the process of incessant rewriting of the
dominant national idea in response to various traumatic, historic events.
Whereas studies of the Russian idea generally focus on the period of Russian history
beginning with the introduction of Christianity in Russia, and the assumption by Moscow of the
religious role of Constantinople, or the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century debate
between Slavophiles and Westernizes, it is necessary to address even earlier historical events that
contributed to how the Russians have seen themselves and their role in the world.40 Going back
to the prehistory of Russia, the Slavic people appeared in the European historical records in the
sixth century and were said originally to occupy the area between the Bug, the Pripiat and the
Dnieper Rivers.41 According to a major source of information about Slavic prehistory, the
twelfth century chronicles “The Story of Olden Time” (Povest vremennykh let), or better known
in Western scholarship as “The Primary Chronicles,” various Slavic tribes carried their own
traditions, led distinct ways of life and were governed independently from each other.42 All of
them, however, lacked necessary military organization and strength to resist foreign invaders
imposing tributes on Slavic tribes: the Khazars in the south and the Scandinavian Vikings in the
north.43
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When in the second half of the ninth century the tribes suffering the Scandinavian tribute
had managed to “[drive] the Varangians back beyond the sea...and [had] set out to govern
themselves,” internal feuds left them no choice but to turn to the Varangian Rus people for help:
“Our land is great and rich, but there is no order in it. Come to rule and reign over us.”44 The
Rus, who sought to control the trade route “from the Varangians to the Greeks” passing in part
through the territory populated by the Slavic tribes, accepted the invitation.45 The Norseman
Rurik - one of the three brothers who agreed to “look after” the Slavs - held the throne of
Novgorod, which after his death in approximately 880 passed to one of Rurik’s relatives (most
likely his brother-in-law Oleg), who was also entrusted with the guardianship of Rurik’s son
Igor. In a couple of years, Oleg took over Kiev (by killing Rurik’s military commanders Askold
and Dir, who ruled the city) and subsequently made it the capital of a new state - Kievan Rus
(882-1240).46
The coming of the Rus people to reign over the land of the Eastern Slavs and the role of
the Varangians in the formation of the first Russian state became a central issue of an important
scholarly debate, known as the Normanist controversy, in the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries.47
The proponents of the “Normanist theory,” the most radical of which (primarily historians of
Germanic origin) considered the Slavic tribes as “a backwater of ignorance and savagery,”
attributed the role of Russian state builder to the Scandinavian Rus.48 While these claims were
met by a wave of indignation among many Russian intellectuals, the theory, or at least its
modification, was supported by Western-minded thinkers.
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Most advocates of the “Normanist” view in Russia sought to emphasize an enduring bond
between the people and their ruler. The theory of summoning of a foreign ruler, depicted as the
calculated submission (“amicable bargain”) of the Slavs and thus as an expression of their
wisdom, served to evince the submissive nature of the Russians and their need for an autocratic
state. Unsurprisingly, this perspective - presented by the nineteenth century Russian historian
Mikhail Pogodin - earned enthusiastic approval from the tsarist state. Moreover, the Normanist
view was used to amplify the supposedly long-established affinity between Russia with the
Western world. At the same time, the fact that Russia was arguably established as a result of the
“amicable bargain” distinguishes it and its purportedly peaceful and enlightened path of creation
from Europe that, according to Pogodin, passed through a violent and bloody formative
process.49
This interpretation was challenged by anti-Normanists, who saw their opponents’ view as
an attempt to humiliate Russians and asserted instead that the East Slavic tribes should be
credited for their independent contribution to the process of early state formation. While some
“nativists” questioned the ethnic belonging of the Rus people, defending their Slavic roots, and
thus the native origin of Russian monarchy, others used the legend to find the origins of Russia
as a multi-ethnic state and thereby establish support for an “imperial” theory of Russian statebuilding.50 Already by the mid-sixteenth century Russia was a home to non-Christian and nonSlavic people.51 The military expansion agenda of the Russian Empire had to coexist, in an
uneasy and often contradictory manner, with Orthodox and Slavic practices in Russia.
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Unlike Russian Normanists, “nativists” argued for the voluntary summoning of the
Scandinavian princes by the Russian people (versus the conquest of the latter by the former): the
Varangians were invited to save the Russians from internal feuds and the need to use violence.52
The original relationship between the people and the rulers was also conceived as the
relationship of protection and noninterference. The rulers were not supposed to impose on “the
inner fabric of national life,” or a traditional Russian institute of the village commune (obshchina
or mir). The people in their turn were arguably disinterested in politics as a result of their “inborn
revulsion at wielding power,” and thus willingly submitted their political will and freedom to the
autocrat.53 This view on the state and the people also portrays the Russians as a nation strong
enough to absorb a foreign dynasty.
While it is not possible to talk about the Russian nation at the time of the summoning
(there were only tribes at that time), the “Normanist theory” became one of the most prominent
attempts to retroactively formulate the “essence” of Russianness. Both Normanist and antiNormanist views emphasized the least progressive elements which have comprised the Russian
idea ever since: surrender to a strong ruler, apathy for political life, and the presumed
prominence of the Russians and Russian culture among other ethnic groups and cultures. Besides
emphasizing specific characteristics of Russianness, the Normanist controversy exemplifies,
generally speaking, the very nature of the national subject – its constitutive dependence on the
national other and, more specifically, the ambivalent or, speaking in Lacan’s terms, primitively
paranoid relationship with the West that has been defining Russian national identity for
centuries.
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As Tim McDaniel argues, Russian national identity was built defensively or in fear and
suspicion of the West. This could be explained by the fact that, according to McDaniel,
Russianness “was more ideology than ‘culture’.” 54 Ancient Rus did not have an organized
archive of knowledge, traditions and national ways of life as it was a network of culturally
distinct Slavic tribes. What eventually united them was the common faith. The Russian nation
then is not an outcome of an incremental ethnogenesis, however fantasmatic this process is.
Instead, the Russian nation emerged as a result of a swift and calculated move guided by the
tasks of “theology, state-building, and community-building.”55 And it is later, during the times of
Russian Empire, when a fully fledged idea of the Russian nation formed on the basis of the
religious and autocratic peculiarities of Russia.
Since the early days in Russia, religion and politics marched in lockstep. The very
Christianization of Kievan Rus occurred as a step toward state-building. Grand Prince of Kiev
Vladimir the Great (978-1015) made a conscious decision to convert Russia from paganism to
Orthodox Christianity: his objective was to unite otherwise loosely affiliated fortified cities in
one state (besides, adoption of Orthodox Christianity promised to establish and sustain
advantageous military and trade connections with Byzantium). To give the somewhat arbitrary
choice of state religion a more profound significance, Vladimir’s son Yaroslav set a process of
history making in motion. Although, as mentioned above, historic memory is a retroactive effect
of largely unconscious rewriting of the perceived experience of the past, in Kievan Rus monks
were commissioned to give Russia a sense of historical and cultural distinctiveness. According to
Geoffrey Hosking, a story of the newly established Christian people went as far back as the sons
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of Noah and the apostle Andrew who arguably prophesized that “[o]n these hills the grace of
God will shine forth, there will be a great city, and God will erect there many churches.”56
An almost similar attempt at historicizing the spiritual origins of the nation can be
observed, for example, in the rhetoric of the modern Russian state. Speaking with regard to
Russia’s military involvement into the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in 2014 Putin
emphasized that:
In addition to ethnic similarity, a common language, common elements of their
material culture, a common territory, even though its borders were not marked
then, and a nascent common economy and government, Christianity was a
powerful spiritual unifying force that helped involve various tribes and tribal
unions of the vast Eastern Slavic world in the creation of a Russian nation and
Russian state. It was thanks to this spiritual unity that our forefathers for the first
time and forevermore saw themselves as a united nation. All of this allows us to
say that Crimea, the ancient Korsun or Chersonesus, and Sevastopol have
invaluable civilisational and even sacral importance for Russia…. And this is how
we will consider it from now on.57
Since the moment Russia adopted Orthodox Christianity, its religion and history have served to
endow the Russians with a sense of wholeness and purpose.
Prior to the conversion it was geography, or more specifically the adverse geographic
conditions of the East European plain, that precipitated thinking of the early Russians: “Harsh
seasonal cycles, a few, distant rivers, and sparse patterns of rainfall and soil fertility controlled
the lives of the ordinary peasant; and the ebb and flow of nomadic conquerors often seemed little
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more than the senseless movement of surface objects on an unchanging and unfriendly sea.”58 As
Billington argues, the assumption of Christianity allowed the Russians looking back on the
circumstances of their life with confidence and meaning, which, in its turn, explains “the
extraordinary sense of history,” or “desire to see a spiritual truth in the tangible,” which was a
defining feature of early Russian culture and is characteristic of modern Russian politics.59 As
Billington adds, “Orthodox Christianity offered a particularly close identification of charismatic
power with historical tradition: an unbroken succession of patriarchs, prophets, and apostles that
stretched from creation and on to final judgment.”60 A mystic sense of Russia’s divine destiny, as
a function of the very mythical objet a, has guided the process of cultural and national identity
construction for centuries. Every experience and event of the Russians has been diligently
monumentalized as a proof of Russia’s movement toward its preordained future.
Vladimir the Great’s choice of religion for Russia, as some argue, became one of the
greatest tragedies in Russia’s history:
The goals most sought by the Russian government in the twentieth century have
been material progress and power. From that perspective, the Russians would
have been vastly more fortunate in 988 to have chosen the elixir of future
dynamism, that is, the religion of Rome. From the perspective of the Russian
Orthodox believer, the rationalism and materialism of Western liberal capitalism
and the rationalism and materialism of Soviet Marxist socialism are Tweedledum
and Tweedledee, and one of them is as close to Antichrist as the other. 61
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While the West embraced ascetic-ethical types of religion (first Catholicism and later also
Protestantism), Russia entrusted itself into the ascetic-mystical Christian Orthodoxy. Following
Max Weber, Hugh Ragsdale explains that the “inner-worldly ascetism” of the West was
conducive of rational action.62 Those following the ascetic-ethical model search for salvation in
this life by transforming the world in accordance with religious tenets, where the world is
perceived to be a creation of god and is the only medium where one can prove his/her
worthiness. When the ascetic as “a rational reformer or revolutionary,” for example, achieves
success or gains profit, this is perceived to be god’s reward for the ascetic’s labor.63
In contrast, the “world-rejecting ascetism” of Russian Orthodoxy favors withdrawal from,
or rather resistance to, the world which is supposedly full of temptation and utilitarian, mundane
and thus ungodly activities. Within this view the ascetic passively waits for salvation possible in
the afterlife. While the inner-worldly ascetism welcomes participation in the life of society, the
world-rejecting religious paradigm presents matters of society, including civil society, as
dangerous since they purportedly promote individual, selfish interests rather than the common
good as the ultimate purpose of salvation. Instead, the world-rejecting attitude relies on an idea
of sobornost. The term sobornost (which originates from the word sobor, or “council,” “church”)
was first used by Slavophile Ivan Kireevsky and further developed by Alexei Khomiakov to
indicate a supposedly authentic element of Russianness - “the choral principle in Russian life,” a
religiously inspired innate harmony among Russian people.64
To emphasize an important difference between society as an aggregate of individual
interests and sobornost as an organic, undivided unity of people, I must point out that the West
and Russia rely on two distinct dialectics of the public and the private. The West functions in line
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with the liberal-economistic model, while Russia is entrenched in the collective domestic view of
the private as theorized by Philippe Ariès.65 According to the liberal-economistic theory of the
public/private, the private is a sphere of individual interests which lead to the common good. The
private realms of market economy and civil society often oppose the encroaching public – the
authority of the state. If understood from a perspective of the domestic or familial model, the
private is a sphere of people as an organic whole, as symphonic unity that provides “a refuge
against the self-interested individualism and impersonality of civil society.” 66 Conducive of
individual action, the Western ascetic-ethical religious model was certainly more compatible
with the intellectual spirit of Enlightenment and thus a development of an active civil society,
whereas Russia’s mystic religious attitude precluded critical thought and civic engagement.
The notion of sobornost was introduced by the Slavophiles precisely to counter such
Western values as a preference given to individual freedom supposedly at the expense of
communal unity. At the same time the Slavophiles also set the Russian principle of sobornost
against the Catholic tradition of the uniformity of the language of the Catholic Church and
ecclesial authoritarianism. Being antithetical to individual interests and choices, as well as far
from static servitude, sobornost instead is based on a Russian Orthodox understanding of the
organic harmony between freedom and community: it is “the free unity of the members of the
Church in their common understanding of truth and finding salvation together – a unity based
upon their unanimous love for Christ and Divine righteousness.”67 While sobornost promotes the
type of community that in a conciliatory spirit becomes a place for both freedom and obedience,
most of the Russian national experience, however, has been far more propitious toward the latter.
Within the Russian Orthodox tradition of the assuaging “unity in plurality” or diversity, one can
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choose freely only as long as he/she makes the only possible “right” choice, and in this action the
subject is not really emancipated.68
Generally speaking, lack of freedom lies at the very foundation of the human subject: as
the subject assumes his/her unary mark, he/she is precluded from enjoying his/her (mythical)
unity fully. He/she is forced by the alienating function of language to choose between the
freedom of ultimate enjoyment and life as a meaningful subject in the favor of the latter.
Moreover, by entering language the subject becomes a part of a particular socio-political and
cultural order which guides his/her attempts at certainty. As mentioned before, the absence of the
fundamental freedom of jouissance, that is, the ultimate impossibility to be what one desires to
be, opens up a space for ethical decisions. Sobornost as an expression of the supposedly innate
Russian aspiration for freedom amounts to what Žižek calls “an empty symbolic gesture”:
“freedom of choice effectively often functions as a mere formal gesture of consent
to…oppression and exploitation.”69 Whether the one who extends the empty gesture truly
believes in freedom to make a choice or acts cynically, such action exemplifies a tragic attitude.
In other words, sobornost can be seen as a tragic national aspiration toward the illusory
complementarity of individuals, united by their love of God, “carried consistently to the end and
actualized in full…in the one, complete, integral truth of Divine humanity.”70
Although formulated as a debate between Normanists and nativists, the Normanist
controversy presents no more than two slightly different versions of the Russian Orthodox
mystic ascetic. The themes of renunciation of violence, implied obedience to and suffering
inflicted by authorities, featured in the Normanist theory, have religious roots and can be traced
68
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to discussions of important historical events and political figures, such as a story about Boris and
Gleb. Princes Boris and Gleb, the youngest sons of Vladimir the Great, refused to defend their
dynastic rights for the Kievan throne by force and were murdered presumably by their sibling
Sviatopolk. Having suffered violent deaths, which imitated Christ’s willingness to bear
crucifixion, Boris and Gleb were beatified as strastoterptsy (“passion-bearers”).71
Another historical figure associated with piety is Alexander Nevsky, who governed
Novgorod during the most painful time of Kievan Rus’ history - the early years of the Tatars
invasion. At that time Russia faced an uneasy choice: either to resist the Tatar-Mongol invasion
and perish (the Tatars’ army was the strongest in the world at that time) or to humbly accept the
yoke as arguably a part of God’s plan for Russia. The latter option appealed to Alexander
Nevsky, who supposedly was unburdened by his personal ambitions, but concerned with the
safety of his people. He surrendered himself and his state to the lordship of the Tatar-Mongols
and agreed to pay a tribute to the invaders. Alexander Nevsky, as Nicolas Zernov argues,
“[taught] the Russians two lessons which they were loath to learn”: to strategically submit to the
rule of a stronger opponent and to obey unconditionally their own rulers.72 With the end of the
Tatar-Mongol yoke in Russia and inspired by the following rise of the Russian Empire, the
Russians erased the memory of Russia’s surrender to the invaders from the East, replacing it with
an unbridled suspicion of and hatred toward everything foreign, while at the same time
remaining loyal to their rulers.
A supposed virtue of pious submission to the authority of the state and the church and
thereby the will of God gravely curtailed the development of Russian civil society.73 Obviously
encouraged by the state and the church, withdrawal from matters of political significance since
71

“Passion-bearer” is the lowest holy rank in the Russian Orthodox Church. See Garrard and Garrard 118.
Zernov 24.
73
On the history of Russian civil society, see Evans Henry, and Sundstrom.
72

141

then have been often discussed in fatalistic terms: “Fashioned, moulded, created by our rulers
and our climate, we have become a great nation only by dint of submission....Scan our chronicles
from beginning to end: on each page you will find the profound effect of authority, the ceaseless
action of the soil, and hardly ever that of the public will.”74 In renouncing their individual
political freedoms and distancing themselves from politics, the Russians arguably find freedom
to lead a satisfying spiritual and moral life in a familial community. This is what Daniel
Rancour-Laferriere calls “a masochist’s idea of freedom”- a peculiar idea that servitude
precipitates freedom.75 Nikolai Fedorov, a nineteenth century Russian philosopher, for instance,
saw a more sophisticated and keen understanding of freedom in Russian meekness.76 As Pyotr
Chaadaev, another Russian philosopher of the same period, adds, “in abdicating its power in
favor of its masters, in yielding to its native psychical climate, the Russian nation gave evidence
of profound wisdom.”77
Although it may be fair to say that a tragically inflected attitude of obedience to the
authority of the state has been cultivated throughout Russia’s history and presented as an
idiosyncratic feature of Russian national spirit, it would be wrong to claim the Russians are
psychically predisposed to volunteer resignation of their will. Contrary to Johann Gottfried von
Herder’s theory of Volksgeist, national identity is not a pre-political, inborn, God-given
mentality, character or soul of a people, but a product (or rather a product-in-making) of the
national subject’s politically and ethically significant reactions to contingencies of its being. 78
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The above holds true even taking into account that from the perspective of Lacanian
psychoanalysis any subject is fundamentally enslaved by language:
Regarding this slavery that inaugurates the roads to freedom…I can point here to
what it hides….The struggle that gives rise to this slavery is rightly called a
struggle of pure prestige, and what is at stake—life itself—is well suited to echo
the danger of the generic prematurity of birth, which Hegel was unaware of, and
which I have situated as the dynamic mainspring of specular capture. But death—
precisely because it is dragged into the stakes…—simultaneously shows what is
elided by a preliminary rule as well as by the final settlement. For, in the final
analysis, the loser must not perish if he is to become a slave. In other words, a
pact always precedes violence [of the Master] before perpetuating it, and what I
call the symbolic dominates the imaginary, allowing us to wonder whether or not
murder really is the absolute master.79
Lacan employs a metaphor of the master and the slave to argue that any human being upon
entering language and society submits to language, thus becoming a slave to the master signifier
that gives meaning to his/her life. Only by refusing the ultimate freedom of jouissance that leads,
as mentioned in Chapter Two, to the symbolic death of the subject, or annihilation of
subjectivity, is the subject able to become somebody, or to mean something to somebody, and
“[t]here can be no more obvious lure than this, politically or psychologically.” 80 In this newly
found, albeit fleeting, certainty the subject then obtains the sought-after enjoyment. This
circuitous path to jouissance is a path of both suffering and pleasure - gloom of alienation and
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happiness of promised unity: “the path toward death - this is what is at issue, it’s a discourse
about masochism - the path toward death is nothing other than what is called jouissance.”81
The Russian ascetic takes the primary masochistic or alienating injunction to relinquish
jouissance and submit to the law of language by the letter: he/she does not only tragically believe
in the certainty of his/her being, but as the obsessional neurotic he/she makes this belief
conditional on certainty or rather an appearance of certainty, or the empty gesture of his/her
master.82 Therefore, the Russian ascetic slavishly surrenders to the will of his/her autocratic ruler
and this defensive operation supposedly precludes the aspired unity of the self from
disintegrating into meaninglessness. Just as the obsessional believes that he/she cannot enjoy
fully out of fear that it compromises the apparent certainty of his/her master and thereby his/her
own certainty, the Russian ascetic refuses his/her freedom to think for him/herself and act by
his/her own volition. It is peculiar that the Russian ascetic does not even need to believe that the
autocratic leader is the true master; the relationship between the Russian obsessional ascetic and
the master is that of the amicable bargain.83 The master merely carries out a function of mastery,
or a despotic force that is vital, as the Russian obsessional ascetic believes, for preserving the
national spirit.
The role that the Other executes for the obsessive neurotic approximates considerably
what Habermas dubs as the “publicity of representation.”84 Habermas discusses the character of
feudal authority by pointing out that the feudal lord does not represent his/her people and their
81

Lacan, Seminar, Book XVII 18.
According to Lacan, the fundamental slavery and masochism is the subject’s submission to language - an
operation which splits the subject between what the subject knows about himself and what he really is: “The
masochistic outcome…we cannot understand it without the dimension of the symbolic. It is located at the juncture
between the imaginary and the symbolic. What, in its structurating form, is generally called primary masochism is
located at this juncture. That is also where one must locate what is usually called the death instinct, which is
constitutive of the fundamental position of the human subject.” And “the primary alienation…[is] that by which man
enters into the way of slavery.” Lacan, Seminar, Book I 172; Lacan, Seminar, Book XI 212.
83
As pointed out above, on a fundamental level, language is a pact between the subject and the other.
84
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 7.
82

144

interests, but is merely a tragic demonstration of his/her supposedly god-given power before the
people: “[feudal publicity] imitates the kind of aura proper to the personal prestige and
supernatural authority once bestowed by the kind of publicity involved in representation.”85
What underlies the publicity of both the obsessive’s Other and the feudal lord is an emphasis on
a mere appearance or theatricality of mastery. The obsessive ascetic’s conscious or unconscious
awareness of the ultimate (importance and) impotence of the Other’s mastery, however, does not
bear any comically significant implications: the Russian ascetic tragically welcomes his/her
suffering to be able to reclaim the certainty of the national self.
The Russians saw every traumatic moment of their history that endangered the integrity
of Russia’s territory and culture as a proof that political and intellectual freedom is antithetical to
Russian national experience. That was the lesson of Kievan Rus: “No state afflicted with the
geography of Russia - open frontiers and a northern European agricultural economy - could
afford the luxuries of freedom and anarchy that had condemned Kiev.”86 Kievan Rus was
composed of city-states, or principalities, which coincided roughly with the territories originally
inhabited by various Slavic tribes and now are Ukraine, Belarus and the north-western part of
Russia.87 Each city-state, although self-governed and headed by its own prince of the Rurikid
dynasty, recognized the authority of and paid tribute to the Grand Prince of Kiev.88 The history
of Kievan Rus, as Geoffrey Hosking notes, was a tale of constant effort to build a strong
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centralized sovereign state, which was only a moderate success by the end of Vladimir I’s reign
(978-1015).89
With the death of Grand Prince Yaroslav (1019-1054), who divided the lands of Kievan
Rus among his sons and left his throne of Grand Prince to his eldest son Isiaslav (1054-1068,
1069-1073, 1076-1078), Old Russia plunged into a whirlpool of interprincely rivalry. Based on a
rota (or ladder) system of succession, a genealogically senior Rurikid inherited the throne of
Kiev, while remaining principalities were redistributed among other princes in accordance with
their dynastic status. However, due to an increasing number of Rurikid and the split of the
dynasty into single families, guided by interests of their own clan, this princely succession
system could not accommodate claims of numerous members of the Rurik house to the throne.90
The violent dynastic struggle inaugurated the appanage period in the history of medieval Russia:
the first Russian state transformed into a loosely connected federation of principalities or,
according to some theories, dissolved into separate states.91 The internecine feuds weakened
Kievan Rus and left it defenseless in the face of the Mongol conquest of Russia.
An execution of the politics of openness (or freedom of speech) and change - glasnost
and perestroika - in the second half of the 1980s once again stimulated the break-up of the state
which has been a successor to the Russian Empire. The latter in its turn came to be only by the
imposition of the absolutist power that flourished in the Grand Duchy of Moscow and the
Tsardom of Russia: “The irony of this situation in Russia was that it made the strength of the
nation depend more and more exclusively on the strength of the state, or it weakened society
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progressively.”92 The odds of the Grand Duchy of Moscow surpassing or even reclaiming the
former might and glory of the Kievan state seemed miserably low. However, despite political
disintegration, the Mongol conquest of Russia from the middle of the thirteenth to the second
half of the fifteenth century, a military threat from the Teutonic and Livonian knights, and undue
“attention” from the Polish and Lithuanian territorial contenders, the idea of the Russian land
united by faith and fighting against culturally distinct invaders warranted the continuity of the
Russian people over the turbulent centuries of medieval Russia.
The end of the appanage period and the beginning of “the true Muscovite Russia” is
commonly associated with Ivan III, also known as Ivan the Great (1462-1505), who completed
the centralization of the Russian state by subordinating most major principalities of former
Kievan Rus to Moscow, one of the more affluent of which was Novgorod. Later Ivan’s son,
Vasilii III (1505-1533), “gathered” the few remaining Russian cities.93 As scholars of Russia
observe, “the epochal rise of Muscovy from little or nothing to the status of a powerful East
European tsardom, and eventually of that of the Russian Empire and even the Union of the
Soviet Socialist Republics” is paradoxical.94
There was nothing in the desolate northern city that could suggest Muscovy’s future
greatness: while other principalities, for instance, Novgorod and Tver, could boast of their
economic might and relations with the West, Moscow did not even appear in the chronicles of
the middle of the twelfth century. Nonetheless a few factors - Moscow’s geographic location and
subsequent economic opportunities, the organizational abilities of Moscow’s prince and the
religious significance of the principality - helped to turn an initially unfavorable situation around.
The location of Moscow at the crossing of important waterways contributed to its economic
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development, which enabled the principality to pay tribute imposed by the Mongols promptly
and in full. Favored by the Golden Horde, Muscovy’s grand prince Ivan Kalita, also known as
Ivan the Wallet (1328-1341), secured yarlyk (a “charter of privileges” granted by the Mongol
khan) and with it a commission-based responsibility to collect tribute payments from other
Russian princes, as well as the right to coin money and negotiate. In addition, the transfer of the
Metropolitan seat from Vladimir to Moscow in the early fourteenth century elevated the political
significance of Moscow comparatively to other principalities.95
The absolutist rule of Ivan III, Grand Prince of Moscow, both helped preserve what soon
would emerge as the Russian nation and permitted Muscovy to expand dramatically. Ragsdale
notes that the late medieval and early modern history of Russia instilled in the Russian state and
the Russian people two distinctly different value systems:
The great fault line in Russian culture opposes these two outlooks to each other in
a schizoid fashion. The tradition of the Russian state has been to believe in a
conventionally familiar fashion that this world was comprehensible and
controllable….The tradition of the Russian people finds such an attitude to be
nonsense – pride, arrogance, hubris.96
This “schizoid fissure” between belligerent interventionism on the international arena and
voluntary subservience to the state, however, is no more than tenuous.97 As James Billington
points out, passive kenoticism and active militarism are two sides of the same coin: “Soldiers
followed images of the saints into combat, while dedicated figures at home followed the image
of Christ into the battle with sin.”98 Moreover, the two seemingly contradictory outlooks, as I
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show below, originate from the same psychic structure that underwrites the idea of sobornost coerced “freedom.”
The historical image of Alexander Nevsky exemplifies well the duality of Russian
national identity: an attitude of passive suffering and active sacrifice for the sake of the nation.
Nevsky has not only become an embodiment of religious devotion, self-abnegation and humility,
but is also associated with one of the Russia’s greatest victories over foreign invaders. Nevsky
demonstrated himself as a brave and successful military commander who defeated the crusaders
from the West twice: first the Swedes on the Neva River (hence the moniker Nevsky), and later
the Teutonic Knights at the frozen lake of Peipus (hence the event is popularly known as the
Battle on the Ice). For his faith in God’s will, as well as his tactical cooperation with the MongolTatars, which allowed the Russian Orthodox Church to prosper even under the yoke, Nevsky was
canonized in 1547. Owing to his military victories, which were also viewed through the prism of
religion, his military order – the Order of Alexander Nevsky – was established in 1725, which
later during the Second World War was reinvented in its secular version (Nevsky received the
title of the National Hero and Protector of the Fatherland).99
In modern Russia such religiously inspired dualism has translated, first, into willing
acceptance of the authority of the state: “[Russian Orthodox] people do not go protesting [against
the state], you can’t hear their voices, instead they pray in the silence of monasteries, in carrells,
at home….”100 Patriarch Kirill also trusts that “God can enlighten and strengthen our people on
their way to spiritual and moral growth, development of national identity and basic values in the
life of our multi-ethnic country.”101 At the same time, the Russian Orthodox Church supports
passionate opposition to anyone who challenges the state and thereby the Russians. Speaking in
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the aftermath of the Pussy Riot’s infamous punk performance in the Cathedral of the Christ the
Savior in February 2013, a leading Church official Vsevolod Chaplin openly called for a violent
punishment of the feminist “extremists,” reminding everyone that “when others encroach upon
your relatives, Motherland, country, sacred things, you must defend them from this aggression
by any means possible. Remember how in earlier days the Church called for arms….To respond
to this blasphemy…the state must apply force. If it does not apply force, the people must do
it.”102
Domineering and subservient motifs that permeate Russian national narratives are not
antithetical: they exemplify discursive positions of the hysteric and the obsessional neurotic,
which are both dialects of the discourse of radical uncertainty – the discourse of the Hysteric.
The identities of the hysteric and the obsessional neurotic similarly depend on the Other, whose
mastery, or certainty, is questioned by the subject. The difference is in the precise mechanism of
the subject’s relation to the Other. The obsessive national subject perceives the Other of the state
as a necessary evil that prevents the national self from disintegrating into meaninglessness. The
national subject also emerges in its hysteric role when facing any foreign, non-Russian, nonOrthodox Other, whose enjoyment threatens to compromise the supposed order and stability and
thereby the certainty of the national self. As it transpires in analyses of the national
fantasy/attitude of neo-fascists, Nashi and Putin, the reactionary/revolutionary structure of the
obsessive/hysteric manifests itself in the tragically marked elegiac and epic frames. The frames
together contribute to a messianic apocalyptic understanding of Russia’s destiny, a radically
obscene view of Russianness as the transcendental truth supposedly jeopardized by the indecent
enjoyment of the foreign Other.
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To return to a discussion of the Mongol-Tatar invasion and the changes that followed, it
is worth mentioning that whereas the degrading political practices of the Golden Horde
significantly reduced the authority of most Russian princes, religious tolerance exercised by the
invaders favorably positioned the Russian Orthodox Church as the master required by the
Russian obsessive ascetic to preserve Russian national identity and restore the political unity of
the Russian land.103 Ironically, flourishing under the rule of the Golden Horde, the Orthodox
Church of Muscovy served as a consolidating force against infidel Mongol and later Turkish
intruders by expressing the messianic aspirations of Orthodox Slavdom.104 Following the
Council of Florence in 1437-1439, when the Russian Church repudiated the arguably treacherous
union of the Byzantine Church with the Catholic Church, the fall of Constantinople to the
Ottoman Turks in 1453 was viewed as a “prophetic confirmation” of the role of Russian
Orthodoxy as the last remaining bastion of true Christianity.105
In addition to successfully “gathering the Russian land” and strengthening the single rule
of Moscow, Ivan III went down in history as the Russian sovereign who refused to pay tribute
and disavowed his loyalty to the Golden Horde, thus ending two centuries of Mongol rule in
Russia.106 Encouraged by his political and military achievements, Ivan the Great saw Moscow as
the rightful successor to Kiev, and himself as the sovereign of all Russian lands - “Grand Prince
of all Rus.”107 He was also the first to assume the title of Tsar, meaning “Caesar,” borrowing the
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Byzantine symbol of the two-headed eagle for his family crest after his arranged marriage to
Sophia Paleologue, the niece of the last Byzantine emperor. By creating an ever strong bond with
the Byzantine Empire, Ivan the Great claimed the legacy of both the Roman Empire and the
Christian Church, promoting the messianic ideas of Moscow as the Third Rome and the Second
Jerusalem.108 The motifs of religions messianism translated into a geopolitical argument for PanSlavism in the second half of the nineteenth century.109 In the view of pan-Slavists, the Russians
were marked by God to carry out a special mission of uniting all Slavs with an innate Russian
spirit of organic community and social justice, as well as “deep-rooted popular confidence in the
tsar.”110
One of the most notable proponents of pan-Slavism, Dostoyevsky saw the Russian people
as a humble nation that welcomes its redemptive suffering. Nurtured by misfortunes, the
Russians arguably developed a special ability to empathize with the suffering of other Orthodox
nations, and thus it is Russia’s responsibility and even political right to unite all of Slavdom
under Russia’s uncontestable patronage:
our nature is infinitely higher than the European. And generally all our
conceptions are more moral, and our Russian aims are higher than those of the
European world. We have a more direct and noble belief in goodness, goodness as
Christianity, and not as a bourgeois solution of the problem of comfort. A great
renewal is about to descend on the whole world, through Russian thought (which,
you are quite right, is solidly welded with Orthodoxy), and this will be achieved
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in less than a hundred years, - this is my passionate belief. But in order that this
great object may be achieved, it is essential that the political right and supremacy
of the Great-Russian race over the whole Slav world should be definitively and
incontestably consummated. (And our little Liberals preach the division of Russia
into federal states!).111
Unsurprisingly these xenophobic and racist impulses dominated attitudes of the Russians’ toward
the rest of Europe and the world. Dostoevsky, for instance, hoped “to see political railroads
(Smolensk, Kievan) erected most quickly,… and that there also are new arms very soon.”112 PanSlavists and proponents of both religious and secular Russian messianism saw their moral and
political duty to force the “truth” and “freedom” on others: “Russian democracy with its tongues
of fire, will…light up all Europe in a bloody glow!”113
Today, the messianic apocalyptic idea of Russia’s path, which has been historically
promoted by the Russian state and the church, has extended to what Archpriest Chaplin calls
“Christian patriotism”: “Russia is the third Rome. Russia is the only unenslaved civilization
capable of flourishing as Christian. That is why our patriotism is not chauvinism, not the call of
blood, not unreasonable emotional attachment to the native territory, but primarily an
understanding of the unique Christian mission that…guides our people.”114 Russia and the
Russian people purportedly never diverged from their national purpose, even during the years of
the Soviet anti-religious politics:
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our Motherlands even in the Soviet period in some miraculous way strived to
maintain an independent, free, truly Christian civilization. If Hitler or any
Western leader, who could have replaced him, enslaved Russia, we would never
be free. The Soviet soldier and the will of the Soviet leadership defended our
freedom and opportunity for authentic Christian revival.115
As I demonstrate in the upcoming analyses, such apocalyptic rewriting of the anti-fascist past of
Russia is a distinguishing feature of national fantasy of Russian neo-fascists.
The messianic idea of the Third Rome became a part of Russia’s imperialist ideology and
later Soviet ambitions to spread communism globally. With the end of Mongol rule, Russia
found itself at a crossroads: whether to sustain the role of the protector of the Orthodox faith, to
become an Eastern-Slavic nation-state, or to follow the path of the Golden Horde and transform
into a multi-ethnic empire and a great power. The first two options did not seem feasible, since
already by the mid-sixteenth century, during the reign of Ivan IV (1533-1584), better known as
Ivan the Terrible, Russia annexed the Tatar cities of Kazan and Astrakhan in 1552-1556, thus
bringing an influx of non-Christian and non-Slavic population into the country. Since a fullyfledged idea of Russian national identity had not existed before Russia acquired its imperial
meaning, the two visions - the imperial and ethno-religious perceptions of Russianness - blurred,
causing significant tensions that have run throughout Russian history. The uneasiness of national
identity construction was in part an outcome of an unresolved question about whether Russia
belonged to the West or the East.116 Anxious to become a great European power, although on a
special mission that is inspired by the legacy of the Byzantine East, Russians saw a serious threat
in the progressive countries of Western Europe.
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Billington provides an exceptional account of how Russia had been rediscovering the
West from the fifteenth through the early seventeenth century and how it influenced Russia’s
search for identity. The intense encounters with the economically advanced and culturally
sophisticated West in the early modern period were extremely disturbing: they instilled in the
Russians both a feeling of fascination with the culture and achievements of the West, and a sense
of inferiority and fear.117 “The Muscovite reaction of irritability and self-assertion,” as Billington
artfully puts it,” was in many ways that of a typical adolescent; the Western attitude of
patronizing contempt, that of the unsympathetic adult.”118
Russia’s “awkward, compulsive search for identity in an essentially European world”
began with the political and cultural standoff between Muscovy and Novgorod, Russia’s
prominent contact with the West. The political subjugation of a Westernized Novgorod by an
Eastward-looking Muscovy in the second half of the fifteenth century became the first, but
certainly not the last confrontation between Western and Eastern ideas in Russia. Novgorod itself
was an epitome of the ideological split between republic and autocracy, cosmopolitanism and
xenophobia: the city could boast of “the purest republican government” and, at the same time, it
had “the wealthiest ecclesiastical establishment in Eastern Slavdom.”119 Having secured its
authority over its former rival city, Muscovy set to destroy three characteristic Western traditions
established in Novgorod: commercial cosmopolitanism, representative government, and
philosophic rationalism.
The death of the last of the Russian Rurikids, Ivan the Great’s son Fyodor I, at the very
end of the sixteenth century marked the exceptionally catastrophic and painful fifteen years of
Russian history known as the Time of Troubles (Smutnoe Vremia).The end of the Muscovite
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dynasty delivered a powerful blow to the Russian mentality since, as noted above, the Russian
autocrat was traditionally perceived as the Other of the Russian state - an order that holds
together the Russian land and the Russian mind. A chain of economic, social and military
disasters followed the dynastic crisis. Distraught by the absence of an heir to the Muscovite
throne, weakened by a disastrous famine that slashed the country’s population by a third, shaken
by the growth of peasant unrest and Cossack rebellions, Russia presented an attractive
geopolitical opportunity for its neighbors from the West: Poland and Sweden.120
A major stumbling rock in Russia-Poland relations has been the matter of religion.121
Ever since Christianity split into two branches - Roman Catholicism and Greek Orthodox - in
1054, faith-based conflict has marked the relationship between the countries. In 2000, for
example, during his official visit to the Vatican, former President Putin did not return a formal
invitation to the Pope to visit Russia, which goes against international diplomatic decorum: the
Russian government would not welcome the head of the Vatican until “the dispute between the
Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches is resolved.”122 A year later, to protest against
the Pope’s visit to Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy rallied under slogans such as “We
will defend the Saint Rus from Catholicism,” and “Orthodox Christians’ tears and blood are on
the Pope’s hands.”123
The chaotic interregnum was certainly to Poland’s advantage, since it created an
opportunity to bring Russia into the fold of the Catholic Church, as well as to exert political
power over the Muscovite land.124 The Time of Troubles was a period of exceptional patriotic
upsurge among the Russians, who initially failed to liberate Moscow from the Poles, but later
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defeated Poland and Sweden.125 Driven by the rebellious hysteric’s enmity against the West
(particularly the Poles) and, just as in the earlier times of the appanage and the Tatar Mongol
Yoke, united in a subservient obsessive fashion behind the Orthodox Church, the Russians
managed to restore order and to end the interregnum.
For about four decades following the Time of Troubles, the Church moved to the tsar as
close as ever: distressed by the prior events - social disturbances and foreign invasions - the
churchmen and aristocracy supported Tsar Mikhail I (1613-1645) zealously. Moreover,
Mikhail’s father, Filaret, was appointed as Patriarch of the Orthodox Church and given the title
of Great Sovereign. Though the Time of Troubles left the Church extremely conservative and the
Russians suspicious of the West, Russia soon renewed its interest in the West (as well as the
East) to pursue its imperial ambitions. With an exception of a short spell in the early 1990s,
when Russians were briefly inspired by the prospects of becoming a liberal democracy, the
distrust toward the West and contempt for the supposedly immoral Western way of life, along
with the insistent desire to catch up with and even dominate the West politically, economically,
and technologically, became a major element in the process of Russian national identity
construction for centuries to come. The spirit of the national triumph over the enemies from the
West that the Time of Troubles ended with is now commemorated every year on National Unity
Day (November 4), which celebrates Russia’s victory over the Polish invaders in 1612.
However, as mentioned earlier, this holiday is better known for so-called Russian Marches demonstrations organized by neo-fascist, ultra-nationalist and anti-immigrant activists in major
cities in Russia on this day each year since 2005.
The calamities of the Time of Troubles were read by many Russians as God’s revenge for
losing the true faith: most of the clergy, supported by many laypeople, attempted to bring back
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pristine Russian Orthodoxy through acetic practices, such as strict fasting, increased discipline,
regular confessions, restriction of entertainment and so on.126 Assuming responsibility to provide
the whole Christian Orthodox world with authentic Orthodoxy, reformers close to Aleksei I
(1645-1676), known as Zealots of Piety (revniteli blagochestiia), or Lovers of God (bogolubtsy)
insisted on bringing Russian Orthodox practice - rituals, liturgies, scriptures - in line with the
rites of other Orthodox Churches, particularly with the Greeks. The clash between the reformers
and those who resisted modernization and unification of the Russian Church, aptly named Old
Believers (starovery or staroobriadtsy), was more than a split between the modernizers and the
conservatives in the monastic realm: the ecclesiastic division exposed momentous tendencies in
seventeenth century Muscovy that were to have far-reaching consequences in the history of
Russia. As Billington notes, the implications of the Great Church Schism of 1667 can be
compared with those of the Russian Revolution of 1917, since both events became “a point of no
return in Russian history.”127
The division in the Russian Church in the second half of the seventeenth century was
described in chronicles with the Russian words khistrost’ (guile, deception, shrewdness) and
blagochestie (vehement dedication, fervid faith) - the former was used in association with
Western knowledge and skills, while the latter stood for “ardent loyalty” to the Church, the
sacred past and the God-like figure of the monarch.128 It is unfortunate that since the time of the
standoff between Muscovy and Novgorod education and knowledge had been conceived as
dangerous and even sinful. Such an inherently tragic worldview, for example, elucidates the
origins of a famous proverb “opinion is the mother to all suffering, opinion is the second fall,” as
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well as the meaning of the phrase “to go into books” - “to go out one’s mind.” 129 Just as the
rationalistic critical thinking of Novgorod was crushed by obsessively religious Muscovy under
Ivan III, so a few centuries later any element of modernization - commerce, technology, science was perceived to be a deceit of an honest Russian muzhik by the heretic West. It was a peculiar
mixture of conservatism, spiritualism, xenophobia, as well as an anti-Jewish attitude, that
precluded Russia from adopting whatever positive the West had to offer, however, without
having to dismiss modernization completely.130
When ecclesiastic reformers, including some Russian autocrats (most notably, Peter the
Great), began their attack on Russian religious and cultural traditions for the sake of progress,
foreign practices and thinking were still perceived by the Russians as something alien. 131
“Dualism and the absence of a neutral axiological zone” (a fundamental feature of Russian
mentality), along with a weak sense of nationhood prior to Russia’s interaction with the West,
prevented the Russians from forming a balanced view of the West, particularly its cultural,
political and economic achievements.132 The response to increased interaction with the West was
“almost schizophrenic:” the split between pro-Western and anti-Western mindset - what in the
nineteenth century came to be known as the controversy between the Westernizers and
Slavophiles - has survived till the present.133
While from the mid-fifteenth to the mid-sixteenth century, the fear in official Muscovy
was primarily that of the Catholic “Latins,” a stronger xenophobic reaction against the Protestant
“Germans” swept across Russia during the late years of Ivan IV’s reign.134 More than ever
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before, the Muscovy of Ivan the Terrible found itself in absolute “political uncertainty and
ideological confusion.”135 An “ostensibly xenophobic and traditionalist” ruler, a devoted
advocate of total autocracy and a self-professed enemy of the Protestant West, Ivan IV, in a
ironic turn of events, opened the country for large-scale Westernization and summoned a
representative assembly (zemskii sobor).136 Eventually disturbed by the changes brought about
through the process of Westernization, that is, encompassing practices that steered the country
away from its “sacred past and the internal solidarity between the sovereign, church, and family,
on which Muscovite civilization was based,” Ivan immersed Russia in terror with the help of
Russia’s first secret police: the oprichniki.137
The early eighteenth century modernizing reforms, carried out by Peter I, or Peter the
Great (1682-1725), resulted in even greater shock for the Russians: the growth of Russia as a
modern, multi-ethnic secular state was detrimental to the old Russian view of themselves as a
pious Christian Orthodox nation loyal to its divine tsar.138 The need to build and sustain Russia
as a European great power, which it was already by the end of the seventeenth century, required
steady technological progress, significant military achievements, and, at least, an appearance of
cultural and religious tolerance.139 Russian culture was marked by Polish (yet not Catholic)
influences, while Swedish, German and Dutch (but not Protestant) influences were apparent in
the country’s administrative and military spheres. Invited foreign specialists formed the new
service nobility, known as dvorianstvo, or “men of the court,” and replaced the old traditional
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landowning aristocracy.140 In addition to his innovations and transformations, Peter I started
calling himself an emperor and moved the capital from conservative Moscow - a bastion of Old
Russia - to cosmopolitan Saint Petersburg - a symbol of the new, enlightened Russian Empire.
Having subdued a rival for state authority, the Russian Orthodox Church, Peter the Great
substituted the religious messianic idea of the Third Rome with a new form of messianism – a
zealous dedication to education and progress.141 A similar preoccupation with economic and
technical growth determined the politics of the USSR and is a defining feature of modern
Russia’s objective to “be competitive in everything.”142 Inspired by the European Enlightenment,
Peter the Great’s reforms could have potentially opened the Russians to a comic national selfawareness. This, however, did not happen in Peter’s Russia and would not either happen later in
the Soviet Union and Putin’s Russia. Just as other Europeans monarchs in the seventeenth
century, Peter the Great relied on enlightened despotism, where knowledge and progress were
merely used as instruments of boosting the power of the state both at home and abroad.
Since the idea of active learning and mastering new skills in attempts to bring out a
profound change (which for Russia virtually always involved Westernization of its economy,
politics and culture) was antithetical to the conservative and resigned mind of the Russian
ascetic, it is only owing to the insistence of the Russian autocrat, as Ragsdale argues, that a
process of modernization in Russia was made possible. While this argument holds true with
regard to modernization processes of Petrine Russia and late imperial Russia, which largely
involved industrialization, expansion of commerce and dissemination of education, which were
rejected by the masses and intellectuals defending a purportedly true Russian way of life, in the
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Soviet Union and in modern Russia the state’s aspirations for economic advancement and social
improvement were widely welcomed and actually boosted the authority of state power.
The Russian people, for example, enthusiastically responded to the call of Soviet leaders
“to catch up with and surpass” the West (more specifically, the U.S.).143 The state rhetoric of
post-Soviet Russia has also been saturated with sentiments of economic and technological
advancement. Acknowledging the pressing need for Russia to integrate into the global economy,
Putin reiterates that “only those who fully utilize new [technological and economic]
opportunities win.”144 This can be explained by the fact that the passive, obsessive quality of the
Russian ascetic mind approximates in its tragic impulse the nation’s active pursuit of economic
and technological success, provided the latter is instrumental in the nation’s confrontation with
the national other.
Nevertheless, considering the dramatically distinct socio-political and economic
circumstances in early modern Russia, including the fact that the Russian clergy was threatened
by the reforms, and given the overwhelming illiteracy of the majority of the population, the
strength with which the Petrine reforms were rejected among conservative and religious Russians
is not surprising.145 The ideology of the new secular multi-national empire was met by two
intense forces - Old Believer communalism and Cossack inspired peasant insurrectionism.
Different, yet mutually reinforcing, these two forces not only shaped the historical
dispute between Old and New Russia, but also defined all the oppositional forces under the
Romanovs, including those that led to the Russian Revolution of 1917. Both the products of the
religious awakening of the Time of Trouble, the traditions of Old Believers and peasant
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insurrectionists morphed into distinctive, yet loosely organized movements, in particular, as a
hostile reaction to Peter I’s modernizing attempts. While the merchants, who made up the core of
the Old Believer movement, protested against the growth of the central government and the
restrictions it imposed on the old urban communities, Cossack-led peasant rebels challenged
lifetime peasant servitude and the twenty-five-year military service obligation. Moreover, the
movements were aboil with indignation over the luxurious life of the Westernized court and
disturbed by women monarchs who almost continually ruled Russia till the end of the eighteenth
century.
From the middle of the seventeenth century the Russians suffered, in Billington’s words,
from an “eschatological psychosis”: the Church Schism followed by Russia’s painful
transformation into a multi-national empire incited apocalyptic fears in many Russians.146
Although not exactly psychotic, the Russians experienced a profound national trauma. If by
tradition Russian monarchs were regarded as God’s representatives, “messianic deliverer[s],” or,
in other words, the Other, Peter the Great was proclaimed the Antichrist.147 Amidst anxiety over
the impending end of the world, associated with the exposed lack of the Other of the state, the
Old Believers, as well as representatives of the monastic revival (another, yet less prominent
religious movement), in accordance with a religious belief in the redemptive power of suffering,
withdrew from the political and intellectual life of the country. Since neither the official Church
nor the tsar (or emperor) was no longer the guarantor of “true” Russianness, they moved closer
to the common folk: pious, uncorrupt Russians, bearers of true faith. Later the idea of redemptive
salvation by leading a simple, ascetic life was extended over the secular realm to give rise to
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Russian Freemasonry in the second half of the eighteenth century and, a century later, to Russian
populism (khozhdenie v narod, pilgrimage to the people).
Disgusted by the licentious, extravagant life of Catherine II’s Francomanic court, rather
than by their own privileged status, the conflicted and self-hating Russian aristocracy renounced
their foreign ways and found the source of spiritual rejuvenation in Freemasonry. It is worth
mentioning briefly that Russian Freemasonry acquired two distinct yet interrelated forms: the
first-phase Masonic order was a practically-oriented philanthropic St. Petersburg based
organization, while the second-phase Masonic order was a mystical, contemplative Moscowbased Lodge.148 St. Petersburg’s Lodge did not distinguish itself much from the superficial life of
the court. In contrast, the latter was largely concerned with the issues of religious and national
self-consciousness: the second-phase Masonry was “leading men’s gaze back to the idealized
rural and religious culture of Muscovy.”149 First, engaged primarily in education and
philanthropy, and later guided by a broader “seductive belief in the realizability of heaven on
earth through the concentrated efforts of consecrated thinkers,” Russian Freemasonry shaped a
new intelligentnoe soslovie - a class of intellectuals between the traditional aristocracy and the
peasantry, as well as separate from the state.150 The role of Freemasonry in Russian social
thought is very difficult to overestimate: the secret society was a sign of burgeoning, albeit
fragile, tradition of critical thought in Russia. Freemasonry “had charged the air with expectation
and created a sense of solidarity among those searching for truth…Most important, ideas were
creating a thirst for action.”151
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From the 1840s to the early 1880s Russia saw an unprecedented preoccupation with
obshchestvennaia mysl (“social thought”). This, according to Billington, was both a delayed
response to revolutionary events that occurred in France between 1830 and 1848 and an
expression of Russian intellectuals’ desire of a better life for the masses. Unlike similar
aspirations in Western Europe, longing for transformation carried social rather than political
significance: many expected the monarch to become a source of reforms, the most significant of
which was considered to be the emancipation of the serfs. Following the familial model of the
public/private, Russian intellectuals saw an opportunity for Russia’s advancement not in a robust
civil society, but in a simple communal life of people distant from politics.152
The two most important intellectual currents of the early nineteenth century, as noted
earlier, were the Westernizers and the Slavophiles.153 According to the latter, while the Western
way of life “had been devoured by the cancer of rationalism,” Russia had a brighter future.154
The supposedly perverse nature of Western democracy, characterized by hostility, violence and
slavery, they argued, was inferior to authentic Russian rule, founded on the principles of
spirituality, truth and freedom (expressed in the tradition of sobornost). Unlike liberal democrats
who purportedly promoted a new kind of despotism – “a liberal ‘aristocracy of wealth’,”
authentic democrats were conceived by the Slavophiles as egalitarian socialists, and purportedly
true democracy was recognized as an intrinsic component of the Russian way of life: “We shall
always remain democrats, standing for purely human ideals and blessing every tribe to live and
develop in peace in its own way.”155 While, unlike the Slavophiles, the Westernizers discarded
the traditional Russian practices, including “the social and moral-psychological tradition of
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serfdom and the ancient communality of the ‘mir’” as backward, and advocated for Russia to
follow the European trajectory of development, both the Slavophiles and the Westernizers as two
nationalist philosophies advocated a unique path for Russia’s development as an ever-growing
empire.156
Over the last decades of the nineteenth century, Slavophilism grew into imperial
chauvinism and Pan-Slavism: those new forms of Russian nationalism were based on pride (lack
of humility) and insensitivy to reason. Orthodox messianism of the first generation of the
Slavophiles was substituted with geopolitical thinking in the second phase of Slavophilism: the
supposed spiritual decay of the West, as well as Russia’s national interests, became a moral basis
for Russia’s imperial expansionist politics. At the turn of the twentieth century, the third
generation of Slavophilism turned to “unbridled anti-Semitism.”157
Although an anti-Jewish attitude was part of the Russian national outlook as early as the
sixteenth century, it became especially prominent in tsarist Russia.158 Imported from the West,
this tragic attitude struck the chords of the Russians for several reasons. The Jews were perceived
as a religious foe and later as an ethnic enemy of the “Slavic” or “Aryan Russian” race. Being a
product of classical peasant animosity toward the commercial and intellectual life of the city,
anti-Semitic attitudes in Russia were amplified in Slavophilism. As Alexander Orbach points out,
the philosophy of Slavophiles was inimical to Western practices and ideals of individualism,
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capitalism and political liberalism, which in its turn did not leave the Jews any chance to become
a part of Russian culture.159
The revolutionary potential of progressive ideas, which resulted in the decline of absolute
rule of monarchs and the Church in Western Europe, as well as an increasing idealization of
peasant life as a bastion of national purity, caused by the principal preoccupation of the state
with modernization along Western standards, made Russian autocrats take a step back, as they
feared for their thrones.160 By the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth
centuries the Russian state plunged into conservative nationalism, which since then almost
continually fostered a sense of cultural superiority and Russian (primarily religious and panSlavic, though later also social and political) messianism.
The reign of Alexander I (1801-1825) can be fairly characterized as an interlude of neoEnlightenment, as it followed the despotic last years of Catherine II, the tyrannical regime of
Paul I (1796-1801), and preceded the even more reactionary regime of Nicholas I (1825-1855):
“the new ruler stood as the very embodiment of the humanness, progressiveness, affirmation of
human dignity, and freedom that educated Russians fervently desired.”161 The beginning of the
nineteenth century in Russia was full of hopes for major political and social reforms, yet
Alexander I was not decisive enough to go through with them: to limit autocracy and abolish
serfdom.
The year of 1812, when Russia defeated Napoleon, started the second, mostly reactionary
period of Alexander’s reign. The victory over Napoleon encouraged the monarch to view himself
not just as savior of Russia but of all Europe: Alexander I “felt he had a special mission.”162
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Following his participation in the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and full of determination to
preserve peace in Europe and prevent atheism and revolutionary impulses from spreading, the
monarch joined the Holy Synod with the Ministry of Education to create the Ministry of Spiritual
Affairs and Popular Enlightenment: the “ministry of religious-utopian propaganda.”163 This new
institutional hybrid was charged with reforming Russians into “ecumenically minded Christians
in whom better education, Bibles in the vernacular...and participation in organized philanthropy
would instill benevolence, self-discipline, a sense of social responsibility and a heightened civic
consciousness.”164 Alexander’s aspiration, as Dominic Lieven asserts, was to build a “cohesive,
authoritarian, mildly progressive polity,” rested on the traditions of mutual respect between the
state and the people.165
Alexander’s version of a great European state clashed violently against the realities of
early nineteenth century imperial Russia: debilitating serfdom, strong authoritarian rule, religious
and cultural assimilation of the non-Christian, non-Russian population. The Decembrists
(Russian army officers, members of a secret society - the Union of Salvation, later renamed as
the Union of Welfare) were infused with determination to transform Russian autocracy into a
constitutional monarchy, institute the rule of law and reform serfdom. Yet, the hopes of the
Decembrists “to prod [the] nation into political and moral greatness commensurable with the
military greatness assured by [the Russian military heroes] Suvorov and Kutuzov” were quashed
by Alexander’s brother, Nicholas I (1825-1855).166 As a result, no significant relaxation of
monarchical rule happened until the beginning of the twentieth century. On the contrary,
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Nicholas I, who came to be known as Europe’s gendarme, immersed the country in conservatism
and extreme nationalism.
Convinced by his Minister of Education, Sergey Uvarov, that Russia was in dire need of
a coherent national idea, Nicholas I introduced the theory of Official Nationality, founded on the
notions of autocracy (samoderzhavie), Orthodoxy (pravoslavie), and nationality, or better said,
national outlook (narodnost). Russia no longer aspired to be a secular multi-ethnic Enlightened
European state of the Petrine design. Now, warned by the French Revolution and the Decembrist
revolt, buttressed by a “contempt for [Napoleon] and uncompromising love for the Mother
Russia that he attacked,” the state adopted an ideology of national absolutism.167
The messianic and imperial ambitions of Russia in the mid-nineteenth century were
dramatically halted by its defeat in the Crimean war of 1853-1856.168 The defeat not only
shattered Russia’s reputation as a European great power, but also was detrimental to the political
stability and security of monarchy within the country. As Hosking notes, the precarious position
of Russia in the international arena gave rise to political movements aiming to topple the
monarchy. Thus even the most conservative statesmen saw the dire need to return to the policy
of Westernization, which was equated with the economic and technological advancement of the
country. At the same time the problem with modernization in a Western fashion, as the history of
Western Europe demonstrated, was that it necessarily incited profound political changes which
challenged the very existence of monarchy and empire.
The new economic reforms aimed at fostering prosperity among the poverty-stricken
masses, who could not be exploited any further, as well as Russia’s industrialization, brought
about the long-awaited emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and significant changes in Russia’s
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education system. In the 1860s universities opened their doors for newly emancipated peasants.
To pursue higher education was considered as advancement on a social ladder for anybody
except students from noble and wealthy families. While the emancipation terms financially
crippled the peasantry, sending peasants “into a deepening spiral of indebtedness and poverty,”
the education reform proved to be more progressive and therefore put the security of autocratic
power in jeopardy.169 Fostering a new generation of experts qualified to carry out tasks of
modernization inadvertently led to the proliferation of independent critical thought. At last, a
critical public sphere, or obschestvennost, emerged in Russia. It is peculiar that while modern
Russian thought was indebted greatly to Western ideas, it failed to fully retain their progressive
comic significance. Superimposed on inherently tragic notions of sobornost and Russian
messianism, which manifested themselves in a traditional disregard for the political freedom of
both Russian people and other nations, a philosophical doctrine of socialism, became, oddly, “a
defense against the West…and a superior form of the West against an outmoded form of the
West.”170Among the most influential appropriations of socialism were the ideologies of the
Socialist Revolutionaries and the Marxists.
Before the socialist revolutionaries emerged as an organized political force, they initially
emerged as the Russian populist movement of khozhdenie v narod. This “grassroots movement”
was also known as narodnichestvo, and those who participated in it were called narodniks.
Narodniks were predominately university students who came from families of merchants,
artisans, artists, doctors, teachers, and so on; in other words, from meschanstvo, the Russian
equivalent of the modern middle class. Russian populists criticized the state for newly introduced
economic and fiscal policies that arguably contradicted what was perceived to be the true
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Russian spirit. In line with Charles-Louis de Secondat Baron de Montesquieu’s concept of
national character, with which they were likely familiar, narodniks considered the Russians to be
“naturally” predisposed to a communal type of life.
According to Montesquieu, a general spirit of the nation is shaped by a variety of static
elements and dynamic factors: “climate, religion, laws, the maxims of the government, examples
of past things, mores, and manners….”171 Depending on which of “these causes acts more
forcefully” each nation acquires certain immutable features. Speaking on the role of climate,
Montesquieu, for example, asserts that it conditions some nations into cherishing freedom and
impels other nations to readily dispense of it. Besides, Montesquieu argues that the state’s laws
and form of government must correspond to the nation’s native temperament. Although Lacan’s
psychoanalysis too takes into consideration the role of the Real as sensible, the national subject’s
defensive reaction to it cannot be viewed as something objective and determinate. National
identity is not in a direct causal relationship with external circumstances, but an indeterminate
process of negotiation of the fundamental tension between how people perceive themselves and
others.
The Russian populist movement was conceived around a rather naïve faith in the peasant
commune as the last source of the supposedly true Russian mentality and an unadulterated
familial way of life, and so members of the movement advocated for socio-economic equality
and political liberty, which would amount to a peculiar form of Russian socialism. While it has
its roots in Western Europe, the doctrine of socialism acquired a specific Russian cultural
meaning: “[i]t elevated to an ideal the egalitarian, self-contained, and participatory peasant land
commune and workers’ artel.”172 Although many proponents of Russian socialism were atheists,
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the old religious idea of sobornost, or the pristine spirit of human solidarity, as well as the
messianic aspirations of “Holy Rus,” inspired Russian radical intellectuals of the nineteenth
century to see the Russian peasant commune as the only source of salvation – salvation from the
tyranny of the tsar and aristocracy at home and the soulless rationality and individualism of the
West.
It turned out that Russian peasants, however, were as hostile to narodniks - who
attempted to relieve peasants from oppression - as the latter were to their landlords - those who
were directly responsible for the peasants’ plight. Meanwhile, Russian peasants remained loyal
to the tsar who in their eyes always remained, with the exception of Peter the Great, the “true
tsar,” “tsar-batiushka” (“tsar and the good father”), divine savior, or the Master of the obsessive
Russian muzhik.173 While neither the Pan-Slav program nor Russian populism were able to
mobilize the masses, a strong sense of hostility felt toward the Jewish population of Russia
moved peasants to action. Pogroms, or anti-Jewish riots, broke out in Russia at the end of the
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century: “There outbreaks of destructive frenzy
were products of rapid economic growth and population movement, and then of radical political
change, all of which reawakened old popular resentments against a people who seemed to have
done well out of disrupting a traditional [Russian] way of life.”174
What tragically brought together the Russian state, the Russian intellectuals and the
common Russian people was an idea of the national enemy who must be overpowered by all
means possible. Nicholas II (1894-1917) took advantage of a surge in popular anti-Semitism to
unite the masses, the clergy and the aristocracy around ideas of Russian national absolutism: he
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extended moral and financial patronage to armed squads (also known as black hundreds) of
people who “became enraged by the insolence and audacity of the revolutionaries and
socialists…nine-tenth of [whom] are Yids.”175 Black hundreds, which were organized around the
Union of Russian People (SRN), became “a halfway house between the old-fashioned
reactionary movements of the nineteenth century and the right-wing populist (fascist) parties of
the twentieth.”176
Without denying the role of racist and religious motifs that moved Russian antiSemitism, the state employed the black hundreds mostly pragmatically or cynically – to counter
each and every force that threatened the autocratic rule of the tsar in any way. Both in the USSR
and later in modern Russia the part of the menacing national other from outside was most often
assigned to the West, while the national enemy within, or in Putin’s words, “a fifth column” and
“national traitors,” was the Jews, other “unreliable” ethnic groups, and Russia’s liberal
opposition.177 The SRN and black hundreds in a sense became a precursor of state-sponsored
hatred and violence, which is discussed in Chapter Five.
The Soviet ideology appropriated a few pre-Revolutionary discourses of exeptionalism,
the most powerful of which was Slavophilism. More precisely, Soviet Communism was “a
strange amalgam” and “odd jumble” of Marxism as a legacy of German idealism and English
economic history, the Slavophiles-inspired Russian idea and the Petrine zeal for modernization
and progress, to which Slavophilism was paradoxically unsympathetic.178 One of the major
principles structuring the vision of Russia in the twentieth century was Soviet internationalism.
Lenin believed that nationalities had to be dissolved on the way to a supranational world of
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socialism. Nation-centered ideas once prominent in Slavophilism and pan-Slavism were
superseded by the rhetoric of internationalism and “the friendship of nations,” however, only in
appearance.179 In reality, the ideological proximity of the Bolsheviks and the supporters of the
Russian idea led to the emergence of “a new red-white, or later even red-white-brown, ideology
called national bolshevism.”180
On the surface, Soviet leaders, including Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin and Mikhail
Gorbachev, welcomed ethnic diversity and even defended nations’ “right to arrange their affairs
as they please;…a right to preserve any of their national institutions, whether beneficial or
harmful – nobody can (nobody has a right to!) forcibly interfere in the life of a nation.”181 By
promising to respect the right of nationalities for self-determination, Lenin solicited great support
for the October Revolution. In the same spirit, Gorbachev acknowledged that “interference in
those internal processes with the aim of altering them according to someone else’s prescription
would be all the more destructive for the emergence of a peaceful order.”182 Furthermore, in his
essay “Marxism and the National Question” Stalin insisted that “the complete democratization of
the country is the basis and condition for the solution of the national question.”183 As Stalin
argued, a decision to “permit [a minority] to use its native language,” to “possess [their] own
schools” and to “enjoy liberty of conscience (religious liberty), liberty of movement, etc.” would
have resolved ethnic tensions and consequently would have rendered ethnic differences obsolete,
thus leaving “the workers of all nationalities of Russia [united] into single, integral collective
bodies” and as such focused on the common task. Unlike Stalin, who never truly entertained
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even an idea of granting a Soviet republic equal political rights, Gorbachev believed, perhaps
sincerely, that although “[i]n the past, [national] differences often served as a factor in pulling
away from one another…[n]ow they are being given the opportunity to be a factor in mutual
enrichment and attraction.”184 This comic guarantee of freedom, however, turned out to be no
more than an empty gesture.
The formal nature of the gesture was obvious even before attempts to secede from the
Soviet Union were decisively suppressed: from the Soviet communist view freedom of selfdetermination was modeled on sobornost, or a tragic understanding of truth and choice. By
insisting on the primacy or the ultimate truth of the proletariat’s interests, Stalin emphasized the
need:
to influence the will of nations so that the nations may arrange their affairs in the
way that will best correspond to the interests of the proletariat. For this reason
Social-Democracy, while fighting for the right of nations to self-determination,
will at the same time agitate, for instance, against the secession of the Tatars, or
against cultural-national autonomy for the Caucasian nations; for both, while not
contradicting the rights of these nations, do contradict “the precise meaning” of
the [Russian Marxists’] programme, i.e., the interests of the Caucasian
proletariat.185
In other words, ethnic diversity of the Soviet Union was tolerated and even celebrated as long as
it was perceived as inconsequential and a matter of “cosmetic” ethnic variations. When ethnic
peculiarities became vocal and politically menacing to the unity of the Soviet state, the
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Communist Party fought those anti-Communist “nationalist deviations” with fervor.186 Stalin, for
example, wrestled local nationalisms by deporting supposedly dangerous and disloyal ethnic
groups to Siberia and other regions aiming to inhibit the growth of national resistance and in
effect to guarantee the security and integrity of the USSR. In solidarity with the Soviet Union’s
disregard for the political will of other states and nations, Putin, when invited to comment on
historical significance of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, stated that “this pact did make sense in
terms of guaranteeing the Soviet Union’s security.”187
Although nationalism was condemned as “a bourgeois struggle,” Russian ethnocentricity
became a useful tool in the hands of the Bolshevik Party.188 Under the theatrical cloak of
internationalism and “the friendship of the peoples,” the Soviet ideology was in fact imbued with
ideas of Russian imperial messianism and “superior Russian ways.”189 Popular and often
simplified Russian sentiments about the developed and dynamic West, on the one hand, and the
stagnant and superstitious East, on the other, contributed to the country’s eagerness to prove its
place in the world and “help” Asian ethnic minorities - supposedly backward and dangerous
peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia - to transform their “primitive” ways of life.190
The spirit of nationalism under the guise of Soviet patriotism was spread by celebrating
the country’s history (to be more precise, Russian history), by cultivating a sense of pride and
love for the country. In the introduction to “the best” textbook on the history of the USSR, for
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example, the image of the USSR as an exceptional (“only one Socialist country in the world”),
rich (“our country is the richest in the world,” “more prosperous all the time”), successful (“our
country was a backward country now it has become the most advanced and mighty country in the
world”), multicultural (“in no other country in the world is there such friendship among the
various peoples as in the USSR”), just (“all the peoples of the USSR work for the common
good,” “all of us work for ourselves, and not for parasites”), and resistant (“the people of the
USSR fought their oppressors and enemies”) country was constructed.191
By the time the USSR realized the immediacy of the threat posed by the tragically
obscene Other of Hitler’s Germany (and the consequences of having signed the RibbentropMolotov Pact), tragic national sentiments had forged Communist ideology. The very pact
demonstrated that what counted was strength and power, rather than political liberties and
international laws. Rethinking the legacy of the Soviet Union’s fight with fascism, Antifa
members, for instance, point out that “in the Soviet Union we were not told…why one had to be
an anti-fascist; we were only told that Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union, and therefore it
was an enemy. There were no discussions about what was going on in the Soviet Union….”192
Although the Soviet people demonstrated truly selfless, comic heroism when confronted with the
horrifying Realness of the war, the state never fought fascism from a legitimately comic position
– by defending political liberties and freedom as such.
Shaped by distinctly conservative and tragic political ideas and social practices, such as
dominance of the state and the church in the socio-political life of the country, as well as popular
support of military chauvinism, xenophobia and racism, the Russian idea has so far manifested
itself as an aggressive hysterical posture complemented with obsessive resignation from freedom
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to make politically consequential choices. Ravaged by the radical ambiguity of the national self,
acutely experienced in Russia’s everlasting pursuit of statehood, the Russian national subject
seeks solace in the purportedly apolitical, determinate space of spiritual communal life, which it
is ready to defend with its life.
Taking into account that at present Russia cannot afford to be perceived as an aggressive
tragic national subject and thus to be isolated from the West, competing national narratives often
invoke Russia’s national democratic tradition – “the rule of the Russians with their own
traditions of national self-government without standards imposed on us from outside” – to justify
the country’s pursuit of political, economic and/or military stability and strength. 193 As the above
brief overview of the articulatory history of the Russian idea reveals, Russia’s attempts at
democracy, however, have been comic only on the surface; at bottom they comprise the least
ethically consuming and the most forceful solutions to the national subject’s radical ambiguity.
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4

THE TRAGIC NARRATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN NEO-FASCIST MASTER

As extreme nationalist attitudes have been gradually intensifying during Putin’s
presidency, more journalists, scholars and politicians started drawing parallels between postSoviet Russia and late Weimar Germany, voicing their concerns about the arguably ascendant
fascist trend in the country (some went so far as to compare Putin to Hitler).1 There are, however,
those who have cautioned against such comparisons, deeming them either unjustified or outright
provocative.2 The disagreement about whether fascist ideas have permeated the mainstream
national vision or have been a merely marginal and thus inconsequential element of Russian
politics hinges on, first, how fascism is defined and, second, whether political actors that
promote fascist views are to be approached as mad and irrational.
Since the present study is centered on the employment of the word fascism in competing
national narratives, and this chapter in particular is dedicated to a psycho-rhetorical reading of
national ideas promoted by representatives of the Russian extreme right, I must, first, address the
question of what counts as fascism, considering both the circumstances of contemporary Russia
and a long history of Russian conservative thought. Second, I discuss whether fascist beliefs,
including contemporary Russian fascist attitudes, should be viewed in terms of pathology (more
specifically, psychosis and perversion) and irrationality from a Lacanian point of view. Finally, I
briefly mention major events that contributed to the shaping of the national fantasy of Russian
neo-fascists and examine the psycho-rhetorical narrative of the latter both on the Imaginary and
Symbolic levels.
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4.1

The Reciprocity of Russian Neo-Fascism and the Russian Idea

The question of what counts as fascism has been widely discussed and resolved in a
number of ways.3 It is true that we are able to recognize modern versions of fascism in the
images of a crowd with arms stretched out in a salute or carrying banners with swastikas. Yet the
issue of defining fascism in modern Russia, especially considering the popular memory of the
country’s anti-fascist struggle, is more than an issue of fascist aesthetics or, for that matter, a
mere borrowing of fascist ideas that cropped up in Western Europe in the twentieth century.4
Most often fascism is characterized as an extreme ethnic or a broader cultural nationalist
idea that is characteristically xenophobic and anti-Semitic, favors authoritarian and totalitarian
forms of government, suppression of civil liberties, in a military chauvinistic fashion advocates
for the unity of the nation beyond the borders of its original state, promotes the nation’s imperial
and even global ambitions as the nation’s supposedly special historical destiny, and is reinforced
by means of propaganda and conspiracy theories. These features, however, do not uniquely
separate fascism from other forms of the extreme right.5 A key element of fascism, according to
Roger Griffin, is its revolutionary aspect vocalized in the myth of national rebirth.
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As Shenfield insists, Griffin’s definition of fascism as “a palingenetic form of populist
ultra-nationalism,” however, fails to emphasize the premodern element of the national myth.6 For
the former, fascism is rather “an authoritarian populist movement that seeks to preserve and
restore premodern patriarchal values within a new order based on communities of nation, race, or
faith.”7 This definition, however, does not differ dramatically from Griffin’s more elaborate
explication of fascism as
[an] essentially palingenetic, and hence anti-conservative, thrust toward a new
type of society…that… builds rhetorically on the cultural achievements attributed
to former, more ‘glorious’ or healthy eras in national history only to invoke the
regenerative ethos which is a prerequisite for national rebirth, and not to suggest
socio-political models to be duplicated in a literal-minded restoration of the past.8
While placing emphasis on the reactionary and the revolutionary aspects respectively, Shenfield
and Griffin both characterize fascism as an ideology that simultaneously struggles to preserve
premodern, “authentic” values and to create a radically new society under modern conditions.9
Keeping in mind Lacan’s thesis that any attempt to recollect the past, let alone to reanimate it,
necessarily involves its revision, “the literal-minded restoration of the past” then, one can
conclude, always ends in a production of something new.
organization is to provide a maximum definition - the fullest collection of features - and a minimum definition - the
smallest amount of core features that constitute extreme right-wing ideology. Whereas the minimum of required
core features varies from scholar to scholar (some of them identify up to ten core elements), the most frequently
used characteristics of extreme right-wing ideology include ethnic nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy,
and the strong state. See Mudde, The Ideology of Extreme Right; Mudde, “Right‐Wing Extremism.”
6
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character of fascism, Griffin insists – in a kind of coyly essentialist manner – that those who “[are] drawn to fascism
for non-revolutionary motives” are conservative “fellow travelers rather than ‘true’ fascists.” Griffin, “Da Capo,
Con Meno Brio” 264. For more on the anti-modernizing feature of fascism see Kitchen; Turner.
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It is not only from the above consideration that I argue against a clear-cut separation of
Russian conservative ultranationalists as an arguably reactive force from undisguised neo-fascist
revolutionaries (which, if supported, would dilute the gravity of the problem of radically tragic
attitudes in Russia), and analyze psycho-rhetorical narratives of the Christian Orthodox and
monarchist Russian Imperial Movement (RID) and two neo-fascist organizations – the Slavic
Union (SS) and Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), as a consolidated national
fantasy. A close reading of the rhetoric of the aforementioned groups points to a significant
ideological convergence among them, as well as an idiosyncratic character of Russian neofascism. Similar to Russian neo-fascists who swear their “[fidelity] to the Blood and the Land,
for [their] Race is in [their] Blood, and the ashes of [their] Ancestors are in [their] Land,” the
formally imperialist and monarchist RID proclaims the Russians as a superior race, more
specifically, a remarkably “spiritual,” or “divine” race.10
А fragile contraposition of tradition and modernity, reaction and revolution, for example,
lies behind Andreas Umland’s observation that unlike traditional ultraconservatists (one of
whom is arguably Putin), Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who is dissatisfied with the old, i.e. tsarist and
Soviet, imperial models, and thus pushes for a new, revolutionary kind of Russian empire (the
one that includes Afghanistan, Turkey and Iran), can be qualified as fascist.11 Contra Umland, I
assert that the expansionist views of the Impertsy are as radical as the views of Russian neofascists: they both promote a thesis of Lebensraum – an understanding that territories of empires
must grow in order to provide “the state-forming peoples of those empires [with]…a [much
needed] place under the sun.”12 In addition, one of the founding beliefs of Russian national-
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monarchist national fantasy - the principle of “Russia is where Russians live” - is so unabashedly
reminiscent of Nazi Germany’s aspirations to unite with Germans living outside of its borders,
that is reveals modern Russia’s rather bellicose intentions to expand quite possibly beyond the
bounds of Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.13
Russian neo-fascists – be they the self-proclaimed national-socialist SS, the selfdescribed national-democratic DPNI, as well as the formally national-imperialist/nationalmonarchist RID, all promote a vision of a new Russian state where an elevated status of ethnic
Russians (including Ukrainians and Belarusians who are purportedly ethnically Russian),
compared to other non-ethnically-Russian citizens of the country, is guaranteed by the
Constitution. In addition, the SS, for example, calls to “lawfully” limit liberties and freedoms of
“inferior races,” or non-ethnic Russians, to deport illegal labor immigrants, to deprive such
federal subjects as republics of their national status and excessive funding from the federal
budget, to conduct forced Russification, and to limit movement of some non-Russian ethnic
groups outside their respective republics.14 Although somewhat reminiscent of the Nazi policy
toward the Jews and other ethnic groups considered Untermenschen, which eventually
culminated in Hitler’s plans to exterminate and enslave “inferior” people, Russian neo-fascist
national fantasy, as I demonstrate in more detail later, is not that of the Nazi kind, but possesses a
distinct Russian character.15
То explain the Russian specificity of neo-fascism it is important to take into account the
fact that Russians have been shaped by the memory of the Great Patriotic War and the continued
experience of living in a multinational state. This is not to say, however, that Russians are
somehow immune from tragic national fantasies. On the contrary, increasingly tragic images of
13
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the nation capture the eye of more and more Russians. Thus, for instance, according to the 2015
Levada polls, 39 percent of Russian citizens expressed their approval for Stalin’s leadership,
while about 30 percent remain indifferent to the figure of the Soviet dictator. As Roman
Dobrokhotov, a leader of the Russian youth democratic movement My (“We”) asserts, “Russians
lack the genetic memory that Europeans and people of former Soviet republics as those who
[fought totalitarian regimes] have”: Russians never took a truly comic stance and fought the
totalitarian regime of Nazi Germany or the USSR as just another national enemy. 16 Although
generations of Russians have been brought up within the anti-fascist and multinational narrative,
it left them with nothing more than a mere argument that is now used superficially to defend the
supposed moral superiority and spiritual strength of the Russian nation. The lesson of the
country’s fight with fascism, sadly, did not inspire Russians to adopt a habit of treating
representatives of other cultures and ethnicities with genuine respect.
The rhetoric of Russian neo-fascists may not be flagrantly hateful also due to the
Kremlin’s increasing pressure on anybody critical of Putin’s regime.17 While in the late 1990s to
mid-2000s Dmitry Demushkin, the SS leader, spoke from a position of a neo-fascist, openly
drawing on the German theory of National Socialism (which, as he notes, “did not belong to
Germans, but the whole white mankind”), by 2015 he unequivocally defined himself as a
moderate or “traditional nationalist.”18 As Demushkin further explains:
It is important to understand that in 1999, when the Slavic Union was created, the
political situation was completely different. There was no Article 282, there were
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lots of [neo-Nazis] in the organization, but now they do not exist at all [in Russia].
The situation changed, and nationalism evolved too.19
What transformed, however, is not the sweepingly tragic national vision held by Russian neofascists, but the way the national fantasy is negotiated when exposed to close attention from the
state, which attempts to keep radically neo-fascist expressions at bay (especially considering
Russia’s vocal accusations of Estonia and Ukraine as exemplars of state fascism).20 In other
words, Russian neo-fascists had to learn to relay their ideas dubiously and guardedly.
It is also necessary to acknowledge the unprecedented scale and speed of globalization
processes, which strongly affect how the idea of the Russian nation is being negotiated. From
this angle, it is not totally surprising that Russian neo-fascists consider the efforts of, for
example, the Jews of Israel to build and sustain their nation-state exemplary: “best
representatives of the Jewish nation heroically fight in the next Golan Heights, standing up for
their right to exist, and little by little reclaim land from the desert cultivating it.”21 Even more so,
for Russian neo-fascists, Israel “is the outpost of the European civilization [‘the Civilization of
the White Race’] in the Middle East….a civilization that is sick, weak, in need of a cure, but our
civilization!”22 If not for such a spirit of nationalism, Russian neo-fascists warn, Europe would
be overrun by people that “aggressively spread completely different and even opposite values.”23
All the above and other factors at a greater or lesser degree have contributed to the sound of the
neo-fascist national voice with a distinctively Russian accent.
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The budding fascist-like tendencies in modern Russia are more than simply a disturbing
inheritance of the interwar fascist regimes in Europe.24 While Russian conservatism (historically
represented, for example, by the semi-fascist state-sponsored Black Hundred active at the
beginning of the twentieth century in tsarist Russia) and fascism in Europe share the same antiEnlightenment sentiments (e.g., suspicion of liberal individualism, rationalism, and materialism),
the tradition of extreme Russian nationalism and later neo-fascism has its roots in the Russian
idea, discussed in the previous chapter as a persistent preference for autocracy, Russian
Orthodoxy, military chauvinism, xenophobia and racism at almost any particular moment in
history. It is not surprising then that contemporary Russian neo-fascists support Mikhail Grott, a
prominent ideologue of Russian émigré fascism of the first half of the twentieth century, in
arguing that Russian fascism is a continuation of Russian History:
Russian History, the whole national way of life of the Russian people, its reach
and peculiar historical and state traditions, its ecclesiastic-religious way, special
way, profoundly devoted and self-sacrificing, - all these features have composed a
powerful ideological foundation for the Russian Fascist Movement, and thus there
has not been any need to borrow and imitate.25
The long tragic tradition of Russian national identity negotiation, especially as it was shaped
around Christian Orthodoxy, thus provides fascist ideologues with an opportunity to define the
nation in fatalist, messianic or, as I explain more below, apocalyptic terms, and to defend a
supposedly authentic Russian way of seeing the national self and the national other.
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The emphasis on the arguably native “fascist ideas and attitudes, which are religiously
significant, historically meaningful and politically necessary for the New Russia,” also allows
Russian neo-fascists to disassociate themselves from painful memories of the Nazi invasion in
the USSR, which begot in Russians a somewhat automatic, yet admittedly superficial, aversion
to anything or anybody referred to as fascist.26 Fighting to preserve the purity of the white race
and the Russian nation, neo-fascists – contemporary supporters of the ideas of ethnic and
religious exclusivity and superiority of the Russians – refuse to be branded as “fascists” and
consider all such accusations to be a provocation on the part of their perceived enemies.27
Moreover, distancing themselves from German fascism, Russian neo-fascists
occasionally manage to capitalize on the Russian memory of the Great Patriotic War and
paradoxically portray themselves as anti-fascists. For instance, as Russia had been preparing to
celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War, the International Russian
Conservative Forum was held in St. Petersburg.28 Although the forum gathered many European
and Russian ultranationalists, including neo-Nazis, Hitler apologists and Holocaust deniers, some
of them referred to forum participants as “anti-fascist” and “Russia’s friends who support
Putin.”29 In light of the Soviet Union’s fight with Nazi Germany and modern Russia’s opposition
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to the West, anti-fascism is conceived as an intrinsic feature of Russian patriotism. As the
perceived threat to Russia had been steadily growing during Putin’s presidency, Russians once
again saw themselves in a battle with malevolent forces, which allowed anyone who supposedly
fights to defend the country’s interests at home and abroad (but only as they are formulated by
the Kremlin) is to be considered a Russian patriot and thus an anti-fascist.30 Apparently, the word
“fascism” has become an unspeakable term, while fascist-like behaviors, as we shall see in this
and following chapter, under various names, including “anti-fascism,” unashamedly proliferate.
As explicated above, neo-fascism can be viewed as both a conservative or (reactionary
and restorative) and revolutionary force, as an aspiration “to create a completely new order
which, despite all its newness, is rooted in the fundamental force of the past.”31 As such, the
fascist idea is nothing other than an apocalyptic myth of national tragedy.32 While the invocation
of the ideas of national decadence and national rejuvenation in fascist narratives sounds quite
nostalgic, an apocalyptic account of fascism does not create a backward-looking, romanticized
image of the nation, but rather draws an image of a renewed nation – a nation that is both free of
enemies and thus able to be rebuilt on “eternal” values into something new.
An apocalyptic quality of the fascist myth also emphasizes the dramatic, tragic opposition
between the national subject as good and the national other as evil, which begins at the moment
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the latter infringes on the well-being of the former. This must only result in the victory of the
former and the eradication of everything incompatible with or corrupting the national character.
In addition to tragedy proper, tragically inspired elegy and epic also contain the qualities of an
apocalyptic myth. Russia, for instance, has traditionally viewed itself as being on a mission to
fight its enemies and so to revive the “true” Russian spirit and follow the higher purpose of the
Russian nation. Such tasks are given an eschatological meaning: a failure to fulfill the nation’s
destiny necessarily leads to its demise. Only by redemption through a tragic rage, epitomized in
the Russian paranoid hate for the national other, can the Russian nation and even the whole
world be purportedly saved.
It is noteworthy that Russian neo-fascists’ embrace of both tradition and modernity in a
way reflects the long-standing ambiguity of Russia’s vision of itself as a part of the Eastern or
Western civilization, which I briefly mentioned in Chapter Three.33 Such an intersection of
history and geography in the national fantasy of Russian neo-fascists echoes Lacan’s argument
that historical development is not a straightforward unfolding of a continuous narrative in time,
but is a matter of constant repunctuation of metonymically organized signifying chains. As I
demonstrate in this chapter, negotiation of national identity by Russian neo-fascists is precisely a
symbolic rearrangement of Russia’s position vis-à-vis the West and the East, which in
appearance is understood as a search of Russia’s “essence” in time.
For the DPNI, for example, Russian extreme nationalism, similar to modern European
ultranationalism, is nothing other than “a [response] of postindustrial society to the invasion of
archaic elements,” such as the flow of labor immigrants from the former Soviet republics in the
North Caucasus and Central Asia: “There is hardly anyone who wants his cozy neighborhood in
Moscow to turn into a mountain village where strange dark-skinned people will be yelling
33
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gutturally back and forth in a foreign language.”34 As Russian neo-fascists express their racist
and xenophobic contempt for the supposedly uncivilized, primitive life of peoples to the East,
they seek to conceive of Russia as a part of Western civilization. Russia’s identification with the
West, however, has to be understood solely in terms of economic development, scientific
progress and technological modernization, rather than proliferation of liberal democratic values
and practices. Propping up Russia’s status of a major nuclear and space power, economic and
technological advances, as Russian neo-fascists stress, is able to “[mobilize] national sentiment”
and “[save the country] from total fragmentation, from absolute enslavement.”35
At the same time, the SS and the RID insist that only by relying on Russian tradition,
“[the] religious, spiritual and….mystical” vision of Russia, can it become “a counterbalance to
the modern rational-material world order of progress” and thus “[preserve] the spirit, uniqueness,
mentality and culture of the nation.”36 While seeking to match the West in economic and
technological spheres, Russia (both in the psycho-rhetorical narrative of Russian neo-fascists and
the philosophical tradition of Slavophilism with which the former is often consonant)
nevertheless opposes the “materialism” of the West that arguably declares profit its supreme
value. In doing so, Russia does not derive inspiration from the predominantly Muslim culture
and the tribal past of its neighbors to the East, but from its historic and religious closeness with
the Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire. As I already pointed out in Chapter Three, it is in the
long-lived opposition between the Latin West and the Greek East that Russia found its mission to
bring “the morally disturbed Europe, this race of degenerates” “to a new and more (morally and
intellectually) lofty civilization” with Christian Orthodoxy and traditional Russian ways at its
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core.37 As Russian neo-fascists see Russia clashing with the “soulless” and “blasphemous” West,
the messianic idea of Moscow as the Third Rome also challenges the Muslim East as a historic
enemy of Christianity and all of “white Aryan Christian Europe.”38
Having discerned the sinister omen in the arguably decaying morals of an “insensitive,
thoughtless and spineless” Europe and the “waves of Muslim migrants, [who] like the
apocalyptic locust invade Europe,” Russian neo-fascists warn that Russia as “the post-Byzantine
geopolitical leader of the Orthodox world” is on the brink of “the Great and Last religious-racial
mystic war.”39 The Russian nation has arguably been caught between the two equally threatening
forces: European blasphemy and Islamic fanatism. On the one hand, there is “the Christ fighting
Judeo-Masonic” world government, which “for a long time already [has] been governing
[Europe] behind the curtain” and attempts to “establish the New World Order, or ‘Democratic
Civilization,’…the Kingdom of the Antichrist.”40 On the other, “the expansion of [Muslim]
barbarians [into Europe]” can only end with the creation of “the New World Muslim
Caliphate.”41 The course of globalization, which promotes “the Judeo-Masonic ideology of racial
Anglo-Saxon superiority,” and Islamization as a process of “[bringing] everybody into
‘submission to Allah’” and installing a “Sharia-based sense of justice,” arguably strips the world
of its humanity, perverts or negates the idea of faith and freedom, and destroy nation-states.42
Only the “imperial future of Russia as the Middle Eurasian state” founded on the tradition of
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“Christian Orthodoxy as [its] geopolitical force” is capable of defending Europe from “the
anarchy [spread by Western liberalism] and barbarism [of the Islamic world]” and to save the
world “from any kind of unipolarity and dictatorship.”43

4.2

Fascism, Pathology, Irrationality, and Ethics

As briefly mentioned above and in the next chapter, Russian neo-fascists, as well as the
mainstream conservative Russian public, in other words, those who support an authoritarian
regime founded on an aggressively manifested ethnic national idea, readily call themselves antifascists. Although this “anti-fascist” rhetoric of Russian neo-fascists, entwisted with memories of
the Soviet people’s actual fight with fascism, is in part fueled by immediately opportunistic,
speculative motives to discredit political opponents, it owes greatly to conflicting beliefs and
feelings that have been shaping the Russian idea for centuries. As explored in Chapter Three,
most popular or privileged national visions have come about in the vacillation between
seemingly incompatible experiences (as they have been throughout Russia’s history): an attitude
of passive suffering and active sacrifice; an idea of Russia as a part of the West and the East;
fascination with the Western economic, technological and cultural progress and a sense of deep
hatred toward the West; an understanding of Russia as a nation-state and a multicultural,
multiethnic, and multiconfessional empire. Perceived ideational inconsistency of the Russian
idea prompted some scholars to discuss it in terms of “eschatological psychosis” and “schizoid
mentality.”44 Escalating ethnic nationalist attitudes in contemporary Russia too encouraged many
journalists and scholars to talk about Russia’s nationalist “paranoia” and racist “mass psychosis,”
43
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and, furthermore, to draw parallels between Russian national visions in their historic and modern
forms with fascism.45
Possessing “the most counterposed contents,” fascism is indeed most often explained as a
kind of pathology, manifested in a culmination of the irrational, or put in psychoanalytically
inflected language, as a maddening irruption of the unconscious that is expressed in highly
irrational, inexplicably evil and aggressive behavior.46 In other words, in line with Freud’s
opposition of aggressive human nature with cultured human culture, pathological, irrational and
unconscious are used as synonyms used to describe fascism.47 Others, on the contrary, believe
that fascism is what it is due to the cold and calculated logic foundational of its ideology and
practices. In this chapter I take a moment to argue that from a Lacanian point of view ideological
articulation of national identity cannot be discussed in terms of (ir)rationality and pathology,
including psychosis and perversion (as it is often the case both in scholarly and popular debates
on the nature of fascism), but should be viewed as a matter of ethics, with fascist ideology being
an instance of tragic national fantasy. In other words, the arguably irrational and pathological
nature of fascism or, on the contrary, the supposed mathematic-like logic of fascism, cannot
exclusively define fascist attitudes.
Fascist fantasy embraces both the irrational and the rational. As I demonstrate in this
chapter, Russian neo-fascists call for “pragmatic militarism and thoughtful patriotism”; their
judgments are arguably not irrational and their actions do not supposedly stem from blind
xenophobia and “narrow-minded revenge,” while at the same time emotions and irrationality, as
45
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Russian neo-fascists insist, comprise the core of ethnic mythology and, surprisingly, prove that
the national subject has a sensible appreciation of its national essence.48 Such curious
inconsistency does not point to madness (which actually can be employed rationally and
strategically) or cynicism of fascism as an ideology, but reveals the overall tragic grotesque
incongruity of fascist fantasy, in part associated with the conspiratorial character of its narrative.
As I already noted in Chapter Two, conspiracy is only a seemingly coherent, yet logically and
factually questionable, narrative that nevertheless is intensely appealing to a non-critical
audience.
One may argue that neo-fascist national fantasy as a radically conspiratorial narrative is
not pathological, because “‘political’ paranoia [is not] an easily identified and pathologized
ailment”:
by uncritically labeling certain claims “paranoid” and dangerous to society (in
general), such theories miss the most important meaning of conspiracy theory:
that it develops from the refusal to accept someone else’s definition of a universal
social good or an officially sanctioned truth. This is not to say that we must open
our arms to all manner of conspiracy theories. It is merely to assert that diagnoses
of political paranoia are themselves political statements reflecting particular
interests. Until we discover some magically unmediated access to reality,
conspiracy theory cannot simply be pathologized in one sweeping gesture.49
While true, this argument emphasizes the ethical and political consequences of labeling
conspiratorial and by extension fascist narratives as pathological. Alternatively, an explanation
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of fascism through the prism of Lacan’s psychoanalysis focuses on the question why fascist
national fantasy cannot, rather than should not, be viewed as pathological.50
Taking into consideration the fact that a large number of scholars and journalists regard
fascist and neo-fascist tendencies as manifestations of mental illness, such as psychosis and
perversion, and therefore alarming, it is important to explain how – on the most fundamental,
structural level – fascist narratives interpellate people susceptible to conspiratorial arguments,
rather than, for example, clinical psychotics or perverts.51 Moreover, a Lacanian account of the
fascist national subject, which is structured as the neurotic, provides the critic with analytical
tools – the Four Discourses – needed to resolve the apparent grotesque inconsistency of a fascist
narrative.
In Lacan’s psychoanalysis, neurosis (and its four permutations or discursive practices),
perversion (including fetishism, sadism and masochism) and psychosis (including paranoia,
schizophrenia and manic depression) are distinct affective mechanism of dealing with lack or
division inherent to subjectivity. While neurosis is considered to be a normal way of organizing
the sense of the self and others around lack, perversion and psychosis are viewed as pathological
structures of the psyche. As explained in the previous chapter, the subject is precluded from the
enjoyment, or jouissance, of the united self, that is, from the Absolute Being or the Thing, by
virtue of being a speaking subject. By passing through “the double stage of alienation and
separation,” the neurotic is able to sublimate jouissance with desire, sustained in relation to the
objet a in fantasy: “desire is merely a vain detour with the aim of catching the jouissance of the
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other.”52 The psychotic fails to go through the phase of symbolic alienation as he/she does not
incorporate the signifier of the Other, or the Name-of-the-Father, while the pervert gets
represented and thus alienated in language, but yet he/she does not advance further. Only by
passing through the stage of separation successfully, that is, by paradoxically becoming
subjected to recognition by another speaking being, the subject is able to secure a relatively
autonomous subjective position for him/herself. Below, I explicate the peculiarity of
subjectivization in psychosis and perversion in order to demonstrate that collective identity
cannot be discussed in terms of pathology (which is understood in a strictly Lacanian sense).
In contrast to the neurotic subject who complies with the alienating “No!” of the Father,
the knowledge of which is, however, pushed into the unconscious, in psychosis the law that is
laid down by the fundamental signifier, or the impossibility of the absolute jouissance, is
“[rejected] into the outer shadows” of the subject’s psyche.53 As an effect of “a primordial
process of exclusion of an original within, which is not a bodily within but that of an initial body
of signifiers,” the psychotic subject suffers the ambiguity and even disintegration of his/her
relationship with the self and others.54 As Lacan succinctly describes the problem with the
psychotic, “the ego in its function of relating to the external world…breaks down.”55 With the
fundamental signifier missing, the psychotic struggles to find his/her place in the Other as a
symbolic network of social connections with many particular others. Instead, the psychotic’s
identity is given its form by the Imaginary, in the rivalrous and paranoid relationship with the
other within the self - “this imaginary other, this strange god who understands nothing,…who
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deceives the subject.”56 The psychotic’s inability to subdue this overwhelming libidinal force in a
safe and productive, that is, Symbolic, manner results in the invasion of jouissance in the form of
hallucinations and delusions.57 In short, the psychotic does not stand a chance to get engaged by
socially reproduced meanings since for him they do not cohere in any sort of congruent network,
while messages that the psychotic receives in the form of hallucinations and delusions are always
considered by him as obviously meaningful and strictly personal.
Just as with the psychotic, the function of the pervert’s Symbolic is impaired (albeit in a
different fashion), which speaks to the pervert’s inability to participate in a “proper” ideological
construction of the self. The pervert acknowledges castration, but immediately disavows it:
he/she simultaneously cedes his/her raw jouissance as a culmination of uninhibited enjoyment of
oneness and refuses to accept in return anything less - the symbolically managed “will to
jouissance,” which sprouts from lack and leaves the neurotic subject to answer to the question of
his/her being over and over again, by affectively investing in a continuous stream of part-objects,
the value of which is contingent on the Other’s desire (that is, on what particular others are
assumed to long for, but can never have since the human being is ridden with lack).58 To put it
otherwise, the pervert neither allows the absolute jouissance to overrun him/herself, which is the
case with the psychotic, nor succumbs to desire as a restricted, but safe way to enjoy oneself,
which is the neurotic’s tactic. Instead, the pervert attempts to get the raw jouissance bound to a
particular sensory experience without supposedly sacrificing the absolute enjoyment in the
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slightest, thus “creating an alternative…order in which jouissance holds pride of place.”59 The
aspiration for “the right to jouissance” is, however, futile, since it goes again the principle of
castration, according to which “jouissance is forbidden [interdite] to whoever speaks.”60 Said
differently, faced with the forced choice between the freedom of jouissance and life as a
meaningful subject, the pervert necessarily embraces the latter, but thinks of him/herself as “the
brute subject of pleasure,” as that who supposedly has access to the most enjoyment.61 Unlike the
psychotic and similar to the neurotic, the pervert’s affective economy as such is thoroughly
fantasmatic, where “the order of fantasy…props up the utopia of desire” to be complete.62
Although the neurotic’s and the pervert’s fantasies are both attempts at mastery of
themselves, the pervert’s fantasy operates in a fairly distinct fashion. Perversion, as Lacan
argues, is “an inverted effect of the phantasy” of the neurotic, expressed in the formula a◊$.63
Rather than being the split, alienated subject that attempts to fill in the constitutive void with an
objet a, which is seen as the property of the subject’s counterpart, the pervert is “reconstituted
through alienation at the cost of being nothing but the instrument of jouissance,” that is, by
positioning him/herself as an object in which of the jouissance of the Other is petrified, or
becoming the idol, “the black fetish, [wherein]…[the pervert’s partner or victim] can adore the
god.”64
As Lacan explains, the pervert sustains him/herself an imaginary relationship to his/her
counterpart, whose image functions as a reflection of the pervert’s own lacking self. The pervert,
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however, disavows the division of subjectivity he/she encounters in the other and thus in
him/herself by identifying “with the phallicized [or complete other]….It is properly speaking
with the phallus [or fullness] that he [or she] identifies himself in so far as this phallus is
hidden.”65 In other words, the pervert takes upon him/herself the role of the exclusive object of
the particular other’s desire.
Normally the Other’s desire “confronts [the subject] with this sort of uncrossable barrier
to the satisfaction of [his/her] own desire,” by becoming a question that the neurotic can never
answer definitively due to a life-long relationship of constitutive – both differentially and
affectively - dependence on another desiring, or lacking, subject. The pervert, however, shuns
lack by aspiring to become everything that the former lacks to create the Other as an order that is
complete unto itself, thus erasing any presence of otherness. As such the pervert’s fantasy cannot
establish a properly ideological connection with the other: the pervert is never interpellated by
the impervious question of the Other’s desire: “Che vuoi?”
Although achieving the uncompromised jouissance is the task the pervert believes he/she
takes upon him/herself, it is not what he/she actually accomplishes: “what appears from the
outside as satisfaction without restraint is defence, is well and truly the bringing into play, into
action of a law in so far as it restrains, it suspends, it stops, precisely on the path of this
jouissance.”66 The whole experience of the pervert is aimed at bringing the law of lack into
effect, which is too manifested in treating the pervert’s victim or partner as puppet. The pervert
humiliates the other, “seeks [to cause] the anxiety of the [other],” by revealing the other’s lack
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and seizing control of the other’s desire, and so enacts the Law or prohibition of the absolute
enjoyment imposed by the Symbolic.67
To bring the preceding considerations of the self/other dialectic in neurosis, psychosis
and perversion in relation the question of nationhood, it is easy to recognize that lack and
otherness comprise the foundational mechanism of national identity negotiation.68 The national
subject aspires to secure a complete idea of the national self as distinct from or even
incompatible with the national other. In opposition to Carl Jung’s definition of fascism as “a
mass psychosis which was bound to lead to crime,” even the most radically tragic national
subject, I argue, does not possess the structure of the psychotic.69 A tragic national fantasy,
buttressed by the images of profound otherness, culminates in an idea of a stable, well delineated
national subject, and this is precisely what the psychotic is not. Instead, the psychotic loses
him/herself in the ambiguity of his/her relationship with others and the self, as he/she is overrun
by jouissance experienced as an onslaught of otherness from within. While a tragic national
narrative may be thoroughly paranoid, suspicious of the other, it is still a normal (or neurotic),
albeit politically dangerous and ethically questionable, make-up of a national fantasy: as
discussed in Chapter Two, the ego, torn by aggressive and competitive impulses, has an
essentially paranoid structure. The Russian neo-fascist fantasy, in particular, is far from being
psychotic, as it is, as I demonstrate later, a purposeful employment of paranoid imagery within
the dominant symbolic field of the Other: liberal democracy.
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The national subject is not built as the pervert either. Contra this claim, Žižek and Juliet
Flower MacCannell, however, discern the perverse nature of fascism in the obscene, nonutilitarian value of unquestionable obedience, “an act of formal sacrifice,” a sacrifice without any
instrumental purpose, demanded from the masses: fascism after all “perceives directly the
ideological form as its own end, as an end in itself.”70 By renouncing any personal gain obtained
from his/her murderous actions and repudiating any ideological reasoning, any meaning behind
incomprehensible violence, the fascist national subject, as the scholars argue, becomes the very
instrument of the jouissance of the Führer.71 Said otherwise, following the tautological maxim
“one must obey because one must,” the ordinary fascist as a Lacanian pervert sacrifices his/her
will to the will of the Other, or rather to the Other’s will to jouissance.
The accent on the formal nature of sacrifice demanded by fascism, “the [pure] spirit of
sacrifice,” coincides with Walter Benjamin’s theoreticization of fascism as the aestheticization of
politics.72 As Benjamin argues, with modern technological advancement, in particular, in
reproducing the work of art, the latter lost its mythical quality that it possessed earlier. The
destruction of aura in its turn created plentiful opportunities for the public to actively engage
with art, to employ art for political purposes. Fascism, according to Benjamin, did the very
opposite: it aestheticized politics by relieving the fascist from any considerations, save for the
supposed organic harmony or authentic beauty of the imagined fascist nation. Fascist ideology,
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in Benjamin’s words, was meant to become an experience of “an aesthetic pleasure of the first
order.”73
Another representative of the Frankfurt School, Theodor Adorno, explains the
phenomenon of fascism in a similar fashion. As humanity evolved, Adorno notes, rational
thinking allowed people to conquer and understand nature, which contributed to the
demystification of the world around them. The ideology of fascism, however, became a moment
of perversion of reason, which gave way to mythological thinking. More precisely, within the
tradition of the Frankfurt School the irrationality of fascism is viewed neither as a negation of
rationality nor a lapse into pre-modern savagery, but rather a as “the ultimate ironic fact that an
excess of rationality as so defined adds up to a new level of irrationality.”74
Julia Kristeva too sees the perverse quality in fascism.75 Commenting on the works of
French novelist and fascist ideologue Louis-Ferdinand Céline, Kristeva argues that fascism
presents an instance of the discourse of abjection, which is “perverse because it neither gives up
nor assumes a prohibition, a rule, or a law; but turns them aside, misleads, corrupts; uses them,
takes advantage of them, the better to deny them.”76 In her psychoanalytic theory of subjectivity,
the abject is the otherness within, “[a] massive and sudden emergence of uncanniness,” which
“simultaneously beseeches and pulverizes the subject,” disturbs order and meaning; and
abjection is a process of expelling of “the impossible within.”77 Fascism as a form of abjection
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then extols an idea of the nation that is “capable of being full, without other, without threat,
without heterogeneity” when “differences [are absorbed] into a kind of sameness.”78 The vision
of the nation as an organic whole, as “material positivity, a full, tangible, reassuring, and happy
substance,” appeals to primitive human desire for the mythical unity with the self, which
transforms the nation into “a replica of primary narcissism.”79 Kristeva sees fascism as a longing
for the pre-Symbolic, “spontaneous, innate, animal beauty” of the nation, which is beyond
politics and presents the end in itself, and as “a rage against the Symbolic,” the society that is
regulated by the paternal law (castration) and its “reason that constrains and maims.”80
Speaking about fascism as a triumph of corrupted rationality, Bauman argues that the
culture of the “[f]ormal and ethically blind…bureaucratic pursuit of efficiency“ created its
conditions of possibility.81 Bauman insists that the mathematical-like logic of fascist ideology, as
well as the precision, unambiguity and discipline that come with it, was essential for the
organizational achievements of fascism, and “[h]aving reduced human life to the calculus of selfpreservation, this rationality robbed human life of humanity.”82 Just like Žižek and MacCannell,
Bauman acknowledges an ultimate emptiness of fascist ideology expressed in unquestionable
obedience to the Führer and he believes that it is not ideological zealotry that becomes the
propelling force of fascism, since “[it] is safer, and above all much more efficient, to put
emotions aside.”83
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Bauman, however, agrees with Arendt in that fascists “were neither perverted nor
sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal.”84 While Arendt is adamant
about “the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil,” Bauman insists on its
rationality.85 In a complementary way to Arendt’s emphasis on the lack of critical thought behind
“the intricate bureaucratic setup of the Nazi machinery of destruction,” Bauman concludes that:
[it] was the designing of the ‘solution to the Jewish problem’ as a rational,
bureaucratic-technical task, as something to be done to a particular category of
objects by a particular set of experts and specialized organizations – in other
words, as a depersonalized task not dependent on feelings and personal
commitments – which proved to be, in the end, adequate to Hitler’s vision.86
Bauman’s observations about the excessive rationality of German fascism are especially
important in light of Russia’s accumulating appeals to the rationality of the country’s actions:
they are made, as I show in this and the next chapter, by both Russian neo-fascists, the Kremlin
and those loyal to the Kremlin.
Although distinct in emphasis from Benjamin’s thesis on fascism’s aestheticization of
politics, Bauman’s explication similarly stresses that fascist ideology leaves no room for the
political: fascism aestheticizes politics not only by arguably stripping it of an ideological content,
but also by distancing it from any moral responsibility, by “neutralizing the impact of primeval
moral drives.”87 Emilio Gentile arrives at a similar conclusion that fascism contributes to the
withering of the political, although he takes an argumentative route that runs counter to the
claims of those who present fascism to be ideologically and morally void. Gentile emphasizes
84
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the reliance of fascism on myth (more specifically, an apocalyptic religiously inspired national
myth), or what he calls the sacralization of politics. In other words fascism promotes an
unconditional and indisputable belief in the fascist nation, whose values supposedly serve as the
“source of meaning and [define] the ultimate aim of human existence on earth.”88 As such, the
process of national identity construction precludes an active negotiation of national fantasies and
is limited to a passive parareligous engagement in mass spectacles that institutionalize national
memory and discipline national sentiments from the point of view of an “authentic” national
vision. In this sense Gentile’s sacralization of politics is consonant with the concept of
aestheticization understood as an often tragic aspiration toward the purportedly original, auratic
value of the nation. Similarly it is possible to talk about the aestheticization of national fantasy in
Burke’s terms – as a movement toward perfection, toward the unquestionable “Truth and
Beauty” of the nation.89
Burke’s theory, and more specifically his “logic of perfection,” too is at variance with the
argument that fascism is an obscene ideology of pure, formal sacrifice.90 Burke discusses Hitler’s
rhetoric by emphasizing its reliance on myth and “a bastardization of fundamental religious
patterns of thought,” which brings Burke’s understanding of fascism closer to that of Gentile,
rather than Žižek or Bauman.91 Moreover, a large part of his scholarship draws on theology,
which “serves as a [model] of verbal ‘grace’ that ‘perfects’ nature.”92 From the point of view of
Burke’s logology, fascism can be addressed in terms of purificatory sacrifice, propelled by the
guilt of imperfection that requires redemption. The juxtaposition of Burke’s fascist, whose
national fantasy presents itself as “the purgative-redemptive ethical drama,” and Žižek’s fascist,
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whose national fantasy is ideologically void, allows recognizing a key distinction between the
neurotic’s and the pervert’s fantasies.93 As neurotic, the Burkean national subject can explain its
mode of jouissance in a multitude of particular, culturally shared linguistic motives. Thus, for
example, the Russian neo-fascists’ call for sacrifice emerges from an idea of defensive action,
the need to “rescue” the Russian nation from its supposedly imminent death at the hand of its
supposed national enemies. Meanwhile, the perverse subject is animated by the sole injunction to
enjoy its fullness.
It seems that Žižek argues that properly ideological, that is, particular or, speaking in
Burke’s terms, linguistic motives are absent from the fantasy of the perverse subject, which
makes the pervert’s unconscious dynamics of desire, that is, the Burkean psychological motive,
readily available to the subject. This is the case neither in perversion, nor in fascist fantasy,
which Žižek and others see as perverse. First, as I show below, according to Lacan, the pervert’s
reality is thoroughly fantasmatic, that is, filled with particular, linguistic motives, although with a
few variations. Second, speaking in terms of Laclau’s account of hegemonic identity, the
ideological totality of fascism is too permeated with particular demands, the realization of which
is threatened by perceived national enemies.
The explanation of fascism as pathology, more specifically, sadism as one of the forms of
perversion, can be attributed in part to the interpretation of perversion in opposition to neurosis:
while neurosis is often described as “our ability to repress our more destructive impulses and to
sublimate them into socially productive activities,” perversion arguably subsumes everything
primitive, impetuous, destructive and meaningless (both as impossible to symbolize, as it is the
case in Kristeva’s theory of abjection, and formal or devoid of content, as it is emphasized in
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Žižek’s explication of the obscene quality of fascist ideology).94 This opposition parallels the
conflict between nature and culture prominent in Freud’s psychoanalysis, rather than the
difference between perversion and neurosis in Lacan’s theory of subjectivity. Through the prism
of Lacan’s psychoanalysis, neurosis cannot be equated with obedience to the law of the cultured
society, while perversion cannot be solely explicated as the waning or the transgression of that
law that leaves the pervert in the grip of uninhibited drives.95 Lacan insists that perversion “is not
simply an aberration in relation to social criteria, an anomaly contrary to good morals, although
this register is not absent….It is something else in its very structure.”96
Just as with neurosis, perversion is a possible, albeit less common response to castration
as the unattainability of the absolute jouissance, an attempt to subdue the destructive libidinal
force by means of the Symbolic: “Perversion… is the privileged exploration of an existential
possibility of human nature - its internal tearing apart, its gap, through which the supra-natural
world of the symbolic was able to make its entry.”97 Similar to that of the neurotic, the pervert’s
fantasy is a promise of fullness that can never be delivered. Perversion then is not the immediacy
of jouissance, which was purportedly possible preceding the infliction of the symbolic law, but a
promise thereof; it is not “the sensual version of a [supposedly] higher, more comprehensive
notion of rationality,” but an appeal thereto.98
The difference between the neurotic’s and pervert’s fantasies stems from their underlying
structures, and that difference is crucial in explicating why the pervert cannot be considered a
collective, ideologically bound subject. The pervert occupies a position of certainty and
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knowledge by providing what he/she thinks is an answer to the question of the lacking other.
This precludes him from establishing a symbolic, truly social bond with the other, since forming
collective identities is a way of dealing with lack or otherness as it is experienced from within.
Said differently, the pervert does not respond to an ideological hailing: he/she is supposedly not
the one who wonders what the Other wants from him/her.
The structural idiosyncrasy of the pervert’s mode of jouissance is manifested in fantasy,
which is not at all contradictory to that of the neurotic, but an alternative way to deal with lack,
although for the pervert the only lacking subject is the desiring other and not himself/herself. The
neurotic’s fantasy is more varied and flexible: the subject’s libidinal energy can be invested into
a plenitude of symptomatic objects (in the case of national identity they are abstract ideas that
have material manifestations), which are of value only by the sheer virtue of occupying the same
place as the object of the other’s desire. In perversion the will to jouissance circles around the
bodily images of the pervert and his/her victim or partner. Said differently, the neurotic’s fantasy
is a shot at making sense of the Real by symbolic means, which highlights the neurotic’s attempt
to resolve the second lack, that is, to domesticate the Real as the impossible. Meanwhile the
pervert strives to experience the Real. The perverse fantasy then emphasizes the real lack, or the
Real as the sensible, and such an affective economy can hardly become constitutive of an
ideologically bound subject.
The pervert’s fantasy is an attempt to secure the mythical union with the other perceived
as the pre-Oedipal completeness without otherness, which would entail the dissolution of the
subject’s autonomy and subjectivity itself (in reality, as I mentioned above, the pervert’s fantasy,
however, always leaves the pervert desiring and thus lacking). Although “[t]he dialectic of the
unconscious always implies struggle, [or] the impossibility of coexistence with the other,” the
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neurotic is, nevertheless, “constructed around a center which is the other.”99 In terms of the
present discussion, to be able to see itself as a part of a nation, the national subject has to position
itself in relation to the national other. It is from the latter that the national subject – in an inverted
and unconscious fashion – receives the coordinates around which it can build its national image
and gets recognized in that image. If the national other as the ultimate enemy is removed from
the equation, which is ultimately the pervert’s fantasy, there is nobody left to negotiate national
identity with. Even in the radically tragic national fantasy of fascism that rests on appeals for
total extermination of the national other, the idea of otherness as a disconcerting gaze under
which the national subject maintains itself nevertheless persists.100
Just as national identity construction, as well as fascism as its most tragic form, cannot be
discussed in terms of pathology, it is not a matter of (ir)rationality either, although in academic
literature fascism is frequently described as a rational or irrational behavior, be it either a
perverted indifference to the justification of one’s acts (as explicated by Žižek and MacCannell),
a revolt against the rationality of the Symbolic (as discussed by Kristeva), an excess of
rationality that leads to amoral, apolitical administrative pursuit of efficiency or a mythological
thinking (as described by Bauman and Adorno respectively), a fervent aspiration toward a
mythical idea of the organic wholeness, the ethereal beauty and the innate truth of the nation or
race (as considered by Burke, Benjamin and Gentile respectively), and, finally, an uncritical, yet
dispassionate, view of actions performed by oneself and others (as advocated by Arendt).
Moreover, for the general public the irrationality of fascism too has become the definitive
feature of this ideology, which prompted Russian neo-fascists to insist on their rationality, as
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well as sanity (since in public opinion irrationality is often taken to be a sign of derangement).101
Russian neo-fascists do not purportedly fall prey to irrational conspiracy theories, but they are
rather mindful of realpolitik and “concerned with social justice and the life of the Russian people
here and now.”102 Russian neo-fascism, as they claim, no longer consists of “marginalized
individuals or a bunch of madmen and old ladies marching in delirious carnivals,” but “a
relatively effective and successful political force.”103 At the same time, however, Russian neofascists see it necessary to counterpoise what they consider to be the exceedingly calculated,
rational behavior of the West.104
Even more so, fascism is not an issue of mental health, as I already explained, as well as
good sense and, for that matter, goodness in general, although categorical claims of neo-fascists
to rationality, normalcy and virtue must not be left without attention since those
characterizations, as well as fascist ideology on the whole, are ethically questionable. It is worth
noting that the traditional concept of good stands apart from ethical implications of
psychoanalysis: “Doing things in the name of the good, even more so in the name of the good of
the other – there you have something that will give us no shelter from culpability, nor from all
kinds of interior catastrophes.”105 Instead, from a Lacanian point of view, in order to not give up
on desire, one must “[go] beyond not just fear [for one’s own good], but all pity [for the good of
the other as a specular image of the self].”106
Complemented with Burke’s concept of attitude, Lacan’s psychoanalysis, as I illustrate
below, allows seeing a fascist idea of the nation as that which derives strength both from the
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tragic content of its message and the formality of its appeal. Moreover, I argue that Lacan’s
theory is able to provide sufficient explicatory rigor to resolve the grotesque incongruity – the
simultaneous presence of the irrational and rational content – of fascist fantasy. The Master’s
discourse, for example, demonstrates a radical disjunction between the body ($) and the name
(S1), thus highlighting a tautological, or what Žižek refers to as perverse, nature of any
ideological construct, including the fantasy of fascism: behind any ideology lies the collective
subject’s desire to match its name. As the aura of completeness or the Real is forever lost for any
speaking being, pure jouissance of the unity of oneself is experienced only fantasmatically. The
Master’s discourse further emphasizes that the ultimate arbitrariness or lack in the center of
ideology is concealed or accounted for by narratives that aim to explain the origins of and values
attributed to an ideological commitment.
As the Discourse of the University shows, such narratives, whether they are based on an
unconditional and pious belief, bureaucratic logic, or a formal injunction to obey power,
constitute a system of knowledge (S2) that is promoted as objective, rational, universal or simply
true.107 The structure of the Discourse of the University allows seeing why a fascist fantasy,
which may be defined as formal, bureaucratic, uncritical, fanatical or cynical, is always nothing
but an attempt at rationalization of the authority of the master signifier. Even behind the obscene
and non-utilitarian nature of what Žižek sees as a purely formal and not properly ideological
sacrifice lies an unquestionable belief in the will of the Master, a conviction that the Master
equals its name.
Further, the Discourse of the Hysteric illustrates how the fascist national subject refuses
to be named by the national other who arguably usurps the position of power unjustly and thus
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precludes the fascist from becoming the true self. At the level of the Hysteric’s Discourse the
fascist fantasy often manifests itself as an elegy of apocalyptic magnitude – an unfairly uneven
confrontation with a demonic and devious figure of the national other. As I demonstrate in the
analysis of the fascist national fantasy in this chapter, Russian neo-fascists see world politics as
more than a contest among nations in their physical, economic and technological might. In the
Russian fascist fantasy, dominant nations are not necessarily spiritually superior and therefore
their advantageous position is purportedly unjust and short-lived. As the bearer of “truth,” the
fascist national subject is supposedly destined to dominate the national other qua the sham
master and more so to become the absolute object of the national other’s desire. In other words,
the fascist subject does not intend to annihilate national others completely, but to govern them.
Moreover, the Hysteric’s Discourse, in its obsessive variation, can explain the nature of
the cynic’s participation in a grand fascist narrative or any other tragic idea. The cynic is the one
who engages in ritualized practices, since he/she does not truly believe in the idea supported by
those practices. This, as I argue, still amounts to a tragic attitude. Paradoxically, the fascist
cynic’s affective organization does not differ much from that of the fascist fanatic: in their
obsessive performance of the idea of racial supremacy, whether they believe in it or not, both the
fanatic and the cynic attempt to defend themselves from the radical void within in a manner
incompatible with the Lacanian-Burkean ethical idea. At this point I propose to leave this largely
theoretical discussion to weave it in the reading of the psycho-rhetorical narrative of Russian
neo-fascists.
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4.3

The Success and Failure of Russian Neo-Fascism

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, whose ideology at least in appearance revolved
around the idea of internationalism, Russian ethnic nationalists came out in the open with an ever
more decisive force.108 One may recall, for example, a bomb blast at the Cherkizovsky market in
2006 (a place of work for many immigrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus before its
shutdown in 2009) that left fourteen dead and about fifty injured.109 While the neo-fascists who
committed the terrorist act at the market tried to get rid of “too many people [there] of Asian
background,” other right-wing extremists also fought with local “enemies of the Russian
movement and the Russian nation”: “Antifa street thugs,” “low-life immigrants,” “Russophobe
journalists,” “punishers wearing [police] shoulder straps and [judicial] robes.”110 In addition to
threats and beatings, some of the most successful neo-fascist actions include the murders of
human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov (who was involved in a criminal case against a former
Russian colonel guilty of the murder of a Chechen woman), a journalism student and Novaya
Gazeta journalist Anastasia Baburina (who wrote about activities of neo-fascist groups), and
independent anti-fascist (Antifa) activists Ilya Dzhaparidze and Ivan Khutorskoy.111
The SOVA Center for Information and Analysis – a non-government organization
researching the issue of Russian ultranationalism - reported a steady rise of neo-fascists’ terrorist
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activity since late 2008, not only in relation to mostly Muslim labor migrants from Russia’s
North and South Caucasus and Central Asia, but also government agencies, such as police
stations, military draft committees etcetera. While before 2008 most Russian ultranationalist
groups either ignored or hoped for the Kremlin’s support, most recently in response to the
government’s intensified crackdown on Russian neo-fascists, their rhetoric has become more
pronouncedly anti-governmental: the government is considered to be “sick with Russophobia”
and responsible for the “miserable condition of the ethnic Russians.”112 At the same time Russian
neo-fascists have often avoided vocalizing their anti-governmental sentiments at protests or
during interviews, since public anti-Kremlin speech would have certainly make them an object of
a far more focused attention from the state.
Another prominent incident was a violent clash in Kondopoga (a Russian city in Karelia
Republic) in early September 2006. Following a restaurant brawl between Chechens and ethnic
Russians, which resulted in the death of two Russians, “troops” mobilized by the DPNI rightwing radicals arrived in the town to “assist” in pogroms against local residents of “Caucasian
nationality.”113 Having failed to get the two-day riots under control promptly, Kondopoga’s
authorities instead promised to consider the city residents’ petition to resettle all Caucasians
(primarily Chechens) from Kondopoga. According to the leader of Karelia, Sergey Katanandov,
“the main reason for the public unrest [is] that before our eyes representatives of other nations
acted disrespectfully and belligerently, ignoring the mentality of our nation.”114 Karanandov’s
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thoughts did not seem to differ dramatically from Alexander Belov’s interpretation of the
Kondopoga events. As the leader of the radically xenophobic DPNI Belov insisted that
[ethnic Russian] people gathered to say that they were sick and tired [of nonSlavic immigrants]. One could hear only two phrases most of the time - “overrun”
[Caucasians have overrun Russia] and “fed up” [Russians are fed up with
Caucasians]. It is constant humiliation by those who came here that has forced
[Russians] to stop fearing and come out [in the streets to protest].115
The Kondopoga events have become an example that neo-fascists have been following ever
since. The most recent, albeit unsuccessful, repetition of the Kondopoga scenario, when neofascists escalated a conflict to an ethnic fight, was the reaction to the devastating floods in
Russia’s southern town of Krymsk in July 2012, which the extreme right attempted to explain in
ethnically charged terms. Meskhetin Turk, Kurdish and Romany ethnic minorities were accused
of taking advantage of the tragedy: “they snatch away humanitarian aid and take it home. Then
they sell it. For a few days, when the town experienced problems with water, they took all the
water and resold it at forty rubles.”116
In the winter of 2010-2011, Russia again saw a series of racial clashes, which began on
Moscow’s Manezh Square in response to the murder of soccer fan Yegor Sviridov by people
from the Caucasus.117 Reportedly, up to 20,000 people gathered at Manezh Square. Never before
were neo-fascists able to gather and announce their radical slogans so close to the Kremlin walls.
According to Alexander Verkhovsky and Galina Kozhevnikova, the SOVA Center’s director and
deputy director respectively, the violent ethnic outbursts on Manezh Square were the first
successful attempt by the extreme right to transfer “the Kondopoga technology” - escalation of
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local incidents involving ethnic Russians and ethnic minorities with the goal to incite nationwide racial awareness and mobilization - to the heart of Moscow. 118 The riot participants
chanted racial slogans, raised hands in the fascist salute and subsequently attacked non-ethnic
Russians who did not manage to leave Manezh Square on time. Shortly thereafter, racial attacks
also occurred in the Moscow subway, where extreme nationalists assaulted non-Slavic-looking
passengers.
While some neo-fascists engage in various forms of violent action, others look for “more
legal venues for [their] actions.”119 The two streams of Russian neo-fascism do not seem to
intersect, although the latter often seek to profit from the success of the former, as it was the
case, for example, in Kondopoga when the DPNI arrived after the brawn had started to “[get]
their dose of publicity, and that was it.”120 Moreover, there is a situation of mutual distrust and
even contempt: radical neo-fascists believe that leaders of high-profile ultranationalist and neofascist organizations “more than once discredited themselves in the eyes of ultra-right youth,”
while those, like the leader of the SS Dmitry Demushkin, who aspire to become a systemic
political force in Russia, consider the “barren subculture” of ethnic national radicalism harmful
as it discredits the whole movement.121 And it is precisely the rhetoric of such aspirations by the
SS, the DPNI and the RID that is the focus of my present analysis.122
While more aggressive autonomous neo-fascists have been successful in reacting swiftly
to supposedly racially motivated incidents and inciting mass riots in Russia, neo-fascist
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organizations, in attempts to become a legitimate force in Russian politics, created “the brand of
the Russian March.”123 The annual march of extreme nationalists and neo-fascists became a
staple of November 4, in effect having replaced the original meaning of the day - National Unity
Day. This holiday of national solidarity and patriotism marks the victory of the all-Russian
volunteer army over the Polish invaders in 1612, which ended a painful and devastating period in
Russia’s history, the Time of Troubles.
As I already mentioned in the Introduction, every year Russian nationalists and neofascists gather on November 4 to express their grievances toward people from the Caucasus and
other parts of the former Soviet Union, Jews, communists, anti-fascists, liberals and occasionally
the government and the president. Despite numerous protests by human rights activists, Russian
liberal politicians, analysts and journalists, openly neo-fascist and xenophobic organizations
continue to obtain permissions for this event (with the exception of 2006). Organizers of the
Russian March submit multiple applications - requests to hold demonstrations in different places
- in hopes that at least one application will satisfy the requirements of the authorities. Demushkin
stated that in case all applications were denied, the Russian March was to take place anyway:
“there is only one question for the authorities, whether the Russian March is to be sanctioned or
it happens as demonstrators are breaking through the special police force cordons.”124
Since 2009 permission has been granted to organize the Russian March in Moscow’s
Lublino district - a residential area where residents have been extremely dissatisfied with a recent
transfer of non-Russian vendors (many of whom are Asian illegal immigrants) from the
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Cherkizovsky market to Lublino’s trading center.125 In 2012, the Russian March broke away
from Moscow’s outskirts and returned to the center of Russia’s capital. Russian nationalists and
neo-fascists once again walked along the Moscow River across from the Kremlin: “For us, it has
been fundamentally important to get out of the captivity of the bedroom districts.”126
As this short overview of the events that sparked public outcry shows, the actions of neofascists of either current cannot be dismissed as inconsequential.127 Racial riots and the Russian
Marches, especially the Russian Marches of 2010-2013, which brought together 5,500-6,000
people, revived the Russian extreme nationalist scene. Hoping to push Russian ethnic
nationalism past occasional covert street scuffles and partisan action to enter an open, large scale
and politically significant struggle with the supposed enemies of Russia, the banned neo-fascist
Slavic Union (SS) and the Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), with the support of the
Christian Orthodox and monarchist Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) and other ultranationalist
organizations, founded the Ethnic-Political Association Russkie (“Russians”) in May 2011.128
By “[uniting] national-democrats, national-socialists and national-monarchists” into a
“the largest coalition of Russian [ethnic] nationalists” Russkie was supposed to become a serious
contender in the arena of “legal socio-political activity.”129 As some Russian neo-fascists
insisted, “[existing] ideological animosities [among members of the association] would be
cancelled out by the commonality of major goals,” including their primary aim - “to restore
Russian national statehood”:
At the moment the existence of the Russian nation is threatened. Our people is
refused the right for national identification, the right for self-governance, all rights
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and freedoms without any exception. Our country is being transformed into a
colony used for its raw materials, where the state-forming titular ethnic group will
follow the fate of native Americans - to die off quietly in reservations, while
displaying hospitality and tolerance. We, Russian [ethnic] nationalists, think that
it is possible to change the existing situation, moreover, this is our immediate
responsibility. 130
But no matter how resolute were the intentions of Russian neo-fascists, their aspirations were left
unrewarded by success. The association lasted for about four years until its activity was
suspended in August 2015 and the organization was banned as extremist in October 2015.
Russkie was charged with stirring up racial hatred - the motive discerned in the group’s calls for
“the creation of the nation-state and the struggle for national liberation by any means.”131
Although Russkie was just about the only legal major ultranationalist organization left in
Russia, it was unable to withstand not so much the pressure from the state, as the consequences
of its internal tension. Russkie already started to disintegrate following the 2014 Ukrainian
revolution, the annexation of Crimea by Russian and the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Тhe
SS and DPNI sided with Ukraine, while the RID, having taken the pro-Putin stance on the
Ukraine crisis, left the ranks of the Association (the latter, however, adopted an anti-Kremlin
position as soon as Putin’s suspected support of pro-Russian protest forces in Eastern Ukraine
waned).132 Russkie’s split was anything but sudden: the Russian nationalist movement was never
able to act as one united front, which precisely is a reason of why it is not possible to talk about
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Russian nationalism as a movement; instead there is rather a number of organizations and groups
that represent extreme nationalist and neo-fascist views. As Demushkin admits, “modern Russian
nationalists…[have been] walking in various directions by taking the coherent [nationalist
philosophy] apart into the elements they like,” such as anti-Semitism, racism, imperialism and
autocracy.133
Even before the ban at its most active, having become a nationalist force fairly noticeable
by experts and law enforcement, Russkie failed to secure any significant popular support. Both
Russian ultranationalists and those who have studied their activity agree that “[the] majority of
Russians do not care for [the anti-systemic ethnic] nationalists,” “[whose] leaders are unknown
and incomprehensible to ‘the average citizen,’ and whose voices fall on deaf ears.”134 As
Demushkin and other ultranationalists believe, “[their] ideas have always been contained within
the boundaries of a very tight media space. [They] never had a chance...to get [their] message
across” to large audiences of major Kremlin-controlled TV channels.”135
According to Verkhovsky, the failure of extreme nationalists to reach average Russians
can be rather attributed to the fact that “[Russians] cannot see themselves in the company of
delinquents with a knife in the pocket,” rather than to the authorities’ pressure.136 This is,
however, not to say that Russians do not also experience the deep inner rejection of ethnic
hatred. On the contrary, the level of xenophobia has been persistently high: according to the
2013 Levada polls, 66 percent of respondents across Russia and 84 percent of Muscovites agree
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with the slogan of the Russian March - “Russia for Russians” (although they hardly ever
participate in the Russian March or any other events organized and supported by Russian
ultranationalists).137 As Lev Gudkov, the director of the Russian non-governmental polling and
sociological research Levada Center, and Verkhovsky, the director of the SOVA Center,
emphasize, the majority of Russians simply prefer to bank on the state: “People are afraid of
[neo-fascist radicalism] as an expression of unlawful behavior, outrage, violence…[they]
surrender their will to the state, expecting that the latter will set everything right.”138 This, in its
turn, can be explained by the role of the obsessive national subject which Russians most often
assume in relation to the state: while they largely agree with those who accuse the authorities,
including the president, of corruption or another kind of misconduct or crime, they nevertheless
remain loyal to the state and consider any challenge directed against the state as an immediate
threat to themselves, more precisely, to their image of the coherent, ideal national self.139 As a
consequence, the majority of Russians persistently choose stability and order over the role of
civil society to contest or negotiate policies and practices of the state, as well as other democratic
values.140
Having felt the increasing squeeze of the state and being able neither to attract ordinary
Russians, the majority of which are noticeably xenophobic, nor to guide and shape the “truly
massive and potent, but totally unorganized” force that most autonomous neo-fascists present,
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Russian neo-fascist organizations failed to spark the genuine “people’s protests,” similar to the
racial clashes on Manezh Square.141 Under such circumstances, Demushkin warns, even less
extreme ethnic nationalists are likely to go radical: “Now [ethnic] nationalists will become a
Russian ‘ISIS,’ and this situation will dominate [the scene of Russia ethnic nationalism] for some
time.”142 In fact, the SOVA Center has already noted an increasing militarization of Russian neofascist organizations.143 Russian neo-fascists engage in more regular combat training of
volunteers participating in the military conflict in Ukraine’s Donbass on both sides, which upon
their return are most likely to participate in violent anti-immigrant or anti-governmental (or both)
activities in Russia: “there will be blood, lots of blood….In that blood (which is largely going to
be the blood of [ethnic] Russians!) the non-cohesive mass of ethnic Russians will resurge as the
Russian nation.”144
Russian neo-fascists, however, do not give up on their plans to “organize [Russian]
people, unite the best of them” into nationwide protests, although “not to support a particular
politician with a specific program, but to talk about general acute problems.”145 Lacking an
opportunity to reach large audiences through mainstream largely state-controlled media outlets,
Russian neo-fascist organizations decide to retreat from the public eye and instead concentrate
on “forming the Russian public opinion” through “everyday campaigning among the civic and
ethnic majority of [the] country, rather than relying on a single event that is hard to get
permission for from the occupation regime.”146
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4.4

The Tragic Imagery of Russian Neo-Fascism

Even at a glance it is obvious that Russian neo-fascism is a fairly distinct vision of the
nation which cannot and should not be completely and totally compared to historic fascism. But
as any radically exclusive embrace of the nation, the Russian national fantasy is a narrative that
aspires for the maximum coherence of the national image, that is, for a conspiratorial
interpretation of the world, where nothing, not even the Real, which is theorized by Lacan as the
provenance of pure contingency, is left to a chance. Since the national subject never equals the
perfect image it lays claim to, such unity is always anticipated. In this anticipation the role of the
symptom, as I pointed out in Chapter Two, is of the utmost importance. The symptom marks the
place in the national subject’s fantasy through which the knowledge of inconsistency, or lack,
which has been originally expelled into the unconscious, comes back. This memory of the
founding lack, however, returns as a metaphor – in the form of something that separates the
national subject from its objet a, or something that destroys the supposed coherence of the
national image. The truth of the symptom or the meaning of the symptom as metaphor, however,
is that it does not preclude the national subject from the aspired perfection of its national image;
instead, the national subject owes the consistency of its national fantasy to the symptom.
Since, according to Lacan, “[the] manifestation of the subject’s symptoms is dominated
by those relational elements that in an imaginary way color his/her relations with objects,” the
analysis of the psycho-rhetorical narrative must start at the level of the national subject’s
imaginary connection to the national other.147 Most tragic national subjects look for the source
of, as well as a solution to, the unbearable incompleteness of the self in images of national
others, while in comic national fantasies symptoms are located within the national self – as an
147

Lacan, Seminar III 170.

223

error or imperfection to master. As the close reading of Russian fascist fantasy below
demonstrates, Russian neo-fascists attribute their surging displeasure to the actions of somebody
else.
Despite the schism among Russian neo-fascists around the issue of the Putin-led military
involvement in Ukraine, Putin is predominantly portrayed as the most immediate and callous
enemy of ethnic Russians.148 Putin is accused of being “Russia’s main fascist,” whose regime, as
Russian neo-fascists argue, aims at the national, cultural, economic and political oppression of
ethnic Russians.149 Thus, for example, Putin’s politics arguably consist in replacing the “true”
Russian idea with “the brain virus” of a “multicultural-Russophobe mode of thinking,” which
supposedly depletes ethnic Russians’ experience of otherness and thus the idea of the self as
autonomous subject.150 Despite Putin’s repeated claims that ethnic Russians are “the stateforming people,” that they comprise the essence, “the ethnic foundation of Russia,” Russian neofascists compare Putin’s rhetoric with the Soviet thesis of “the friendship of nations“ and explain
both as harmful anti-Russian practices with double standards: “ethnic Russians are expected to
be friendly with every nation and ethnic group, but [they] do not get the same treatment.
Everybody in Russia, except ethnic Russians, can insist on special treatment. But the slogan
‘Russians, unite!’ is deemed ‘fascist.’”151 Putin arguably “[turns] Russia into a miserable
diminished copy of the USSR,” “an empire in reverse” or a “colony,” where ethnic Russians are
the colonized people, thus negating the aspiration of the latter toward becoming their absolute,
pure self.152
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Thus, for example, Putin’s regime arguably aids in promoting Islam, Judaism and other
religions at the expense of the Russian Orthodox culture.153 As Russian neo-fascists lament,
pointing to the former “Deputy Prime Minister of the occupation government, Chechen-Jew
Aslambek Dudayev, better known as Vladislav Surkov,” representatives of ethnic minorities
hold high-ranking positions and receive preferential treatment everywhere else, in short, enjoy
themselves to the full: on the labor market, in the education sector, in the army, and, more
importantly, before the law.154 Putin is deemed to be guilty of covering up crimes committed by
non-ethnic Russians, while at the same time denying the “democratic” rights and freedoms of
Russian nationalists and accusing them of extremism.155 Besides, by increasing income taxes,
skimping on pension payments, financing a comfortable lifestyle of “the Kremlyad,” “[giving]
away the lands soaked in sweat and blood of [ethnic Russians]…to the enemies” both in the East
and the West, as well as “feeding the Caucasus, hordes of Asian migrants, and even the
Libyans,” “making annual monetary contributions to the NATO states at the expense of Russia’s
national wealth,” and, finally, “surrendering resources of the country to its geopolitical
adversary[ies],” such as China and countries of Western Europe, Putin supposedly engages in
economic terrorism against ethnic Russians.156
Having toughened the financial burden of the Russian people, who “eat worse than did
the captives in Nazi Germany,” “the present genocidal regime of Putin does everything to lower
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the chances of ethnic Russians for physical survival.”157 The Kremlin is also accused of
attempting “to destabilize the traditional family, decrease birth rates and depopulate nations” by
flooding the country with drugs and alcohol, passing legislation with regard to, for example,
surrogacy, abortion, pediatric organ donation.158 Each and every action of Putin and state
authorities, perceived as unerring rational actors, is interpreted by Russian neo-fascists as a part
of the conspiratorial plot to rob Russia of its strength, or the objet a, embodied in such partobjects as the country’s land, wealth and natural resources, which in effect contributes to the
physical annihilation of ethnic Russians and the demise of the Russian idea, the bearers of which
are exclusively the former. Unlike Soviet leaders who – on ideological grounds – suppressed
national sentiments for the sake of keeping “the imperial USSR” together, as Russian neofascists insist, Putin’s rhetoric is devoid of any ideological, or “sincere,” motive, in other
words.159 Although purportedly stirring up the contradictory ethnic nationalist and multicultural
sentiments in the country, Putin’s politics “purposefully runs against Russia’s interests,” moved
by either “maniac non-reflexive Russophobia” or “purely selfish, personal interests.”160 In short,
Putin is portrayed as unapologetically tragic - evil, inhumane, sneaky and lying.
At the same time, in the neo-fascist national fantasy Putin is not the only or even the
ultimate national other; instead, he/she is rather considered as a venal, profiteering underhanded
agent of Russia’s enemies both in the West and the East. In the West, the properly tragic national
enemy is the “Yid-Mason[ic],” “Yid-democratic global backstage” which pursues the politics of
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“totalitarian….capitalism.”161 The latter is designed to suppress the “true” democratic rights and
freedoms of nations (including ethnic Russians) and to destroy national economies “with endless
crises and dead end technologies” just to generate profits for “the world oligarchy.”162 Any kind
of economic cooperation with the West then is perceived by Russian neo-fascists as just another
step toward “the [final] loss of national sovereignty,” that is, the national subject’s certainty qua
independence from the Other, which will allow Russia’s enemies to split and “absorb [the
defragmented Russia’s body] bit by bit.”163
In fact, as Russian neo-fascists insist, the post-Soviet Russian state was created as a
“semi-colonial state” by the U.S.,” seen as the center of “the world Judo-Masonic government,”
composed of “Jews and Anglo-Saxons, swept by the fierce hatred toward the ethnic Russians and
Russian Orthodoxy.”164 By arguably supplying Western Europe and the U.S. with natural
resources and serving as а commodity market, that is, by offering its national body as an
instrument of the national other’s enjoyment, “the Russian Federation de facto props up
American [and Western European] econom[ies]” and strengthens the current power position of
the West.165 In other words, Russian neo-fascists, curiously, see the relationship between the
West and Russia in terms of a perverse connection between a sadist and its victim respectively.
This, however, is not to say that perversion or, to be more specific, masochism is the structure of
the Russian neo-fascist national subject. Instead, rather than being a masochist, Russian neofascists attribute the qualities of the former to Russia, thus setting up the tragically inspired
elegy, which I discuss later in this section.
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In addition to the economic pressure, the West attempts to get Russia out of the way
politically, having given Putin “a top priority task – to prevent ethnic Russians from taking back
their own state.”166 As Russian neo-fascists continue, “[a] wealthy, free and truly independent
Russia…bodes no good for the U.S., the EU and anybody else in the world, because as such it
will start producing its own goods, it will become a rightful [economic and political] player in
the world.”167 In short, numerous national enemies are intimidated by Russia that is complete
unto itself.
Simultaneously, Russian neo-fascists express solidarity with “European brothers,” as well
as voice their concern about the future of “Mother-Europe” packed with “aggressive and
uncontrollable barbarians who are ready to break and burn everything at the drop of a hat.”168
Apparently Russian neo-fascists do not give up on the idea of “White Europe” united against its
enemies – both non-white, non-Christian population and the so-described global anti-national
regime of cynical profit-seekers.169 Although Russian neo-fascists claim to “love very much our
European brothers” (which the former thereby clearly distinguish from “the modern masters of
the world”), they see white Europeans as severely mistaken or fooled by the arguably cynical and
vulturine world government: “the modern European world lives in the state of moral numbness,
thoughtlessness and spinelessness.”170 As the belief in the truth, or essence, of the nation (and
“only the truth of God is above the truth of the nation”) vanishes, “people become, as is the case
in the West, biped economic, domestic animals, whose interests are limited to the problems of
stable keeping and entertainment.”171 Lacking the mobilizing power of ethnic nationalism and
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infected with “viruses such as ‘political correctness’ and ‘tolerance’,” all of which “reveals the
lack of immune resistance” to foreign elements, that is, the Otherness, the weakness of white
Europeans, as Russian neo-fascists insist, is “perilous” as they are facing their “racial and
religious enemies posing as Muslim ‘refuges’.”172
Russian neo-fascists also remind white Europeans how “a ‘respected’ European
bourgeois” treacherously left “the most loyal sons of Mother-Europe” to face their enemies –
first, “Bolshevik terror,” the Soviet state and, later, Putin’s tyranny – alone.173 Making a
reference to the post-World War II repatriation of Cossacks, who collaborated with Nazi
Germany, which was carried out by the British by deceit and force, Russian neo-fascists lament
that
[the] martyrs of the Lienz [displaced persons] camp and other places trusted [the
British] so much that only the very reality [of the repatriation] could convince
them otherwise. So the myth of gentleship and special military ethics of the
British Army, as well as Western Europeans in general vanished. It was replaced
by the image of a rude, stupid and heartless creature.174
Whereas Russian neo-fascists’ sentiments toward their “European brothers” may seem to contain
a comic impulse, the former are rather moved by the indecision of the grotesque, struggling to
embrace the latter as long as they conform to the way of living promoted by the “Yid-democratic
global backstage.”175 In addition to the tragic grotesque, Russian neo-fascists’ attitude toward
Europeans that purportedly forgo the values of white Christian Europe can be also viewed as a
dismissive caricature. To laugh heartlessly at a caricature image of the national other, rather than
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calling for its total elimination, functions as a kind of compromise between tragedy or comedy
proper, invited by the absence of a definitive stance with regard to the national other. The latter
is then neither fully rejected as evil, nor accepted as merely mistaken, although it can be
perceived as more tragic or more comic. In this case the attitude of radical ambivalence, or the
burlesque, gravitates toward the tragic pole, albeit it may not be as tragic as the position of
Russian neo-fascists with respect to immigrants from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and other
regions.
Hoping to ward off ethnic Russians from liberating Russia, from restoring the country’s
“extremely great” potential as a promise of national identity fullness, Putin purportedly also
plays into the hands of Russia’s enemies in the East.176 In addition to the arguably snide
intentions of China in the Russian Far East and Siberia, Russian neo-fascists are concerned with
the influx of labor immigrants from the former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central
Asia. A palpably tragic attitude toward the latter is explained by the supposedly existing
“incompatibility of characters and blood“ of ethnic Russians and “flocking mlecchas.”177 Such
preexisting psychological and biological conflict, as Russia neo-fascists believe, is exacerbated
by “the impudence of ethnic criminal groups, which consist of far from the best representatives
of the Caucasus, Central Asia, African countries and some other states,” and their “aggression
and ostentatious disrespect toward ethnic Russians.”178
Although Russian neo-fascists maintain an unreservedly tragic attitude mostly toward
“ethnic mafias,” or “Caucasian criminals,” and “wacko Wahhabis” (which must be dealt with
decidedly – by means of physical annihilation if necessary), generally the Eastern “barbarian”
national enemy is depicted as another tragically marked burlesque character – lazy, uneducated
176
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and uncivilized, rather than unapologetically evil, or tragic.179 In the burlesque national fantasy
promoted by Russian neo-fascists “dark-skinned people from [their] mountain villages” come to
Russia and “get rich at the expense of ethnic Russians”; they bring over their “degenerate” work
culture and “live in Moscow by their tribal laws”; they easily get their “‘Ph.D.s’ [in] Churkestan
[but] cannot put two plus two together”; they receive internships in Russian universities “to gain
experience selling various national products, for example, opiates”; and they obtain Russian
citizenship by simply having “a graduate degree (although we all know what graduate degrees
from Central Asian universities are worth).”180
In Russian neo-fascists’ tragic burlesque the national other, however, is even welcomed
into the national fantasy, since, as Russian neo-fascists emphasize, “getting to know another
nation is a prerequisite of national consciousness.”181 Such understanding by Russian neofascists of the role of the national other runs counter to Kristeva’s explanation of fascism as a
perverse attempt at dissolving otherness and arriving at the pre-Symbolic kind of oceanic
limitlessness. Instead, Russian neo-fascists aspire for the idea of the autonomous national self,
which exists only by virtue of its opposition to the national other. Therefore, “the main point of
all anti-immigrant sentiments is not to make the government deport several million of
immigrants, but to bid farewell to immigrants in the popular mindset.”182 In other words, the
anti-immigrant rhetoric supposedly animates Russian national sentiment by inviting ethnic
Russians to shake off their Soviet identity by rejecting the idea of, in Žižek’s terms,
decaffeinated Otherness manifested in the old Soviet slogan of “the friendship of the nations.”
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Russian neo-fascists, however, do not truly recognize the key role of the “constitutive
outside,” or in other words, the constitutive function of the national other in the process of
national identity construction.183 If they did, they would find themselves in close proximity to the
Lacanian-Burkean ethical ideal, when the national subject identifies with its own lack concealed
behind the symptom – the figure of the national other, and therefore sees the latter in a comic
light. Instead, in line with Carl Schmitt’s tragic definition of politics as the locus of the
inescapable tension between national subjects who happen to become enemies in a particular
situation, Russian neo-fascists emphasize the mobilizing potential of the menacing figure of the
purportedly barbaric immigrant.184
In fact, the whole neo-fascist narrative of the relationship that exists between ethnic
Russians and their national others, be they immigrants, ethnic minorities that contribute to the
multinational makeup of the country or other peoples that fight for their right to selfdetermination in Russia’s immediate sphere of influence and beyond, is permeated with an
attitude of tragic ambivalence, or the tragically marked burlesque. Filled with appreciation for
the ability of the non-Slavic Muslim population in Russia to preserve their traditions and ethnic
identity, Russian neo-fascists, however, are outraged that “[d]uring Muslim holidays [Moscow]
turns into Moscowbad.”185 As Russian neo-fascists explain, they have nothing against any other
religion and culture as long as they are promoted beyond Russia’s borders (which, as I show
below, diverge greatly from the internationally established borders of the Russian Federation):
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“[i]nside Russia we cannot honestly permit such equality….Do as you please at home, think of
yourselves as equal or even superior, but as soon as you encounter our way of life, you must
follow it.”186
Similarly Russian neo-fascists nevertheless claim to defend the rights of ethnic groups
that have no ties to any national formations outside Russia (for instance, the Chuvashs, the
Bashkirs), “[but] under the condition that they are not separatists and do not impose their way of
life and traditions to others.”187 The rhetoric of the supposed benevolent national authority and
tolerance of ethnic Russians functions as an empty, formal gesture: such “benevolence” and
“tolerance” apply to whatever is left of ethnic and cultural diversity after legalizing the status of
ethnic Russians as the state-forming nation, refusing cultural and political autonomy to nonethnic Russians, enforcing the practice of assimilation, as well as implementing the full range of
economic, demographic and territorial measures toward “desocialization, “ or population control,
among ethnic groups that cannot be assimilated.188
Such efforts, according to Russian neo-fascists, do not infringe on the rights of nonethnic Russians, since “their rights have been already maximally exercised – they have their own
republics, influential lobbies, cultural autonomies,” and all the more exercised at the expense of
ethnic Russians.189 Thus Russian neo-fascists effectively deny ethnic minorities in Russia any
political significance: just as in Soviet times, non-ethnic Russian nationalisms are rejected
through the folklorization of ethnic diversity. Thus it is not surprising that Russian neo-fascists
discuss freedoms and rights of non-ethnic Russians in administrative terms: Belov, for example,
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has characterized the convicted Norwegian fascist mass murderer and terrorist Anders Behring
Breivik as none other than “an effective manager.”190
As if echoing Stalin’s answer to the national question in the Soviet Union, Russian neofascists are ready “to influence the will of nations so that the nations may arrange their affairs in
the way that will best correspond to the interests of the [ethnic Russians].”191 Unlike Stalin, who
“had to hide behind the official ideology of Marxism in attempts to ‘smuggle’ ethnic Russian
nationalism” into the Soviet Union, Russian neo-fascists decisively reject the Soviet rhetoric of
multiculturalism, the very idea of which is deemed “illusory,” “blasphemous” and outright
dangerous: the blending of nations and cultures arguably “goes against laws of nature and is
simply biologically impossible” and thus often “risks ending with a bloodbath.”192 Praising
Stalin’s swift measures in dealing with the Chechens, the Ingush, the Crimean Tatars, the
Kalmucks, the Azeri and other ethnic groups in the Soviet Union that purportedly collaborated
with the Nazis during the Second World War, Russian neo-fascists are certain that “‘the
friendship of the nations’ has been possible only by resorting to repressive measures and total
control [which they explicitly support], or by means of insane subsidies [to some former Soviet
republics]” (and Russian neo-fascists unequivocally prefer the former).193
By pointing out the failure of the Soviet and European strategies of multiculturalism,
Russian neo-fascists state that only “a strong, although alien, national culture is much more
likely to become a foundation for the integration[, although not equality,] of ethnic minorities,
rather than the void in its place.”194 By rejecting the idea that the multicultural state does not
190
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have to rely on some preferred ethnic national vision to sustain itself and, even more so, by
ignoring a more radical view of the structural void or lack in the center of any identity, Russian
neo-fascists instead offer to organize the national vision of Russia as a multicultural state around
the nation’s essence, its objet a. As the function of lack and the unattainable object that
guarantees identity fullness, the objet a is represented symptomatically by the purported strength
and authority of ethnic Russians. The status of ethnic Russians as state-forming is arguably a
paramount condition of a viable “union of nations,” an historical example of which Russian neofascists see in Russia’s imperial past.195 Being home to various nations, the Russian Empire
purportedly possessed “all the conditions for ethnic Russians to become a modern political
nation, when traditional society morphs into a conscious community of national solidarity.”196 In
other words, Russian neo-fascists contend that when the idea of ethnic and cultural peculiarity is
perceived not only on the most immediate, emotional, or unconscious, level, but is also grasped
rationally, the nation gets to become a political, civic formation.
Drawing on the utterly misconstrued version of Anderson’s theory of the nation as an
imagined political community, Russian neo-fascists juxtapose Rossiysky (“Russian”) and Russky
(“ethnic Russian”), civic and ethnic types of national identity: the former is described largely as
an outcome of an “‘industrial’ production” and “mass dissemination of [a national vision],”
while the latter is viewed in terms of the Real - as an always already existing “organic and
natural formation,” which is “solidified in high culture (including literary language, art, a body
of foundational texts…).”197 Communities that gave up on its objet a – the truth or essence of the
nation, and instead are tied together by the principles of Western civic nationalism are arguably
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“propelled by herd instinct and promises of material well-being,” which bring people back to a
state of primordial, “faceless,” “shapeless” “biomass,” before they were supposedly molded into
ethnic communal organisms by the divine will.198 Taught by the experience of Russian Empire,
ethnic Russians then choose to be a Russky, rather than a Rossiysky nation.
Comparing Russky nationalism to a Western model of civic identification, Russian neofascists argue that nationhood defined by common citizenship is out of touch with the Real, that
is, it is never more than a fabricated kind of nationalism that presupposes “loyalty of the nation
to bureaucrats,” who purportedly are not bound by any moral and ideological considerations,
while the principle of ethnic belonging ensures the loyalty of authorities to the nation: “In other
words, if we are a nation of Rossiyan (“Russians”), we are serfs of the state (in a sense that we
are bonded to a certain piece of land by way of dividing the Soviet inheritance… among
nomenklatura clans). If we are Russkiye (“ethnic Russians”), then we are potential owners,
citizens [of the state] eager to accede to their sovereign rights.”199 Furthermore, for Russian neofascists, Russky is a “truly” civic or political kind of nation-building, since it allows them to
defend the political and other rights of the ethnic majority, while Western attempts at fostering a
sense of national unity reflect nothing but venal desires of national bureaucracy and world
oligarchy. Only when the political reason of civic nationalism is built on ethnic mythology as an
appeal to emotions and the irrational, as Russian neo-fascists emphasize, can the national
“consciousness [be in harmony] with the [national] unconscious,” and the nation “experience the
continuity of its historical identity.”200 Such idiosyncratic interpretation of ethnic and civic types
of nationalism stems from the radically tragic vision of nationhood, which manifests itself as
follows. First, while placing an emphasis on the Real, or the biology, of the nation, Russian neo198
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fascists deny the Real its nature as pure contingency. As a result, national identity is understood
not as a process of historically and thus rhetorically contingent negotiation set in motion by the
structural negativity of the national subject, but as a destiny of the national organism that persists
in its tragic literality.
Inspired by Russia’s imperial legacy, Russian neo-fascists are eager to cut down the flow
of federal budget money to the “parasitic” Southern provinces of the Russian Federation such as,
for example, the Chechen Republic, while refusing to part with those territories, even if that
means turning to coercion.201 To keep Russia whole as it “was spreading to the south, the east
and even the west” is taken to be a “historical mission” of the state-forming ethnic Russians, who
“[contributed] to that great movement with their arms, legs, head, and, finally, blood.”202 Yet the
sacrifice that ethnic Russians make with their “pound of flesh” is not the sacrifice of the Real of
the national body, understood as land, recourses and lives of ethnic Russians, but the sacrifice of
the objet a.203 The “loss” of this special organ, as explained in Chapter Two, is the price one
“pay[s] for that mystical operation” of subjectivization.204 By misrecognizing the originary lack
for losses that the national subject purportedly has to endure at the hands of its national others in
attempts to sustain the ideal of Russianness, Russian neo-fascists urge ethnic Russians to
exercise their “birth-given right” to be in charge of Russia. Considering the failure to do so from
the perspective of tragic mourning, Russian neo-fascists contend that the country is purportedly
bound either to transform into something “unnatural, abnormal from the point of view of the
spirit, the race, and the nation” - a some kind of “Frankenstein” monster-state with “arms, legs,
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heart and head [grafted together] from different corpses, that is, different peoples,” or to be taken
apart.205
Haunted by the images of corps morcelé, or the body in pieces, which arguably becomes
the destiny of the multicultural state founded on the Western liberal concept of tolerance,
Russian neo-fascists, however, reject the ideal of the pure monoethnic nation-state. Instead they
call to rehabilitate Russia’s imperial body: “Russia precisely as the nation-state of ethnic
Russians and acting as a guarantor of the rights of ethnic minorities stands a good chance to
reintegrate Russian territories, sawn off in 1991.”206 Such territories include “Russian enclaves,”
or “the areas of historical and predominant living” of “the divided Russian nation,” the lands
“given by God, developed by our ancestors, paid for with their blood and bequeathed to us and
future generations.”207 Russian neo-fascists thus see the ideal of the Russian nation in the image
of ethnic Russians who by the fact of their sheer presence in a certain territory, or the Real of
their habitation, define the reach of the interests of the Russian state: “Russia exists there where
ethnic Russians are. There is no Russia where there are no ethnic Russians. Russia’s territory
ends there.”208 A similar sentiment, which attaches particular importance to the Real conditions
of the life of the nation - the value that the country’s territory and the benefit of the dispersion of
ethnic Russians and Russian speakers far beyond the country’s borders, is also characteristic of
the rhetoric of Putin-sponsored Nashi, and its political significance is compatible with tragic
implications of political realism.
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Echoing the Nazi doctrine of Geopolitik, Russian neo-fascists see the nation as an
organism “living in harmony with nature and according to its laws,” which must be able to
broaden its Lebensraum, its living space, as it grows: “Such is the gloomy, but vital geopolitical
justice, or law.”209 Following this aggressive, tragic “logic of Russian history,” neo-fascists claim
Russia’s authority over former Soviet republics.210 Moreover, the other Slavic nations – the
Ukrainians and the Belarusians, are not even considered as separate ethnicities: both Belarus and
Ukraine were “never associated with any ethnic group or a separate nation, but are territories
populated by ethnic Russians that found themselves in different states after the Tatar invasion
and the Polish conquest.”211 Simultaneously Russian neo-fascists, in particular the SS, applauds
Estonia’s, and Ukraine’s struggle to escape the grip of its “elder brother” as a remnant of the
Soviet politics, as well as admire ethnic nationalist aspirations anywhere in the world.
Neither friends nor enemies, immigrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as
ethnic groups that contribute to the multinational makeup of the country and other nations that
fight for the right to self-determination in Russia’s immediate sphere of influence and beyond,
are arguably “strangers” or, in the case with Ukraine, estranged brothers (and, as Russian neofascists emphasize, “a stranger is not necessarily an enemy”).212 The national stranger functions
as the ultimate spectral other, the one in whom the national subject sees an image of the self and
somebody else, the one that attracts and repulses, the one that invites fascination and aggression.
This contradictory relationship, as Lacan explains, is “the play of the see-saw between [the ego]
and [its semblance in the mirror - the alter ego],” a paranoid oscillation between familiar and
alien images that the national subject alternately sees in its national other as in the mirror,
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revealing the fundamental division and inadequacy, or the ontological wavering, of the national
subject. 213 It is important to emphasize once again that the national other qua stranger, which is
often portrayed in the national fantasy of Russian neo-fascists through a fantasy-frame of the
burlesque, is not seen as a symptomatic figure of the comic adversary, but rather in a Schmittian
manner - as a more or less tragic embodiment of the purportedly ever-present and necessary
ethnic rivalry: “[the national] enemy…is…the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient that he [or
she] is, in a specifically intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the
extreme case conflicts with him [or her] are possible.”214
This dynamic is especially apparent in the image of the Israeli Jew promoted in the
national fantasy of Russian neo-fascists. As I briefly demonstrated in the beginning of this
chapter, Russian neo-fascists praise the strong national spirit of the Jews. This, however, does
not stop the former from expressing distrust of the latter, pointing to a purported defect in the
Jewish national character: “the Yid is Yid because he can deceive a goy without a twinge of
conscience.”215 Similarly, Russian neo-fascists express indignation with a comparatively
successful incorporation of the motif of suffering into Jewish national narratives: “there is no
other craft in which the Jews put in so much effort, passion, hypocrisy than crafting lies about
the hardships, persecution, abuses, oppression, discrimination, humiliation they went
through.”216 Considering the prominence of elegy in the Russian neo-fascist national fantasy,
which I explore below, such resentment is the legacy of imaginary rivalry and paranoid
aggression that rose up from an almost simultaneous recognition and misrecognition of the
Russian self in an image of the Jewish other.
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Russian neo-fascists point out that the national stranger is not to be judged on the merit of
its values if they are considered in isolation. This sentiment stems from the idea of contextual,
rather than structural relativity of the national subject’s desire. Unlike Lacan, who argues that the
mysterious objet a serves an unyielding link connecting the desire of the subject with the that of
the Other, which is demonstrated in the bewildering question “Che vuoi?”, Russian neo-fascists
claim to ignore even the most aggressive nationalist agenda pursued by the national strange, as
long as it does not hinder domestic and international ambitions of Russia and ethnic Russians:
“There are no universal human morals. And that is why it is not up to the nationalist to become
outraged with the morals of other nations; one must take into account the particular nature of
those morals and, based on that, one can build relationships with others or refuse to do it
entirely.”217 But as soon as political and cultural objectives of other ethnic groups and nations
collide with the supposed national interests of ethnic Russians and the geopolitical goals of
Russia, admiration then immediately transforms into contempt expressed in caricature: for
instance, in its “derisive” attempts to counter Russia, Estonia is ridiculed as “a geographic
dwarf.”218 In short, for Russian neo-fascists, who unwittingly or knowingly, but in either way
misguidedly, build their worldview consonantly with Schmitt’s theory of the political,
geopolitics rather than ethical considerations governs the actions of nations: for Russian neofascists the nation and “the phenomenon of the political can be understood only in the context of
the ever present possibility of the friend-and-enemy grouping, regardless of the aspects which
this possibility implies for morality, aesthetics, and economics.”219
In the supposed absence of the universal ethical system and by extension common
standards for international law, Russian neo-fascists understand world politics as a violent,
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tragic, but thoroughly “natural“ struggle for power and resources available in certain territories in
abundance. From a Lacanian point of view, to think of the political in biological terms is to
reduce the desire to enjoy the national fullness to the need to have access to the purportedly vital
resources, that is, to pass off the Symbolic as the Real, while the latter is inaccessible to the
human being so far as it is unmediated. This is an inherently tragic position. Instead, an ethically
responsible act would consist in making such substitution transparent.
Just as in the rationality behind the Nazi’s atrocities, the national fantasy of Russian neofascists at first glance seems to rest on the ethically void principles of Realpolitik and Geopolitik
and gives paramount priority to assuring self-preservation in the most effective way. It is also
peculiar that the only feature that separates the belief in the priority of the nation’s interests from
the Western idea of self-centered individualism, which, according to Russian neo-fascists,
promotes nothing but “selfish ‘consumer society’,” is an opposition between goals of a collective
subject and interests of an individual actor; in either case the subject, be it a nation or a citizen, is
considered as “an egoistic, rational, utility maximizer.”220
The well-being of the Russian nation, however, does not only overweigh concerns of
national others, but also trumps the individual interests of each ethnic Russian: in a somewhat
masochistic fashion ethnic Russians are also expected to see themselves in a strictly utilitarian
light – as means to further purportedly suprahuman objectives, the certain grand mission of the
nation. Such juxtaposition of the collective and the individual, as I mentioned in Chapter Three,
highlights the incompatibility between the Russian religiously inspired model of the supposed
innate harmony among people, or sobornost (which lies at the very foundation of Russian ethnic
ideal espoused by Russian neo-fascists) and the Western ideal of active civic engagement in
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political governance, rather than supporting the assumption of the difference between the
purported spirituality, or otherworldliness, of Russians and the ascribed materialism of the West.
While arguing that it is impossible to compare various national values and thereby speak
of the common good, Russian neo-fascists nevertheless reject the chaotic and axiologically
undifferentiated model of the world that is ruled by means of brute force for the sake of merely
biological survival.221 This, as I pointed out above, transpires in the burlesque confusion neofascists experience toward vigorous nationalist endeavors of national others, as well as estranged
“European brothers.”222 Just as the Soviet vision of the Russian nation as “the first among
equals” functioned merely as a cautious way to insist on the privileged status of ethnic Russians
in the USSR, so do Russian neo-fascists speak of the superiority of the Russian idea over all
other national visions without at the same time playing down the idea that the world necessarily
involves racial and national division, as well as cooperation. Russian neo-fascists, for example,
acknowledge that “[they] have no choice but to become cynics, without, however, giving up on
the idea of the European [white] unity. The fact is that this unity will be such as we want it to
see.”223 Such self-defined cynicism, manifested in an attitude of burlesque ambivalence, can be
further explored by looking into how Russian neo-fascists explain the origins and the nature of
the nation.224
Against the initial impression that one might get from the rhetoric of struggle and
survival, Russian neo-fascists renounce the model of the world organized by the laws of pure
biology and thus permeated with “racial corruption,” when “superior and inferior races get
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‘appointed’ at a whim of the currently strongest and the most powerful [racial/national]
element.”225 Such opportunistic biological hierarchy is nothing other than “fascism in the worst
sense of the word (which is far from being a univocal concept).”226 From this angle Russian neofascists denounce Nazism, as well as “Jewish fascism” and Caucasian “fascis[m],” noting that
“[w]hen the Russian people slide into poverty and die off, while [another] nation thrives, grows
big and fat at the expense of the former, this is…fascism.”227 Rather than differentiating among
biologically stronger or weaker “natural races” (just like animals divide in predators and their
prey), Russian neo-fascists turn to the authority of biblical texts and “Christian Orthodox
anthropology“ to be able to speak of races in terms of their “spiritual,” “psychic” differences.228
Race is explained as a “bio-informational” entity, “a transitory form between matter and
spirit.”229 The sought-after strength and authority of Russia, which Russian neo-fascists discern
not only in the country’s vast territory and abundant natural resources, but also in the supposed
national character, and which make up the country’s essence, or the objet a, are still considered
to be a manifestation of the nation’s Real, rather than a product of rhetorical signification of the
historical contingency of the national subject’s traumatic encounter with the Real.
Before they divided in nations, presumably, at the time of the biblical Fall, people
arguably existed as one “godlike, divine race,” as equal “on the axiological scale of spirit and
race.” 230 The hierarchy of racial and national values was then established and reinforced in the
course of historical development of nations, albeit “not [as] a result of good or bad environment,
but [in relation to] inherited qualities of certain blood and race.”231 Some “bio-spiritually”
225
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superior nations, including ethnic Russians, can supposedly trace their origins to Japheth, one of
Noah’s sons, and his descendant, who were “able to return to their absolute purity,” while others
further sank into sin and bestiality.232 While this argumentative move - to insist on a quasispiritual component to the supposedly natural struggle for power and resources - may not be
totally expected, its value, however, is easy to grasp. As Russia has to put up with the current
technological and economic superiority of the West, Russian neo-fascists attempt to stake out a
claim to the nation’s spirituality as something that cannot be more or less objectively evaluated,
although it purportedly originates in the Real.
In addition to the “racial corruption” that arguably incites fascism, in the opinion of
Russian neo-fascists, the principles of humanism, pacifism and tolerance, associated with liberal
democracy, Western civic nationalism (as opposed to “true,” Russky political or civic
nationalism) and the secular state, are interpreted as “insensitivity to otherness,” or the inability
of the national subject to attune to the voice of the national other. This too leads to factual
inequality and, as a result, outright fascism.233 Thus, as we can see, Russian neo-fascists continue
to insist on the tragic negativity, understood in terms of the national subject’s opposition to its
particular national others, rather than the structural negativity of lack.
Refusing to accept the thesis of “racial nihilism [understood as] an antiscientific
affirmation of absolute equivalence, absolute equality of potential, absolute unification of people
of all races and ethnicities,” Russian neo-fascists argue that “[t]o see essentially unequal
[national subjects] as formally equal…means to create terrible actual inequality. How do you
image the formal equality and cohabitation of wolves and sheep, foxes and chickens, elephants
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and whales? Is tolerance…possible in the first two, as well as the third, cases?”234 To clarify their
total rejection of the ideas of inborn equality and tolerance, Russian neo-fascists provide a
hypothetical example:
Imagine, for example, there are two groups of people equal in size on an
uninhabited island; they are ethnic Russian and Chechens. You place them
together and give them equal rights. After a while you are surprised (if you do not
believe in raceology) to see ethnic slavery! Most ethnic Russians…(owing to their
natural predisposition) will engage in constructive labor. Most Chechens –
similarly owing to their predisposition – will at once join gangs, procure weapons
and attack ethnic Russians, who have created something that can be taken
away.235
Based on this logic Russian neo-fascists explain the current hegemony, or mastery, of the U.S.:
the latter is deemed to be nothing but a bully, which hides its imperialism behind “the faceless
‘will of world society’” and “abstract, universal norms of international law [that] concea[l] and
mystif[y] particular international relations of domination and submission.”236 This arguably
allows Russian neo-fascists to talk about American “legal fascism,” which reveals itself in “the
repressive dialectic of disposition and assumption of sovereign rights of other countries” by the
U.S.237 Moreover, lulled into complacency by “the mysticism of commodity fetishism” (which
Russian neo-fascists discern in practices of tolerance, pacifism, liberalism, civic and secular
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reason), Europe arguably lost the sight of its objet a - true ethno-religious values as an
expression of the (quasi-)genetic, “bio-informational” code of white European nations.238
Unlike Europeans, who are purportedly no longer able to think critically and thus to fight
with the godless politics of world oligarchy (since “throughout history critical rationality has
been anti-American rationality”), ethnic Russians boast of well-developed critical faculty, which
arguably has been “a part of [ethnic Russian] national identity,” or, more precisely, Russky
political nationalism.239 The appeal of Russian neo-fascists to critical thinking is, however, as
valid as the idea of “civic” solidarity of ethnic Russians, that is, the odd coalescence of ethnic
and civic nationalisms, both of which are misconstrued by Russian neo-fascists and presented as
the “true” Russian nationalism.
In general any meaningful references to reason and freedom, which cannot exist one
without the other, are, as I explain later, in the grotesque contrast to the traditional Russian
concept of sobornost, which promotes a pious belief in truth that is given and immutable.
Russian neo-fascists are certain that the “[Russian] patriot must be conservative,” and that no one
can “come up with [national values] on their own, since such arbitrariness is a prerogative of
those who disregard tradition or intend to destroy and sweep it away.”240 Finally, in the manner
reminiscent of Walter Lippmann’s argument for technocracies, where governments are guided by
“disinterested expert[s]” who “[make] the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make the
decisions,” presenting them with “a valid picture of the environment,” Russian neo-fascists insist
that:
It is impossible to be part-time political thinkers or ideologues. That is why only
those who constantly produce political ideas must release them to public. All
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others may experience those ideas in a variety of formats: from an uncritical
emotional response to an opportunity to comprehend fairly complex, but compact
doctrines.241
This vision of public rationality, however, is not only largely uncritical and thoroughly
undemocratic, but also misguided in a sense that neither wholly disinterested nor perfectly
truthful knowledge is within the reach of an expect or, for that matter, any other human being. In
short, it is openly tragic.
By supposedly being both guardians of Russian traditional values and in the vanguard of
modern political struggle for the freedoms and rights of ethnic Russians, Russian neo-fascists
refuse “to trade on national interests, turning them into private profit.”242 In place of pacifism,
tolerance and liberal democracy, they promote the Russian ideal of “true equality that draws on
divine justice” and can be attained only in war, through victory and suffering.243 In war the
nation is supposedly able to prove its role of a resolute defender of “the True Church, the Church
that is bellicose, that never compromises with the evil, never capitulates to it.”244 Any military
loss in Russian history, as well as the gaping economical and technological lag of the country
then is conceived in a way that is consonant with the overall apocalyptic quality of fascist fantasy
- as a temporary and unfair situation, rather than a defeat. Since what is at stake is the very
existence of the nation and the whole race, losing is never an option. Besides, as I noted above,
the worth of the nation as a bio-spiritual construct is purportedly assessed not only by its physical
and material strength, but also by its spiritual quality.245 This vision, however, does not
underplay the gravity of adversity by explaining any unfortunate situation, as I will demonstrate
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below, in tragically epic terms. Ethnic Russians, аs neo-fascists further warn, must still be ready
to fight, and even “want and like to fight,” “to be…a militarized society.”246 It is owing to such
perpetual and “pragmatic militarism [coupled with] thoughtful patriotism” and galvanized by
“the Great Victory” over Nazism, that ethnic Russians can arguably claim Russia’s authority in
the world.247
Every Russian victory is perceived in a conspiratorial fashion as just another
confirmation of Russia’s power, as well as righteousness, because Russians choose “the Eternal
Destiny of Heroes – the Path of the Ancestors, [over] the destiny of the unworthy – the
momentary pleasure of dabbling in the mud of material prosperity.”248 The ability to go
heroically to the very end - “without ‘pity’ for someone or ‘as in duty bound’, but because
[fascists] feel the responsibility to do good“ - is the destiny of the “true” Russian hero.249 This
apocalyptically inspired epic attitude is, however, far from a humble vision of the nation as
heroic – as the one wrestling its tragic fantasy, rather than fighting national others. The victory in
the Great Patriotic War in the national narrative in question is portrayed as a defeat of another
national enemy, rather than a triumph over a radically tragic fantasy. It is peculiar that Russian
neo-fascists do not only praise the Russians who protected Russia from Nazi Germany, but also,
as I mention below, those Russians who, originally being a part of the anti-Bolshevik coalition,
fought the Soviet regime on the side of the Axis powers.
What matters to Russian neo-fascists is only whether ethnic Russians are able to preserve
the nation, to stand up for its supposedly natural rights and ultimately to complete “the Godgiven special mission” – to assure “a continuation of Russian History ushering the Russian
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nation and the world in a new [great] epoch of national, spiritual and state life of the Russia-tocome.”250 Fighting for the glorious future of the Russian nation and subsequently, as Russian
neo-fascists insist, for that of Europe and even the whole world is explained by the purported
Russian desire to protect the “real freedoms,...real culture and...real life standards” of “White
Europe,” and “to revive the Truth and the Beauty [of the White Ideas] on the Earth.”251
Whereas Russian neo-fascists maintain that “[c]elebrating war heroes must be more
important than mourning war victims,” it is an attitude of the both necessary and unfair suffering
of ethnic Russians that gives the tragically marked epic fantasy-frame its appeal.252 The more
there is suffering, there bigger is victory. As I noted in Chapter Three, the idea of religious
ascetic sacrifice underpins Russian national identity as it has been renegotiated through the ages.
Just as with many Russian cultural and political figures, from the nineteenth-century Russian
writer and proponent of pan-Slavism Dostoyevsky to Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin (one of most
vocal and loyal representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church), Russian neo-fascists welcome
misfortune and misery, because “suffering will bring those who got used to living peacefully,
calmly and comfortably [or, in other words, godlessly,] back to their senses.”253 Such cleansing
suffering is bequeathed by the ruthless ethno-religious authority – the true national leader –
and/or as a promise of Russia’s greatness, and as such is always “greeted with understanding and
support” by Russian people.254
Although self-inflicted, such suffering is оften portrayed as caused by national enemies,
the multitude of which aspires to destroy Russia by stripping ethnic Russians of their supposedly
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birth-given rights and turning them into “a dismal silent herd.”255 Pointing to the present
economic, demographic crises in Russia, as well as recalling the supposed treatment of ethnic
Russians as “cannon fodder [during the Second World War] and draught cattle” in “[the great]
construction projects of communism,” in addition to the most recent “persecution[s]” in former
Soviet republics (including the Baltic states, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine), Russian neofascist talk about no less than “Russian Holocaust.”256 Said otherwise, Russian neo-fascists
adopted the tragically marked elegiac national fantasy-frame of apocalyptic significance, when
the national subject is perceived as unjustly discriminated against by national enemies in the East
and the West, “enslaved” by the impostor government - “Putin’s thief junta” - and further
coached into “the myth about the innate ‘guilt’ of ethnic Russians” for their “conscious
patriotism.”257 Contrary to Nashi’s evaluation of Russia’s current position, as I show in Chapter
Five, Russian neo-fascists are adamant that the situation is close to being hopeless.
Russia neo-fascists therefore believe that their candidly tragic actions are a truly
defensive response: “if adequate people in droves approve inadequate actions, it means that the
problem is not them, but in their living conditions.”258 The Kondopoga ethnic clashes, the
Russian Marches, and the Manezh Square racial riots thereby are all deemed to be warranted
reactions of ethnic Russians as true victims of “ethnic terror.”259 As neo-fascists emphasize,
those events are not manifestations of blind xenophobia; they do not rise from petty grievances
or irrational, “narrow-minded revenge,” “although those emotions…serve as a sign of the
rationally apprehended truth.”260
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Russian ethnic nationalism is then considered to be a politically meaningful expression of
“the very biology“ of the Russian nation.261 From this angle, the Russian Marches, as Russian
neo-fascists stress, must be regarded as exceptionally significant events, a mode of physical
enactment of Russianness, “a simple language that even animals can understand. Heavy steps
and a loud voice mean strength and bravery. Light steps and a whisper indicate weakness and
cowardice.” 262 The Russian Marches then arguably become an opportunity for ethnic Russians
to “reclaim [their] lands just by marching on them together.”263 As such the annual Russian
March is not “a folk festival,“ but “a triumph of democracy,” “ethnic Russians’ demand for a
civil society,” a “Russian Tahrir.” 264
Drawing а parallel with large-scale civil protests in Egypt in 2011, neo-fascists position
themselves as those who defend the freedoms and rights of ethnic Russians, and fight Putin’s
regime of “total deideologized dictatorship,” democratic “farce and open profanity.”265
“[Russian] (‘national’) democracy” is offered as the best alternative to Western democracy, since
the latter functions only as “a mechanism of introducing ‘right’ ideas” that necessarily coincide
with the interests of the U.S.266 It is noteworthy that for Russian neo-fascists the ultimate truth
corresponds exclusively with the interests of ethnic Russians both at home and abroad. But since,
as Russian neo-fascists point out, world politics cannot be reduced to a mere instinctual fight for
physical survival, and some nations can rightfully claim their spiritual authority over others, the
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geopolitical interests of Russia as a bio-spiritually superior people take precedence over those of
the U.S.
The analysis of the psycho-rhetorical narrative of Russian neo-fascists has shown so far
that their national fantasy bears a profoundly tragic attitude, manifested in properly tragic,
burlesque, epic and elegiac frames. The world is perceived in apocalyptic terms: as currently
“sinking into evil” and thus in dire need of salvation, which can only be achieved if one follows
“the canons of uncompromising Orthodoxy of the early Middle Ages, unsullied with…various
humanistic, ‘universal human’ interpretations.”267 What also transpires is that the national
fantasy in question is thoroughly grotesque in the sense that it is built around apparent logical
and ideological incongruity, despite its conspiratorial bid for coherence.
Russian neo-fascists, as I demonstrated above, insist that nations prosper in war, but
perish in peace; that true equality and justice are attainable only if one follows the idea of racial
and spiritual superiority of some nations over others; that Russia needs civil society and critically
minded people while at the same time the tradition of the Russian idea presupposes a voluntary
surrender of individual interests and opinions in exchange for a feeling of belonging to a great
nation; that national aspirations of ethnic Russians must be understood in oxymoronically
sounding terms of political biology and biologically driven civic nationalism; that the nation’s
suffering is imperative, but unjust; and finally, that liberal democracy is in fact fascist, whereas
Russian neo-fascism is an example of true democracy. The later claim is of special importance in
this work and so it requires a slightly more focused attention.
Aware of the historical stigma of fascism and how “in the country that defeated fascism,
playing a cool Arian can only bring disgrace,” Russian neo-fascists meet with indignation any
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accusations of fascism.268 They keep insisting that “nobody among [them] considers oneself a
fascist,” that there is no such phenomenon as Russian fascism, instead “there is a big country
with a big problem which we must urgently solve.”269 Playing with words, all Russian neofascists want is to disassociate themselves from the politics of Nazi Germany and the Nazis’ plan
to exterminate and enslave ethnic Russians, Russian neo-fascists, since the former claim to do
exactly opposite. Thus Russian neo-fascists note that one can almost automatically assume the
anti-fascist position of ethnic Russians: “fascists considered ethnic Russians pigs and
subhumans. [If I call myself fascist, it means] that I have to hate myself in the first place.”270
Moreover, the Nazi ideology is portrayed as perversion or corruption of fascism, or even as “an
anti-Christian, satanic movement, [which] was a logical extension of principles of the JudeoMasonic civilization aspiring to establish ‘a new world order’.”271
Simultaneously in the psycho-rhetorical narrative of Russian neo-fascists one can stumble
upon the most clearly voiced conviction that fascism (but not Nazism) is a doctrine of “Truth and
Beauty on the Earth” and a voluntary desire or an innate “responsibility to do good,” inspired by
the moral authority and the innate strength of ethnic Russians as a superior bio-spiritual
nation.272 As such, Russian neo-fascists add, fascism (in a supposedly “good” sense of the word)
complement the very essence of Russianness:
Th[e] fascist history of medieval Russia does not only organically link our
modern Russian Fascist Movement with the history of the Russian state, but is a
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direct source of Russian fascist ideology, its religious and moral nature, its deeply
national shape, its spirituality…and its state regime and political practices….273
Hoping to give fascism a distinctly positive, that is, Russian meaning, Russian neo-fascists assert
that the “ominous and unattractive image” of fascism is just a tool that the state and politicians
use to fight political opponents or “anything that in the slightest degree differs from liberal
discourse.”274 Such tactics, as they warn, are likely to backfire, because by calling a “true”
patriot “fascist,” that is, by pushing for an association between Russian “conscious patriotism”
and fascism, one in effect “rehabilitate[s] the world ‘fascist’.”275
Based on what emerged in the chapter so far, one may conclude that both fascism (more
specifically, what Russian neo-fascists see as “good,” “pristine” fascism) and anti-fascism (as
antithetical to “corrupted” fascism) correlate with loyalty to Russian national interests and a
willingness to fight Russia’s national enemies. It also becomes obvious that such grotesque
attitude possesses a resolutely tragic valence. Instead of denouncing the radically tragic ideology
of fascism, Russian neo-fascists celebrate the victory over just another national enemy: this
victory is simply “a reminder of the triumph that inspires us for new victories” and “national
solidarity that makes our nation invincible.”276
While the symptomatic, somewhat one-dimensional reading of the national imaginary
shows that Russian neo-fascists negotiate the meaning of Russianness by appealing to the largely
tragic “logic of Russian history,” including the purportedly bellicose legacy of Russia’s victory
over Nazi Germany, it remains hard to explain how the tragic national fantasy, especially when
rendered in a peculiarly grotesque, conspiratorial form, allows Russian neo-fascists to gain the
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upper hand in an ideological face-off with the West, which alternatively claims the comic legacy
of anti-fascism as it is expressed in the principles of liberal democracy. To explain how Russian
neo-fascists set their Russian idea against the Western liberal discourse, while at the same time
speaking in terms of the Western national other, I suggest moving the further analysis into the
dimension of the Symbolic.

4.5

The Triumph of the Symbolic Master

Unlike the analysis of the Imaginary, which offers an insight in how the national subject
sees national others and thus itself, the reading of the Symbolic, permits us to understand why
the national subject invests in particular images. To answer the second question in the most
general way it would be enough to say that, by securing certain discursive positions in relation to
national others, the national subject attempts, albeit in an unconscious manner, to become a
subject without lack. Bearing this in mind, a psycho-rhetorical reading of national fantasy in its
symbolic dimension, nevertheless, must maintain a degree of specificity to ensure analytically
rigorous findings. In other words, when exploring the Symbolic, rhetoricians seek to understand
why certain national images in particular cultural and socio-political contexts are able to fill in
the lack more affectively (and thus effectively).277
As I discussed in Chapter Two, the Symbolic is an unconscious register of continuously
established signifier-to-signifier correlations that structure the subject’s relationships with others,
manifested in certain imaginary commitments. Those images can be said, albeit with certain
reservations, to comprise individual, distinct national connaissance, or conscious knowledge. On
277
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the other hand, the Symbolic is what Lacan describes as the (unconscious) language of the Other,
in sense that it “is located outside of man,” that it is intersubjective.278 Considering the
increasingly globalized modern world, nations and thus their national narratives do not exist in
isolation from each other or the dominant global discursive structure. They are attached to each
other on the Symbolic level – by signifiers that, just like “links by which a necklace firmly hooks
onto a link of another necklace made of links,” allow for reciprocal encroachment of national
symbolic networks.279
Judging by signifiers prevalent in the symbolic reservoir of the national fantasy, it is
possible to say that for Russian neo-fascists the West becomes the privileged Other. Although
the resolute national character of Eastern “barbarians,” as well as their unshakable fidelity to
traditions, inspires and intrigues Russian neo-fascists, for the latter find themselves captivated by
the desire of the West to a far greater degree. In fact, it is obvious on the most immediate level:
Russian neo-fascists prefer to speak the language of their Western other – the language of
progress, rationality, democracy (although only when it is beneficial to them). This is telling,
especially in the context of Russia’s enduring aspiration to distance itself from the image of
backwardness most commonly ascribed to Russia in the West, the civilization potential of which
the country has long aspired to match. By passing that image on non-Slavic and non-Christian
nations in the East, Russian neo-fascists attempt to prove the worth of ethnic Russians as an
“urban, European, civilized, fairly humane, kind, non-aggressive [nation, which, nevertheless,]
has its national interests” and ready to defend them in war.280 Such appeals to the supposedly
civil and peace-loving Russian nature seem to be at variance with the generally bellicose rhetoric
of neo-fascists only if one ignores the endeavor of Russian neo-fascists to merge the civic and
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ethnic forms of nationalism into the “true” Russian nationalism as a rationally apprehended idea
of ethnic solidarity.
It is also possible to assume that ethnic Russians, as they are portrayed in the national
fantasy in question, are placid only relatively – as compared with the purported aggressive tribal
barbarism of nations in the East. Indeed, the Russian national subject sees itself vis-à-vis its
Eastern and Western national others differently: in opposition to the supposedly irrational
barbarism of the East, Russia is depicted as an example of rational civility, while Russia’s
spirituality is emphasized against Western pragmatism. The process of Russian national identity
negotiation then can be better understood from the angle of discursive positionality - as a search
for the objet a of the Russian nation in the symbolic space between the East and the West, or
tradition and modernity.
The world, as it exists in the national fantasy of Russian neo-fascists, is a reality of
competing Masters– partisan discourses of ethnic national, or “bio-informational” values, among
which ethnic Russians assert, through courage and suffering, their supposed superiority.281
However, in Lacan’s words, “the loser must not perish”: by setting ethnic nationalisms against
the Russian kind, Russian neo-fascists do not wish to eliminate the national other.282 As they
insist, only in the presence of the national stranger is the Russian nation capable of seeing itself
as such. This knowledge, however, is not that of the Analyst (

, who understands (S2)

that the subject’s radical uncertainty (a) prompts the national subject to invest in the image of the
national other. Instead, this is the obscene certitude of the Master (
absolute knowledge and thus power to impose its will on others.
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As a fantasmatic vision, the reality of competing masters does not exist, since such
structure, as Lacan points out, “[is missing] a bond that would keep the society of masters
together”: the Master always needs its Slave .283 By opposing the Master’s discourse of Russian
nationalism to what they see as the Master’s discourse of purported tribal barbarism of the East,
Russian neo-fascists in fact ascribe the position of the Slave to their Eastern national other.
Therefore, rather than by taking a place in a hierarchy of national values that ethnic Russians
arguably head, the Eastern national other is forced to assume an inferior position toward the
Russian nation by trading its Master’s discourse, or its sovereign right, its national liberty, for a
life of the symbolic slave. Having depicted the Eastern national other as aggressive and
backward, as the other who needs to be pacified and “introduced…into world civilization by
association with the Russian World,” Russian neo-fascists refuse to release non-Slavic ethnic
minorities and former Soviet republics from Russia’s imperial embrace. 284 Only through such a
procedure can the Russian national subject maintain the desired mandate of the absolute Master,
yet merely until it starts to experience its own powerlessness, or subjective uncertainty, again.
According to Lacan, the Master (as well as the subject in any symbolic position) never
gets to enjoy itself fully, since “[t]he satisfaction of human desire is…mediated by the other’s
desire and labor.”285 In other words, the Master/Slave dialectic in Lacan’s psychoanalysis is
nothing other but the basic mechanism of subjectivity production: the national subject gets to
know itself only in relation to the national other; but since the latter is also lacking, or it is never
what it seems or says, it is ultimately unable to become a stable base point in the national
subject’s search for subjective certitude. As a result, the presence of the national other will
always cause anxiety. This is the reason why Russian neo-fascists suspect that the purportedly
283
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primitive and barbaric Eastern national other always enjoys itself more: it seems to observe its
traditions and the way of life despite even the most adverse circumstances, while ethnic
Russians, as Russian neo-fascists occasionally admit, have a hard time to stand united behind one
national idea.286
Whereas the “threat” coming from the East is perceived predominantly in terms of
“pollution“ of ethnic Russians by “substandard blood,” the “danger” from the West, more
specifically the modern Western form of democracy, is understood on the level of ideas that
arguably “shake the foundations of our community, our nation.”287 It is especially peculiar then
that non-ethnic Russian groups and nations in what in Russia is most commonly understood as
the East are regarded as Russia’s ideological enemies, who defend their own national identities
and national cultures, while the West, more specifically, world oligarchy or world government,
is viewed as a non-ideological adversary guided by mere “colonialist utilitarian
considerations.”288 In other words, unlike the supposedly impassioned struggle for national
liberation carried out by ethnic Russians, as well as other ethnic groups and nations in the East,
the U.S. and countries of Western Europe got “an ideological virus with which world oligarchy
attempts to bear down the resistance of its opponents.”289 This virus, according to Russian neofascists, has led to “the degradation of civilized nations,” which purportedly lost their national
essence, or, said otherwise, their object a, just to replace it with “the rootless and egoistic
‘consumer[ism]” ridden with “awful vices.”290 In other words, in the view of Russian neo-
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fascists, national ideology is viable only when it is firmly established in the Real of the national
subject – its “bio-informational” code.
Unlike the national other in the East, the Western national enemy, or the so-called world
government (which Russian neo-fascists also distinguish from the Western national stranger –
estranged “European brothers”), is ascribed the position of the cynical bureaucrat:
There is…the worldview of bureaucracy. It tends to cooperate with oligarchy and
therefore to profess “democratic values.” Besides, it owns a certain economic
center that allows making profit and faking up popular support, so nobody could
catch corrupt officials and traitors red-handed. Bureaucracy does not stand for any
idea. By means of propaganda it creates an illusory perspective of
“modernization” and “political competition.”291
While the narrative of a cynic must be read in terms of the discourse of the obsessive, Russian
neo-fascists associate cynicism with the supposedly non-political, non-ideological discourse of
the University. Russian neo-fascists decidedly contrapose the value of ethnic nationalism to the
Western model of liberal democracy, which “the…Judeo-Masonic [corporate] government” and
oligarchy purportedly attempt to hard sell to sovereign nations under the banner of globalization
and progress: “Many will say that it does not matter who is in charge. The most important thing
is prosperity. Western countries, for example, prosper, and it means that democracy lived up to
expectations.”292
Russian neo-fascists are adamant that such logic is problematic and precarious. First, they
insist that high living standards in the West cannot be attributed to technological modernization
and its “political correlate” - democracy, but are tied to “the exploitation of underdeveloped
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countries – colonies and semi-colonies” by the West.293 Further, Russian neo-fascists see modern
Western democracy as simply an attempt to conceal the ultimate motive of global profiteering.
Such a material motive, as Russian neo-fascists stress, characterizes the Western national enemy
as a cynical hypocrite.294
As a discourse of universal values, democracy is, in the view of Russian neo-fascists, a
stillborn social framework, since it supposedly lacks partisan, ideological conviction, which
arguably derives strength from the Real, that is, the biological quality of the nation as the very
element that assures a strong social bond among people. For Russian neo-fascists such social link
presents itself as an unconditional, yet purportedly rational belief in the exclusiveness of one’s
nation as the complementarity of the national body and the national character. Further, the
West’s cosmopolitan democracy project is also arguably apolitical, since it is indifferent to
national interests. It is not surprising then that Russian neo-fascists feel no qualms about
speaking the language of Western liberal democracy, when they insist on the rights and freedoms
of ethnic Russians: after all, the discourse of democracy is, as they have it, entirely formal,
without any ideologically significant content, and as such can function in almost any political
context. Having conceived of Western liberal democracy as a non-ideological and formal project,
Russian neo-fascists conclude, “there is no reason to look up to the decaying model of the
West.”295
It does not mean, however, that any discourse that lays claims to objectivity and
universality is a cynical symbolic construct that revolves around nothing but the prospect of gain
and venal practices, just as it does not mean that the discourse of bureaucracy is necessarily
293
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apolitical and cynical. Neither does this structural conjunction of the particular and the universal
whittle away the ethical ideal and political significance of comic melancholy advocated from a
position of universality in the discourse of liberal democracy.
The Western national enemy is not apolitical, formal or cynical just because, as Russian
neo-fascists insist, it appeals to universal, extra-national beliefs: the West instead simply
functions, as I explicated in Chapter Three, as an agent of the Discourse of the University. To
describe the liberal democratic narrative as a cynical project, conversely, constitutes an attitude
of cynical disbelief, which is still, as I noted in Chapter Two, an ideological and tragic construct.
Indeed, Russian neo-fascists engage the discourse of the Hysteric in it obsessive form, which
corresponds with a symbolic structure of the cynic: they point to the cynical distance between
universal claims and particular interests of the West, while at the same time arguing that the
Russian “truth” is the truth of the whole white race.
By revealing the purported impotence of the master signifier of liberal democracy to
produce a meaningful engagement of people, Russian neo-fascists – as the revolutionary agent of
the properly Hysteric’s discourse – protest the West’s liberal, pluralistic model of socio-political
life vigorously. Such contention, regrettably, does not lead anywhere in the direction of the
inherently comic discourse of the Analyst, thus depriving the Russian national subject from an
opportunity to engage in a sober, thoughtful critique of excesses that are no doubt proper to
practices of liberal democracy and global capitalism.
Rather than betting on the discourse of Western liberal democracy, which Russian neofascists adamantly describe as an ideologically hollow and politically listless discourse of
axiological universality, ethnic Russian “patriots” are called on to fill “the ideas of freedom and
justice, human dignity and social justice, democracy and the rule-of-the-law state,” “the ideas
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that have been corrupted by opponents with our own – national and traditional – content.”296 The
true Russian way of life is purportedly inspired by the principle of organic national unity –
sobornost, and grounded in “monarchy and real (‘national’) democracy” (which arguably
participate in a symbiotic relationship), “national capitalism,” as well as the idea that ethnic
Russians are not only bound by blood, but are also united by common political interests – the
rights and freedoms of ethnic Russians, which purportedly outweighs the rights and freedoms of
other nations due to bio-spiritual superiority of ethnic Russians.297 The war against Nazi
Germany - as just another national enemy of ethnic Russians - arguably revived the traditional
“Russian nation-society”: “The Victory is a call for a mature civic position…which is able to
repel any assault on our land.”298 It is peculiar, that the idea of civic engagement, which is
commonly understood as a sphere of an ideological, political negotiation between the state and
society, is revolutionized by the hysteric national subject: it is reformulated in terms of a resolute
defense of or even a war for, “true” national interests against the nation’s enemies.
Western democracy is treated as a formal, disembodied category – as an entity without an
essence, without the discernible, established objet a. The provenance of the latter, according to
Russian neo-fascists, is the Master’s Discourse of ethnic nationalism – an uncontested
knowledge of the national self. It is this knowledge, this secret that the Russian national subject
offers to the West. By placing the Russian national subject into a position of the Hysteric,
Russian neo-fascists do not only attempt to mobilize ethnic Russians around “genuinely” Russian
values, but also to protest the supposed ideologically depleted and politically defused authority
of West, which they set against the ideologically and politically charged authority and strength of
ethnic Russians derived from the nation’s bio-spiritual code.
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Further, Russian neo-fascists insist that Russia “[i]n the last battle will be the paragon of
Europeanness.”299 The apocalyptic final fight is apparently the struggle for the future of “White
Europe,” as well as the whole world. Following the triumphant and sacrificial legacy of Russia’s
victory over Nazi Germany, when “[e]thnic Russians contained the plague [of fascism] begotten
only and exclusively by Europe,” and the dissolution of the USSR, when “[the Russians]
sacrificed their state sovereignty in order to save other nations of the Continent from the ‘red
plague’ epidemic,” Russia is about to save Europe and the world again.300 This time it is from
both racially compromised nations and cynical, pseudo-democratic global forces.
As this chapter approaches its close, it is time to resolve the problem of how, by engaging
the nodal point of fascism from within the global discourse of liberal democracy, Russian neofascists manage to negotiate what it means to be Russian. First, it is important to recall that the
national fantasy offered by Russian neo-fascists is decidedly tragic. As such, it does not break
from the way the national idea that has been consistently articulated throughout Russia’s history
– as a vision of a xenophobic, anti-Semitic, imperialist, chauvinistic nation that pins it hopes on
the strong state at the expense of individual, civil liberties.
The Russian national subject expresses its penchant for tragic mourning in a variety of
fantasy-frames. Among tragedy proper, epic, elegy, and the burlesque, the grotesque fantasyframe is especially prominent: Russian neo-fascists make appeals to “true” democracy and
promote an “authentic” model of civil society. However, they do this without any pretense of
supporting Western values of democracy, human rights, or political and economic freedoms.
While at first sight it may seem that a tragic Russian national subject would simply take
advantage of the anti-fascist legacy of the USSR’s participation in the Second World War by
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claiming Russia’s purportedly rightful place within the Western discourse of liberal democracy,
the above analysis demonstrates that Russian neo-fascists instead attempt to dismantle the liberal
democratic hegemonic structure. They do so by denying the existence of the common good and
ethics, in particular, the universally pursued and comically inspired principles of individual
liberty and freedoms.
In a striking resemblance to the Soviet notion of morality and ethics, voiced by Vladimir
Lenin at the Third All-Russia Congress of the Russian Young Communist League in 1920,
Russian neo-fascists insist that the moral and the ethical are necessarily subordinated to national
interests: “We reject any morality based on [universal] human and extra-[national] concepts. We
say that this is deception, dupery, stultification of [nations] in the interests of [world
oligarchy]…. Our morality stems from the interests of the [national] struggle of the [ethnic
Russians].”301 In such a way Russian neo-fascists attempt to recast fascism in terms of national
liberation, which, in its turn, would supposedly nullify the grotesque effect of calling themselves
anti-fascists.
Although conceived as originally equal, competing systems of national values, as Russian
neo-fascists argue, are subordinated to a privileged Master, whose role ethnic Russians
supposedly have a right to claim. Ethnic Russians are depicted as more civilized, rational, and
politically sophisticated when compared to the purportedly aggressive, tribal social organization
central to the Eastern national others. The Russian national vision is also assumed to be
ideologically inspirited in contrast to the arguably cynical and thus politically listless idea of
Western democracy. Having placed the Russian national subject in a position alternative to both
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the barren West which is not a true Master and the Eastern Slave, Russian neo-fascists strive to
declare the utmost mastery, the bio-spiritual superiority of the Russian nation.
Yielding to the “multitude and economic strength of [Russia’s] adversaries,” or the
physical and financial might of the East and the West respectively, ethnic Russians are arguably
nevertheless worthy to carry out “God’s special mandates, which separate [the Russian people]
from other [nations].”302 The whole “Russian ethnonational history” - the Russian “drama” of
suffering, courage and survival against all odds, the story of the nation that has become
“hardened as a nation by several world wars and revolutions” – purportedly allows ethnic
Russians to prove authority over national others.303
By inviting ethnic Russians to “remember [their] superiority for the sake of [their]
ancestors, buried from Crimea to Ussuri Taiga, where they fell in the battle with the tyranny of
[national others],” Russian neo-fascists also profess the supposedly grand role of war, including
the Great Patriotic War, in fostering a sense of national solidarity and encouraging active civic
engagement.304 Having disposed of the clear distinction between the words “fascism” and “antifascism,” Russian neo-fascists also manage to dilute the meaning of “democracy.” Thus in the
Russian neo-fascists’ national fantasy, any political action, whether it is commonly characterized
as fascist or anti-fascist, strives toward the ideal of “democracy” as longs as Russian national
interests are regarded as of paramount importance.
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5

THE MANY FACES OF TRUE AND PURPORTED ANTI-FASCISM IN MODERN
RUSSIA

As the previous chapter showed, the problem of neo-fascism in modern Russia is not to
be taken lightly. Russian neo-fascists promote an image of a suffering nation, destined to fulfill
its heroic prophecy via the tragic sacrifice of its ethnic and racial enemies in a war. However,
one may think that in a country harboring painful memories of German fascism the neo-fascist
narrative of the nation is bound to meet resistance. The state-sponsored “democratic anti-fascist”
group Nashi (“Ours”) and the independent anti-fascist movement Antifa both claim to be the
forces of such resistance. Having declared their uncompromising anti-fascist and pseudo “antifascist” positions, Antifa and Nashi respectively, as this chapter establishes, fight decidedly
different fights. While Antifa recognizes the immense danger of Russian neo-fascism, Nashi sees
the peril of fascism elsewhere. “The state youth,” as Nashi calls itself, battles primarily with the
“state fascism” of the U.S., Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, and other countries, including Western
European states and the U.S., and individuals whose actions anger the Kremlin.1
While in the previous chapter I discussed what fascism is, how it is to be approached
from an ethical perspective, as well as analyzed the psycho-rhetorical narrative of the properly
fascist Russian national subject, in this chapter I focus on the negotiation of the idea of
Russianness by the aforementioned anti-fascist and purportedly anti-fascists national actors: the
“democratic and anti-fascist” youth group Nashi, Putin as its sponsor, and the independent antifascist movement, also known as Antifa.
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5.1

Nashi as an Ideological Mouthpiece of the Kremlin

Nashi is not the only pro-Kremlin youth organization. Other major pro-Putin
organizations include, for instance, Mestnye (“Locals”), a regional, anti-immigrant organization;
Rossiya Molodaya (“Young Russia”), a nationalist movement actively engaged in provocateur
tactics at oppositional rallies; Molodaya Gvardiya (“Young Guard”), the youth wing of Putin’s
United Russia party; Novye Ludi (“New People”), a trans-regional organization tasked with the
preparation of the “new” Russian youth, future government officials; and Georgievtsy (“St.
Georges”), a Russian Orthodox movement.2 Yet, among all other state-sponsored organizations,
Nashi stands out as “a notorious symbol of modern Russia.”3
Established in 2005, Nashi, also referred to as Putinjugend in the liberal Russian press
and blogosphere, quickly became a fairly pronounced force, mainly due to its scandalous protests
against Russia’s external and internal “enemies.”4 The group was conceived specifically with the
purpose to unveil “the truth about the ‘orange’ technologies, created and successfully
implemented by the U.S., and ‘color’ revolutions, carried out in a number of the CIS countries.”5
Before I explicate why Nashi sees their anti-fascist mission chiefly in terms of the fight with the
West, which arguably contributed to so called “color revolutions” - a wave of pro-democratic
2
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nonviolent resistance with regard to key political issues, including election fraud - in post-Soviet
republics and the countries in the Middle East, North Africa and the rest of the world, I must
discuss the role of the Nashi project in Russian politics, as well as introduce the events that
generated most of Nashi’s “anti-fascist” narrative analyzed in this Chapter.
One of the biggest international scandals involving Nashi was an argument between
Russia and Estonia over the removal of the Soviet monument in Tallinn. The controversy was
caused by Nashi’s crusade against Estonia’s “state fascism” in connection with the relocation of
a Soviet World War II memorial, commonly known as the Bronze Soldier.6 Since the 1990s the
Bronze Soldier monument, which was erected in 1947 and officially known as the monument to
the Soldier-Liberator, or the monument to the Fallen in World War II, has been an object of
heated discussions: it has been considered by Estonian nationalists to be a symbol of the Soviet
occupation. In February 2007 the parliament of Estonia ratified an amendment to the bill on
demolition of banned constructions. According to the bill, banned constructions are constructions
that “celebrate occupation of the former republic of Estonia, mass repressions in Estonia, which
could endanger the life, health and property of the people, incite hatred or could trigger public
peace disturbance.”7 Following the newly amended law, the government of Estonia planned to
relocate the Bronze Soldier monument and the bed of honor (the graves of Soviet soldiers who
died on the territory of Estonia during World War II) from the center of Tallinn.
After the discussions of the bill began in the Estonian parliament, a group of Estonian
nationalists attempted to lay a barbed-wire wreath at the monument, which provoked a fight
between Estonian nationalists and monument defenders (most of the latter were members of the
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Nochnoi Dozod, or Night Watch, civic movement).8 On April 26, 2007, the situation culminated
in a violent mass riot at the Bronze Soldier monument, known as the Bronze Night. Several
thousand ethnic Russians (citizens of Estonia and citizens of Russia) gathered at Tõnismägi
square, at the Bronze Soldier monument, to protest the decision of the parliament. As the result
of the clashes with the police, more than 800 people were arrested, 153 people were injured and
one man (a citizen of Russia) was killed.9 On the same night the monument was dismantled and
relocated to the military cemetery in Tallinn, approximately two kilometers from the original
location of the monument.
While the Prime Minister of Estonia Andrus Ansip ensured that reburial of the soldiers’
graves would be performed “with dignity and in accordance with all internationally recognized
rules,” Russia regarded the reburial and relocation of the monument as “revision of the antiHitler coalition states’ role in the struggle against fascism during the Second World War, which
goes against not only international law but also the very principles of morality and humanity.”10
A string of events followed the Bronze Night in Tallinn. Inspired by First Deputy Prime Minister
Sergei Ivanov’s call to boycott Estonian food exported to Russia, several Russian supermarket
chains refused to sell Estonian products and the National Meat Association of Russia called for
suspension of business relations with Estonian companies.11 In addition, the Russian Rail Roads
state company stopped processing shipments of oil products to Estonia (yet, the company denied
it had any political reasons).
8
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Nashi, as well as other Kremlin sponsored youth organizations, such as the Eurasian
Youth Union (ESM), Mestnye, Molodaya Gvardiya and Rossiya Molodaya, picketed the
Estonian diplomatic mission in Moscow for several days with slogans such as “Lackeys of
NATO - hands off the Russian Soldier,” “Hitler is an Estonian hero,” “The Second World War
continues,” and “Fascism will not pass.”12 Тhe picketing youth closed off all entrances into the
Estonian Embassy, precluding then Estonian Ambassador Marina Kaljurand from leaving the
Embassy on April 27, although on May 2 she was able to go to a press conference, which Nashi,
however, attempted to disrupt, and she departed for Estonia a day later.13
In addition, quite a few threats were made: the leader of the ESM Pavel Zariffulin, for
example, said that the union is “ready to send…activists to Estonia to conduct some sabotage of
[their] own. [They] might set border marking poles on fire. It is high time to instill the Russian
order there.”14 Nashi too promised to go to Estonia “to work there as ‘live monuments’.”15 The
leader of the far-right Liberal Democratic Party Zhirinovsky, who joined the unsanctioned picket
at the Embassy at one point, gave Estonia an ultimatum – to apologize to Russia and relocate the
monument back to its place or the “[Russian] airborne division may start military maneuvers
along the border with Estonia and get lost there. They will guarantee a night of horror there.”16
Some of pro-Kremlin youth organizations, including Nashi, eventually moved beyond
their words. The youth wing of A Just Russia party, for instance, blocked the Russian-Estonian
border for half an hour, while Nashi activists traveled to Estonia on tourist visas to participate in
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the Vigil of Memory. Over the period of approximately one month, Nashi activists, donned in
military capes of the Second World War period, attempted to pose as live monuments at the very
place where the Bronze Soldier monument was originally located. Each of them was detained
and, as a result, expelled from Estonia for the violation of the conditions of their tourist visas.17
To top it off, in order “to teach the Estonian authorities a lesson,” Nashi hackers attacked the
websites of the Estonian government, political parties, and media, some of which were hit by
denial-of-service (DoS), and some were defaced or reposted (e.g., on the website of Estonia’s
ruling Reform Party hackers posted an apology note on behalf of Prime Minister Ansip).18
Besides, Nashi insisted that there was nothing illegal in the denial-of-service attack: “It was not a
cyber attack, but an act of civil disobedience, organized in the virtual space.”19
In their turn, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia began to protest against the
“psychoterror” of Nashi: Estonia accused Russia of breaking the Vienna Convention, which
guarantees diplomatic inviolability, and turned to the European Union with a proposition to
introduce sanctions against Russia. The citizens of Russia participating in the Bronze Night riots,
along with Nashi activists who participated in the Vigil of Memory in Estonia, as well as antiEstonian events in Russia, were black-listed by the Estonian Embassy in Moscow and banned
from entering Estonia and other Schengen countries.20
After the relocation, the Bronze Soldier monument was defaced several times, and, as the
Night Watch claims, the administration of the military cemetery in Tallinn did not take any steps
17
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regarding the matter.21 Estonia’s decision to relocate the monument was supported by the U.S.
and some European countries. According to U.S. Ambassador to Estonia Stanley Davis Phillips,
“the Bronze night and cyber attacks put Estonia on the world map.”22 The war on Soviet symbols
spread to other countries: Poland, for instance, developed two laws allowing local authorities to
remove and relocate Soviet monuments. “Symbols of the Communist dictatorship must disappear
from Polish streets,” Minister of Culture and National Heritage Kazimierz Ujazdowski said in
the midst of the Bronze Soldier scandal.23
The events surrounding the relocation of the Bronze Soldier monument in Tallinn
heralded a new stage in the relations between Estonia and Russia. The Bronze Night forced the
former Soviet republics to voice their discontent with, and distrust of, each other louder than
ever. Unable to leave aside the historical baggage of World War II and Soviet times, the
reactions of both countries to the relocation of the Bronze Soldier monument intensified the long
held animosities. Just a cursory glance at media coverage of the relations between Estonia and
Russia indicates considerable tension. For instance, in August 2010 the Ministry of Defense of
Estonia organized a military-patriotic exercise and competition (i.e., “The Erna Raid”) to
commemorate the activity of the Erna long-range reconnaissance group which consisted of
Estonian SS volunteers.24 Further, in October 2010 Estonian teenagers created and uploaded a
video in which they were “jokingly” killing a Russian teenager.25 The video was accompanied by
explanations stating that the video illustrated the proper way to kill ethnic Russians. Reportedly
due to their young age, the creators of the video were not prosecuted. These events once again
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alarmed Russian society and Russian officials, who promptly accused Estonia of glorifying
fascism.
The aforementioned diplomatic incident was not the only scandal that involved Nashi. A
year earlier Nashi had already had an altercation with a foreign diplomat: the group picketed the
British Embassy in Moscow, protesting against the participation of British Ambassador to Russia
Anthony Brenton in The Other Russia forum, a meeting of oppositional - communist, nationalist
and liberal - politicians and human right activists. Following former Russian President Putin,
who characterized Brenton’s participation in the forum as an attempt “to influence the internal
balance of power in Russia,” Nashi picketed the British Embassy, demanding that Brenton
apologize for “appearing before fascists” and providing moral and financial support to the
forum.26 Other major campaigns of Nashi were directed at foreign “politicians-falsifiers” and
“fascists” - primarily pro-American leaders of former Soviet republics, such as Georgian
President Mikhail Saakashvili and former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, as well as
Russia’s archenemy, the U.S., in the person of former U.S. President George W. Bush (“the
epitome of political tyranny and absolutely barbarous lust for power”) and U.S. President Barack
Obama (“a demagogue and a war-monger”).27 Last but not least on Nashi’s enemy list are
Russian opposition groups, “lingerie-clad prostitutes who sell out Russia for the U.S. dollar.”28
In addition to attacking “the essential electronic infrastructure” of Estonia, including the
country’s major media outlets, banks and governmental websites, in 2007, a year later Nashi
engaged in a similar DoS attack on the Russian independent newspaper Kommersant’s website.29
After the Kommersant had named Nashi likuyuschaya gopota, or “jubilant rabble,” and pointed
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out the uselessness of the movement to the Kremlin, Nashi promised to “create unbearable
conditions for Kommersant,” “to psychologically and physically finish” the newspaper.30
One may also recall Nashi’s reaction to former anti-Communist dissident and Russian
journalist Aleksandr Podrabinek’s article, in which he harshly criticized Soviet war veterans for
clinging to the “bloody, false and shameful” Soviet past.31 Following the Moscow’s Veteran
Council demands to remove the “Anti-Soviet [Cafe]” sign at an eatery in Moscow, Podrabinek
wrote:
But the Soviet Union is not the same country, which you depicted in school
textbooks and your lying press. The Soviet Union is not just political instructors,
Stakhanovites, shock workers of Communist labor and cosmonauts. The Soviet
Union is also peasant rebellions, the sacrifices of collectivization and the
Holodomor [the widespread famine in Soviet Ukraine the 1930s], hundreds of
innocent people shot in KGB basements, and millions of people tormented in the
GULAG to the strains of Mikhalkov’s rotten anthem. The Soviet Union is
dissidents who spent their lives confined in nuthouses, it is underhanded murders,
and nameless graves on countless camp cemeteries, graves for my dissident
friends, who did not live to see our freedom.32
In response, Nashi attempted to sue the journalist for defamation, who, in Nashi’s view, insulted
WWII veterans. They threatened him and picketed his house. As a result of the “unthinkable
hounding,” the journalist and his family went into hiding.33
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Besides the incident with Podrabinek in September 2009, Nashi was also involved in a
few assaults on opposition leader and Putin’s critic Boris Nemtsov. At least three times, in
November 2007, November 2010 and January 2011, Nashi activists tried to put a butterfly net
with a sign saying “political insect” on Nemtsov. In November 2007 they also poured liquid
chocolate on the politician, as well as squirted ammonia in his face in March 2009. Similarly,
Nashi harassed another liberal politician - Garry Kasparov: the youth, for example, disrupted his
press conferences, and one Nashi activist chained himself to Kasparov’s car a few times. 34
For its devoted allegiance to the country’s leaders, Nashi is often rightly compared to the
youth wing of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union - the Komsomol.35 Nashi’s website
domain name is (dot)SU - an extension assigned to the Soviet Union. Moreover, Nashi calls
itself the “state youth” (gosmolodezh).36 Another stark reminder of the Soviet times is the slogan
of the Mishki (“Teddy Bears”), a Nashi children’s auxiliary group. Just as in Soviet times, the
organization devotedly praises the country’s leaders: the Mishki’s catchphrase “Thank you,
Putin, for our stable future” is a close copy of the old Soviet slogan “Thank you, Comrade Stalin,
for our happy childhood.”37 Besides the Komsomol’s avant-gardism and the old Soviet rhetorical
style, Nashi’s rebellious zeal is also somewhat reminiscent of Mao’s Red Guard; the
organization’s emphasis on the values of discipline and physical self-control fairly approximates
the pedagogical practices of the Hitler Youth. It is hardly surprising that critics of Nashi have
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dubbed the organization “Putin Youth” - “the Kremlin’s shock troops in a disturbing turn
towards [ethnic] nationalism.”38
Inspired by its own work and endorsed by the Kremlin, the Nashi group even discussed
the possibility of transforming into a political party. 39 While that did not happen, Nashi has
nonetheless served as a political incubator for young politicians. Thus, for instance, Nashi’s
founder Vasily Yakemenko became the leader of the State Committee on Youth Affairs, later
known as the Federal Youth Agency; and the Nashi leader Nikita Borovikov founded the Smart
Russia party, aiming to “change the way of thinking of those who rule the country.”40
In February 2012, the Russian branch of the “hacktivist” group Anonymous leaked
Nashi’s emails, documenting its dirty tactics, including bugging telephones of oppositional
leaders, paying numerous bloggers to promote Putin and Medvedev’s “tandemocracy” and
conduct smear campaigns against the opposition.41 February’s so-called Nashismgate depicted
the already compromised youth movement as an expensive and ruthless Kremlin tool to deal
with anybody who goes against the regime. The leaked emails finally brought to light the
financial support needed for Nashi’s frantic activities (an average campaign conducted by Nashi
cost around eight hundred thousand dollars).42
Shortly after the Nashismgate, the activity of the organization slowed down significantly,
which led to speculations that Nashi was to stop functioning.43 Some insisted that Nashi, being
further compromised by the leaked emails, became an embarrassment; others argued that the
38
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youth group’s projects and propaganda were too primitive and irrelevant in the circumstances
when pressing economic, social and political problems in Russia could not be easily blamed on
foreign “enemies.”44 It was also suggested that Nashi’s leader Vasiliy Yakemenko and Nashi’s
founder Vladimir Surkov simply were no longer favored in the Kremlin.45 Amid widespread
speculations about the end of the movement, and despite Nashi’s questionable image, the
“democratic anti-fascist” youth movement reportedly “continues to more than merely exist; it
gives birth to new projects, which simply are too congested within the present organization.”46
As Kristina Potupchik, a former Nashi’s spokesperson, adds, [w]e do not close, it is your whiteribbon-fountain [or oppositional] ‘revolution’ that comes to an end.”47 According to the latest
reports, “the history of the [group] in its present form is over”: Nashi has reformed itself into a
network of loosely connected projects, as, for instance, a “patriotic” youth movement Stal’
(“Steel”), an “archive of video-memories” Tvoi Film o Voyne (“Your Film about the War”), a
consumer-rights project Kontrolnaya Zakupka (“Sample Purchase”), an environmental project
Ekologiya (“Ecology”), and a health project Begi za Mnoy (“Run after Me”), some of which, as
for instance the latter, became a part of Rosmolodezh, or the Federal Youth Agency, sponsored
by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation.48
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While Nashi was never a widely popular organization and is often ridiculed in the liberal
Russian blogosphere and press, it nevertheless was a significant element of Kremlin politics. The
pro-Kremlin youth organization, though under a different name (Idushchie Vmeste, “Marching
Together”), existed since Putin’s first term in office, and at its very inception the organization
declared the regime’s uncompromising suspicion of liberal democratic tendencies and influences
from the West.49 What emerged as Nashi became an ideological mouthpiece of the Kremlin.
While Putin, as I will show later, has virtually never spoken in an explicitly tragic manner in
order to sustain an appearance of Russia’s supposedly democratic regime and an image of
Russian society that is purportedly accepting of various views, Nashi’s rhetoric has been much
more openly tragic.50 In Nashi’s national fantasy all countries that support the Western model of
liberal democracy, as well as Russian liberal politicians, are unequivocally qualified as enemies
of Russia and Putin’s regime (and the latter is assumed to be a guarantor of Russia’s
sovereignty). In a way, by means of its brazen actions and tragic rhetoric, Nashi had been testing
the receptivity of Russian society to aggressive foreign politics and repressive domestic
measures, which Putin’s third and fourth terms as President of Russia spiraled into. As the
upcoming close textual analysis of Nashi’s psycho-rhetorical narrative elucidates, in attempts to
justify Nashi’s fight with anyone who purportedly wants to harm Russia, the group employs the
tragic fantasy-frame and the tragically marked epic, elegy, burlesque, and the grotesque. These
fantasy-frames, coupled with the almost total absence of the Lacanian-Burkean tragicomic
attitude, describe Nashi’s psycho-rhetorical narrative as politically dangerous and ethically
problematic.
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5.1.1 Nashi’s Tragic “Anti-Fascism”

As Nashi characterizes itself, it is a “democratic anti-fascist movement,” fighting
“misanthropic ideology,” “anti-democratic and inhumane rhetoric” and all those who “deny
people with different skin color, different ideals the right to exist.”51 Group activists emphasize
that xenophobia and fascism as “an anti-ethnic-Russian ideology” has always been alien to
ethnic Russians, while respect for other nations and ethnic minorities is what has supposedly
kept multinational Russia whole.52 Besides, since “fascism is an ideology of the oppressed and
discontented nations,” it has arguably no chance to do well in Russia.53 As Nashi adds, “there is
no place for discontent in Russia, as the [Russian] people choose their own authorities.“54 In
other words, Nashi believes in an inherently comic nature of ethnic Russians, or their historically
ingrained aversion to such a tragic ideology as fascism.55
This, however, does not prevent the group from acknowledging the expansion of
skinhead and other neo-fascist activities across Russia and expressing regrets that most Russian
citizens fail to discern the problem. Yet, as Nashi clarifies, “there are no real fascists in Russia,
while there are many political groups that can be regarded as followers of fascism. Many groups
51
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preach an ideology of radical nationalism and national insensitivity, which brings them closer to
fascists.”56 In contrast to “real” fascism that Nashi describes as a reaction of socially
disadvantaged groups of people to unfavorable economic conditions, the most recent fascist
tendencies in Russia are purportedly of a different origin: it is “occult-nostalgic and glamorous
fascism.”57 As Nashi further laments, for most ethnic Russian “pseudo-patriots,” contemporary
Russian fascism is nothing but a fad, perpetuated by “glossy magazines and literary critics [that]
sing praises to modern fascism.”58 In the eyes of the youth group, such “fashion-forward”
radicals are no more than “clueless patriots” with “teenage needs,” “punks,” “behaving like
idiots,” or “fascist misfits,” whose attempts at…posing as ‘real ethnic Russians,’ seemed funny
and absurd.”59 Having failed to acknowledge that for centuries the dominant Russian idea has
been molded largely by tragic political, social and cultural beliefs and practices, such as
xenophobia, military chauvinism, racism, anti-Semitism, Russian Orthodoxy and a penchant for
a strong government, Nashi stresses that Russian neo-fascism
does not have any cultural foundation, cemented in history. [It] is entirely
borrowed from American movies and pop culture….The clothes are those of
British football hooligans, American movie heroes look back from their profile
pictures, American heroism and hypocrisy is an example they follow – this is a
portrait of the modern ethnic Russian nationalist.60
Apparently, such wacky, or burlesque, characters are seen as “a threat for democracy [in
Russia]” only because they and their “banal fascism” are necessarily connected with attempts at
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“[legalizing] fascism on a political level.”61 Nashi’s reference to the banal fascism of Russian
neo-fascists, however, bears no comparison to Arendt’s idea of the banality of evil, since the
former considers Russian neo-fascism described in Chapter Four as simply marginal, superficial
and thus nonthreatening on its own.
Staking out a claim for its leadership in an anti-fascist fight, Nashi thus mentions what
can be truly considered (and is described in Chapter Four) as neo-fascism in Russia only in
passing, and most often it is purportedly a serious issue only when linked to the “fascism” of the
Kremlin’s opposition, both at home and abroad: “To get rid of fascism, as our movement thinks,
it is necessary to take a few simple steps: [Russian liberal politician] Khakamada and other
pseudo-liberal politicians must stop flirting with fascists from the banned National Bolshevik
Party (Natsbol); Moscow’s authorities must stop giving permission to hold Russian Marches in
Moscow; Russia’s State Duma must define ‘fascism’ clearly and adopt laws that guarantee
effective and timely suppression of any signs of fascism; and the state and law-enforcement
authorities must respond harshly to any hate crimes.”62 “To name fascism for what it is,” Nashi
asserts in its educational brochure “Unusual Fascism,” “is to help people find out the truth.”63
And that is what Nashi members are purportedly occupied with.
To stress the difference between domestic neo-fascists and those whom Nashi regards as
much more sinister opponents, the group argues that the former are
[u]nable to understand that the might of Russia is in the unity of our nation, [and
thus] they consciously incite hatred, consciously provoke conflicts without
thinking how it may end. Yet their leaders are usual swindlers who successfully
combine their [political] activity with business and care primarily for money.
61

“Ivanovo” n.pag.; “Nashi Delivers an Attack on Fascism” n.pag.
“How to Defeat” n.pag.
63
“Nashi Published” n.pag.
62

283

Their real masters sit in comfortable chairs overseas, skillfully pulling strings and
generously giving money to the [Russian] fringe groups.64
In other words, while ordinary Russian neo-fascists, whom Nashi sees as stern and sincere
proponents of “aggressive, radical nationalism” and members of “profascist cliques” at the very
most, are depicted as totally oblivious to the consequences of their actions, their domestic leaders
and foreign sponsors supposedly act as cynical crooks that strive to benefit from a possible
escalation of ethnic tensions, leading to a civil war and even the break-up of Russia.65 By placing
the cynical, supposedly deideologized, rather than the ideologically motivated actor into the
position of the ultimate national enemy, Nashi activists, who nevertheless call themselves
“sincere patriots,” attempt, first, to absolve Russian neo-fascists of responsibility for their
criminal hatred, that is, their tragic ideology, and, second, to devalue an ideologically sincere
belief that does not complement the Kremlin’s agenda, portraying it as ineptitude or, at best,
naiveté.
In addition to the disparity between the ways in which Nashi gauges the threats coming
from Russian neo-fascists and their supposed masters, the group also treats Russian neo-fascists
and all other real or purported fascists that are critical of the Kremlin asymmetrically. The forces
that supposedly strive “to revive fascist and ethnic nationalist ideas” in order to destroy Russia
include some local authorities, pro-Western liberal politicians, neo-fascists and governments of
certain former Soviet republics, as well as the European Union and the U.S.”66 It is against them
that Nashi’s most violent, tragic actions are directed. As mentioned above, the group’s activists
got into the habit of harassing Russian opposition politicians and foreign diplomats of the
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supposedly unfriendly states. In addition to physically aggressive methods, Nashi indulges in
symbolic violence too. During its annual ideological summer camp on Lake Seliger, the youth
group, for example, introduced an installation that featured the impaled mannequin heads
portraying Russia’s supposed enemies – domestic and foreign politicians, public figures and
human rights activists which are critical of the Kremlin.67 In another purportedly artful attempt to
expose the “fascist” nature of the country’s foes, more precisely, Estonia, in relation to the
country’s decision to relocate the Bronze Soldier, Nashi organized a mass action: group activists
offered passersby an opportunity to “shoot down” an image of a “fascist” with paintballs.68
Unlike the symbolic mortification of Russia’s “fascist” enemies, the treatment of Russian
neo-fascists is much more delicate. Proposing to combat fascism in Russia as “a successor state
of the multinational and harmonious USSR,” Nashi insists that “one must conduct thorough
work, and not take single actions, which are more self-promotion than anything else.”69
Ironically, the group’s “anti-fascism” does not amount to anything more than a number of
unsystematic and unproductive activities, needed to maintain an appearance of serious antifascist work. Thus, for example, to resist extreme expressions of ethnic hatred, Nashi members
paint graffiti of “pink hearts or funny smilies” over “shameful [fascist] slogans and images”;
repaint building walls into the colors of the national flag while listening to patriotic music; get
passersby to photograph in national costumes of various ethnic minorities of the Russian
Federations; set up make-shift hair salons to offer young people “antifa hairdos,” or a “creative,
brave,” and “flamboyant image” with an ethnic twist as a sign of a person’s “vocal protest
against racial intolerance,” as well as gather on Hitler’s birthday at dormitories to protect foreign
students from neo-fascist assaults only to end up playing “interesting collective games [with
67
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them and]…little boys from the neighborhood. Like this Nashi’s initiative turned into аn outdoor
‘lesson of friendship’.”70
As such Nashi’s work illustrates the group’s perfunctory engagement with what it
describes as anti-fascist resistance. Taking in consideration that xenophobic and racist sentiments
appeal to a large portion of Russians, mainly due to the Kremlin’s increasingly aggressive
nationalist propaganda, anything more than a superficial and unreflective demonstration of
“tolerance” and “the friendship of nations” would be unpopular among Russians and, more
importantly, would challenge the very purpose of the youth group – to fight the “orange” threat,
that is, “to prevent a geopolitical coup d'etat in Russia and counter the introduction of the
external control [over the country] under the disguise of a ‘color revolution’.”71 By perpetuating
the far-reaching Soviet myth of “the friendship of nations,” which I discussed in Chapter Three,
Nashi embraces ethnic differences only as far as they are seen as a matter of appearances, rather
than a politically meaningful issue. Just as in Soviet times non-Russian nationalist movements
that opposed Soviet power were denounced as anti-Communist, so today any politically
pronounced nationalist sentiments in former Soviet republics, which often fuel “color
revolutions”, or non-violent protests against Kremlin-friendly corrupt and authoritarian
governments that result in the shift of an ex-Soviet state’s allegiance toward the West and the
hopeful pursuit of NATO membership, are color-coded: they are deemed “orange,” that is,
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Russophobe, undemocratic and fascist.72 What concerns the ethno-nationalist aspirations in the
North Caucasus, they are distinctly characterized as terrorism.
There is no denying that nationalism often manifests itself in an illiberal, chauvinistic
way. Owing to the underlying tension between the exclusive principles of descent, and cultural
or religious specificity, that are foundational of ethnic nationalism, on the one hand, and open
and all-embracing ideals of liberalism, on the other, national liberation aspirations of some nonRussian nations that were a part of the Soviet Union or reluctantly remain in the immediate
sphere of modern Russia’s influence at times have been indeed marred by distinctly tragic
tendencies. For instance, both official state and popular discourses in the Baltic states and
Ukraine are yet to acknowledge the disturbing history of the collaboration of their nationalists
with the Nazis.73 Moreover, in the process of building their national sovereignty after the
dissolution of the USSR, some former Soviet republics adopted or were about to adopt
discriminatory legislature against ethnic minorities. Thus, for instance, Latvia and Estonia did
not automatically grant citizenship to all their residents after 1991, which left many ethnic
Russians who moved there while those states were in the Soviet Union, as well as their
descendants born in Estonia and Latvia prior to 1991, without citizenship.74 Another
controversial issue concerned the decision of the Ukrainian Parliament to repeal the 2012 law on
the status of the state language and languages of ethnic minorities, which guaranteed the right of
many ethnic Russians living in Ukraine to use the Russian language in various spheres of their
lives.75
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Yet, the issue of ethnic peculiarity for non-Russian nations has been largely a question of
their nation’s freedom from the totalitarian and authoritarian embrace of Soviet and modern
Russia, and as such consonant with the fervor of the French Revolution, used to promote the
ideas of personal and political liberties, democracy and popular self-determination.76 Thus, for
instance, commenting on the annual marches of Ukrainian nationalists in Kiev and other
Ukrainian cities to honor Stepan Bandera, a leader of Ukrainian independence and the antiSoviet resistance movement who willingly, albeit briefly, cooperated with Nazi Germany,
Umland argues that “[t]he iconic Stepan Bandera figure is supported less as a former ultranationalist and fascist, than as a resolute fighter against, and tragic victim of, Moscow’s
imperialism.”77 While there are outright racists, anti-Semites and homophobes among Ukrainian
nationalists, Umland insists that in general Ukrainian moderate nationalism is inclusive and
civic, rather than illiberal and ethnic.
Just as the Ukrainian or Baltic nationalist movements cannot be wholly characterized as
extreme right-wing or fascist, so neither can all Caucasian fighters for national independence,
who threaten the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, be characterized as terrorists.
While it is necessary to acknowledge the role of both domestic and foreign radical Islamists in
the North Caucasus, who carried out, encouraged or condoned terrorist attacks in the Russian
Federation, the Kremlin’s attempts to blame the instability in the region on religious
fundamentalists disregard the existence of Chechen national liberation aspirations and other
separatist and irredentist projects. As a reaction to the Russian Empire’s expansion into the
Caucasus and the subsequent vicious politics of the Soviet and modern Russian state toward
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indigenous ethnic groups, separatist and inter-ethnic conflicts in the area have been brewing for
centuries.78
While downplaying the potential of Russian neo-fascism and magnifying the significance
of pro-fascist tendencies in Ukraine and the Baltic states, as well as the infusion of international
terrorism in the North Caucasus region, Nashi, however, discerns the greatest threat in the
intensions of the West, which purportedly fuels fascist sentiments in former Soviet republics and
even condones and sponsors terrorist attacks in Russia and elsewhere. It is peculiar then how
Western Europe and the U.S., which promote liberal values, rather than pro-fascist and properly
fascist forces in Russia and former Soviet republics, have become Nashi’s ultimate national
enemy of the “democratic anti-fascist” youth group. While a cursory look at the group’s actions
towards its opponents gives only a rough idea of Nashi’s national vision, a symptomatic reading
of Nashi’s national fantasy allows us to understand what the group’s “anti-fascism” and “an
eclectic ideological synthesis that defined [Nashi’s] friends and foes” are.79
As I mentioned above, for Nashi, the most dangerous enemies of Russia are in the West.
The U.S. stands out among them as the purportedly most vicious national other. In a way
resembling NATO Supreme Commander Philip Breedlove’s sentiment that Russia presents an
“existential threat” to the U.S., young “sincere patriots” declare that U.S. foreign policy, which
manifests itself in “the predatory expansion of the U.S.,” aims to undermine Russia’s
sovereignty, which stands for the idea of the complete national self: “America will not be
Russia’s friend until the latter will be of strategic interest for the former. And there always be
78
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such a relationship!”80 In a cartoon, made by Nashi in order to promote general conscription in
Russia, the U.S. is depicted as an octopus-like monster that strives to devour the Russian
Federation:
USA is a huge fatty, that…cannot stop consuming [various recourses such as oil,
gas, metal, people]….But the most part of the American food is in
Russia….[Americans] have two options: either they eat less and less, stop
growing and die, or they come and take our food. They cannot but come for it.
And this is not because they dislike us or they are our enemies, not at all. This is
because they want to eat and their state wants to eat. And an average American
wants a powerful car, stylish clothes, a bigger house, and brighter light.81
Having unburdened its vision of international relations from any ideological considerations or
traditional moral value, which is consonant with the most radical form of political realism realpolitik, as well as making a subtle evaluative reference to what in Russia is traditionally
considered as Western soulless materialism (yet without embracing the Left’s critique of
consumerism), Nashi further explains that the U.S. is “scared” and “jealous” of “Vladimir
Putin’s achievements,” “the increasingly effective state power,” and the overall “strengthening of
[Russia]” and thus “[feels the urgency] to invade our country to take control over our
resources.”82 For Nashi, the power and strength of the Kremlin and by extension Russia itself are
the treasured objet a, which serves as a guarantor of the country’s sovereignty, both politically
and ideationally, and as such is the target of Russia’s national others.
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While insisting that “sheer cynicism“ motivates the sinister agenda of the U.S., the Nashi
group is nevertheless appalled by the supposedly devious plans and the politics of double
standards favored by the U.S.: “by all means possible,” even using democracy as “[its] favorite
pretext,” the U.S. attempts to “drive [Russia] out” from the global arena.83 The U.S. foreign
policy in regard to, for example, Georgia, Libya, and Bolivia, where the U.S. “secretly plots to
depose…President Evo Morales,” as well as the fact that the U.S. “misleads its NATO allies,”
tries “by hook or by crook to keep Russia from entering the European energy market,” clearly
illustrates, as Nashi emphasizes, that “globalist American acts belie Obama’s ‘multipolar’
words.”84 As a result, Nashi continues, “honest competition [with the U.S.] is simply out of the
question.”85
Having expressed indignation with not so much cynicism, but with the national other’s
attempts to veil it or present it from a morally advantageous position, Nashi repeats continuously
that the real purpose of America’s “winged democracy” is to stall Russia’s development and,
more specifically, “prevent Russia from passing a gas pipeline to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
America is ready to do anything, even to methodically exterminate [thousands of] Serbs.”86 In
addition, NATO, which is generally associated with the U.S., has purportedly turned into “an
official protection racket for Afghan drug traffic,” thus causing problems both in Russia and
other European countries.87 In other words, Russia has not been the only American foe: the U.S.
“subjugated bled-white Europe,” “colonized” smaller countries, including some former Soviet
republics, and “got into a fight with the whole world.”88 As Nashi stresses, “the aggressive
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foreign policy of the U.S. has already brought about a number of humanitarian catastrophes,
wars and mass human rights violations” in different parts of the world.89 And those who are
ready to sacrifice the well-being and lives of others “at the altar of [the supposedly non-existent]
American democracy,” as the youth group emphasizes, are criminals or even worse - they are
“devoid of everything human.”90
Nashi concludes that “[t]he U.S. attempts to provoke the Third World War” by “bombing
peaceful citizens” in Yugoslavia, Libya, Iraq and other countries, “supporting the territorial
claims of Japan,” “meddling with the elections process and politics” in Russia, “financing
organizations that undermine the political system of Russia, or supporting openly hostile [proWestern] regimes in post-Soviet countries.”91 In Nashi’s view, “[i]t is easy to draw a historical
parallel” between the role of the U.S. in World War II and its “subversive activities,” or “color
revolutions,” in the post-Cold War period: “For the U.S. the Second World War was a way to
overcome the Great Depression. And now, when the state and its currency have been weakened
by the crisis, the U.S. again deliberately attempts to destabilize the situation in the world.”92
Every action of the U.S., including even the release of a computer game, purportedly
speaks volumes about the aggressive and malicious agenda of the state: “an American game,
Modern Warfare 2 - the goal of which is to shoot Russian citizens on behalf of terrorists - was
released on November 10. ‘To sell this game in Russia is a crime’.”93 Nashi activists are
similarly outraged by U.S. Sen. Benjamin Cardin and Congressman Alcee Hastings’s
“antidemocratic and inhumane rhetoric” regarding the 2010 Moscow Metro bombings.94 Making
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a reference to the complicated history of Russia’s involvement in the North Caucasus, the
American politicians described the bombings as “a cry for help to end the violence and poverty
in Chechnya and neighboring regions which engender the desperation that makes these sorts of
incidents more likely.”95 In short, Nashi’s national fantasy is a conspiracy-driven narrative in
which the U.S. is portrayed as a devious criminal engaged in sneaky tactics, an aggressive
provocateur, and, as I will explain in greater detail below, a “inhumane” fascist and terrorist
sympathizer.96
As Nashi argues, hostility and backstabbing on the part of the West have been
characteristic of the relationship between Russia and the West since at least the thirteenth
century, after the Tatar-Mongol invasion: “Then the Kievan Rus sustained losses not so much
from the Tatars, but its Western neighbors, who did not miss a chance to take advantage of the
weakened Kievan Rus in order to cut off Western Russian lands in Belorussia and Ukraine.”97
While the Tatar Yoke left a significant imprint on the Kievan state, now traceable, for example,
in Russian language and, more importantly, the Russian state tradition, Nashi blames the West
for Russia’s misfortunes.98 As soon as the West felt its technological and military superiority
over Russia, the former purportedly started to nourish an idea and make attempts to conquer the
latter. Making repeated references to the Time of Troubles, Napoleon’s and Hitler’s invasions, as
well as the turbulent period of the early 1990s, Nashi insists, quite fairly in this case, that the
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West’s threat to Russia “has been chronic since the thirteenth century, [and] has been made more
serious with the outbreak of the technological revolution in the West.”99
Military encounters with national others, indeed, greatly contribute to shaping up any
national idea, which is usually demonstrated in the celebratory repertoire of a state. In Russia, as
noted, National Unity Day is observed on November 4, on which day in the year 1612
“multinational Russia defeated [Polish] invaders and ended the [turbulent] Time of Troubles,”
while annual parades commemorating the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany on May 9
honor “the victories that we owe to our unity as a people.”100 As Hosking argues, during and
immediately after the Great Patriotic War the dominant national idea even crystallized into a
comic national fantasy, and later “this fresh-minted civic patriotism was squashed by Stalin and
the Communist party.”101 Most often, however, Russia’s victories and losses have been viewed
tragically - as a sign that Russia is always under siege: “Napoleon and Hitler dreamt of affirming
their power over Russia. Today the U.S., on the one hand, and international terrorism, on the
other, aspire to assume control over Eurasia. They have fastened their eyes on Russia. To defend
the sovereignty of our country, just like our forefathers did 60 years ago, is the task of our
generation.”102
The Russians, as Nashi contends, must also learn from their losses, the most traumatic of
which was arguably the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Revoicing Putin’s well known statement
that the break-up of the USSR was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century,”
Nashi nevertheless admits that the “Communist project brought the USSR into a stalemate,”
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because “under the Soviet regime the country did not prosper, society did not develop
dynamically, and people were not free. Moreover, an ideologically driven approach to economy
doomed our country to a persistent gap with developed countries.”103 Engaging in a rare moment
of self-reflection, as it may seem at first, the youth group admits that “the West often served as
an example of reforms in various spheres of public life,” most notably when post-Soviet Russia
attempted to transition from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy.104 Yet, in
light of the devastating results of the neo-liberal “shock therapy” policy, which was
enthusiastically supported by the West and such institutions as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank, Nashi, just like many Russians, believe that the West can no longer
lead by example. This sentiment, lacking humility and responsibility for Russia’s own
misfortune, together with, as the analysis reveals, the group’s disregard for individual rights and
freedoms despite claiming otherwise on occasion, becomes an element of Nashi’s principally
tragic worldview.
Shifting the blame for the costs and disappointments of the post-Soviet economic reforms
in entirety to the West, the youth group is adamant that what the West attempted to force the
country into was the “regime of oligarchic capitalism” as “an extension of animal world, where
everybody fights everyone else, where, being unburdened by moral or legal considerations, the
strong wins.”105 The neo-liberal reforms of the 1990s indeed left a large part of the Russian
population in poverty, while creating “a powerful small circle of fabulously wealthy business
elites,” comprised of those who by means of deceit and corruption gained access to formerly
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state-owned enterprises or, in Nashi’s words, “offshore aristocracy: people who, like the preRevolutionary nobility, earn income in Russia, but prefer to spend it and keep it in other
countries, mostly in offshore accounts.”106 Still these young “patriots” are not being anything but
deceitful about the nature of the regime they vowed to fearlessly protect.
As numerous critics of the Kremlin’s regime claim, providing at times fairly convincing
theories and evidence, modern Russia exemplifies a kind of “‘mafia’ system [a]s a merger of
bandits and the state.”107 Alexey Navalny, Russian oppositional leader and head of the Russiabased Anti-corruption Foundation (FBK), for instance, has published a number of chilling
investigative reports that document the close ties between Yuri Chaika, Russian Prosecutor
General and Putin’s closest ally, and the Tsapok gang, one of Russia’s most notorious criminal
gangs.108 Besides, Navalny on a regular basis unveils how Russian government officials and their
families routinely exploit their access to the state’s power and coffers to be able to amass
enormous wealth. Navalny is not the only to provide tangible proofs in support of an already
widely popular presumption that in Russia the political, business and organized crime interests
undoubtedly intersect. In May of 2016, following a decade-long investigation into the activities
of Russia’s largest gangs – the Tambov and the Malyshev crime families, suspected of murders,
extortion, money laundering, arms and drug trafficking on the territory of Spain – a Spanish
national court judge issued international arrest warrants for several high ranking Russian officials,
who allegedly belong to Putin’s circle.109 Later, in September, yet another corruption scandal
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broke out to reveal how far-reaching the state-run money-laundering infrastructure is in Russia.
According to the documents leaked from a Panama-based law firm, there are apparently
connections between $230 million that were stolen from the Russian treasury in a massive tax
fraud scheme, which involved Russian officials, the police, bankers and the Russian mafia, and
the funds received from an offshore company by cellist and Putin’s best friend Sergei
Roldugin.110
Unwilling to admit that Putin’s regime is the very system of “corrupt bureaucracy” and
“oligarchic capitalism [as] the privatization of the state by a bunch of moneybags and
bureaucrats,” which “casts the nation into criminal mayhem,” Nashi continues to see the
supposed vestiges of “the period of chaos and anarchy of the 1990s” in the present attempts of
the West to urge democratic changes in Russia, rather than in the politics of the Kremlin:
“[u]nder the pretense of external aid to democratization, ‘colorful revolutions’ have become an
instrument of competition; with the help of this instrument various oligarchic clans, however, do
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not promote democracy, but attempt to redistribute property and power.”111 In other words, proKremlin “anti-fascists” see aspirations for political liberalization in light of Russia’s unfortunate
transition to democracy; that is, a decade of economic and social devastation that the neoliberal
reforms, together with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, wrought on the Russians, is viewed as
a yearning for “the freedom to rob and kill.”112 As Nashi explains further, “[a]rmies of terrorists
were roaming the streets, and oligarchs…carved out their fortunes during the time when Putin
was not the head of Russia,” thus leading one to believe that a strong state power serves as a
deterrent to “oligarchic capitalism” and “guarantee[s] progress, freedom, and justice in
Russia.”113
Addressing the West and Russian liberal politicians, whom Nashi sarcastically calls
“freedom fighters,” group activists passionately declare that “[the former] will not like any leader
of the Russian state who does not betray its interests….[They] will [always] love Judahs and hate
apostles of a strong state,” like, for instance, “Stalin, who made our country a great power and
saved the world from fascism,” and Putin, who has fought successfully the “two ills that plague
Russia: terrorism and the force that wants to destroy the country from within,” pointing to
anybody, including Russian neo-fascist, non-Russian nationalist or separatist, as well as liberal
voices, who opposes the trajectory of the Kremlin’s regime (albeit for different reasons).114
Resorting to religiously inspired rhetoric, Nashi raises the strong state leader to the status of a
divine-like master, whose despotic power is considered to be proportional to his ability to save
Russia from a “colorful revolution” as “a geopolitical project of placing [the] country under
external control,” and thereby to preserve the supposedly authentic Russian national spirit of
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“liberal patriot[ism].”115 Previous attempts to bring Russia to submission – during the Second
World War and purportedly the transition period of 1990s – failed, giving Nashi’s confidence, as
well as remembrance ammunition, to counter modern “orange revolutions.”
As Nashi explains further:
The ideal of freedom presupposes the existence of the following universal human
aspirations: the aspiration for personal freedom and the aspiration for state
sovereignty. Until now these two freedoms were set against each other. Liberals
are ready to sacrifice the country’s independence for the sake of personal freedom.
Communists and fascists are eager to sacrifice personal freedom for the sake of a
glorious state. For us…[p]ersonal freedom and national sovereignty are the two
sides of the same coin. Therefore a strong independent Russian state is a
necessary condition of freedom, just as democracy and a market economy are its
fundamental prerequisites.116
While attempting to strike a balance between personal freedom and state sovereignty, Nashi,
however, demonstrates that “personal freedom [of citizens] in independent Russia” is always
secondary to and thus restricted by the interests of the state as defined by the Kremlin. 117 Nashi’s
interpretation of the meaning of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition period of the
1990s as the most recent traumatic moment in Russian history, together with the dramatic
experience of World War II, then exposes the critical gap between the paradigms of Western
liberal democracy, the values of which, according to Nashi, can only weaken Russia, and strong
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state leadership, which ensures the existence of “the democratic, lawful, functional federative
[Russian] state.”118
“Sincere patriots” contend that “[t]he idea of the right of nations to self-determination is
the result of Russia’s victory over fascism,” failing, however, to admit that the defeat of Nazism,
first of all, should have equally reaffirmed appreciation for human and civil rights and
freedoms.119 While continuing to insist that “[o]n the global scale this victory became an impulse
to the break-up of colonial empires and to the start the national liberation of dozens of countries
and nations,” as well as applauding the Soviet Union, which “was the first country in the world
to declare [in 1917] the principle of national self-determination as foundational of its politics,”
pro-Kremlin activists, however, stretch the truth.120 In contrast to the claims laid out in Nashi’s
“Manifesto” that Russia “between the 1980s and 1990s granted Eastern European nations that
had hosted Soviet troops since 1940s the right to decide their own destiny” and “on its own
accord united [East and West] Germany” in 1990, neither before the Second World War nor after
it Russia willingly parted with any of the nations that comprised the Russian Empire and the
Soviet Union or were within the Russia’s sphere of influence.121 The celebrated legacy of the
Great Victory then is not the legacy of cooperation among generally comic countries for the sake
of “peace, love and friendship,” of the world united in its rejection of an ultimate tragic force.122
Instead, it is the legacy of the post-World War II world divided into the Western and Soviet (and
now Russian) spheres of influence at the Yalta Conference in 1945. It is therefore not entirely
surprising that in the very same “Manifesto” Nashi both insists on the idea of sovereignty of a
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state and “the equality of rights of large and small nations,” and it believes that “within their
spheres of influence both [the USSR and the U.S.] without hesitation resorted to violence in
order to settle a conflict and stabilize a situation” as a normal foreign policy practice.123
In addition to the displayed hypocrisy, the apparent contradiction in Nashi’s national
fantasy, however, can be understood by directing attention once again to the notion of sobornost,
conceived and promoted as a defining feature of Russianness. Nashi’s idea of individual liberty
that is curiously blended into the concept of the collective is based on nothing other than the
religiously inspired vision of individual freedom voluntarily subordinated to the will of the
whole community. Said otherwise, the freedom of individual Russian citizens or neighboring
smaller nations is bound by the limits of the so-called Russian World. As such Nashi’s national
fantasy echoes Heinrich von Treitschke’s “hypothesis of the State as power, constrained to
maintain itself as such within and without, and of man’s highest, noblest destiny being cooperation in this duty,” and his claim that “the state is not to be judged by the standards which
apply to individuals, but by those which are set for it by its own nature and ultimate aims.”124 It
is peculiar that the Russian Orthodox notion of the harmonious reconciliation of the conflict
between the individual and the collective does not only dovetail von Treitschke’s neoMachiavellian political realism, but also sits well with a consideration of the national question
within the framework of Marxist political idealism.125 Just as Stalin advocated for “the complete
democratization of the country,” which he saw as an unfettered proliferation of ethnic national
interests only if they were not at variance with the programme of Social-Democracy in the Soviet
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Union, so Nashi as the self-defined democratic and anti-fascist youth group vouches to assert the
rights and freedoms of Russia’s citizens and neighbors, however, with an implicit caveat that
those liberties do not pose a threat to Russia’s sovereignty.
The startling agreement between the ideas of the country’s independence and what
amounts to be the conditional freedom of its citizens or neighbors then helps us to comprehend
how anybody who threatens the Kremlin’s regime and, by extension, Russia’s sovereignty is
considered to be adhering to a hostile and even “inhumane ideology,” as well as what the modern
Russian civil society moved by the traditional Russian “multiculturalism” truly looks like.126
While I save the consideration of what Nashi sees as the civic foundation of Russian national
identity and arguably a boisterous civil society for the next section, I must first discuss how
Russia’s adversaries come to be seen as “terrorists” and “fascists” sponsored and often controlled
by the West, which, as I demonstrated so far, is treated as the most ferocious and perfidious
national other.
Speaking of international terrorism, which for Nashi is most often associated with
separatist aspirations in the North Caucasus, the group insists that “large-scale terror came to
Russia together with the chaos and decay,” brought about by the Western-inspired democratic
reforms of the 1990s.127 Young “patriots” also point out that the West continues to brazenly
intervene in the internal politics of other countries in hopes of causing instability and benefit
from it:
The result of [the U.S.] victory [in Lybia] will be Gaddafi’s death or his
extrajudicial execution (while even Nazis were able to stand trial), the appearance
of a loyal leader, who is, however, neither talented nor charismatic, the takeover

126
127

“Saratov” n.pag.
“Nikolay Starikov” n.pag.

302

of oil wells, the long-term presence of [U.S.] military forces. Living standards
will drop, crime, insurgency and terrorism will flourish, without legal sources of
income the population will engage in either drug trafficking or serve the West’s
oil interests.128
While the U.S. and Western Europe, as the group admits, may not directly sponsor terrorist
activities, Nashi concludes that “[b]y criticizing [Russia’s] insufficiently delicate methods in its
fight with enemies, [Western countries] in effect have become the allies of international
terrorism.”129 Making a reference to the strong Western condemnation of Russia’s military
tactics in Chechnya, which involved indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas (and thus caused
heavy civilian casualties) and other war crimes, Nashi emphasizes that anybody who questions
Russia’s sovereignty and its right to defend it by any means necessary is as evil and barbarous as
the purported terrorists in Russia’s Caucasus.130 It is noteworthy, however, that while Nashi does
not see the Kremlin’s ruthless military tactics employed during both Chechen wars as
problematic, group activists nevertheless condemn the West for its supposed involvement in
extrajudicial actions in Libya and other countries.
Compared to its “anti-terrorist” rhetoric, Nashi has been much less straightforward in
connecting Western countries, most of which were the Allies fighting the Axis powers in the
Second World War, to their “fascist” politics. However, as a thorough analysis of Nashi’s
rhetoric reveals, for pro-Kremlin activists “the fight with fascism today is…the fight for the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of Russia.”131 More specifically, Nashi draws parallels
between “Hitler’s fascism as an attempt to exterminate or enslave whole nations” and the
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supposedly aggressive agenda of the U.S., as it is demonstrated in the country’s “claims for
exceptionalism and global leadership,” attempts to “augment [its] power over Russia,” to “make
[Russians] put up with the role of untermensch or subhumans in [their] own country,” to “[sneer]
at Russia, [to laugh] and [spit] at it from TV screens,” as well as in the West’s “thoughtless
[liberal] politics that offends the national dignity of Russian people.”132 Besides, as Nashi hints,
the U.S. was not even a genuine ally during the Second World War, since the latter “hope[d] to
hide out on the other shore,” using the Second World War for its own economic gain, and “only
on June 6, 1944, less than a year before the end of the war, the U.S. and the Great Britain opened
up a second front in Europe.”133
As I will demonstrate in more detail in the following section, Nashi sees Russia as an
uncontested contender for global leadership, and any doubt about that or what “sincere patriots”
regard as an attempt to “spread dismay, anxiety, and hatred of [their] own country” among
Russians is perceived as the attack that is not less alarming and vicious than a fascist or, for that
matter, terrorist act.134 Even “a fight with the memory of those who perished during the [Great
Patriotic] War,” which Nashi discerns in the decision of the Estonian government to relocate the
Bronze Soldier of Tallinn in 2007, and the demolition of another Soviet World War II memorial
in Georgia in 2009, is denounced as “fascism, an attempt to efface the feat of thousands of our
heroic compatriots from the memory of our nations” and to contest, as implied in Nashi’s
national fantasy, the post-War division of spheres of influence.135 In sum, all those who
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purportedly want to harm Russia whether by launching a military offensive, by denigrating
Russia’s achievements, questioning its role in the post-World War II world, disputing its
potential or simply criticizing the Kremlin, are decidedly characterized as terrorists and
“extremist[s]… of liberal and fascist ideology” or at best their allies.136
Having painted a picture of the ultimately tragic national other, Nashi, however, does not
see the U.S. as an intimidating opponent. In fact, in the eyes of Nashi activists, the U.S. is a
burlesque character. After all, what is a better way to discredit the enemy than to portray them as
weak, cowardly, half-witted and even deranged? First, as the youth group suggests, the U.S. is
overwhelmed by a wide range of internal problems: “The middle class in the U.S. has been
having the hardest time since the 1950s”; “the U.S. deals with a range of territorial disputes,”
including those with Mexico, Haiti, and “the history of the Alaska purchase is rather murky”;
“the U.S. has the record numbers of incarcerated”; the country cannot manage an influx of
migrant laborers; “[x]enophobia and racism are widespread in the U.S.”137 Second, similar to the
sentiment put forward by Russian neo-fascists, the youth group explains the economic and
technological advancement of the U.S. with the country’s unfathomably unfair luck or deceitful
politics. Thus, for instance, arguing that the Second World War did not happen on the U.S.
territory, Nashi activists reveal that the sacrifice of Russians was “the [true] cost of [American]
well-being.”138 Nashi activists also insist that “the technologies that the West passes over to
[Russia] are pernicious for the [latter], and the U.S. and Europe are not interested in Russia being
strong.”139 Everything that the U.S. exports to Russia is purportedly low grade, “be it fast food or
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much vaunted American democracy.”140 Finally, Americans arguably suffer from being ignorant
and overweight, or, as Nashi puts it in the manner that the American people have been
commonly described in Russia since the mid-1990s, “stupid and fat.”141
As the market-oriented reforms in the early 1990s drove Russia into a precarious
economic situation, the attitudes of hope for and fascination with the West that Russians adopted
with the collapse of the Soviet Union gave way to a generally growing suspicion of and hostility
toward the U.S. and Europe. Under the deteriorating economic circumstances, Russians were left
with nothing but to jeer at the supposedly half-witted nation, which, to the utmost astonishment
of the former, has been arguably enjoying itself to the fullest, as it is evident from Nashi’s
references to the West’s supposedly rampant materialism. Nashi’s then picked up on the already
prominent topic of the purported asininity of the American people. Treading in the steps of
popular Russian stand-up comedian Mikhail Zadornov, who made a fairly successful career of
his performance routines targeting supposedly absurd American everyday practices and obscure
U.S. laws, Nashi organized a public action, aiming to make Russians realize that “Russian laws
are worthy of respect,” especially in comparison with the U.S. laws: “In fact, instead of solving
its serious problems, America functions in accordance with very absurd and funny laws.”142 The
youth group also pokes fun at “awkward photograph[s]” and the “lower than average
intelligence” of George W. Bush, “the manners of power-wielding despot” John McCain, as well
as other U.S. and other Western European political leaders who “in attempts to reach their goals
go not only beyond the law, but also, in general, common sense.”143
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Without making any attempt to truly understand the psychological subtleties that drive
the behavior of the national other, which, as I mentioned in Chapter Three, is a characteristic
feature of the tragic burlesque, Nashi suggests that U.S. officials may even suffer from some
mental disorders. For example, when McCain passed a word of warning to Putin that “[t]he Arab
Spring is coming to a neighborhood near you,” Nashi organized a series of burlesque protests at
the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. They presented the U.S. politician with a huge lollipop so he
could “stop his mouth” with it, and explained McCain’s remarks as “the result of severe head
traumas suffered in Vietnam,” thus becoming a perfect prelude to Putin’s response that “Mr.
McCain was captured and they kept him not just in prison, but in a pit for several years. Anyone
[in his place] would go nuts.”144 By taking the appeal to ridicule as a fallacious tactic of
replacing logical argument with mockery of the opponent, which is native of the burlesque, even
further, the youth group also argues that “Senator McCain’s statements…demonstrate his state of
extreme arousal.” As a result, Nashi activists suggest that “the American politician follow the old
saying ‘Make love, not war” and promise that “if, due to his age, that does not work,…[to give]
him Viagra for his birthday.”
Аs the youth group concludes in a sweeping manner, “American hostility toward Russia
has acquired a paranoid character.”145 In reality, however, a burlesque tactic of interpreting the
actions of the national other in an overexaggerated and necessarily unflattering manner amplifies
a conspiratorial mode of thinking, or paranoid logic, that the tragic national subject so often
resorts to. By refusing to give the national other the benefit of the doubt, the tragically burlesque
national subject interprets every rhetorical event as an unequivocal proof of the national other’s
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inadequacy and inferiority: Nashi’s national enemy, for example, is depicted as powerless,
foolish, insane, impotent and, as I illustrate below, cowardly.
Before it is too late, Nashi “patriots” suggest American leaders come to their senses:
“The U.S. apparently is not scared of repeating the scenario of Hitler’s campaign. They probably
hope to hide out on the other shore, as they did during the two World Wars....With modern arms
the consequences will be even more horrible. Is the U.S. ready to account for its words?”146 As
the youth group immediately adds, only to emphasize the purported cowardice and snaky
cunning of the U.S., “[t]he U.S. was very careful to join the war [against Germany] only when it
was time to share the victory (and they ‘successfully’ shared it with us, and, as it turns out, it is
them who overcame fascism).”147 By dwarfing the supposed national enemy’s might and valor,
the youth group, however, does not intend to soften its resolutely tragic attitude toward the U.S.
in particular and the West in general as an inhumane war monger. The tragically marked
burlesque allows Nashi to rhetorically play down the ultimate national enemy’s ability, rather
than the intention, to harm Russia.
What the ultimate national other supposedly lacks in power, it compensates with a
considerable number of allies: the U.S. has purportedly recruited West-leaning governments of
former Soviet republics and a whole army of Russian liberal politicians and human rights
activists, who in a decisively tragic manner are called “paid provocateur[s],” “Judahs,” “public
enem[ies],” revengeful “Russophobes,” “who hail bandits and terrorists that killed Russian
soldiers in the Caucasus region as ‘heroes’, separatists who call for the disintegration of the
country and openly work for the American government,” and whom later in his key annual

146
147

“War Makes” n.pag.
“War Makes” n.pag.

308

speech Putin referred infamously to as “a fifth column” and “national traitors.”148 In the eyes of
pro-Putin “anti-fascists,” human rights activists and “[Russian] liberal politicians like Garry
Kasparov, Vladimir Ryzhkov, Boris Nemtsov are certainly neither fascists nor terrorists. But for
them the external control over Russia is progress, for us it is defeat. The problem of Russia’s
sovereignty is the main issue that divides us from liberals.”149 However, as the analysis of
Nashi’s national fantasy demonstrates, the group has many more reservations about Russian
liberal politicians than it has expressed in its Manifesto quoted above. The “radical” liberalism of
the latter allows Nashi to put Russian “pseudo-liberals” on par with right wing extremism or
terrorism.150 Thus, for, example, “sincere patriots” are outraged by veteran liberal politician
Boris Nemtsov’s list of “those who are responsible for stifling civil rights, liberties, and
Constitution,” calling it none other than a “hit list” of “those, against whom [liberals] plan to take
revenge as soon as they ruin Russia.”151 It is also noteworthy that the youth group dubs Nemtsov
a “False Dmitriy [who] deliberately spreads discord in the country.”152 By referring to the
historic figure of a Polish-backed impostor, who was the Tsar of Russia briefly during the Times
of Troubles, which ended with a popular and victorious Russian uprising against Polish invaders,
Nashi keeps drawing parallels between Russia’s past and present and warns Russian liberal
opposition of a similar fate.153
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By mocking all those whom Nashi also call “petty [criminals],” “little-known
politician[s]-provocateur[s],” “small and harmful [insects],” “endangered species,” “Rocinante
[Don Quixote’s horse] with broken legs and a torn-off tail,” liars, spenders and philanderers, the
youth groups aims not only to intimidate anybody who is critical of the Kremlin’s regime, but
also to discredit genuinely oppositional liberal voices in Russia.154 When, as Nashi “patriots”
recommend, the U.S takes their “freelancers” and “the State Department’s pet[s],” back to
America, then the “farce that has nothing to do with the real…expression of citizens’ will” will
give way to the true Russian civil society.155 What kind of civil society and political culture the
youth group offers in exchange for the Western model of liberal democracy and the values of
democratic civil society, which seem far too alien to Nashi “patriots,” is discussed in the next
section.
Nashi rightfully points to the ethically problematic alliance that existed between national
liberation movements in Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and the authorities of Nazi
Germany, thus emphasizing that modern Ukrainian and Baltic nationalisms have been
compromised by the memory of collaboration with the Nazis, as well as expresses legitimate
indignation at, for example, Latvia’s attempts to commemorate soldiers of the Latvian Legion,
which was a part of the Waffen-SS. Pro-Putin “patriots,” however, often take their accusations of
state fascism of Ukraine and the Baltic countries, which will purportedly result in “[b]ombings,
genocide, death camps,” too far.156 For example, Nashi decries the relocation of the Bronze
Soldier in Estonia, as well as other Soviet-era World War II memorials in former Soviet
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republics, calling it “not only illegal, but also a crime against the Russian people.”157 Russian
“patriots” also bemoan that “[t]he genocide of the Russian speaking population is happening in
Estonia,” and some other former Soviet republics, where “nationalists attempt to build an
ethnically homogenous state and want to assimilate representatives of other, non-titular nations,
which at fate’s whim happened to live in [those] countr[ies].”158 Finally, Nashi anti-fascists fret
about “reprisals” taken by the Estonian government on those who “defended us, defended peace,
defended the Bronze Soldier,” and the group’s activists who intended to participate in protests
against the relocation of the monument in Tallinn, but were “not let in Estonia on tourists
visas…[having been deemed] ‘a threat to Estonia’s national security’.”159 Indeed, the issue of
commemoration of SS soldiers and veterans in the Baltic region and less so in Ukraine is not to
be ignored. Similarly, according to the Amnesty International, in some former Soviet republics
“[p]eople belonging to a [Russian-speaking linguistic] minority enjoy very limited linguistic and
minority rights, and often find themselves de facto excluded from the labour market and
educational system.”160 At the same time, Nashi cannot legitimately except Ukraine, Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania to embrace the official Russian narrative of the World War II and instead of
denouncing the Soviet Union as an invader to view it as liberator. It is reasonable to assume that
in light of the history of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy towards the countries within its zone
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of interests, former Soviet republics would be less than eager to welcome hawkish activists on
the Kremlin’s payroll in their countries.161 Moreover, as the group suggests,
major geopolitical players, just like in the last century, understand that such
ideologies [like fascism] are an effective geopolitical weapon. Their cultivation in
a rivaling country and at its borders is a sure way to weaken an opponent. It is an
old proven technique. That is why Europe closes its eye to Baltic fascism, and at
the same time helps [fascism] develop also in Russia.162
Yet here, too, Nashi goes overboard by indulging in a conspiracy theory to explain the lack of
public concern for the aforementioned problems in the Baltics from Western governments
regardless of how regretful and disturbing the West’s reticence in this matter truly is.
Just like their “overseas overloads,” pro-Western politicians and governments of former
Soviet republics are “diagnosed” with various mental disorders. Following the relocation of the
Bronze Soldier, about 100 of Nashi “patriots,” dressed in white coats and armed with pills,
gathered at the Estonian Embassy to “[announce] of the detected mental disorder оf the
government of Estonia.”163 As Nashi continue, “[m]ajor symptoms of madness are, in particular,
the removal of monuments to the heroes of the Great Patriotic War, refusals of entry into a
country without any explanation, glorification of fascism, trials of veterans [of the Second World
War with security and police backgrounds].”164 Around the same time, Nashi also expressed its
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opinion on the decision of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko to run for a second
term by claiming that he lost “elementary brain functions.”165 Pointing to Yushchenko’s
extremely low five percent approval rating, the youth group came up with “three variants of the
diagnosis: either [Yushchenko] does not know that he has to have more than half of votes to win
the election (mental deficiency), or the digit zero seems to him to appear next to the digit five
(paranoia), or he stopped to perceive reality adequately (schizophrenia).”166 Overall, most
Westward leaning neighbors of Russia are portrayed as pitiful slaves to the ultimate national
enemy’s will.
An expressively tragic vision of the national other as a perpetrator presupposes a
tragically infused elegiac image of the national self. Yet, while Nashi “patriots” are certain that
“the messianic philosophy of the U.S. on the international arena” poses a real threat to Russia’s
sovereignty, they nevertheless do not consider “the situation …[as] nearly hopeless.”167
Compared to the tragic elegy of Russian neo-fascists that contributes to a flagrantly apocalyptic
idea of the world, Nashi’s plaint is then far more muted. Nashi’s elegiac fantasy-frame is not
typical in a sense that it does not “[spread] the disproportion between the weakness of the
[national] self and the magnitude of the situation.”168 On the contrary, speaking about the current
balance of forces in the world, the youth group points to “the ambiguity and instability of the
U.S. leadership position,” and agrees that “Russia cannot be defeated; neither Napoleon, nor
Hitler could do that, and the U.S. will not be able to do that either.”169 While Nashi adds that [i]f
Russia loses the [global] competition, it may perish as did the Roman Empire, the Byzantine
Empire, the Ottoman Empire,” the group here expresses not so much an apocalyptically driven
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view of the country’s future, but rather accentuates, in an admittedly ambitious manner, the
supposedly grand status of Russia, on par with the great empires of the past.170
Before I move into a discussion of the epic frame in Nashi’s psycho-rhetorical narrative, I
must point out that the powerlessness that Russia experienced in its recent history. It happened
when the USSR took the path of perestroika and glasnost and eventually dissolved, and later
when Russia was transitioning to a new type of political and economic system that, as many
Russians believe, failed them. As Nashi argues, besides “dismay, anxiety, and hatred of [Russia],”
the sense of “weakness…[was] inculcated in [Russians]…under the sweet songs of freedom,
perestroika and universal human values.”171 Thus Nashi attempts both to invalidate an authentic
expression of anguish that Soviet people felt over ignoble and intolerable life in their unjust and
immoral state and to amplify the overwhelming feeling of confusion over the failure of the
democratic reforms of the 1990s. This translated into the sweeping anger towards the national
other that by its very presence exposed what life in the Soviet Union truly looked like. Whereas,
as I noted earlier, pro-Putin activists acknowledge that the Soviet regime drove the country to
ruin, they see the problem primarily in its economic and technological delay, dismissing the
crucial role of political and civil liberties and freedoms in the betterment of society and the
nation as a whole. In sum, Nashi’s elegy, whose tragic nature I am yet to explain, is built around
the image of the strength and rightfulness of the national subject and the idea of the waning
power of the national enemy – the power that the latter more than makes up for in its
deceitfulness and depravity.
When one accepts suffering as inevitable, or, in other words, his/her own imperfectness,
mistakenness as intrinsic, elegy acquires comic value. However, when one views suffering or
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weakness as something that should not have happened in the first place, since the national self is
supposed to be perfect, elegy approximates Burke’s tragedy. Short of sincere humility, Nashi’s
elegy then is thoroughly tragic. Nashi insists that, as it happened during the Second World War,
Russia has been undeservingly attacked, and sees the “predatory” practices of the U.S. and its
“pugs” as “nothing but betrayal.”172 Speaking of the West’s supposed treachery, the group
accuses Russia’s “former allies” (as well as Japan as a former Axis Power) of “attempts to revise
the results of the [Second World War]” and “cut off our territories.” 173 Nashi, however, mourns
not the West’s pursuit to efface the memory of the joint anti-fascist fight, but the legacy of the
Yalta Agreement.
Unlike Putin, who in this matter, oddly enough, has been more straightforward in making
Russia’s grievances known to the West, Nashi’s narrative contains modest references to Russia’s
exasperation, specifically with the West’s purported infringement on the deal made at the
February 1945 Yalta Conference and other post-World War II treaties, including the July 1945
Potsdam Declaration and the September 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, as well as promises
received on the issue of NATO’s non-expansion eastward with the end of the Cold War, when
the problem of European security came once again to the forefront of discussions among global
leaders. A sensitive issue, for example, has been U.S. support of Japan in the territorial dispute
with Russia over the Kuril Islands, which arose in the aftermath of the Second World War. Being
seemingly more distressed by the U.S. taking the side of a former Axis country, rather than by
the very territorial claims, Nashi declares that the current U.S. position on the issue “cannot even
hold up from a legal standpoint and is a political speculation.”174 Besides, as Nashi continues,
“[the U.S.] betrays not only [Russia], but also its own citizens, who fought Japan in the Second
172
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World War….[The American and Russian] peoples stood by each other in the hour of need. But
now the U.S. government decided to betray the memory of the friendship that saved our nations
from death.”175
Similarly, the youth group sees treachery in the West’s attempts to interfere in political
processes, influence civil society and sway election results in Russia and other former Soviet
republics through, as Nashi claims, the West’s enthusiastic approval and support of supposedly
dangerous, fascist politicians and ideas, as well as “openly hostile regimes in former Soviet
republics,” and, finally, by “financing organizations that subvert the Russian regime.”176 Thus,
for example, complaining about British Ambassador Anthony Brenton’s participation in the
Other Russia forum – an event organized by a wide coalition of Putin’s opponents, including
liberal, far right and far left politicians, Nashi representatives cannot “imagine how a Russian
Ambassador in the U.S. gathers representatives of the Ku-Klux Klan, the Black Panther Party
and other radicals, promises to help them financially, and then asserts that he held a meeting with
representatives of American civil society.”177 Although Nashi rightfully questions the
willingness of some Russian liberal politicians to enter the opposition alliance with extreme
nationalists or even fascists, the youth group, however, jumps at a conclusion that the former, as
well as Western governments, share the very ideology of Russian right wing radicals. Further, in
concert with the Kremlin, the youth group accuses Russia’s only independent election
monitoring group Golos of acting on the instructions of their sponsors - “fanatics from the State
Department,” to discredit the results of Russia’s parliamentary elections and in this way stir up
anti-government protests.178 Dismissing the possibility of a genuine objection to electoral fraud
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in particular and the Kremlin’s politics in general, Nashi thus unfairly portrays any dissent in
Russia as foreign influence.179 This, in its turn, speaks loud about the nature of Nashi’s version
of civil society.
While accusing the West of betrayal, Nashi does not openly speak about it as the mere
unfaithfulness of Russia’s national others to what was essentially the cynical international postwar deal, similar to the secret protocols of the earlier Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Instead, the
relationship with the West is arguably mired by the latter’s brazen ingratitude:
Today many in the West try to rewrite history and belittle the role of Russia in
this war, to besmirch the Russian soldier, who liberated Europe from the yoke of
Hitler’s fascism, aimed to exterminate or enslave nations. But we are proud that
our grandfathers won. If it was not for them, the whole world today would be
living under the awful fascist dictatorship, and many nations would have been
exterminated. This is how a country proves its global leadership – by liquidating
the most dangerous threat for all of mankind.180
By assuming a high moral position, Nashi depicts Russia as a Jesus-like hero that willingly
sacrificed itself for the sake of national others’ freedom and well-being. This purportedly
happened during the Second World War, when, thanks to Russia, the U.S was supposedly able to
live peacefully and flourish. As Nashi demands in an injured voice, “Americans must know the
cost of their prosperity,” which is arguably tens of millions of lost lives of the Russian people
and the discernible interruption of Russia’s economic and technological progress.181 Further, in
the 1990s, “Russia in its own volition renounced Communism and withdrew from the territories
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under its control.”182 Nashi does not forget to emphasize that “[f]or Russia this decision turned
into a decade-long economic downfall, the break-up of the USSR, an increase in social disparity
and ethnic conflicts.”183 Moreover, during the Chechen Wars “ [Russian] officers…with blood
washed off [the] mistakes” of “those who speak so much about freedom and democracy.”184
Identification with the supreme power and authority of a great empire or a god-like hero
leads Nashi to adopt a far from humble attitude – a tragic epic fantasy-frame. By claiming that
“[t]he truth about the past must help [Russians] deal with new threats,” Nashi activists argue that
modern Russia remains to be the sole protector of true democracy and freedom.185 It becomes
obvious that Nashi uses the words anti-fascist and democratic as a as synonymous, or at least
closely related, ideas. Russia’s anti-fascist past, according to Nashi, predetermines its
purportedly democratic present and future. Nashi “patriots” believe that liberal democracy
cannot be measured by the “U.S. State Department ratings,” but presents itself as “the rights and
freedoms defended by [the] ancestors” of young Russians.186
The lack of humility is also discernible in Nashi’s satire, which endows the frame with a
tragic accent. While “[e]xpertness in satiric practice makes [comic] inventory almost possible,”
Nashi “patriots” fail to utilize the means of comically inspired satire to “exorcize [their] own
vanities by building a fire of other people’s vanities.”187 On the contrary, Nashi insists that most
Russians lack self-respect and pride, thereby “[tainting] the image of the ethnic Russians,
citizens of Russia.”188 Having dubbed the summer Work & Travel program, which allows college
students to experience U.S. culture while offsetting travel costs through work mainly in a
182
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hospitality business, Bend the Neck & Travel, young “patriots” advise Russian students “not go
to the U.S to ‘serve napkins to the masters’, to clean their toilets”:
It is not a secret that Russian students are lured to work in the U.S., having been
promised a good salary, accommodation, opportunities to travel all over America,
but nobody tells them that they can get deceived, or, as they say, ripped off.
Nobody warns them that they will be essentially slaving away all day long.189
Making disparaging statements with regard to the international exchange summer program,
Nashi goes further to emphasize that, by doing “dirty jobs” as dishwashers, valets, janitors and
waiters, Russian students of prestigious universities find themselves in place of migrant workers,
which pro-Kremlin activists consider demeaning. Under the slogan “Use your head, rather than
using your hands to clean American restrooms!” the group activists held a few events in Russian
cities urging Russian students “to respect themselves and their country first,” instead of
“wash[ing] dirty clogged toilets after stupid and fat Americans.”190
Rather than acknowledging the decades of the brazen unaccountability of and the
intolerable pressure from the government, which precipitated the undignified and humiliating life
in the Soviet Union and after its dissolution, Nashi activists attribute responsibility for the
widespread Russian self-loathing and self-doubt primarily to the West. While claiming, as
pointed out above, that Western countries, including the U.S., have persistently and deliberately
have been trying to weaken Russia even by instilling an inferiority complex into its citizens, in
truth it has been rather merely the presence of the ultimate national other as a preeminent power
and a country that boasts of higher living standards, that brought about an array of conflicting
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sentiments such as anger, resentment, envy, admiration and a yearning for recognition and
respect. Moreover, as Nashi insists, ordinary Russians are to blame too:
Who is guilty of the fact that [Russian] people are morons and do not understand
anything, that [Russian] people are absolutely weakwilled and perverted, that they
lost self-respect, and yet are eaten up by vanity and consumerism? Indeed, it is
Putin’s fault that we litter our forests...; that in [the world’s biggest supermarket
located in Moscow] shoppers dig in the rotten produce [on sale] just like pigs,
while the store’s owners regard them as such; that we lie all day long, lie to
ourselves, our loved ones, kids and parents. It is all Putin’s fault. If so, then Nashi
gives out free stickers “It is Putin’s fault.” Come by, take a dozen just in case. If
you decide to throw away an empty bottle in the forest, put a sticker on it, throw it
and just walk away. Putin will pick it up.191
Relieving Putin of any responsibility for Russia’s problems, which are brought about in no small
measure by corruption, lies, and contempt for the average Russian, which the Kremlin and local
authorities have been regularly accused of, the Kremlin-backed “anti-fascists” construct an
image of the supposedly non-lacking, authentic authority, which functions as the last and only
guarantor of identity for the obsessive subject.192 Stated differently, without a sufficient factual,
material foundation to ground modern Russia’s claims to global power and authority and to
affirm the Russians’ desire to take pride in their country, as well as to exact respect, first of all,
from their own government, the Russians invest affectively in the figure of the strong leader
whom the former believe or only pretend to believe.193
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Unlike the resolutely tragic motives that manifest themselves in a variety of fantasyframes – tragedy, epic, elegy, satire and the burlesque, the grotesque confusion is evident in
Nashi’s national fantasy. In the grotesque, which is often associated with “periods marked by
great confusion of the [socio-political and] cultural frame, requiring a radical shift in people’s
allegiance to symbols of authority,” one is undecided about how to deal with the enemy whether to reject it or accept it as it is.194 The incongruity gravitates towards tragedy, when one
perceives the other as a nuisance. On the other hands, when the grotesque is closer to comedy,
incongruity can actualize its potential to make one view the situation in a new light. Nashi
“patriots” resort to incongruity without laughter in order to deal with the traumatic loss of
authority over a traditional zone of Russian influence – countries of the Eastern Bloc, which,
according to Nashi, are supposed to remain devoted “younger siblings” of Russia, and for which
the latter is always “compel[ed]…to be responsible for.”195 Having rejected the pro-Western path
of development taken by many of those countries, Nashi’s Russia, however, is not willing to part
with those countries. The group explains it by saying hypocritically that “an immediate
geopolitical profit, expressed in the money and power of some private individuals, cannot be a
measure of the fate of the [nations], bound by thousands of years of history.”196 However, it is
enough to look at Russia’s policies, such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Yalta
agreement, and Russia’s aggressive actions towards its neighbors, including Russian military
intervention in, for example, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and, more recently,
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Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 to see that the country’s geopolitical concerns by far
outweigh the supposed fraternity of former Soviet republics.
Nashi’s rhetoric is an obvious reminder of the Soviet rhetoric of “the friendship of the
nations,” praising the ideological unity and cultural diversity of the Soviet Union while securing
the status of the ethnic Russians as a state-forming people. Rather than genuinely protecting
minority rights to cultural and religious identity, Nashi worries about keeping national minorities
in Russia and former Soviet republics loyal to the Russian government and subordinate to ethnic
Russians, thus reinforcing the image of Russia as a powerful empire. This brings Nashi’s
grotesque closer to a tragic kind, just like all other fantasy-frames, including tragedy, elegy, epic,
satire, the burlesque and the grotesque, within the group’s psycho-rhetorical narrative. A faint
promise of comic self-reflection with regard to Russia’s Soviet history reveals itself as a sham as
soon as the close textual reading of Nashi’s psycho-rhetorical narrative discerns the
disappointing, yet unsurprising indifference of the “democratic anti-fascist” group towards
equality and individual liberties, its preoccupation with the economic and technological
modernization of the country. Moving immediately into the next section, I seek to complete the
discussion of Nashi’s Russian idea, albeit this time by providing an insight into the group’s
national fantasy from another – symbolic, angle.

5.1.2 Nashi’s Competitive “Democracy”

The tragic worldview, which is easily identifiable in Nashi’s Russian idea, becomes even
more pronouncedly morose when the psycho-rhetorical narrative in question is evaluated along
its Symbolic dimension. The Kremlin’s “anti-fascists” contend that “[g]lobal progress involves
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the competition of nations....Those who are satisfied with what has been already achieved are left
behind and fade away in world history. This is actually the essence of democracy as a social
regime of competition in everything we do.”197 As the analysis unveils, despite some apparent
differences, Nashi’s national fantasy is as tragic as the psycho-rhetorical narrative of Russian
neo-fascists. The latter emphasizes conflict as a natural state of relationships among states and as
such is in line with the emphasis political realism places on power politics and geopolitical
considerations, and the former stresses competition under the circumstances of global anarchy,
which yet only in appearance approximates the principles of neoliberal institutionalism.198
Considering the fact that Russia’s “global leadership will always need to be shored up by an
efficient army, reliable and high technology weapons,” because “[t]he weak are disrespected,
beaten, and disregarded,” the country’s blatant disregard for the norms of international law and
what appears to be a hypocritical disdain for the role of international organizations, as well as the
unrestrained indulgence in geopolitics as justification for Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, one
may say that Russia is essentially guided by the cynical goal of self-preservation under the
disguise of free market-like, unfettered competition. 199
As Nashi further clarifies, “[n]ormal democracy is precisely the freedom of competition
[in economic and military might, and technological development], which is restricted neither by
the ideology of universal equality nor by the brute force of state or local criminal
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dictatorship.”200 Whereas Russia in appearance promotes principles of the rationally driven
competition among individuals states, which can potentially lead to international cooperation for
the mutual benefit of states, the national fantasy of youth group, however, presents a fairly bleak
picture of today’s world – not just hostile, but also ethically problematic. Although Nashi
activists “want citizens of other states to take Russia’s economic lead, want that their interests
encourage them to cooperate with Russia,” global competition is arguably “tough and sometimes
even cruel. The weak must accept the rules of the game set by the strong and stay in the wake of
the latter’s politics, get culturally assimilated. You are either a leader, or a follower, or a
victim.”201 As Russian “anti-fascists” add, “[the strong] call the shots. This is how they secure
their victory.”202 Here Nashi can be heard reminiscing about the bipolar Yalta world order, which
other countries had no choice but to accept. Such have been the spoils of Russia’s victory, which,
as “anti-fascists” lament, are now being challenged by the West, more specifically, the U.S.,
which has engaged in a “violent promotion” of the hegemony of oligarchic capitalism in the
modern world.203 Although Nashi makes a point to differentiate freedom and democracy as
competition, from the purported permissiveness and lawlessness of Western “oligarchic
capitalism…as an extension of animal world, where everybody fights everyone else, where,
unburdened by moral or legal considerations, the strong wins,” the former in practice looks much
like the latter. 204
It then leaves no shadow of a doubt that Kremlin-backed “patriots” promote an illiberal
variant of global competition that induces coercion rather than inviting cooperation, or rather
push for a global hierarchy of nations, despite calling themselves “liberal patriots” and claiming
200
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that big and small nations started to enjoy equal rights precisely as a result of Russia’s victory
over Nazi Germany.205 In other words, just like Russian neo-fascists, pro-Putin “anti-fascists”
see the world as a contest of distinct Master’s Discourses, which incorporates different systems
of values. This means that participants of unfettered global competition make appeals to
something other than universal rights and freedoms.206
As the analysis of the elegiac and epic frames of Nashi’s national fantasy demonstrates,
Russia purportedly is not willing to put up with the role of the follower or the victim. Living
under an arguably constant threat of assault and even annihilation from numerous national
others, Nashi is proud that Russia has never been the Slave to any Master. Just as in 1945, for
example, Russia prevailed - “liquidat[ed] the greatest threat to whole humankind and thereby
“assert[ed] its leadership in the world,” now the Russians are facing threats of a comparable
magnitude: international terrorism and renewed fascist sentiments, which have been sponsored
and manipulated by the U.S. as the contemporary global dictator, or, in Nashi’s words, “global
[hegemon].”207 Encouraged by the victorious memory of Russia’s fight with Nazi Germany,
Russia has arguably got what it takes – the mysterious objet a, to claim its leadership in the
world. In other words, as the agent of the Hysteric’s Discourse, Nashi’s Russia challenges the
Master, the power of which, as we have seen in the discussion of the burlesque frame in the
previous section, is lacking and thereby ludicrous.
Pro-Putin “patriots” are confident that “[they] can build Russia as [they] see it. And this
project can change the whole world for the better. Not everybody has this chance in life.”208
Russia’s claims to global leadership havе been arguably backed up with “facts” integrated into
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“The Modern Political Atlas” – a purportedly scientific project, which “guarantees precision and
reliability of the conclusions” about Russia’s role on the global arena.209 The “facts” that
transform the objet a qua secret, or truth, of Russia’s superiority, into something tangible, or
Real, as Nashi believes, are Russia’s rich natural resources and its possession of a Heartland “the most geographically advantageous launching ground to exercise control over the world.”210
At the same time, as it transpires from Nashi’s psycho-rhetorical narrative, “Russia’s
leadership is not to be understood [solely] as its military and political domination over other
countries and nations, but [also] as Russia’s global influence, founded on the base of the appeal
of Russian culture, mode of life, political, economic and social regime.”211 In other words, as
pro-Putin “anti-fascists” insist, the rule of global competition, however, hostile it may be, “must
have some support, must seem to be fair.”212 Global competition then is also posited as an
“ideological fight,” or “the fight for what can be considered just and unjust.”213
Russia’s major rival in an ideological global competition, as the analysis reveals, is the
Western paradigm of liberal democracy. In Nashi’s view, the latter is merely a form - an empty
structure, or an abstract model, which cannot be simply copied: “Each country, including Russia,
must look for its own path to renewal….We can count on the dignified future only if we are able
to connect universal principles of market economy and [liberal] democracy with Russia’s
reality.”214 While pointing out that “[n]ot just any politics can be pursued” in Russia, thus
emphasizing the ideological strength of the Russian idea, or the Russian national Master’s
Discourse, Nashi nevertheless refuses the same advantage to the Western project of liberal
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democracy.215 By doing so, as well as pointing out the purportedly inherent cynicism of the
West, the state-sponsored “anti-fascists” strategically mischaracterize the discourse of liberal
democracy, which, as a comic variant of the Discourse of the University, cannot be reduced to its
form. As such, Nashi’s national fantasy is perfectly aligned with the radically tragic attitude of
Russian neo-fascists.
Nashi further adds that “[t]he concept of justice has a historical character that has been
defined by the living conditions of people.”216 In Russia, freedom and justice have been
traditionally understood in relation to the concept of sobornost. This also determined what the
Russian ideas of civic nationalism and civil society, as they are interpreted by Nashi, now looks
like. Unlike Ukraine and the Baltic states, “which understand nation primarily in its ethnic
quality,” the Russians, according to the Kremlin-backed group, are a civic nation, although with
a certain reservation: “Russia is a state not only for ethnic Russians, but also for every nation that
is part of Russia. Concurrently, the ethnic Russians are the state-forming and largest nation of
Russia, that is why Russia’s destiny depends on what kind of position the ethnic Russians
adopt.”217 The stipulation, however, brings the Russian nationalist sentiment back to its Soviet
and Imperial roots, when Russia’s multiculturalism was welcome up to the point when political
demands of non-ethnic Russian nations and groups started to interfere with the interests of the
Russian state and the ethnic Russians. Indeed, such is the contemporary “[idea] of racial,
religious and cultural unity for the sake of our common Motherland – Russia. The fight with
fascism today is the a part of the fight for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Russia.”218
The characterization of practices of political expression of non-ethnic Russian sentiments as
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fascism dramatically circumscribes the space of freedom for anybody who does not belong to the
state-forming nation.
By noting that “cultural diversity is the treasure of society, and the task of the state and
civil society is to protect cultural diversity and support various cultures,” Nashi claims to do just
that.219 Just like the notion of sobornost as unity in diversity contributed to shaping the practice
of Russian multiculturalism, so does it designate Russian civil society as unity in plurality. Both
the narrative of multiculturalism and the narrative of civil participation is structured as the
discourse of the obsessive: Nashi activists only pretend to believe in the freedom of cultural and
political expression, and thus are able to protect the national self as from its very impossibility.
Instead, it wishes ethnic differences to be forced out of the political sphere, which could have
been, perhaps, welcomed if that did not leave ethnic Russians in the exact opposite – politically
privileged – position.220
Both the rhetoric of multiculturalism and civil participation is the rhetoric of mere
appearances, or the obsessive’s charade. The “flamboyant,” “creative, brave character” that
Nashi attributes to its activism, diverges radically from a creative, or poetic, spark that drives a
truly comic, politically significant protest.221 As Burke reminds us, “[a]ction involves character,
which involves choice; and the form of choice attains its perfection in the distinction between
Yes and No….Though the concept of sheer ‘motion’ is non-ethical, ‘action’ implies the ethical
(the human personality).”222 Since the group supports the Kremlin-approved set of ideas and thus
promotes the status quo, it is left with nothing but to imitate authentic civic particiation and antiestablishment character. For instance, donned in scrubs, several Nashi activists once joined the
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Dissenters’ March – a Russian oppositional protest, “in order to evaluate the state of mind of its
participants,” and were subsequently arrested.223 They “even managed to spend some time in a
cell,” only to get promptly released as soon as the police found out their affiliation. Carrying out
will of its Master, Putin-sponsored Nashi is also “fearless” enough to organize an unsanctioned
picket to demand the resignation of a police officer who fell out of favor with the Kremlin.224
Proud of their “brush” with the law, Nashi activists, however, “are not scared to express their
views and will continue to guard the interests of [their] country.”225
In addition to the task of “building of effective civil society,” Nashi also vouches to
nurture a generation of the new Russian “political, economic, and administrative elite”: “modern,
highly qualified, competitive, moral, patriotic, and united by the idea of serving their
Motherland.”226 In short, young “leaders” see the group as “the megaproject of [their] generation,
the megaproject ‘Russia’.”227 Taking into consideration the emphasis that Nashi places on the
tasks of Russia’s modernization and competitiveness, it is fair to say that what Nashi aspires to
create is no less than a unique Russian brand: “We want to improve the lives of people in Russia
so that people from other countries envy us, so that they aspire to live like we do. ‘To live like a
Russian’ must become hip.”228
It is then ironic that, as if in anticipation of Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria
Zakharova’s comments that the foreign policy of the U.S. bears resemblance to a reality show in
its purported overwhelming reliance on image-building tactics, rather than on facts, Nashi
decries the U.S. politics as “the endless American show”: “American politics, American
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elections with the budget of 5 billion dollars, McCain’s rating, global economic crisis – these are
all American ‘entertainment’ paid with the lives of thousands of people.”229 Pointing to “[the
atomic bombing in] Hiroshima, [U.S. involvement in military conflicts in Iraq,] South Ossetia,
‘color revolutions’ in former Soviet Union republics, [the breakup of] Yugoslavia, the Twin
Towers collapse,” the youth group urges Russians to “express their civic position regarding this
issue,” that is, to “say ‘no’ to the [senseless, inhumane] American show.”230 Thus, having
become a major Kremlin-sponsored PR project, Nashi, as the hysteric, speaks the language that it
hears the Other speak in order to beat the latter in its own game.
As the above discussion of Nashi’s national narrative shows, Nashi employs Burkean
tragedy and the tragic fantasy-frames of epic, elegy, satire, burlesque, and the grotesque. This
and the fact that Nashi’s rhetoric contains no trace of the Lacanian-Burkean tragicomic attitude
characterize Nashi’s national fantasy as politically dangerous and morally suspect. Russia is
depicted as being surrounded by enemies and always in danger. Nevertheless the Russians are
capable of escaping the impending universal disaster by sacrificing their enemies and embracing
their “true“ Russian self.
In addition to arguing that the imaginary dimension of Nashi’s psycho-rhetorical
narrative presents a politically dangerous and morally suspect way to renegotiate national
identity construction, my reading of the psycho-rhetorical narrative of Nashi also demonstrates
how the group’s narrative unfolds in the Symbolic. From its “democratic anti-fascist” position
Nashi attempts to reshape the dominant symbolic field organized by the nodal point of liberal
democracy, to rearticulate its meaning. More specifically, by drawing parallels between Russia’s
past and present enemies - Nazi Germany and Western countries as their modern “sympathizers,”
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Nashi “validates” tragic images of the national self and secures a symbolic position of the only
“true” defender of anti-fascist memory and democratic present time. This move allows Nashi to
present itself and the Kremlin as authentic democrats and thus determine, as a master signifier
would, the whole symbolic field of liberal democracy.

5.2

The Comic National Fantasy of Independent Anti-Fascists (Antifa) as the Agent of the
Analyst’s Discourse

The painful memory of the Soviet Union’s fight with fascism during World War II has
posed an obstacle and created an opportunity for Russian neo-fascists, such as the nationalist
movement Russkie, the Slavic Union, the Movement against Illegal Immigration, the Russian
Imperial Movement, and state-sponsored “anti-fascists,” such as Nashi, in their attempts to
renegotiate the meaning of Russianness. Terribly injured in the battle with Nazi Germany, the
Russians have developed an almost automatic adverse reaction to anything or anybody deemed
“fascist.” As a result, Russian neo-fascists scramble to dissociate themselves from the fascism of
Nazi Germany by declaring the latter to be a perversion of the “true” fascist ideology. Asserting
themselves as proponents of freedom of speech and defenders of the rights of the Russian people,
or, in other words, as “fair,” “democratic” fascists narrate their fantasy of the national self and
the national other through discourses of tragic mourning.
More precisely, Russian neo-fascists attempt to resolve the apparent grotesque disparity
between their own fascist actions and “democratic” intentions by resorting to the rhetoric of
apocalyptic elegy, paranoid tragedy and prophetic epic: the narrative of the nation on a special
mission, the success of which is undeservingly threatened by actual “fascists,” who therefore
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must be symbolically or physically destroyed. Unlike Russian neo-fascists, who had to reconcile
their fascist attitudes with popular memories of the Great Patriotic War, the pervasive revulsion
of the Russians against the fascism of Nazi Germany has made it easy for Nashi to push its
supposedly “anti-fascist” agenda. Self-proclaimed “anti-fascists,” however, did not venture to
counteract neo-fascist behavior (e.g., Nashi’s anti-fascist actions have been limited to mostly
inconsequential, activities, such as painting pink hearts and smilies over fascist graffiti). Instead,
Nashi’s “anti-fascist” vision of the Russian nation stands in uneasy proximity to the neo-fascist
image of the national self and the national other. Admittedly, Nashi exhibits slightly less tragic
behavior than neo-fascists. Yet it too, in order to realize its political agenda, exploits, albeit in
more subtle ways, the xenophobic and racist mood prevalent among many Russians today.
Reminiscent of the neo-fascist national narrative, Nashi’s fantasy is the tragedy of the
nation surrounded by numerous enemies who treat it unfairly and thus must be dealt with if
Russia is to return to its “predestined” course. Although for neo-fascists the major evil comes
from people of non-Russian ethnicity, and for Nashi the primary threat emanates from the West,
the national fantasies of neo-fascists and state-sponsored “anti-fascists” have much more in
common than not. The list of enemies, which both groups portray as “fake” democrats and “true”
fascists, significantly overlap. More important, the ways in which neo-fascists and pro-Putin
“anti-fascists” negotiate Russian national identity are far from the Lacanian-Burkean tragicomic
attitude, which, if achieved, would allow the national rhetoric of both groups to be more
politically sound and more morally acceptable.
Amid all of this tragic discourse, however, exists a third force: a constellation of
independent anti-fascist groups known as Antifa. This third force joins Russian neo-fascists and
state-sponsored “anti-fascists” to contest what it means to be Russian. Antifa, as a network of
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autonomous anti-fascist affinity-groups, resists “the politics of neo-Nazi political parties, but
also...individual racism,… totalitarianism, xenophobia, religious, national and gender
discrimination.”231 Besides, the most popular Antifa’s slogans include “Will to freedom is
stronger than prison! Say ‘No’ to political repressions,” “Antifascism is not a crime! Stop the
persecution of…antifascists,” “[Antifascist] Nikita Kalinin is murdered by neo-Nazis,” “Say
‘No’ to political assassinations!”, “Unite in the fight against ethnic nationalism and capitalism”
and, finally, “Russia is for everybody, except fascists!” as a response to a favorite slogan of neofascists “Russia is for ethnic Russians.”232 While Antifa members adhere to a diverse palette of
political views, such as “liberalism, Marxism, anarchism and other derivative ideologies,” they
are say united in their “opposition to reactionary, ultra-right and center-right ideologies, such as
national socialism, fascism, conservatism, neo-liberalism and others.”233
Just like the anti-fascist movement in Western Europe, which arose in the 1920s in
response to budding fascism and never culminated in the creation of a single party, but instead
has been represented by a number of brief collaborations among pronouncedly left-wing groups
(which have quite distinct views on a fascist threat), antifascism in Russia has not been much
more than “a monumental ambiguity” either.234 Speaking in more precise terms, Antifa in
modern Russia functions as Laclau’s empty signifier, that is, as a term that is able to enclose
(and, in effect, temporarily efface) a variety of particular meanings, such as anarchism,
communism, liberalism and so on, by way of setting them against the common exclusionary limit
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of fascism.235 In other words, the ideological differences that set groups with liberal and
diversely leftist views apart from each other do not matter much in the face of a fascist threat,
which unites the former in equivalent resentment toward the latter.
Such unity, however, is always precarious, since “the being or [identity] which is
represented through the empty signifiers is not a being which has not been actually realized, but
one which is constitutively unreachable…[as]the result…of the unstable compromise between
equivalence and difference.”236 To place Laclau’s words in the context of the present discussion
of antifascism, it is enough to state that the idea of resistance to fascism or the identity of the
antifascist can never be definitely connected to one, supposedly true meaning or essence. As a
result, on a more practical, immediate level, it is easy to notice that, similar to the antifascist
movement in Western Europe, Russian independent antifascism is burdened with the problem of
ideological discord: “What at first seemed a catch basin large enough to contain both the Marxist
Left and those dedicated to defending democratic values and civil liberties became a crowded
vessel that broke and sank under the pressure of the hidden agendas of its inhabitants.”237
Such ideological disarray becomes exceptionally palpable during an attempt to identify
Antifa’s specific adversaries. While Antifa’s Manifesto emphasizes the danger of any kind of
oppression and discrimination, that are intrinsic elements of fascist ideology, a close reading of
the narrative of independent anti-fascists reveals that not all of them share the same enemies.
This is the case with, for instance, anarchist skinheads, who make up Russia’s Red and Anarchist
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Skinheads (RASH) and Skinheads Against Racial Prejudice (SHARP) groups, the minority of
whom enthusiastically endorse Stalin’s role in the USSR’s victory over fascism and in the
promotion of the arguably liberatory potential of socialism, whereas others, as I will show below,
press for a far greater reflection on the Soviet past.238
It is even more peculiar, however, that on the very same social media public page (which
along with other antifascists articles, website pages and booklets amounts to a larger, albeit quite
dissonant, narrative), the minority of antifascists call to cherish the political legacy of the USSR,
claiming that “[e]thnic Russians have always respected the principles of collectivism, justice,
equality and freedom” and that the Soviet people, who comprised a multicultural and multiethnic
nation, were truly tolerant towards each other’s differences, and simultaneously parade their antiSemitic, homophobic, anti-Muslim and racist views.239 In addition, some independent antifascists
extend support to Putin’s military interposition in Ukraine, which began in the spring of 2014
with the armed conflict between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian government in
Eastern Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea. It is unsurprising then that these
views are complemented with a deep distrust of the West and pro-Western former Soviet
republics, just as with an open disregard of the “liberal law-bound system.”240
The majority of independent anti-fascists, however, aims to counteract the politics of
Putin’s authoritarian regime, “which exerts greater control over people’s lives, destroys the
environment and exacerbates the social and economic disparity” between the rich and the
poor.241 Unlike Nashi or neo-fascists, who are officially or unofficially tied to the Kremlin,
Antifa claims to be a loosely structured movement that “does not cooperate with any state bodies,
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political parties or repressive units,” and is not sponsored by any Russian or foreign
organization.242
While the Nashi movement is supported by Putin, and neo-fascists are mostly tolerated
by the state, independent radical anti-fascists are often prosecuted and denied a chance to voice
their discontent. Apparently, Antifa has become a common nuisance in Russia, both in the eyes
of the Russian public and the state. For instance, many Russians see both neo-fascists and true
anti-fascists as equally dangerous street hooligans who fisticuff with each other for “some
obscure ideas,” and state officials blame the radical and truly anti-fascist youth for provoking
ethnic disturbances.243 Antifa stands at an immense distance from their “anti-fascist”
counterparts in Nashi and their neo-fascist opponents, both in how they are treated by the state
and how they envision the national self and the national other. Before I turn to the analysis of the
latter, I must first offer a brief introduction to events that help to explain the way independent
radical anti-fascists claim their version of “Russianness.”
As mentioned earlier, National Unity Day on November 4 has become a momentous
occasion in the process of national identity renegotiation in modern Russia. Russian neo-fascists
did not hesitate to seize this opportunity to present their extreme ethnic nationalist ideas to the
wider Russian public. Envious of the success of the scandalous Russian Marches (Right
Marches), Nashi has made several attempts to hijack the brand of the Russian March. Nashi’s
endeavors to “redeem” the idea of the annual nationalist demonstrations, however, ended with its
members chanting the far-right slogan “Russia is for Russians.” Cognizant of the need for true
anti-fascist resistance long before the first Russian Marches of 2005, independent anti-fascists
also resorted to various measures, ranging from organizing educational and cultural events and

242
243

“Anti-Fascist Manifesto” n. pag.
“Activists Discussed” n. pag.

336

holding peaceful rallies, to shooting paint bombs into marching neo-fascists, drawing anti-fascist
graffiti, hanging anti-fascist and anti-government banners, hacking neo-fascist websites and
scuffling with neo-fascists.
Besides Antifa’s responses to the Russian Marches, independent anti-fascists frequently
participate in memorial events to honor and remember true anti-fascists murdered by neofascists. Among the most visible events have been the March Against Hatred, an annual rally
held around October 31 in memory of Nikolai Girenko (a murdered ethnologist and human rights
activist who served as an expert witness in trials against neo-fascists), the action of January 19 in
memory of Stanislav Markelov (another murdered human rights lawyer who worked on
numerous high-profile cases involving state authorities, military officials and neo-fascists) and
Anastasia Baburova (a murdered journalist whose work often covered activities of Russian neofascist groups), and rallies in memory of other murdered anti-fascist activists, such as Timur
Kacharava, Ivan Khutorskoi (aka Vanya Kostolom) and Fedor Filatov.
Sadly, for the last decade assaults on Antifa activists have become the norm: for true antifascists “any event is like a military action,” “a real war of extermination - with explosives,
snipers, car chases etc.”244 Antifa’s own violent behavior is not, however, solely a defensive
reaction to neo-fascist aggression. Some independent radical anti-fascists, known as “militant
Antifa,” see violence against neo-fascists as the main means by which to “educate” the latter.
Among the most questionable actions of the militant Antifa group have been assaults on peaceful
neo-fascist rallies and concerts, as well as the attacks on the office of the pro-Kremlin youth
organization Young Russia and the office of the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda. In
November 2009, militant anti-fascists reportedly entered the Young Russia office, ignited flares
and assaulted Young Russia activists as a retaliation against Young Russia’s leader, State Duma
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deputy Maksim Mischenko, who maintains close ties with the ultra-right organization Russian
Image (one of the founders of Russian Image, Nikita Tikhonov, together with his wife Evgeniya
Khasis, was found guilty in the double murder of Markelov and Baburova). A month later, they
crashed into the Komsomolskaya Pravda office with smoke flares and fire crackers to protest
against its journalist Dmitrii Steshin, a self-acknowledged ethnic nationalist, a friend of Tikhnov
and Khasis, and a defense witness in the Tikhnov and Khasis’s trial.
The aggressive behavior of anti-fascists does not seem to separate militant Antifa groups
either from Nashi or, as some independent anti-fascists acknowledge, violent neo-fascists: “today
it is difficult to distinguish between anti-fascists and neo-Nazis: slang, clothes style, hobbies,
unreasonable violence are totally identical. All these are a sign of a complete degeneration of the
anti-fascist movement.”245 Besides, the actions of militant anti-fascists, admittedly criticized
within the Antifa circle, seem to have sometimes escalated the war between neo-fascists and antifascists and provoked further acts of neo-Nazi terrorism. Recently, however, street fights have
been reported less frequently. The reason, as Galina Kozhevnikova from the SOVA Center
explains, is that, disillusioned with the inefficiency of the anti-fascist action on the part of the
state and consequently seeing itself as a lonely force in the partisan street fight with Russian neofascists, Antifa is simply reluctant to disclose its combat losses.246 The situation is exacerbated by
Antifa’s ideological distrust of the government, on the one hand, and the heightened, albeit
mostly undue, attention of law-enforcement agencies to independent radical anti-fascists, on the
other. Under these circumstances, Antifa opposes itself to neo-fascists and the state, which,
according to independent radical anti-fascists, is an ally of the former.
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Indeed, Antifa has good reasons to be skeptical of anti-fascist measures taken by law
enforcement and state authorities. Often the police refrain from protecting the audience of true
anti-fascist music events against neo-fascists. Even more frequently law enforcement officers
refuse to file hate crime charges against neo-fascists. The discriminatory treatment of the
independent anti-fascist movement by the state is also revealed when true anti-fascists seek
permission for public gatherings. More often than not, independent anti-fascists are denied
opportunities to hold rallies, and when unsanctioned mass meetings do happen the police usually
crack down on them promptly and severely. In contrast, for instance, despite the aggressive
behavior of participants in the Manezh Square rally toward non-Slavic passersby, the police
made almost no arrests to avoid “provoking more serious incidents” (sixty-five detainees were
subsequently released, while as many as forty people were injured in the racist attacks on
December 11, 2010).247 Moreover, the captain of the Moscow Special Purpose Mobile Unit
(OMON) and the chief of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate came to the square to persuade
protesters to disperse by promising to find those guilty of soccer fan Sviridov’s murder (as I
briefly mentioned in Chapter Three, he was allegedly killed by people from the Caucasus).248
The government’s half-hearted efforts in dealing with the violent racist mob are difficult to
comprehend, especially compared to the prompt and violent police responses to peaceful public
actions organized by political oppositional groups (known as Dissenters’ Marches and Strategy31) and independent anti-fascists.249
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The prejudicial attitude of the state toward Antifa has also manifested itself in cases of
wrongfully prosecuted anti-fascists, including Aleksei Olesivnov (aka Shkobar), the “Khimki
hostages” Alexei Gaskarov and Maxim Solopov, and Nizhny Novgorod anti-fascists Albert
Hainutdinov, Artem Bystrov, Pavel Krivinosov, Dmitrii Kolesov and Oleg Himbaruk. Olesinov
was arrested in 2008 for allegedly starting a brawl at the night club “Cult,” and after more than
six months in jail he was found guilty of disorderly conduct and sentenced to one year in a penal
colony.250 Many are certain that Olesinov’s case was fabricated, since neither the club
administration nor guests pressed charges. According to the initial indictment, “[Olesinov]
committed an act of disorderly conduct, which shows his obvious disrespect for society.” The
prosecution also mentioned that “[Olesinov] is a leader of the informal youth movement Antifa,
whose goal is … [the destabilization of] normal functions of society.”251 Olesinov’s defense
lawyer Markelov, Antifa and human rights activists noted repeatedly that Olesinov was tried for
being an anti-fascist and that his case was the most severely handled case of disorderly conduct
in the history of Russian law. Several years later, Olesinov was again taken into custody in
relation to a brawl with the security at Moscow’s night club “Air.” Just as the first time, the facts
contradicted the charges, thus exposing the political nature of both legal actions.
Others judged for their anti-fascist views, Gaskarov and Solopov, were apprehended by
law enforcement officers for allegedly instigating an attack on Khimki’s City Hall. Gaskarov and
Solopov denied their involvement in the rally on July 29, 2010, when around 500 anti-fascists
and anarchists with the slogans “Free the forest from fascist occupation 1941-2010” and “Defend
the Russian forest!” surrounded the Khimki City Hall building, painted on the walls, broke down
a door and smashed several windows in protest against the construction of a new highway
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through Khimki Forest.252 The anti-fascist action occurred several days after the Khimki forest
defenders (who set up a protest camp in the forest) had been assaulted reportedly by a group of
neo-fascist soccer fans. In an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda, Aleksandr Semchenko, the
director of the company in charge of cutting down the forest, acknowledged the company’s
involvement in the crackdown on the Khimki forest defenders’ camp, but clarified that the camp
attackers were not ultra-right soccer fans but security guards hired by Semchenko to provoke
forest defenders.253
The inaction of the police, who instead of protecting the protesters arrested them, and the
lack of progress in the case of Mikhail Semchenko, a prominent defender of the Khimki forest
and the editor of the Khimki Truth, who was severely beaten and as a result remained
permanently disabled, as some anti-fascists insist, led to the disturbances at the Khimki City
Hall. A month later the “Khimkgate” culminated in an oppositional mass rally-concert in
Moscow, which gathered more than 3,000 people to protest the building of the highway.254 What
began as an environmental action later transformed into an anti-government revolt with Khimki
forest as a metaphor for the country’s suffering under Putin’s “repressive and lawless regime.”
While Gaskarov and Solopov had not been caught red-handed on the site of the Khimki
City Hall pogrom, and in spite of the absence of compelling evidence, the anti-fascists were
nevertheless arrested and questioned. The police failed to find the real organizers of the attack on
the Khimki City hall and therefore, as Antifa explains, took the most publicly visible anti-fascists
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hostage.255 It is worth pointing out that Gaskarov and Solopov were apprehended not by regular
police officers but by officers of Center E - a unit to combat extremism, created in 2008 to
replace the Bureau for Combating Organized Crime (UBOP).256 According to Center E officers,
“youngsters went overboard, having directly challenged the authorities. A task was given to
bring them down harshly, that is why nobody will be molly-coddling them.”257 Soon it became
clear that new anti-extremist methods did not apply to Antifa exclusively: police officers also
promised to deal with journalists -”extremist sympathizers” - who were allegedly aware of the
upcoming Khimki City Hall rally but did not report it to the police.258
The most recent operation carried out by Center E (often compared to the oprichnina, or
the secret police of Ivan the Terrible) has been an arrest of anti-fascists in Nizhny Novgorod.
Suspected of being members of Antifa-R.A.S.H (Red and Anarchist Skinheads), Hainutdinov,
Bystrov, Krivinosov, Kolesov and Himbaruk were accused of promoting hatred toward neofascist skinheads, soccer fans and “well-to-do citizens,” and assaulting neo-fascists.259 The antifascists, however, by drawing attention to apparent inconsistencies in the case (for instance, the
Antifa-R.A.S.H identification cards reputedly planted by police officers were misspelled and
incorrectly stood for “Red anarchic skinheads“) claimed that the case was fabricated and they
were political prisoners. Yet, numerous challenges to the improper questioning and search
procedures which, just as in the Khimki case, resulted in emotional and psychical intimidation,

255

“They Promised to Press Everyone,” n. pag.; “Egor Skovoroda,” n. pag.
See “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Some Questions Regarding the Ministry of
Internal Affairs,” n. pag.; “Center E Begins Its Work with Lies,” n. pag.; Smirnov, n. pag.; Skovoroda, n. pag.
257
“Investigation without Mollycoddling,” n. pag. Also see Trofonov and Tiazhlov, n. pag.; Kashin, n.
pag.; Nikulin and Razmakhin, n. pag.; Gorbanevsky, n. pag.; “Legal Proceedings Were Taken with Regard to the
Attack on Khimki’s City Hall,” n. pag.; Chernykh, et al., n. pag.; “Defenders of the Forest Knocked Out the
Administration,” n. pag.; Klimova, n. pag.
258
“Investigation without Mollycoddling,” n. pag.
259
“Do Not Consider Extremism,” n. pag. See “Antifa-Rash Case,” n. pag.; “Nizhny Extremists,” n. pag;
“Nizhny Novgorod Antifa-Rash Members,” n. pag.
256

342

have been explained by law enforcement authorities as the excessive enthusiasm of a small
handful of police officers.260
Under the circumstances, when “Putin turned out to be the main [ethnic] nationalist, and
the new regime established a monopoly on [ethnic] nationalism,” independent anti-fascists set
themselves first and foremost against “the police state” and only then against neo-fascists.261 The
old slogan of the anti-fascist struggle, “fascists kill, the state covers,” however, does not seem to
reflect the new state of affairs. Unable to maintain its political urgency, the Russian neo-fascist
movement, according to Antifa, has lost its ideological identity: “extreme nationalists [have]
nothing more to add to the state rhetoric of...great power chauvinism and anti-Westernism.”262
As independent anti-fascists argue, fascism has become “an element of the Kremlin’s puppeteer
politics, needed for various provocations and show campaigns,” and neo-fascists have become
the Kremlin’s puppets.263
The alleged anti-establishment character of the ultra-right, according to Antifa, has
proved to be a myth. The ultimate goal of Russian neo-fascists, just like the official Russian
Orthodox Church for that matter, in Antifa’s view, has always been to become a part of the
state’s power: “they dream about... crowds of people who, overcome with hate and reverence,
blindly follow them.”264 Notwithstanding their professed hatred of Putin’s “Russophobe” regime
and contempt for the “apolitical” Russian liberal opposition, as Antifa points out, Russian neofascists are ready to join forces with state authorities, as, for example, happened in the assault on
the Khimki environmental camp, or when they rallied alongside the liberal opposition to protest
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Russia’s new anti-extremist legislation, which limits neo-fascists in their attempts to foment
hatred among Russians and other ethnicities. As independent anti-fascists astutely conclude,
support for “the [state] politics of fear, inequality, violence, hatred and exclusivity” has united
neo-fascists and state-sponsored “anti-fascists.”265 Conversely, independent anti-fascists see their
activity as the “the antithesis of all hierarchies, an antithesis of everything that Nazism and
capitalism are, an antithesis of any commands.”266
One may note that Antifa’s rhetoric of the national other, at first glance, does not seem to
differ much from the paranoid tragedies of Russian neo-fascists and Nashi: hemmed in by its
foes, independent anti-fascists counter the fascist threat with violence. For Antifa, this threat
emanates from Putin’s “police state,” its loyal “regime dogs” (Center E and Nashi), state-favored
neo-fascists, as well as “toothless,” hypocritical liberal politicians with their neo-liberal version
of a democratic regime, while “true democracy” and freedom are the foundation of the antifascist worldview.267 Similarly, both the neo-fascist movement and the state-sponsored “antifascist” youth organization claim to safeguard “genuine democracy” and challenge “beastly
fascism.” A more thorough reading of Antifa’s psycho-rhetorical narrative of the nation,
however, offers a totally different insight.
As distinguished from the tragic national rhetoric of neo-fascists and pro-Kremlin “antifascists,” the national fantasy of independent anti-fascists appears to advance a LacanianBurkean tragicomic view of the national self and the national other. Independent anti-fascists do
not rely, as neo-fascists and Nashi do, on the necessity of symbolically or physically killing the
national enemy, who presumably threatens the national self. Instead Antifa activists promote the
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ideals of racial, ethnic, religious, economic and political equality. Anti-fascists see their national
others as those who must be forgiven and educated in how to responsibly construct a national
identity that does not function at the expense of the national other.
Antifa sees the modern anti-fascist movement as a successor to the tradition of selfdefense brigades formed at the beginning of the twentieth century in response to the extremist
actions of the semi-fascist Black Hundred. While, warranted by frequent neo-fascists’ attacks on
Antifa activists in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, brutal force has been a part of anti-fascist
action, most Russian anti-fascists draw a line between anti-fascist struggle and the killing of
political opponents: “our aim is not to annihilate people....If people suffer as a result of our direct
action, it is...an accident. If one is ready to kill because of somebody’s uniform...he or she does
not differ much from Nazis, who are eager to kill because of somebody’s skin color, eye shape or
hair structure.”268 As a loosely structured network of anti-fascist affinity-groups, driven by
various left-wing ideologies, Antifa acknowledges the precarious status of physical force as a
tool to fight fascism and emphasizes the exclusively defensive use of violence: “We started to
fight only because they started to murder us.”269
From time to time, as anti-fascists admit, certain groups, just as it happened at the Khimki
City Hall, get absorbed by playing “the fascinating role of Rambo: corrupted bandits, Nazi
raiders - what can be more impressive, more beautiful?”270 The romantic image of the street fight
with neo-fascists, most anti-fascists lament, often overpowers “the constructive and politically
grounded [principle of anti-fascist] actions,” thus turning Antifa into “a criminal subculture,
members of which seek an adrenaline rush in the streets of our cities.”271 Admitting that
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“violence has more often overpowered reason,” anti-fascists warn their misguided fellow antifascists about the danger of slipping into a neo-fascist version of activism.272 Instead, when
possible, anti-fascists advocate the power of an argument: “It is better to smack a fifteen-year old
in his face; however, it is easier to persuade an adult, he will listen to you at least....I see that
many people seriously believe that Russia is for Russians and that patriotism is cool. And I argue
with them.”273 For anti-fascists, however, “it is impossible to rely on agitation, pamphlets and
other similar methods” when dealing with neo-fascists who systematically resort to and promote
violence.274
Self-reflective about the erroneous blind fanatism and radicalism of some Antifa groups,
as a feature of a comic attitude to the national self, independent anti-fascists emphasize that those
who enjoy fantasies of ethnic exclusivity are not absolutely evil, but mistaken fools, “poor
things” who fall for the empty promises of “crypto-religious” fascist fantasies: “It is not migrants
or ‘outlanders’ who threaten the mythical ‘native majority,’ but the ultra-right minority who
threatens diverse populations living within a particular geographic area. The problem has nothing
to do with the Russian question, but with corruption and a society that allows one to pressure,
exploit and silence others notwithstanding their nationality and religion.”275 Fascism as a
compensatory mechanism offers to resolve social tensions by finding the roots of those problems
in “an easy, familiar, and, more importantly, vulnerable figure of the [national] enemy.”276 The
lesson, as some anti-fascists see it, is precisely the one that we learn by adopting a LacanianBurkean tragicomic view of the nation: the national enemy is no more than a symbolic
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embodiment of underlying social antagonisms. “Do not look for a black cat in a dark room, do
not create your own enemy....think for yourself.”277
By stressing how fascist ideology artificially creates an image of the enemy by covering
over the real reasons for social disparities, Antifa urges Russians to recognize that fascism is
lurking in themselves. The failure of the Soviet system brought about an ideological vacuum:
“consumer values, on the one hand, monstrous poverty, on the other [led] the youth to answer the
question ‘who is guilty?’ in the most primitive, brutish way: ‘intruders,’ those who are not from
our pack, are guilty.”278 The state, as Antifa insists, is accountable for this “chaos in people’s
heads,” since it left people indifferent and susceptible to “the ideology of hatred and terror:”
“[the current regime] benefits from the cattle-like behavior of the people; the less they think, the
better they vote....90 % of the youth dream about a nice position in a state corporation, 10%
about a nationalistic revolution.”279
It may seem that Antifa places responsibility for the xenophobic and racist views of most
people on the state and the leaders of neo-fascist groups, who dupe Russians into believing
mythical stories about enemies of the Russian nation. While this in part is certainly true,
independent anti-fascists also call on all Russians to accept their own role in promoting
discriminatory values and practices. One must remember that “fascism exists among us. It hides
in thoughts, feelings and ideas, which force us...to aspire for that which enslaves and exploits
us....In the disguise of conservative values, fascism offers to magically exorcise the feelings of
fear and anxiety which are natural emotions in a modern fickle world.”280 Having recognized that
one’s nationality has nothing to do with social problems, Russians, according to Antifa, must
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perform a thorough inventory of their own fears and aspirations, their “inferiority complex and
imperial ambitions.”281
Antifa invites the Russians to revise the century-long dilemma of whether Russia’s proper
place is in the West or in the East: “the desire to see [Russia] by all means among ‘developed
European countries,’” as anti-fascists insist, proves to be rather detrimental. Without denying the
necessity to maintain strong ties with Europe, anti-fascists underscore that the old imperial and
then Soviet urge to “catch up with and surpass the West” brings out the worst in the Russians the simultaneous feeling of inferiority to the economically developed West and superiority over
arguably primitive and backward countries and peoples of the East.282 This tension between selfhatred and self-aggrandizement, in Antifa’s view, is bound to engender racism and other
discriminatory attitudes: “Whereas harboring a feeling of social supremacy over ‘the ravshans
and the djumshuts,’ locals understand the instability of this superiority. And inasmuch they fear
to lose their jobs, they do not have any successful experience in collective action, their lack of
faith in themselves prevents them from speaking out against their employers, and they channel
anger against those who are even more oppressed and powerless.”283 “We are all Tajiks,”
concludes anti-fascists, “in the sense that lawlessness and humiliation do not have a nationality.
They are state tools used against each and every one of us.”284 For Antifa, Russian society will
have fascist tendencies as long as people are divided into various - better or worse - categories.
Having destabilized an image of the national other as an evil enemy who needs to be
destroyed, and fighting instead for equality among people of various ethnic backgrounds,
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Antifa’s position, nevertheless, is not of passive tolerance but active outrage. The only adequate
answer to all those who stand for discrimination, defend the presumed superiority of certain
ethnicities over other nations, and consider violence to be a norm, is to “get rid of [neo-fascists]
once and for all,” be that via a symbolic or physical purification: “violence is one of the methods,
but not a primary one; naturally we must use brute force only against those who deserve it.”285
This anti-fascist stance, however, does not equal the tragic fantasy-frame so eagerly adopted by
Russian neo-fascists and Nashi, for whom the national other is always a menacing, abstract,
mythical enemy. Antifa’s view is that of the comic agon, when the national other is perceived as
a necessary adversary, who, however, when crossing a healthy distance between the self and the
other, must be stopped.
Such an attitude places independent anti-fascists at the very threshold of Lacan’s tragedy
of the national self and Burke’s attitude of the comic agon: they proceed, first, by articulating the
way in which the national self fantasmatically constitutes itself at the expense of the national
other and, second, by assuming responsibility for their national fantasies. Antifa urges everyone
not to stop at the realization that the national other is anything but the evil enemy, but to carry on
resisting fascism. The total passivity of modern Russian society is “[the] most dangerous thing:
when you see a swastika, marching young fascists, think who let it happen. To be silent is to
agree.”286
The “notorious” liberal politics of multiculturalism and tolerance, in Antifa’s words, is
not helpful either: “it merely shows us the world through pink glasses without giving answers to
real questions.”287 Thus, for example, Russian liberal politicians manifest their supposed
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tolerance by arguing that migrant workers benefit the country, since most Russians refuse any
dirty, low-paid jobs. Forms of western liberal tolerance that have spread over modern Russia are,
according to Antifa, the same as xenophobic nationalism and “cultural apartheid: “[this] politics
aims to prevent outsiders from assimilating into Western society by encouraging cultural
backwardness in the form of ‘national traditions’ and ‘uniqueness,’ thus condemning them to a
life as outcasts, unqualified workers....”288
Moreover, as anti-fascists argue, the logic of neo-liberal democracy - when the will of the
majority and economic liberalism are sold as one package - is the logic of discrimination,
imperialism, militarism and eventually fascism: “while there is the state and capitalism, while
there is social inequality and alienation, fascism cannot be overcome.”289 Real democracy,
understood by anti-fascists as a left-anarchist project, is founded on the idea of freedom: “the
anti-fascist struggle is inseparable from the fight for real democracy, for the right to vote for all
those who are stripped of this right, for the right to participate in the political life of the country
for all those who now lack this opportunity.”290 Disagreeing with neo-liberal politics, for
example the politics of the neo-liberal reforms in the 1990s, which “did not differ much from the
politics of Nazi Germany,” Antifa’s position is based on the purportedly natural human desire to
be free, which is possible only when all others can enjoy freedom to the same extent.291 At the
same time independent anti-fascists, however, deny neo-fascists the right to voice their hatred:
“when fascists freely express their opinions, all others are silenced.”292
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Anti-fascism, Antifa members claim, is the normal reaction of reasonable citizens to
hatred and discrimination: “today anti-fascism is a process of social hygiene....To be an antifascist is the norm, and not an extraordinary civil position.”293 Unlike state-sponsored “antifascists” who insist on an almost automatic revulsion of Russians toward fascism, independent
anti-fascists emphasize that the memory of the Soviet fight with Nazi Germany, on the contrary,
prevents many Russians from identifying manifestations of fascism in modern Russia: “How can
we speak about the victory over fascism if we keep mum about Stalin’s ethnic nationalism and
his collaboration with Franco? We did not overcome fascism, that is why it is still here....We
must remember about not only those terrible years, when Hitler terrorized all of Europe, but also
about the cruel and inhumane actions of the Soviet Union.”294 The Soviet legacy of the country’s
fight with Nazi Germany, when the latter was positioned as “just another military enemy,”
without emphasizing why one must really fight fascism as an ideology of hatred, ironically left
contemporary Russians susceptible to fascism and hostile to any abstract, mythologized enemy
there is.295
As this reading of Antifa’s national fantasy demonstrates, similar to the narratives of
Russian neo-fascists and Nashi, true Russian anti-fascists attempt to reshape the dominant
symbolic field of liberal democracy. For Antifa the prevalent global regime is regulated primarily
by neo-liberal, economic considerations, which is a stranger to the ideals of true anti-fascism.
However, unlike Russian neo-fascists and their pseudo “anti-fascist” counterparts Nashi,
independent anti-fascists do not advocate for destructive interests under the guise of authentic
democracy. Antifa finds itself on the brink of Lacan’s tragedy. Having assumed responsibility for
their, at times questionable, modes of enjoyment and embodying Burke’s attitude of the comic
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agon, they engage in perpetual struggle with those who prohibit others from enjoying their
healthy national fantasies. Moreover, the very form of this loosely organized movement, which
constantly demands negotiation of ideals and emphasizes the absence of ultimate closure,
corresponds to the structure of the Analyst’s Discourse. As such, the idea of the national self
negotiated by Antifa in a variety of distinct voices, if only for a brief moment, precipitates in
distinct master signifiers.

5.3

Vladimir Putin’s Russian Idea as a Tragic Response to Actual and Perceived Fascism

So far I have discussed how the pro-Putin “anti-fascist” movement Nashi, neo-fascists
and the anti-fascist movement Antifa negotiate the objet a qua essence of Russianness, which
revolves around the usage of the word fascism. The three distinct psycho-rhetorical narratives are
read symptomatically - on the level of the Imaginary, or conscious fantasies which the parties
maintain about the national self and others. While the national visions of neo-fascists and Nashi
are dominated, yet in a different fashion, by tragedy and tragically marked frames of epic, elegy,
burlesque and the grotesque, Antifa assumes a predominantly comic position. As the analysis
moves into the realm of the Symbolic, the reading of the competing psycho-rhetorical narratives
helps to explain much more than how specific images of the ideal national self and others
organize the consciousness of Nashi, neo-fascists and Antifa.
First, considering psycho-rhetorical narratives in terms of both the Imaginary and
Symbolic provides an opportunity to evaluate specific national fantasies as more or less
politically and ethically dangerous or, on the contrary, sophisticated. Moreover, an emphasis on
the Symbolic allows exploring the question of why each of the parties adopts certain fantasy-
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frames. By locating themselves in relation to the history, practice and ideology of fascism (with
the help of various tragic and/or comic means), Nashi, neo-fascists and Antifa attempt to secure
their national selves as acceptable or even desirable within the dominant symbolic order of
liberal democracy. By intervening in the overarching network of signifiers they also aim at
rearticulating that network. As I have shown, the state-sponsored pseudo “anti-fascists” - Nashi position themselves (as well as Putin who backs them up) as the only “true” anti-fascist and thus
democratic force. Anyone who threatens their ideal national self, be that the regime's political
opposition or unfriendly foreign governments, is deemed to be fascist.
Nashi’s “authentic” democratic ideal is the epitome of repression for Antifa. For the
latter, Putin's regime, together with the youth activists it relies on, and together with the Russian
neo-fascist groups that are largely a product of Putin's ethnically discriminatory politics, is what
is wrong with Russia. Real democracy, according to anti-fascists, can be built on the leftanarchist ideal of freedom, which contrary to neo-liberal politics can guarantee equality and
fairness for all. Compared to Nashi and Antifa, Russian neo-fascists have a hard time
disassociating themselves from the historic burden of fascism. That is why Russian neo-fascists
more often describe themselves as ethnic nationalists rather than fascists. In a rather peculiar
manner, neo-fascists contrast their version of “good” fascism with the dominant democratic
system, which, in their opinion, is nothing other than fascism in its worst sense. In other words,
Russian ethnic nationalists endorse “democratic” fascism - an inborn craving of the Russians for
the fair and good - and contest the real “fascism” of Putin's regime in particular and the Western
world in general.
As it follows from the analysis of the psycho-rhetorical narratives of Nashi, neo-fascists
and Antifa, the three parties see each other as threats (which, however, they propose to deal with
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in distinct ways). In this section, I am looking at another, yet far more important, political force
in the process of Russian national identity renegotiation: the Russian state. The psycho-rhetorical
narrative of the increasingly authoritarian state can be read by paying attention to the rhetoric of
Putin. For the purposes of the present study, I perform an analysis of Putin's psycho-rhetorical
narrative in the context of his reactions to the actions of Nashi, neo-fascists and Antifa. As I will
show, Putin's psycho-rhetorical narrative does not diverge much from the one promoted by the
“Putin Youth.”
As the Kremlin's brainchild, the “democratic anti-fascist” movement Nashi from the
beginning enjoyed Putin's keen support. “I am absolutely certain that...you can help...our society,
the state in solving really important and complicated problems,” insisted Putin, who frequently
visited Nashi's summer camp at Lake Seliger.296 In the controversy surrounding the Bronze
Soldier monument in 2007, Putin gave warm encouragement to the “anti-fascists,” who voiced
old grievances of the Russians against the purportedly ungrateful Estonians. As I have already
discussed, for the Russians the monument symbolized not only the victory of the Soviet Union
over the Nazis, but also the status of the USSR as an “elder brother” protecting the weak.
Coupled with the alleged state discrimination of ethnic Russians living in the Baltic country, the
bill calling for the moving of the monument and subsequent actions of the Estonian government
was accounted for as the utmost disrespect to Russia, the “savior.”297 For Estonia, though, the
bill on demolition of banned constructions afforded a favorable opportunity to get back at Russia
for the years of Soviet rule following the Second World War, perceived as occupation by most
Estonians today. Prime Minister of Estonia Andrus Ansip stated that “the relocation of the
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monument was the only opportunity to preserve the dignity of the Republic of Estonia, and in the
long run - the Estonian state.”298
Compared to Nashi, who, having accused Estonia of “state fascism,” saw its national
other as an inhumane, tragic enemy, Putin's characterization of these, as well as many other
events was not as transparent.299 Estonia's legislative action, according to the Russian President,
was “an absolutely short-sighted” step, “a continuation of [Estonia's] erroneous politics, related
to its attempts to revise the past,” a “very bad, very harmful” decision, and “a sign of [the
country's] political immaturity.”300 One may argue that, having pointed out an error in Estonia's
political behavior, Putin approached the scandal from a position of Burkean comedy. Yet Putin's
acknowledgement of Estonia's mistake is far from the attitude of “humane enlightenment,”
which feeds on true humility and leads to an inventory of personal limits.
In the eyes of Putin, Estonia's political error was not something inevitable and thus
worthy of forgiveness, but a form of “unscrupulous political gambling,” a “purposeful” attempt
to “get attention,” and an attempt “to exacerbate the relationship with Russia” in order to “earn
some kind of economic or political benefits.”301 Those benefits are supposedly connected with
the selfish attempts of Estonian politicians to gain points in a pre-election season and to advance
their positions among the country's more powerful allies. Indeed, Estonia's decision to relocate
the monument was supported by the U.S. and some European countries.302 Nevertheless, Putin's
rhetoric and the measures implemented by the Russian government to “cool the eagerness of
Estonian authorities” clearly illustrate that Estonia is not treated as an equal, contrary to a
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principle at the heart of the attitude of “humane enlightenment.”303 Putin looks down at Estonia
as a politically, strategically and economically weaker national other, which, due to its
immaturity, is prone to make mistakes and, as a result of its insecurity, is in need of help from
more established political players. Like a parent who warns a mischievous child of impending
punishment, Putin cautions Estonian authorities and Estonian citizens on Russia's necessary
reaction to defend its interests. Such a paternalistic disposition, coupled with a promise of
retaliation, do not blend in well with the ideal of comic humility. Moreover, Putin refers to
Estonia's decision to relocate the monument, as well as other attempts to “mock the memory of
those who liberated Europe from fascists” - and glorify Estonia's collaboration with the Nazis
during the Second World War - as “an unprecedented act of state vandalism and disregard for
universal moral norms,” and a form of “ultranationalist” politics.304 So do these images of
Estonia as a sneaky political weasel and an immoral ultranationalist state warrant defining Putin's
attitude towards Estonia as tragic? Intuitively, one may suppose that both images of the national
other are equally tragic. Yet, for Putin, the difference between them is a matter of degree: the
image of the political gambler turns out to be not as diabolic as the image of the ethnic hater.
While Nashi is adamant about the ultimately tragic, “fascist” nature of the Estonian state,
Putin is somewhat wary in his choice of words. At times he calls Estonia ultranationalist and
evil, yet he refrains from explicitly labeling the Baltic state “fascist.” Among possible reasons
behind this nuance are diplomatic subtlety and political strategy. First, as the head of the state,
Putin has to be cautious about how he voices his opinions. As for the “Putin Youth,” the Russian
President acknowledges that “young people...think radically regarding almost any question [and]
want the maximum result for themselves and for their country. I think it is a positive feature.
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One must aim at colossal victories.”305 Nashi then receive a carte blanche in the choice of
methods needed to deal with the Kremlin's perceived enemies. One of the most tragic examples
is the 2010 installation “You are not welcome here,” when Stal, Nashi's radical wing, “impaled”
the photos of Russia's “enemies” in hats with swastikas.306
If for many years the Russian President had been “very pleased...to see the enthusiastic
happy faces [and] eyes of young people, who are looking for themselves and find themselves”
among like-minded fellows in the “democratic anti-fascist” movement, by 2012 the activity of
Nashi reduced significantly amid rumors about the dissolution or transformation of the
organization into independent projects.307 What prompted the Kremlin to give up on its loyal
“guard” remains uncertain. The Kremlin's decision to bring the movement to a halt or reorganize
it, some argue, is connected with Nashi's irrelevance, which increased as the threat of an
“Orange” revolution in Russia subsided. Others insist that the reason for Nashi's disintegration is
the movement leader Yakemenko, who allegedly fell out of favor with the Kremlin. However,
the most convincing explanation is that the emails among Nashi's leader and activists leaked by
the Russian branch of the Anonymous hacker movement badly dented the already not so perfect
reputation of Russian “anti-fascists.”308 Moreover, Nashi's hostile style and the “primitivism of
the...content” offered by the group did not match the Kremlin's ambiguous rhetoric, which
alienated many Russian citizens.309 Nashi's crude tactics contributed to the deterioration of its
image. The movement turned into exactly what Putin wanted to avoid (at least, in appearance,
while not in substance) - “a quasi-Orthodox Komsomol” (a Soviet youth organization).310
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The second reason behind Putin's reluctance to accuse Russia's presumed adversaries of
fascism is likely strategic. For Putin fascism is predominantly a historical term, which is widely
used in official rhetoric to refer to the ideology of the Nazi enemy of the Soviet Union during the
Second World War. While in the heat of the moment some Russian state officials (though not
Putin or Medvedev) may deem Russia's opponents fascist, this is not a “weapon” Putin relies on
in his political fights. For example, when asked why Russian state officials do not hesitate to
throw around the accusation of fascism with respect to, in particular, Estonia, Georgia, and the
U.S., Putin clearly attempts to shrug off the uncomfortable question: “What concerns mutual
insults and rebukes, they result from...the failure to communicate. I would rather not focus
attention on this....”311 Compared with anti-extremist and anti-terrorist discourse, the political
potential of the anti-fascist rhetoric, Putin suggests, is minimal.
Besides, since the focus of Putin’s politics is largely on Russia’s economic and
technological modernization, which requires a significant degree of integration into a global,
more diverse community and therefore presupposes cooperation with the West, to vocally accuse
Western countries and former Allies of fascism does not seem to be tactically beneficial. Instead,
by pushing for the need for partnership against the purportedly common threat of international
terrorism, Putin announces that Russia must be considered as an important player in the
international arena in general and the technological and economic spheres in particular.
Therefore, to explain why Putin banks on the nodal point of “terrorism” rather than “fascism” is
key. To complete this task I continue reading Putin's vision of the national self and others as
constructed and functions in the Imaginary and Symbolic, specifically in the context of Putin's
reactions to the actions of neo-fascists, Nashi, and Antifa.
While Putin insists that “fascism was defeated in 1945,” he also admits that:
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the roots [of fascism]...have not been fully exterminated. Poison sprouts up in
various corners of the planet....There are still those who seek new Führers. Those
who bet on the misfortunes of others....Who are ready to overstep the boundaries
of morality and human decency, and who show full disregard for...human life in
order to reach their goals.312
Thus Putin does not deny that neo-fascist ideas float around in contemporary society, both in
Russian society and abroad. He stresses that all those who “think they act in the best interest of
the ethnic Russians, [but instead] do colossal damage to the Russian nation” are simply “dumb”
and “loony” “morons.”313 In addition to the home-grown “fanatics,” Putin suggests,
“Russophobes” abroad who disseminate ideas of “hatred [and] racial superiority” and propose to
rewrite the anti-fascist history and the role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War are
immoral:
It is sad what happens in other countries, when they glorify Nazi criminals. Yes,
of course, nobody idealizes the Soviet Union in the post-war period. But by no
means can one consider executioners to be victims. Those who bracket the Red
Army with fascist invaders commit a moral crime. 314
Such characterizations of neo-fascist impulses leads to the tragic burlesque rather than purely
tragic rejection of national others.
Putin regards the tragic burlesque of authentic hatred to be far less problematic than the
pure tragedy of calculated provocation. By situating true neo-fascist others within the tragic
burlesque, rather than the fantasy-frame of tragedy, Putin downplays the invasive power of “the
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'bacillicus' of [extreme] ethnic nationalism” (and, as I will show further, he almost denies the
existence of Russia's ethnic nationalist, neo-fascist threat).315 Those who subscribe to hateful
messages and incite discriminatory actions, as Putin emphasizes, are “trivial mercenaries and
bandits,” “agitators...who want to cash in on some problems, who want to be perceived as radical
and gain something.”316 Radicals who honestly believe in their cause “are in fact used [by
terrorists] as a means to destabilize Russia.”317 Thus Putin clearly differentiates between sincere
believers, who in Putin's psycho-rhetorical narrative are situated within the tragic burlesque, and
cynical sponsors of terrorism, who are truly tragic national others. Neither gullible believers nor
sneaky cynics, according to Putin, can escape retribution appropriate to their crimes. Be it either
the tragic burlesque of immoral insanity or the pure tragedy of inhumane, diabolic political
manipulation, Putin is adamant about the need for Russia “to get the truth across to people,” “to
bring those who commit such crimes to their senses.”318 As for the burlesque national other,
Putin repeatedly insists that “the [Russian] judicial system, law-enforcement agencies...must
react adequately and promptly.”319 Meanwhile, for the purely tragic national enemy, “the defeat
of fascism must become a lesson and warning about the inevitability of revenge.”320 Reading
closely Putin's fantasy-frames of the truly tragic and tragically burlesque national others, it is
possible to conclude that while the latter must be disciplined, it is portrayed as less dangerous
and less responsible for its deeds.
Putin sees fascism as a calamity of the past, while terrorism is “a global challenge” of the
present: “today we must remember not only the past, but also recognize the menace
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[of]...terrorism.”321 “It is not less insidious, not less deadly...and not less ruthless” than
fascism.322 But “fascism and terrorism are of the same nature: they both deny the value of human
life, favor violence and violate any rights and freedoms.”323 Putin insists that the country's antifascist past - the memory of “the colossal sacrifice offered by the Soviet people” and “the
military experience” of fighting with fascism - prompts Russia to be at the vanguard of the
modern anti-terrorist war: “we cannot remain indifferent and silent when we...face instances of
extremism, hatred, and racial superiority. It offends both our historical memory and
conscience.”324 “[J]ust as we defeated fascism, together we will defeat terrorism,” adds Putin.325
As decades ago “our people had no choice...[they]...could die or become slaves,” so now must
the Russians come together against the “[challenge] of the new millennium.”326
The problem of terrorism as a progeny of fascism, according to Putin, is “extremely
relevant” to Russia in particular and the world in general.327 Like the “fascists [who] invaded the
Soviet Union [and]... attempted to sow ethnic and religious discord among our peoples,”
terrorists today “commit crimes, so to say, to undermine the territorial integrity of [Russia]” and,
by extension, to compromise the very national idea.328 In concert with Russian neo-fascists and
Nashi who consider the strength and authority of Russia to be the core of Russianness, Putin
explains that “[i]n the 1990s Russia wanted to be friendly with the whole world. At that time we
lost our identity. We were weak. Today we are much stronger, and many do not like that, so they
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start knocking on our doors and try to weaken us and our country.”329 As Putin laments, terrorists
and their sponsors are attempting to destroy Russia by all means possible: “[Terrorists] took
advantage of the issues triggered by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and problems in
Chechnya.... Obviously we must fight [terrorism] if we want to avoid the collapse of our
state....It will be the Yugoslavization of Russia at its worst.”330
A strong and powerful Russia, in other words, the country that enjoys itself fully,
according to Putin, is a deterrent for those who bid to become a world authority: “[A] lesson
from history is that a reason to unleash a war has always been an aspiration for global
domination.”331 The terrorist threat, as it transpires from the analysis of Putin's psycho-rhetorical
narrative, “comes from abroad,” takes advantage of unsuspecting, insane or simply stupid, ethnic
Russian “hooligans,” militant Chechens or radical political opposition, targeting the most painful
elements of Russian statehood: Russia's imperial heritage and autocratic tradition, exemplified in
the relationship between the ethnic Russians and ethnic minorities and the relationship between
the autocrat and political opposition respectively.332
Unlike Nashi activists who unequivocally characterize the U.S. and its allies as fascists,
for Putin such a move would be problematic and more importantly unproductive. On the one
hand, Putin cautiously implies that the actions of the U.S. are nothing short of terrorism. Under
the disguise of democracy, “the U.S. does not seek for friends, they need vassals,” it dreams of
“a role as the world gendarme.”333 Just as “the Soviet Union tried to dictate its own will on its so
called quasi-allies,” so has the U.S. taken the truly dangerous position of “those are not with us
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are against us.”334 The U.S. “[wants] to move Russia aside, so the latter does not prevent [the
former] from realizing its plans of world domination. [It] still is afraid of our nuclear
potential.”335 As the ultimate national other, the U.S. seeks to “directly or indirectly...interfere in
our internal political processes.”336 It does so, for instance, on economic and diplomatic levels.
First it was the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment. When trade restrictions were lifted after
Russia's accession to the WTO in August 2012, so that the U.S. was able to “enjoy the benefits
of Russia’s obligations under the very WTO provisions,” the U.S. could “forget everything that
happened during the Cold War and move on. But no! It had to drag in another anti-Russian law the Magnitsky bill [in December 2012]....Why did [the Americans] do that? Just so that could
blow their gills out: 'we are the tough guy'.” 337 Having recruited an army of Sovietologs, who do
not understand what is going on in our country, [and who] do not understand the changing
dynamics of the world,” the U.S. “dwells in the past.”338 Besides, the U.S also attempts to
“become a part of the internal politics” of the country by sponsoring Russian politicians through
NGOs active in Russia.339
While Putin focuses his attention on the government of the U.S. as the main tragic
national other, some European countries do not escape Putin's criticism either. As becomes
apparent through a close reading of Putin's psycho-rhetorical narrative, European countries present and aspiring member of NATO, including former Soviet Republics - cannot compete
with the might of the U.S. and therefore choose to assume a position that is “strange, bordering
on hypocrisy,” “rather destructive “ as it “[mocks]” the memory of the common anti-fascist fight
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and “[breaks] a traditional bond” with Russia.340 Europe is depicted as a victim of the aggressive
economic and political behavior of the U.S.: “As to the issue that Gazprom [the largest Russian
and one of the largest gas companies in the world] sinks its teeth in Europe's flesh. I do not know
why the Americans worry so much about Europe's flesh. Probably because they do not want to
leave it alone, they like it, it is a good flesh.”341 The position of a victim, however, does not
absolve the European tragic national other of its deliberate and premeditated deeds: “of
economic agreements, glorification of fascist henchmen, and the desire to rewrite history.”342
Even more responsibility lies with the U.S., which drags others into its “imperial [games] on the
global arena.”343 The unilateral actions of the U.S., for example the military campaigns of the
U.S. in Iraq and the violent events in Libya, undermine the legitimacy of international law,
spreads chaos and instills fear in the weak, thus spurring an arms race: “Even the arms race
speeds up because small countries do not feel safe today. International law does not defend
[their] interests. So they are forced to seek [help] or ...to acquire new weapons.”344
It is peculiar that the U.S., together with the strongest European countries, are portrayed
as being guilty of destabilizing world peace both today and in the years before the Second World
War: “before the war, those who determined the world's fate failed to notice the threat in time.
As a result, millions had to pay for this political short-sightedness, for this inability to overcome
personal ambitions.”345 Similarly today, cynical national others - the U.S. and its allies - “smooth
the way for new tragedies.”346
Moreover, as Putin keeps repeating, the U.S. acts stealthily under a democratic disguise:
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[T]here is a lot of civilians' blood on the [U.S.] hands. [It] probably likes it,
cannot live without those awful, repulsive images of Gaddafi's execution, when
the whole world was shown how he was murdered, covered in blood. Is this
democracy? Who did it? Drones, including American ones, attacked Gaddafi's
convoy. Then, having sent a radio signal to a special task force which was not
supposed to be there on [Libya's] territory, brought in the so called opposition and
the militants killed [Gaddafi] without trial.347
References to the hypocrisy of the U.S. in Putin's psycho-rhetorical narrative are numerous:
“Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay detention camp, where people are held without being
charged with anything,” the lack of transparency in the electoral process and impunity of those
who “commit crimes against adopted Russian children.”348 Moreover, the U.S. has the nerve to
undeservingly accuse Russia of anti-democratic infringements. The tragic national other,
according to Putin, does not only attempt to hurt Russia, fearful of the country's growing power,
but furthermore ventures to shift the blame for pursued instability and anti-democratic actions on
to Russia's shoulders. Putin stresses that [“Russia] has always been open and sincere” and its
actions appropriate in each situation.349 “If they smacked us, we must return the favor, otherwise
they will always be smacking us,” continues Putin. “Adequately or not - this is another question.
Besides, they were not provoked. They are up to the ears in a specific [bodily] fluid...I have
already mentioned their problems ...[which] they blame us for. This is wrong.”350
While purposefully accusing Russia of anti-democratic politics, the U.S., according to
Putin, does not practice what it preaches: its actions and words are full of double standards. The
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U.S., as Putin argues, has not learned from history: “Like fascism, terrorism brings violence,
death, disregard for human dignity. And 'double standards' in relation to terrorists are
unacceptable, so are the attempts to exonerate fascist supporters. And that is why we must
counter these challenges.”351 By focusing on the image of Russia which has unduly become the
main target of American cynicism, Putin promotes the tragically marked elegy of the national
self. Having situated the national self within the tragic elegy, Putin anticipates the heroic duty of
Russia: “Our nation won in the most terrible war of the twentieth century, and in general the
most terrible war in the human history, and in so doing saved our country, saved Europe from
fascism and gave us the future.”352 Parallel to Nashi's epic depiction of the national self, Putin
draws parallels between the heroic deeds of the Soviet Union and the present mission of Russia
to prevent “chaos,” “defend itself” and save other countries “from disintegration and unending
civil wars.”353
Although Putin sees the danger of American cynicism, which purportedly breeds
terrorism and promotes a fascist-like ideology of global domination, he does not fully commit to
the tragedy of Russia's national others. Putin insists that Russia “[has] more friends than
enemies” and sees the U.S. and Europe as its “trade and economic partner” and, moreover, an
“ally” in the war on terror.354 To mitigate this grotesque conflict with the purported friends, Putin
emphasizes that “[t]he atmosphere of mutual trust and a common goal to win during the historic
handshake at the River Elbe is especially in demand today.”355 Referring to the events of the
Second World War, when in 1945 American and Soviet troops joined forced at the River Elbe,
351
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thus bringing the war close to its end, it may seem that Putin insists that the common anti-fascist
past determines the common anti-terrorist present. Such a conclusion, however, would be
inaccurate as it involves only the level of imaginary fantasy-frames. By engaging the symbolic
dimension of the analysis of Putin's psycho-rhetorical narrative, one may also see that the
grotesque juxtaposition of friendship and conflict is the structural peculiarity of Putin's national
subject.
The Russian national subject does not intend to get rid of its tragic national others
because Russia needs them to be able to position the national self as what the Other - the
dominant symbolic order of liberal democracy - has been always missing, that is, the objet a.
Such is the structure of the Discourse of the Hysteric, which is also adopted by Nashi and
Russian neo-fascists. This, however, is not the only feature that brings the psycho-rhetorical
narratives of Putin, Nashi and Russian neo-fascists close. They all rely heavily on ethically
questionable tragic fantasy-frames of epic, elegy, burlesque, as well as tragedy proper. Having
discussed how Putin, in unison with Nashi, perceives the U.S., as the most sinister national other,
to be in cahoots with European “fascists” and international terrorists in attempts to strip Russia
of its sovereignty and thus national identity, I shall now discuss Putin’s responses to the presence
of the genuine fascist threat and the authentic anti-fascist force in Russia.
The reaction of Putin's regime to the outburst of Russian neo-fascis in Russia is
disquieting. Despite numerous protests by human rights activists and experts, Russian liberal
politicians, analysts and journalists, openly neo-fascist and xenophobic organizations year after
year are allowed to organize the Russian March, known as “the bright show of all Russian
extreme ethnic nationalists.”356 The reaction of the Kremlin to these officially unsanctioned
ethnic rallies is even more disturbing. Having failed to get the two-day Kondopoga riots under
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control promptly, the city authorities instead promised to consider the city residents' petition to
resettle all Caucasians (primarily Chechens) from Kondopoga. According to the leader of
Karelia, Sergey Katanandov, “the main reason for the public unrest [is] that before our eyes
representatives of other nations acted disrespectfully and belligerently, ignoring the mentality of
our nation” (Vasiliev). Similarly, the 2010 unsanctioned racial rally on Manezh Square in
Moscow was not broken up by police as soon as it started. Despite the aggressive behavior of the
rally participants toward non-Slavic passersby and police officers, the latter made almost no
arrests to avoid “provoking more serious incidents” (sixty-five people who were detained were
subsequently released, while as many as forty people were injured in the racist attacks). 357
Moreover, the captain of the Moscow Special Purpose Mobile Unit (OMON) and the chief of the
Central Internal Affairs Directorate came to Manezh Square to persuade the protesters to
disperse, having promised resolution of the murder case that largely triggered the rioting.358 To
top it all off, the main Kremlin ideologist, former First Deputy of the Chief of the Russian
Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov insisted that it was Russian liberal politicians who
should be blamed for the Manezh Square chaos: liberal politicians “have been persistently setting
the fashion for unsanctioned public actions, Nazis and cheapskates follow it.”359 Similarly,
Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev accused Antifa - “the radical left youth” - of provoking the
ethnic disturbances on Manezh Square.360 The government's “half-hearted” efforts to deal with
the violent racist mob are difficult to comprehend, especially compared to, as I will discuss in a
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moment, prompt and violent police responses to peaceful public actions organized by political
oppositional groups, including Antifa.361
While Putin promised to “suppress any manifestations of extremism no matter where they
come from” and acknowledged that “hooligans can be from both the Caucasus and from
Moscow,” he insists that “there are no signs of...Russian extreme ethnic nationalism” in
Russia.362 What prompted the riots in Kondopoga and Moscow, and what drove some to organize
demonstrations like the Russian March is, apparently, love and worry for the Russian nation.
According to Sergey Baburin, the leader of a nationalist political party who met with Putin to
discuss the 2007 Russian March, the latter “took interest in our activity geared towards the
strengthening of patriotism in Russia.”363 To quote Putin himself, “[the] well known events in
Kondopoga, Sagra, on Manezh Square in Moscow are primarily the result of the inactivity of law
enforcement agencies and the irresponsibility of state officials. Corruption [and the] inability [of
state officials] to guarantee justice, to defend the interests of people, become breeding grounds
for interethnic conflicts and tension.”364 Putin goes even further to claim that the actions of
participants at neo-fascist rallies and instigators of racial riots are clear examples of democracy at
work. Referring in particular to the ethnic riots on Manezh Square in response to the murder of
soccer fan Sviridov, purportedly by people from the Caucasus, and the meeting he had with
predominantly ethnic Russian soccer fans after the events, Putin says:”we must meet with these
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people, work with them....In general, they are positive people....Don't we see how [soccer fans]
abroad smash shop widows and destroy stadiums?”365
The actions of Russian neo-fascists, for Putin, are well warranted: “The problem is that
recently more and more people from the Caucasus have come to [Russian] cities. Many do not fit
into the [Russian] culture....This often triggers legitimate anger.”366 It is clear that Putin refuses
to see any signs of tragedy in the sincere hatred of participants in neo-fascists rallies and
instigators at racist riots. For him, those instances of ethnic animosity are no more than a healthy
democratic process when citizens are able to criticize their government. It is worth noting that
this position of Putin is not an extension of a comic vision of his own limitations. As discussed in
Chapter Three, in Russia the autocrat has always been considered a defender of the people's
interests from the greed and corruption of the nobility (or the government).
While the Nashi movement is supported by President Putin, and neo-fascists are tolerated
by the state, independent anti-fascists are often prosecuted and denied a chance to voice their
discontent. Apparently, Antifa has become a common nuisance in Russia, both in the eyes of the
Russian public and the state. For instance, many Russians see both neo-fascists and true antifascists as equally dangerous street hooligans who fisticuff with each other for “some obscure
ideas,” and state officials blame the “radical” and truly anti-fascist youth for provoking ethnic
disturbances.367 Antifa stands at an immense distance from its anti-fascist counterparts in Nashi
and their neo-fascist opponents, both in how they are treated by the state, and, which is more
important for the purposes of my argument, how they envision the national self and the national
other.
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Indeed, Antifa has good reasons to exercise caution in relation to law enforcement and
state authorities. It has not been a rare occasion that the police refrained from protecting the
audience at allegedly anti-fascist music events against neo-fascists, or that law enforcement
officers refused to file hate crime charges against neo-fascists. The discriminatory treatment of
the true anti-fascist groups by the state is also revealed when they seek permission for public
gatherings. More often than not, true anti-fascists are denied opportunities to hold rallies, and
when unsanctioned mass meetings do happen the police usually crack down on them promptly
and severely.
The above examples of rising ethnic violence, the Kremlin's reluctance to curb racial
aggression, coupled with the regime's suspicion of liberal democracy, may suggest that Putin
feels more comfortable in the company of extreme nationalists than supporters of liberal
freedoms (including members of Antifa). Indeed, for Putin, liberal opposition means radicals
who “repeat the scenario of the 'Orange' revolution aiming at the disintegration of [Russia],” for
which territorial integrity is translated into the idea of the complete national self.368 As a part of
Russian liberal opposition, independent anti-fascists then are seen as naive radicals trained and
aided by those who sponsor terrorism all around the world and foment fascist sentiments in
Europe. One may see that instead of relying on the term “fascism,” Putin resorts to the word
“terrorism” to picture Russia's national enemies. The resolutely tragic image of a cold-blooded
mastermind is far more powerful than the burlesque image of a deranged neo-fascist (or
religious) fanatic, as it provides Putin with the means to symbolically sacrifice the most
tragically perceived enemies of Russia at once: the U.S. and all those who it purportedly
encourages, including international terrorists, Chechen militants, Western European countries
and former Soviet republics that are suspicious of or outright alarmed by the Kremlin’s agenda,
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and, finally, Russian liberal opposition and Antifa. The image of the cynical terrorist and fascist
sympathizer, personified by the U.S., also allows Putin to position Russia at the center, that is, as
the objet a, or the vital element, of the dominant order of Western liberal democracy.
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CONCLUSION

As soon as the results of the U.S. 2016 presidential elections were released, many in
Russia – from ordinary Russians to lawmakers of the State Duma, the Kremlin-sponsored mass
media and Putin – rejoiced at Donald Trump’s surprising victory. “Yes, we did,” some asserted,
making a pun of Barack Obama’s famous campaign slogan.1 “America is ours!” exclaimed
others, noting that “just like Crimea, [the U.S.] was taken without bloodshed! What an effective
foreign policy!”2 There were also those, who in a flurry of excitement, like Margarita Simonyan,
editor-in-chief of the Kremlin-run RT news channel, “want[ed] to ride around Moscow with an
American flag...[because Americans] deserved it today,” adding that “[i]f Trump recognizes
Crimea as a part of Russia, lifts sanctions, agrees with us on Syria, and sets [Julian] Assange
free, I am going to retire. For the world then will be splendid.”3 Sergei Glazyev, a Kremlin
economic adviser, was eager to entertain a conjecture that “Trump, as a pragmatic person, will
scrap anti-Russian sanctions that are also hurting American business.”4
While it is not apparent what the future holds for the Russia-U.S. relationship, it is,
however, clear that the Kremlin has discerned in Trump a kindred spirit – a politician who talks
the business-like language of rational negotiations, pragmatic deals, harmony of selfish interests,
and strategic partnership, brushing aside ethical considerations, which amounts to a fairly tragic
attitude. In fact, Trump’s campaign messages overall have been largely in sync not only with the
national fantasies of Putin and pro-Putin “anti-fascists” (the difference between which is only a
matter of intensity, rather than substance), but also the national narrative of Russian neo-fascists.
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Trump’s promises to “rebuild” and “restore” what was supposedly “ripped from” the U.S., to
stop the “American carnage,” and putting the interests of Americans first resembles the Russian
neo-fascists’ passionate embrace of apocalyptic elegy in pursuit of tragically glorious epic.5
Trump’s nationalistically divisive calls for patriotism and public deliberation that is supposed to
compel solidarity are reminiscent of the traditional Russian concept of sobornost. The latter
emphasizes collective interests at the expense of individual rights and freedoms and is key to
Putin’s and Nashi’s tragic appeals to the unity of the nations in the face of threats from abroad
and Russia’s own “national traitors.”6
The present work, however, is limited to the analysis of the national fantasies of several
national subjects in contemporary Russia: Russian neo-fascists, pro-Kremlin “anti-fascists,”
independent anti-fascists, and Putin. A common thread that runs through all four national
fantasies is the topic of fascism and anti-fascist fight. Admittedly, the memory of Russia’s battle
with Nazi Germany as one of the most traumatic in Russia’s modern history had a profound,
although not necessarily awaited impact on the way Russians negotiate their national identity.
Despite the generally comic idea of anti-fascist resistance, most Russians – those who approve of
Putin’s regime – subscribe to a fairly tragic idea of Russianness: the rhetoric of the state,
represented by Putin and the Kremlin-backed Nashi (who has been merely louder and less
restrained in expressing the views of the former), gravitates toward the hateful message, or tragic
mourning, of Russian neo-fascists, rather than Antifa’s comic melancholy. The question that
arises then concerns the way of how Putin and Nashi, as well as the other national subjects,
account for Russia’s anti-fascist legacy and maneuver contemporary comic conversations that
make up the hegemonic field of Western liberal democracy. To answer this question I resort to a
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Lacanian-Burkean reading of the national narratives in question both on the most immediate, or
Imaginary, and structural, or Symbolic, levels.
As the analysis of the Imaginary dimension demonstrates, Putin and Nashi portray
Russia’s fight with fascism in an unequivocally comic light - as the utmost aspiration for
freedom. Yet, the freedom of ethnic Russians from Nazi Germany did not necessarily imply the
freedom of other nations from Soviet Russia. The Red Army’s resistance to and liberation of
other countries from fascism created an opportunity for Stalin to secure its totalitarian grip over
Central and Eastern Europe, which he took without scruple or diffidence. As such, the
experience and the legacy of the Soviet Union’s confrontation with Nazism fits the largely tragic
history of the Russian national subject, manifested in such beliefs and practices as xenophobia,
military chauvinism, racism, anti-Semitism, Russian Orthodoxy and a proclivity for a strong
government, which have been traditionally characteristic of the Russian national idea. At present
both Russian neo-fascists and the state-sponsored “anti-fascists” invoke the memory of the Great
Patriotic War primarily tragically - as a means to mobilize Russians against the supposed
enemies of ethnic Russians and the Russian state respectively. Nevertheless, Russia’s fascist and
increasingly authoritarian national subjects appeal to the memory of “[t]he Great Victory [which]
has been and will always be the ultimate yardstick to evaluate our motives and actions,” in order
to signify “the power and moral authority of modern Russia.”7 In other words, both Russian neofascists and the Kremlin, together with “the Kremlin youth,” see the history of the country’s fight
with fascism as the ultimate evidence of modern Russia’s strength and leadership, whichare
viewed as a guarantee of Russia’s sovereignty and thus the idea of the complete national self. To
maintain this proposition as a supposedly shared premise in the dialogue with the West, however,
proves to be challenging.
7

“Gala Reception” n.pag.; “Meeting of the Russian Organizing Committee ‘Victory’” n.pag.

375

The incompatibility of between the legacy of the Second World War and the memory of
the Great Patriotic War, which ignores the moral implications of the infamous MolotovRibbentrop Pact, was especially notable during Russia’s May 9 celebrations to mark the 70th
anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany, which the leaders of major Western countries,
including the U.S., UK, France, and Germany, refused to attend. In the eyes of the West, the
Victory Day parade on the Red Square in Moscow could have not been considered in isolation
from Russia’s annexation of Crimea and military involvement in Eastern Ukraine to supposedly
protect the country’s Russian speaking population against the “fascist” pro-European interim
government. In this regard, Hillary Clinton, for example, compared Putin to Hitler: “‘All...the
ethnic Germans…who were in places like Czechoslovakia and Romania and other places, Hitler
kept saying they’re not being treated right. I must go and protect my people, and that’s what’s
gotten everybody so nervous.’”8 Western leaders could not fathom the idea of attending the
celebratory display of Russia’s military might, because, as Donald Tusk, the president of the
European Council, believes, the “presence…beside the current aggressors and the person who
uses weapons against civilians in Eastern Ukraine…[is] too ambiguous.”9
Russian officials, in their turn, explained that some Western leaders “refused [to join the
Victory Day parade] for ideological reasons, trying to use this sacred day in their policy aimed at
containing and isolating Russia; some followed suit, while others were scared.”10 Instead of
honoring “the Soviet people who brought freedom to others,” the West purportedly indulges
fascists in Ukraine, as well as the Baltics, thus displaying its double standards.11 Considering this
escalating division between Russia and the West, it is not immediately clear how the former is
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able to sustain a tragic image of the nation that is not only satisfying for the Russians themselves,
but can also be desirable by Russia’s ultimate national other, that is, the predominantly comic
West. To figure out the technique of such rhetorical jujutsu, I have scrutinized the Symbolic
dimension of the psycho-rhetorical narratives in question to identify strategic positions from
which national fantasies are performed. As the analysis reveals, both Russian neo-fascists and
pro-Putin’s youth group, following its sponsor, assume the role of the agent of the Hysteric’s
Discourse, who rebels against the West, viewed as an impotent, lacking Master. The hysteric
instead considers itself as the bearer of the truth, or mastery, as the one who is supposedly in
possession of the objet a – the mysterious object-guarantee of identity fullness.
Despite the Kremlin’s attempts to modernize Russia’s economy, technology and
diplomacy to present an inviting face, Russia’s image in the West is not as desirable as the
Kremlin hopes it to be. According to the Freedom House and Transparency International
rankings, Russia’s political regime steadily fails to qualify as an electoral democracy (the
country was ranked as “not free” in political rights and civil liberties), and Russia’s economy is
consistently evaluated as one of the most corrupt in the world.12 In a public service
announcement by Amnesty International, for example, social and political coercion prevalent in
contemporary Russia is metaphorically portrayed in a story of a craftsman assembling dead,
bloody, crying matreshkas into one.13 The last doll to nest all the other dolls, pictured in
handcuffs or with duct tape over their mouths, is smiling and beautiful. While building Russia a
charming image or popular brand, the Kremlin continues to blatantly disregard liberal values
both domestically and internationally. This inconsistency between Russia’s words and actions
can be explained not so much by the Kremlin’s hypocrisy, but rather by the desire of the
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Kremlin, as well as other national subjects, to give the Western project of liberal democracy a
distinctly Russian meaning. To be able to do so, the Kremlin attempts to discredit the hegemonic
narrative of Western liberal democracy and thus to recover the legacy of anti-fascism. All needed
is to deprive the project of Western liberal democracy of its ethical considerations.
Mindful of the pervasiveness of globalization processes and, moreover, hoping Russia
becomes a rightful, or privileged, member of international organizations and, more specifically,
the West-led economic community, which would arguably accelerate economic and
technological modernization of the country, the Kremlin, as well as Nashi, adopts the language
of the West. The latter is the language of freedom, rationality, law, and other concepts that, at
least in theory, are comically inspirited. Transposed form the level of the individual to the plane
of the collective, national subject, the idea of an unrestricted freedom of rational pursuit of
sovereign interests of Russia animates national fantasies of Putin and the Kremlin-backed “antifascists,” who also make repeated references to the rationality of the state and the logic of law,
which governs relations within the state and internationally.
Such characterization of the Kremlin’s motivation, however, does not allow calling Putin
a classic proponent of neoliberal institutionalism – a view in the field of international relations
that sees international institutions as a condition of cooperation and an expression of mutually
beneficial arrangements. Yet, being aware of the implications that the unstoppable force of
globalization has for the domestic and foreign policies of any state, Putin is not a typical political
realist either: unlike Russian neo-fascists, he does not hold solely to the idea that under the
conditions of global chaos states tend to pursue such interests as power and security
aggressively, often by resorting to military means.
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Instead, the Kremlin aspires to maximize Russian national interests and actualize the
country’s potential through a combination of hard and soft power, which arguably demonstrate
Russia’s strength and authority respectively. The latter – as the object a – in their turn are
regarded as a guarantee of Russia’s independence and ideational certainty. Hard power is
understood as economic and military coercion employed in, for example, the Russia-Ukraine gas
crises, the 2008 Russian-Georgian armed conflict over Georgia’s break-away South Ossetia and,
finally, Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea and military involvement in the war in Eastern
Ukraine.14 Feeling no qualms about relying on the country’s military might, natural resources, as
well as the purportedly advantageous geographic location to its own benefit, the Kremlin
denounces economic sanctions imposed on Russia by Western countries as “absolutely
unlawful,” arguing that “these sanctions…certainly worsen our international relations.”15
Despite the fact that Russia’s actions remain largely fiscally or physically violent, the
Kremlin hopes to reassure the West that the country’s foreign policy has become more
“dynamic, constructive, pragmatic and flexible” and reliant on its soft power - the appeal of the
Russian culture, political values and way of life.16 Since the early years of Putin’s first
presidency, the Kremlin has been indeed actively building a brand of a new Russia and its people
– “attractive” and “influential.”17 Putin insists that the countries that lag behind in the global
redistribution of power will be left with nothing but a subordinate role in world politics. To avoid
such a dismal fate for Russia and its people, Putin asserts, “[the country] must not only preserve
its geopolitical relevance - [the country] must expand it, [Russia] must be in demand....”18 To
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win this global “popularity contest,” the Kremlin has pledged to largely abandon the foreign
policy tactics of military or economic pressure, or hard power. Instead, Putin advocates
“promoting [Russia’s] interests and opinions through persuasion and by winning over” the
country’s strategic partners, in other words, by building the Russian brand.19
Nation branding as a primary tactic of a “soft power” approach, thus, has purportedly
become one of the major goals of Putin’s administration.20 As Lacan tells us, it takes the mere
presence of the national Other, or the one who can be addressed the question “Che vuoi?”, to get
to know the national self.21 The Kremlin, however, literally relies on foreign expertise in order to
build a positive image of Russia. Adore Creative, Ketchum Inc., and Weber Shandwick - all
U.S.-based creative and public relations agencies - are among several Western firms hired by the
Russian government to help it “tell its story of economic growth and opportunity for its
citizens.”22 Such “blending of ‘Mad Men’ and Kremlin apparatchiks” has proved to be effective
now and then.23 Russia, for instance, won its bids to host the 2014 Olympic Games, the 2014
Formula One Grand Prix, and the 2018 FIFA World Cup. The Kremlin has also been successful
at launching English-speaking mass media outlets: TV channel Russia Today, the Sputnik news
agency, an online and print newspaper Russia Beyond the Headlines (which publishes monthly
supplements in such international newspapers as The Washington Post, The New York Times,
The Daily Telegraph, etc.), and an online information portal Russiaprofile.org. Other state-
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sponsored national branding projects include the Skolkovo Innovation Center (a Russian Silicon
Valley), the darling project of Dmitry Medvedev, and Putin’s Agency for Strategic Initiatives. 24
In addition to the aforesaid efforts, the Kremlin’s biggest attempt at building and
promoting the Russian brand was the “democratic anti-fascist” youth group Nashi. Created as an
ideological antidote to the so-called ‘orange’ threat, Nashi pushed for an idea of the purportedly
effective civil society. Unlike the common understanding of civil society, according to which the
latter stands apart from and oftentimes against the government, Nashi’s version is antiestablishment only as long as the power it counters is that of the government of a supposedly
unfriendly state. Moreover, Nashi, as the self-proclaimed Russian civil society, is purportedly
comprised of a new generation of creative government officials and young bureaucrats who
“[are] supposed to start a revolution in the way one thinks and runs the country.”25 What Nashi
ventures then is to centralize power in the hands of the state and wipe out dissent, since Nashi as
“the bureaucracy is the state which has really made itself into civil society.”26
For years, the Kremlin has been pointing out the supposed hypocrisy or even cynicism of
the West and “the degradation (in a political sense of the world) of the idea of democracy in
Western society.”27 Claiming that American democracy has come to naught, the state has been
steadily leaving Russians bereaved of hope that a democratic regime that promotes individual
freedom, liberties and, generally speaking, a dignified life, is viable and thus worth aspiring for.
The 2016 U.S. presidential elections presented Putin with another sterling opportunity to move
one step closer to his goal. Before the elections, Putin, directly or via his mouthpiece Nashi and
24
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state-run mass media, pointed to the purportedly undemocratic nature of the U.S. Electoral
College system, spoke of his bewilderment as Russia’s requests to observe the U.S. elections
were denied, hinting at possible electoral fraud, and expressed reservations whether ordinary
Americans bear sway over the U.S. politics. After Trump had sealed his victory with the
Electoral College, but had got outdistanced in the popular vote, Putin started to whistle a
different tune.28 Now, he stood by the “legitima[te] U.S. President,” disconcerted by the attempts
of the liberal mainstream political elite to “stage a Maidan in Washington to prevent Trump from
taking office” and “to bind hand and foot the newly elected President to prevent him from
fulfilling his election promises.”29 The reason of this about-face is purely strategic: whether
claiming that the American regime does not represent the majority of Americans or insisting that
“true” democracy does not have to be inspired by liberal values does not make much difference
to the Kremlin. Its objective as the agent of the Hysteric’s Discourse is to dismiss the Western
liberal project by any means necessary and then to propose Russian “democracy” as an alluring
alternative. Together with the alleged Russia’s military, economic and technological potential,
Russian “true” democracy amounts to the desirable objet a. With only a few minor differences,
such as Russian neo-fascists’ vocal resistance to globalization, opposition to the Kremlin, a
strong emphasis on both a biological and spiritual qualities of ethnic Russians, the national
fantasy of neo-fascists matches that of the state-sponsored “anti-fascists” and Putin.
The Discourse of the Hysteric is characteristic of the narrative of the Russian neo-fascist
subject, who in an analogously tragic manner negotiates Russian national identity as an
uncontestable confluence of superior genetic material and spirit, while at the same time
emphasizing the supposed pragmatism and thoughtfulness of their national sentiments. Although
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the Russian idea in its most tragic form has been traditionally rooted in the anti-Enlightenment
suspicion of rationality, and fascism is often explained as an eruption of the unconscious or a
corruption of rationality. I argue that (ir)rationality cannot be regarded as a definitive feature of a
fascists narrative. What unites various theories of fascism, including Jung’s view on fascism as
mass psychosis, Žižek’s and MacCannell’s idea of the perverse fascist subject, Benjamin’s
aestheticization of politics, Adorno’s understanding of fascism as an excess of rationality,
Kristeva’s theory of fascism as abjection, Bauman’s bureaucratic fascism, Arendt’s banal
fascism, Gentile’s sacralization of politics, and Burke’s explication of fascism as a quasireligious movement toward perfection, is the tragic nature of the fascist national fantasy, rather
than the (ir)rationality or pathological nature of fascism. While the comic national subject builds
its identity around lack, making it a pronounced core of any desired object, the tragic national
subject sustains itself only negatively, that is, by positioning itself against the national other and
only then being able to get to know what it desires. In this sense, tragic identity is as hollow as
the discourse of liberal democracy is in the view of the Russian tragic national others discussed
in this work.
For Russian neo-fascists, Putin and Nashi, Western liberal democracy is an inherently
weak and misguided project: it purportedly undermines the ability of nations to resist their
enemies, while promoting all-permissiveness and shameless consumerism. So defined, it
arguably cannot help but to deteriorate into oligarchic and totalitarian forms of capitalism and
outright fascism, when the strongest lead and others fall victims to the former. Save for
independent anti-fascists, all national subjects analyzed in this work deny Western liberal
democracy any political viability: as an appeal to universal rights and freedoms, tolerance and
multiculturalism, it supposedly lacks a vigorous partisan, ideological commitment and as such is
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nothing but an empty form or a structure that can be better served if equipped with Russian,
authentically “democratic” values. In other words, the discussed tragic national subjects seek to
challenge the discourse of liberal democracy – the comic narrative of universally applicable
human rights and freedoms, by passing it off for a cynical discourse of global bureaucracy. Yet it
is such tragic rhetoric of an ethically detached administrative-like operation, managerial efforts
with regard to non-ethnic Russians, as well as to civic participation and political action in
general, is inherently cynically. Having gutted the dominant discourse of liberal democracy out
of its life, its comic essence, Russian neo-fascists, as well as the Kremlin and the youth group it
sponsors, then are able to comfortably negotiate their distinctly tragic national fantasies.
In the course of the bureaucratization of the political, the impact of the notion of
sobornost is perhaps the most profound and far-reaching. The idiosyncratic idea of truth and
individual freedom discovered in harmony with the collective molds the national fantasies of the
tragic national subjects in question. Yet, in line with prevalent sentiments surrounding the
collapse of the Soviet Union and recent poll data, the vast majority of Russians did not and do
not identify with Soviet and Russian authorities. Between the period 1998 and 2016, in response
to the pollsters’ request to identify the most appropriate statements about the government, 45 to
60 percent of the polled replied that “people who we vote into office quickly forget our concerns
and disregard the interests of the common folk,” followed by 25 to 29 percent of Russians who
consider “authorities [to be] a special group of people, the elite who think only about themselves
and do not care about us.”30 Surprisingly, during the same period the number of Russians who
think that power must not be usurped by one person reduced by half – falling from 44 to 21
percent.31 Among Russians who now believe in the Kremlin’s strong hand are 35 percent of
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those who support the strong leader unconditionally and 37 percent of those who think that
concentration of power in Putin’s hands is acceptable only as a temporary solution (compared to
16 percent in 1989).
What the polls and the present analysis suggest is that most Russians do not have a
supposedly innate preference for authoritarian practices and continue to hope that Russia one day
becomes not only an economically and technologically advanced country, but also an open, fair
and free society. This, however, does not mean that most Russians actively hold to a resolutely
comic idea of the national self and the national other. To reconcile these conflicting claims I
argue that the discourse spoken by the Russian national subject is the discourse of the obsessive.
The obsessive is both a zealot and a cynic, who may not believe that the Master is all-powerful,
but still bend down before its mastery in hopes to tell its own truth, to become its own Master
one day.
The ascendance of new master signifiers, however, does not have to lead to a tragic
resolution; instead the structure of the obsessive as it is grounded in the notion of sobornost may
possibly create an opportunity for dissent or any other authentic, comic actions. As profoundly
ambiguous and even contradictory, sobornost was conceptualized not only as an antithesis to
Westernization and the proliferation of bourgeois, material values, but also in opposition to
language uniformity and, more generally speaking, the “ecclesial authoritarianism” of Roman
Catholicism.32 Understood as “a living world that must be enfleshed and lived rather than
encoded and domesticated,” sobornost then, I believe, possesses a liberatory potential. A further
inquiry is required to understand whether sobornost, which is foundational of the entire Russian
idea, can be reformulated as, in Lacan’s terms, the acephalous knowledge, or masterless truth, of
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the unconscious, which may possibly animate a comic vision of Russian civil society in
particular and the Russian national subject in general.33
While tragic attitudes continue to dominate the province of national identity construction
in contemporary Russia, Antifa offers a comforting alternative. By occupying a position of the
Analyst, it offers a critical history of both the Russian national subject and neoliberal hegemony.
Originally galvanized by passion for individual freedom and human dignity, neoliberal practices
have withdrawn from the comic ideals that the theory of neoliberalism is founded on, moving in
the direction of “free market fundamentalism.”34 When it is thus corrupted, as it was, for
example, the case during the democratic reforms of the 1990s, neoliberalism, in its entirety or
partially, becomes a common language of various tragic forces, including, ironically, those that
represent the state (Nashi, Putin) or those that counter globalization (Russian neo-fascists). While
free market is considered to be antithetical to the state, and neoliberalization paves the way to
global integration, the national fantasies of Nashi, Putin and Russian neo-fascists operate
comfortably within a larger narrative of calculated aspirations toward the accumulation of capital
and power. As David Harvey points out, the “uneven….development of neoliberalism, its
frequently partial and lop-sided application from one state and social formation to another,
testifies to the tentativeness of neoliberal solutions and the complex ways in which political
forces, historical traditions, and existing institutional arrangements all shaped why and how the
process of neoliberalization actually occurred.”35 From this angle, it is then not overly surprising
that by speaking the language of neoliberalism (which is considered to be originally associated
with political liberalism), some in Russia promote the system of crony capitalism and support
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economic elites close to the state, and others envisage a scenario where ethnic Russians could lay
claims to their supposedly rightful economic and political privileges.
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